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Abstract
This thesis aims to  m ake a significant contribution to the developm ent o f  the 
em erging literature on small business strategy. First, it conducts a critical review 
o f  the existing literature on strategy in general, and its relation to  small firms in 
particular. Second, it investigates w hether o r no t small firms do make strategic 
decisions, and discovers how  these are incorporated into their long-term  plans. 
Third, it establishes a link betw een the strategies employed by new  small firms and 
their subsequent perform ance. And finally, it advises on the strategies and actions 
a small business should follow  if  it w ishes to  achieve high perform ance. As such, 
the w ork  should be useful, not only to  academ ics with an interest in new small 
firms, but also to practitioners and small business advisors.
The thesis explains how  tw o fieldwork instrum ents were designed, for use in 
face-to-face interviews with the ow ner-m anagers o f  150 young micro-firms 
throughout Scotland, over a tw o-year time period. This w ork led to  the design and 
developm ent o f  a new  database, and the creation o f  17 case studies on small 
business strategy. C luster analysis was used to group the firms into high, medium 
and low  perform ance categories. Then strategies followed by each perform ance 
category w ere analysed to  discover why some w ere m ore effective than others. 
The case study evidence was used to  support this analysis, further augm ented by 
statistics from the adm inistered questionnaire.
Seven propositions w ere developed, and empirically tested. O f these, the m ost 
notable w ere that: first, higher perform ers appear to  have a better appraisal o f  their 
own strengths and weaknesses, as well as being m ore aware o f  opportunities and 
threats, com pared to  the low er perform ing firms; second, the im plem entation and 
continued use o f  inform ation-technology has a statistically significant and positive 
effect upon perform ance; and third, the gathering o f  trade intelligence (e.g. 
marketing, quality) on rivals appears to  enhance perform ance. Further 
propositions, on awareness, funding and ownership, round o ff the detailed picture 
provided o f  perform ance in the new small firm.
VI
Chapter 1
Introduction: small business strategy
1.1 Introduction
This w ork sets out w ith the aim o f  making a significant contribution to the existing 
literature on small business strategy, based upon empirical evidence from  prim ary 
source data. First, it will undertake a critical review o f  the literature on strategy, 
both for corporations, and as it relates to  the  small firm. It will develop tw o 
instruments, fo r use in fieldwork, to  gather unique evidence on strategies in the 
new small Scottish firm. It will attem pt to discover w hether or not small firms can 
and do make strategic decisions, and how  these are incorporated into their long­
term  plans. It will then try  to  establish links betw een the strategies followed by a 
new small firm and their subsequent perform ance, investigating w hether the m ore 
visionary approach o r formal strategic planning is m ost prevalent, and which is 
most successful. Finally, the thesis will prescribe strategies which should assist a 
business in achieving high perform ance. By dint o f  achieving all o f  the above, this 
w ork should m ake a significant contribution to  the extant literature on small 
business strategy.
C hapter 2 com m ences with a critical analysis o f  the existing literature on strategy 
and the small firm, to  establish any gaps that might exist. This analysis raises 
several issues which prove to be useful in the developm ent o f  an adm inistered 
questionnaire on small business strategy. C hapter 3 describes how  the sample o f  
young small firms was established, the administered questionnaire designed, and
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face-to-face interviews conducted. It then explains how  a second body o f  evidence 
w as obtained w ith the aid o f  a new sem i-structured interview schedule, used to 
develop 17 case studies.
Chapter 4 describes the construction and analysis o f  the database used to  hold all 
o f  the quantitative information. C luster analysis is used to  divide the firms into 
groups o f  high, medium and low perform ers, and the strategies o f  each 
perform ance group are examined in turn, to  establish which actions lead to  the 
m ore successful firms. Chapters 5 and 6 extend this discussion to  the qualitative 
evidence provided by the sem i-structured interviews, supporting the findings with 
statistical tests on the quantitative data from the administered questionnaire. 
Finally, in C hapter 7, prescriptions are given for high perform ance which, it is 
hoped, should help ow ner-m anagers o f  new small firms to  focus their goals 
tow ards achieving high perform ance. Thus the quantitative and qualitative data 
enable us to  establish w hether or not small firms can, and do, m ake strategic 
decisions and, if  they do, how  these are incorporated into their long-term  plans.
This w ork is set within the larger context o f  a four-year study being conducted 
by Professor Gavin Reid, D irector o f  CRIEFF at the University o f  St Andrews, and 
sponsored by the Leverhulm e Trust. The quantitative evidence is draw n from  one 
o f  seven sections o f  a questionnaire developed to examine the life-cycle effects o f  
new small firms in Scotland. This thesis uses data from the first tw o years o f  the 
study, and takes information on perform ance m easurem ents (such as turnover, 
profits and assets) from the other sections o f  the questionnaire, w here relevant. It 
builds on earlier w ork by Reid, using similar fieldwork m ethods, and relies on 
previously established connections within the small business community in 
Scotland for privileged access to  their databases o f  ow ner-m anagers o f  new  small
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firms. W hat distinguishes this w ork from other studies, though, are its unique 
m ethod o f  tracking the firms over a four year time horizon (or tw o years, for this 
thesis), in order to  observe the changes undertaken by a small firm as it grow s into 
a larger and m ore profitable organisation, and the sample size o f  150 firms, which 
is tw ice the size o f  R eid’s (1993) earlier study. An additional unique feature o f  this 
w ork  is its focus on strategy in the young, and very small (<10 employees), micro 
firm in Scotland during the 1990s.
1.2 Background to the study
The strategy o f  a business is taken to be the plan o f  action or policies it pursues, in 
order to  create for itself the best possible competitive advantage in the m arket 
place vis-a-vis its rivals. This study was prom pted by the gap in the existing 
literature on business strategy for the small firm 1, and with particular emphasis on 
the case for Scotland. There exists an immense amount o f  w ork related to  strategy 
in large corporations [cf. A nsoff (1965); M intzberg (1979); P o rter (1980, 1985)] 
dating back over thirty years, but little concerned with smaller enterprises. In 
recent years, w riters increasingly have been directing their w ork tow ards the case 
o f  the small firm2, but the lack o f  published volumes on the subject suggests that 
the area o f  research is still very much in its infancy. Even those w orks that target 
specifically ‘small’ firms [c f  Bam berger (1983); Variyam and Kraybill (1993)] 
often define such businesses as having up to  500 employees. They therefore 
neglect the small start-ups that are under consideration in this work.
^ o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y ,  ‘ s m a l l ’  r e f e r s  t o  s o - c a l l e d  micro firms,  w i t h  a n  a v e r a g e  o f  le s s  
t h a n  t e n  e m p l o y e e s  a t  f i r s t  i n t e r v i e w .  S e e  S t o r e y ’ s ( 1 9 9 4 ,  C h a p t e r  1 )  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m s  
i n  a g r e e i n g  u p o n  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  ‘ s m a l l ’ f i r m .
2 S e e , i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  R e i d  ( 1 9 9 3 )  a n d  R e i d ,  J a c o b s e n  a n d  A n d e r s o n  ( 1 9 9 3 ) .
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Perhaps the main problem  for investigators in this area is the difficulty in 
gathering reliable data. Small firms are not subject to  the reporting conventions o f  
larger enterprises, which are required to make public their accounts and are often 
listed in various registers o r directories. Therefore, information on the operations 
and financial perform ance o f  smaller firms is hard to  come by. Establishing a 
sample is, in itself, not an easy task, given that there is no national register o f  start­
up firms in Scotland. Researchers must therefore rely upon other sources3 to 
provide them  with the contact names on new  entrepreneurs, o r information 
pertaining to their businesses.
There have been som e empirical w orks on the small firm such as those o f  
B am berger (1983) and Variyam and Kraybill (1993), but the definition o f ‘small’ in 
these cases is rather bigger than that used in this study.4 Probably the m ost readily 
com parable studies are those o f  Reid, resulting in Reid and Jacobsen (1988), Reid
(1993) and Reid et a l (1993). These volumes represent ground-breaking 
techniques for analysing small firms. They are based upon data obtained from 
original adm inistered questionnaires and sem i-structured interviews conducted with 
ow ner managers o f  Scottish firms, and provide evidence to show  that small firms 
do indeed strive to  achieve com petitive advantage by employing such strategies 
described by Porter (1980) as cost leadership, differentiation and focus.
There are various argum ents as to which types o f  strategies are the m ore 
effective. M intzberg, for example, favours the adaptive ‘visionary’ approach, 
whereby the organisation is run according to a ‘mission’, decisions are reached
3 S u c h  a s , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  E n t e r p r i s e  T r u s t s  o r  C h a m b e r s  o f  C o m m e r c e .
4 V a r i y a m  a n d  K r a y b i l l  ( 1 9 9 3 )  d e r i v e d  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  f r o m  a  s a m p l e  o f  s m a l l  f i r m s  w i t h  le s s  t h a n  
5 0 0  e m p l o y e e s .  B a m b e r g e r  ( 1 9 8 3 )  r e f e r s  t o  s m a l l  f i n n s  a s  h a v i n g  b e t w e e n  1 a n d  4 9 9  e m p l o y e e s .
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through learning and experience and they are based on the ‘intuition’ and 
‘creativity’ o f  key personnel.5 He criticises the formal planning procedures 
advocated by others as being too rigid, saying that they restrict or prevent the use 
o f  judgem ent and intuition. Kay (1993, p.357) agrees with M intzberg that 
“ strategy is necessarily incremental and adaptive” , but adds that this “does not in 
any way imply that its evolution cannot be, or should not be, analysed, m anaged 
and controlled” .
Reid has based his w ork on evidence collected from  small firms by speaking to 
them  and asking what they actually do; how  they run their business. In Sm all 
Business E nterprise  (1993) he develops a ‘Porter-influenced analytical fram ew ork’ 
and contends that small firms can and do use formally structured strategies in the 
running o f  their organisations. Reid (1993, p. 119) claims that P o rte r’s third 
strategy, “A focus strategy, aimed at the particular m arket segment, ... seems m ost 
likely to offer the SBE6 a com petitive advantage” , and that “the typical SBE ... w as 
m ore concerned w ith devising an aggressive competitive strategy than a defensive 
one” [Reid (1993, p. 134)]. This thesis develops further the w ork  started by Reid 
in earlier years, extending the analysis to  a deep and thorough treatm ent o f  m icro­
firm strategies.
1.3 Form of the thesis
The thesis begins in Chapter 2 with an analysis o f  the literature on strategy 
specifically, new  small firms in general, and recent w orks which examine 
specifically the strategies o f  small businesses. Appraisal o f  the literature leads to
5 S e e  M i n t z b e r g  ( 1 9 9 4 ) .
6 S B E :  S m a l l  B u s i n e s s  E n t e r p r i s e .
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questions which are addressed in the fieldwork, and gives rise to  issues o f  topical 
im portance and interest that are deemed w orthy o f  further investigation. For 
example, recent innovations in the m anagement accounting literature suggest that 
total quality managem ent (TQ M ) systems or IS 0 9 0 0 0  accreditation may be 
im portant to  new  businesses. In addition, the rapid changes and innovations in 
inform ation technology over recent years have led to possibilities for its 
exploitation by new small firms.
All o f  the data used in this w ork  were to be gathered by original fieldw ork 
m ethods, so C hapter 3 discusses the generation o f  a sample o f  small firms for 
interview, and the design o f  the relevant questionnaires. It shows how  Enterprise 
Trusts provided a stratified random  sample o f  businesses willing to  participate in 
the study. Tw o instrum ents w ere designed from scratch. The first, an 
adm inistered questionnaire, w as used to provide the main quantitative evidence, 
and enabled statistical analysis. The second questionnaire was a sem i-structured 
interview schedule, which examined the firm’s strategy processes. It form ed the 
basis for a set o f  17 detailed case studies on small business strategy.
Chapter 4 shows how  the quantitative data generated by the administered 
questionnaire w ere installed onto a specially-designed com puter database. It then 
presents and discusses the summary statistics for all 150 firms for the first tw o 
years o f  the study. Using cluster analysis, the firms are then divided into low, 
medium and high perform ers. The chapter ends by analysing in some detail the 
characteristics o f  each perform ance group, by reference to  both m easures o f  their 
perform ance, and their business strategies.
Chapters 5 and 6 constitute the largest and, in som e regards, the m ost im portant 
section o f  the work. They analyse the characteristics o f  each perform ance group,
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in term s o f  the strategies followed by those firms. These chapters draw  heavily on 
the case study evidence, and the findings are supported by statistical data from  the 
adm inistered questionnaire. A  total o f  seven propositions are developed and tested 
to  further investigate key points o f interest. These are illustrated by statistical 
m ethods such as boxplots and cross-tabulations, and are supported or rejected by 
chi-square test statistics for m easures o f  association.
C hapter 7 draw s together the observations from the w ork as a whole. It 
summarises the strategies followed by each perform ance group, and develops from 
these a list o f  prescribed strategies o r courses o f  action that should assist a new 
ow ner-m anager in achieving high perform ance. The w ork concludes with 
suggestions as to  how  business advisors can assist small firms in adhering to  these 
prescriptions.
Supporting material to  this w ork is held in a separate volume o f  five Appendices. 
The first contains a ‘data dictionary’, which defines the variables used in the 
database. For each question in the business strategy section o f  the administered 
questionnaire, there are several relevant variables, which add to  a significant 
num ber o f  entries in total. The data dictionary enables the user to  look up variable 
definitions quickly and efficiently. It gives the name o f  each variable, a brief 
description o f  its meaning, the database table in which it is contained7, and an 
additional note. This note refers to a coding system, which tells the user w hether 
the variable is binary, categorical, a text string, o r in some other form, and w hat the 
coding means.
Appendices II and III contain the questionnaire schedules used in the actual
7  I n  t h i s  c a s e , ks t r a t \  f o r  S T R A T E G Y  t a b l e .
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interviews. The administered questionnaire given is the relevant section (viz. 
Business Strategy) from  the main questionnaire in Reid’s Leverhulm e Trust funded 
study. It has inserted, in addition, the  summary statistics from years one and tw o 
o f  the study. The sem i-structured questionnaire is, again, as used in the fieldwork 
interviews. It w as this instrum ent from which was obtained the qualitative 
evidence discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
In Appendix IV, the 17 case studies o f  individual firms are presented. These 
analyse in detail the firm’s environmental scanning, its strategy form ulation and 
implementation, and m ethods o f  evaluation and control. O f these firms, the high 
perform ers are Cases C, K  and L; the medium perform ers are Cases B, G, H, I, J 
and N; and the low  perform ers are Cases A, D, E, F, M, 0 ,  P and Q.
Finally, A ppendix V contains previous (co-authored) w ork which is o f  some 
relevance to  this study, and is referred to  at various points th roughout the text o f  
this thesis. The first is a chapter in a book on intellectual property, which looks at 
the value o f  patenting to firms in the UK  scientific instrum ents industry. The 
second w ork is a D iscussion Paper which draw s on data gathered for this study. It 
uses the m ethods described in C hapter 4 o f  this thesis to cluster firms into 
perform ance categories, and then applies econom etric techniques to  the data in 
order to discover w hat makes a new business start-up successful. The paper is 
currently under consideration by the journal M anagerial and D ecision Economics. 
The final inclusion in Appendix V is a paper on risk m anagem ent in the venture 
capital industry in the UK.
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1.4 Summary
This introduction has set out the basic reasoning behind the undertaking o f  this 
work. It has set the study into context by examining the background o f  literature 
on business strategy, and found that there is very little recent empirical evidence on 
the subject o f  small business strategy, particularly w ith regard to  very young micro 
firms and the Scottish environment. Problem s o f  data collection w ere raised, and it 
was suggested that a m ajor difficulty in this area was o f  getting the contact names 
o f  entrepreneurs willing to  take part in such a study. In this regard, the au thor w as 
fortunate to  benefit from the good relations with the Enterprise Trust m ovem ent 
previously established by Reid for his earlier works.
The form o f  the thesis w as then discussed. It starts w ith an analysis o f  early and 
recent literature in the relevant areas. It proceeds by describing the fieldwork 
m ethodology, including the sample and questionnaire design. The thesis then 
shows how  a new  database was constructed, and analyses the summary statistics 
before dividing firms into perform ance levels. The case study qualitative evidence 
is then discussed, before finally finishing with prescriptions designed for high 
perform ance.
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Chapter 2
Strategy: from corporations to the small firm
2.1 Introduction
A nsoff (1965, p.5) defines strategic decisions simply as those “pertaining to  the 
relation betw een the firm and its environm ent” . M intzberg (1979, p.25) expands 
upon this description, stating that “strategy may be viewed as a mediating force 
betw een the organization and its environment. Strategy form ulation therefore 
involves the interpretation o f  the environment and the developm ent o f  consistent 
patterns in streams o f  organizational decisions ( ‘strategies’) to  deal with it” . 
P o rter (1985, p .l )  agrees that “com petitive strategy is the search for a favorable 
com petitive position in an industry, the fundamental arena in which com petition 
occurs” .
The w orks o f  A nsoff (1965), M intzberg (1979) and Porter (1980, 1985), which 
look in some detail at the way in which firms develop strategies appropriate to 
their closely analysed environment, and then further investigate m ethods o f  
implementing these strategies, are im portant w orks o f  their kind. They are, 
how ever, geared m ore tow ards larger organisations: those with complex 
hierarchies, which might include a H ead Office, w ith a B oard o f  D irectors and 
several independently run subsidiaries; and those with individual departm ents for 
dealing w ith separate issues such as finance, m arketing and personnel. 
N evertheless, a study o f  the strategies used by small firms can only benefit from the
10
expertise o f  previous w riters on the subject o f  strategy as a whole. By taking 
together the main ideas propounded by such experts, and modifying or adapting 
these ideas, it is possible to  develop a simpler model suitable for application to  the 
small firm, as seen for example in Reid and Jacobsen (1988) and m ore recently in 
Reid et a l  (1993).
This study com m ences, therefore, by putting into context in C hapter 2 the 
reasons for this study, w ith a look at previous related w orks in the area. Section
2.2 considers the existing literature on strategy, being concerned mainly w ith large, 
corporate enterprises. Reference is made, generally in chronological order, to  the 
m ost im portant w orks over the past 30 years or so, from A nsofFs early w ork 
through the structured analyses o f  P orter and the adaptive approaches preferred by 
M intzberg and Steiner. Technology strategy is considered as an increasingly 
im portant aspect in today ’s fast-changing technological world. Reference is also 
made to  o ther w orks that provide a summary o f  the literature on strategy.
An interesting point that emerges from analysis o f  the extant literature is the 
wide variety o f  w ords and phrases employed by different w riters on the subject, 
who seem unable to  agree upon a standard terminology. Som e o f  the m ore 
im portant w ords in use are given in Table 2.1, which clearly illustrates the inability 
o f researchers to  agree on a single description o f  strategy. As long ago as 1965, 
A nsoff used phrases such as ‘strategic thinking’ and ‘strategic decisions’. 
M intzberg (1979) and Steiner (1979) followed similar lines o f  thought, introducing 
the concept o f ‘the organisation’s “mission” ’, and ‘intuitive-anticipatory planning’. 
B oth o f  these authors believe that a firm ’s ability to adapt to  sudden changes and 
make judgem ents based on ‘gut feel’ are im portant to its decision-m aking 
capabilities.
11
TERMS USED BY
WRITERS ON BUSINESS STRATEGY 
Table 2.1
Writer Year Term or Phrase
Ansoff 1965 Strategic Thinking 
Strategic Decisions
Mintzberg 1979,1994 Strategic Apex 
The Organisation’s ‘Mission’ 
Strategic Planning 
Strategic Thinking
Steiner 1979 Intuitive-Anticipatory Planning 
Formal Strategic Planning
Porter 1980,1985 Competitive Strategy
(Sustainable) Competitive Advantage
Corporate Strategy
Five Forces of Competition
Value Chain/Value Channels/Linkages
Cost Leadership
Differentiation
Focus Strategy
Johnson & 
Scholes
1984 Corporate Strategy 
Competitive/Business Strategy 
Developing Strategies 
Strategic Analysis 
Strategic Choice 
Strategic Implementation
Kay 1993 Rationalist School 
Emergent Strategy
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W ith the 1980s came P o rte r’s tw o seminal w orks on ‘competitive strategy’ and 
‘com petitive advantage’ [cf. Porter (1980, 1985)], and with them  a w ealth o f  new 
terms, including the ‘five forces o f  com petition’, the ‘value chain’ and ‘value 
channels’. Johnson and Scholes’ (1984) w ork is heavily influenced by the writings 
o f P orter in that they advocate ‘strategic analysis, choice and im plem entation’, 
conducted in a formal manner. And Kay (1993) divides the w orks on business 
strategy into w hat he calls the ‘rationalist school’ and those w ho fall under the 
heading o f ‘em ergent strategy’. Clearly, no consensus has yet been reached as to 
which term s best captures strategic planning processes.
Section 2.3 considers strategy and the small firm .1 Recent literature on small 
firms is used to  illustrate the current theory relating to  and the experience o f  young 
enterprises. This section falls under five broad headings. Aims, Am bitions and  
M aking D ecisions  looks at the reasons for starting up new small business, the 
expectations held by the ow ner-m anager, and the effects these have on the 
direction the firm takes. F orw ard Planning  considers the need for and usefulness 
o f  having a structured business plan. Funding Growth  discusses the various 
options available to  firms for improving their financial situation or for financing 
expansion. Information, Technology and Communications highlights the need for 
firms to  be aw are o f  their external environment and com petitors, and shows how  
new technologies can assist in the gathering o f  information and achieving o f  
com petitive advantage. And finally, Quality Control and SW O T Analysis 
addresses the relevance o f  formal systems o f  quality control for small firms. In
1 F o r  a n  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  k e y  i s s u e s  a f f e c t i n g  s m a l l  f i r m s  s e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  S t o r e y  ( 1 9 9 4 )  
Understanding the Small Business Sector.
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addition, formal techniques for assessing the internal and external environm ent are 
considered.
2.2 Corporate Strategy
In the preface to  his 1965 w ork, A nsoff (1965, p.vii) talks o f  the managem ent o f  a 
business entity as being “the active process o f  determining and guiding the course 
o f  a firm tow ard its objectives” by means o f  many interrelated activities, including 
“analysis, decisions, communication, leadership, motivation, m easurem ent and 
control” . He singles out decision making as being the key activity, and focuses on 
the arena in which strategic decisions are made. They are, he says, “primarily 
concerned with external, rather than internal, problems o f  the firm and specifically 
with selection o f  the product-m ix which the firm will produce and the m arkets to 
which it will sell” [A nsoff (1965, p.5)]. An awareness o f  the environm ent in which 
the firm operates is therefore vitally im portant when it comes to  making decisions 
about w here the firm should be aiming to go next.
A nsoff rem arks on the difficulties that may arise when daily operating problems 
impede the process o f  strategic thinking. H e argues that a firm m ust be organised 
in such a way that a “proper balance o f  attention betw een the strategic and 
operating decisions” can be achieved, but admits that this is, in practice, difficult 
[A nsoff (1965, p.9)]. The problem is, as he sees it, that urgent decisions which 
have to  be made on a day-to-day basis take priority over m ore tim e-consum ing 
strategic decisions, w hose im pact will only bebome apparent over a longer period 
o f  time.
In order to form ulate strategies to achieve certain objectives, the firm as an entity 
m ust obviously start by identifying those objectives. This is not always an easy
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task: to  set objectives, decision-m akers are required. W ho should they be: the 
owners, or shareholders; management; or a combination o f  people w ith an interest 
in the firm? Long-term  survival, the developm ent o f  a loyal custom er base or a 
sense o f  social responsibility could all be equally im portant to an organisation, if  
not m ore so than, for example, profit maximisation.2 A nsoff (1965, p.39) makes 
the assum ption that “the business firm does have objectives which are different and 
distinct from  individual objectives o f  the participants” . This may well be the case 
in a large firm w ith many separate departm ents and a long track  record in their 
field, w here perhaps the original objectives o f  the firm have altered over time as an 
increasing num ber o f  specialist ‘outsiders’ are brought in to help deal with the 
increasing complexity o f  the organisation. H e accepts that individuals within an 
organisation may still be able to  influence the objectives o f  the firm as a whole, but 
states also that “objectives for an institution known as a business firm can be 
inferred from its relationship to  the environment, from its internal structure, from 
the functions it perform s, and from its past history” [A nsoff (1965, p.39)].
B ridge and D odds (1978, p. 19) analyse corporate objectives, decisions and 
plans, saying that “w hether it pursues grow th, o r some o ther objective, the modern 
large business firm has to  respond not only to  changes in the environm ent and to 
pressures generated internally, it also anticipates change, and influences its own 
environm ent and accordingly needs a decision-taking capability which can meet 
these w ide-ranging demands” . They agree with A nsoff that strategic decision­
making occurs at senior m anagement level, reflecting their importance.
2 F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n  ‘ n o t - f o r - p r o f i t ’  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  m e d i c a l ,  e d u c a t i o n a l  o r  w e l f a r e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  w h e r e  t h e  o w n e r - m a n a g e r  f e e l s  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  s e r v e  s o c i e t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  a d d  t o  h i s  
o w n  p e r s o n a l  w e a l t h .  S e e  A n s o i T  ( 1 9 6 5 )  C h a p t e r  4 :  ‘ A  P r a c t i c a l  S y s t e m  o f  O b j e c t i v e s ’ .
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The achievem ent o f  grow th is seen by Bridge and D odds to  be one o f  the main 
objectives o f  an organisation. They admit that grow th may com e about through 
diversification of, for example, the product line, or by following A nsofFs 
preference for a ‘product m ission’, which “has many different needs to  be satisfied, 
each o f  which may require a different product” [Bridge and D odds (1978, p. 103)]. 
H ow ever, grow th need not necessarily occur through diversification, but can be 
achieved, they argue, by using “market penetration , market developm ent and 
product developm ent strategies” [Bridge and D odds (1978, p. 103)]. The first, 
m arket penetration, involves trying to  increase the volume o f  sales, bo th  by selling 
m ore to current custom ers, and by attracting new buyers from elsewhere. M arket 
developm ent might involve m inor modifications to  existing products, but is 
principally devoted to  “the seeking o f  new  mission requirem ents which can be 
served by the present production line” [Bridge and D odds (1978, p. 103)]. P roduct 
developm ent requires no change in mission, but instead involves making alterations 
or im provem ents to  existing products.
The Strategic Apex is defined by M intzberg (1979, p.25) as being those persons 
who are “charged with ensuring that the organization serve its mission in an 
effective way, and also that it serve the needs o f  those people w ho control or 
otherw ise have pow er over the organization” .3 As such, they are bound by three 
main duties which M intzberg identifies as being: direct supervision; the 
m anagem ent o f  the organisation’s relationship with its environment; and the 
developm ent o f  the organisation’s strategy. The overall role o f  the Strategic Apex
3 S e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  M i n t z b e r g  ( 1 9 7 9 )  c h a p t e r  2  w h e r e  h e  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  ‘ F i v e  B a s i c  
P a r t s  o f  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n ’ : t h e  o p e r a t i n g  c o r e , t h e  s t r a t e g i c  a p e x ,  t h e  m i d d l e  l i n e ,  t h e  
t e c h n o s t r u c t u r e ,  a n d  s u p p o r t  s t a f f .
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is, he considers, to  “ search for effective ways to  carry out the organization’s 
‘m ission’ (i.e. its production o f  basic products and services)” [M intzberg (1979, 
P-26)].
The structural configuration4 for which the strategic apex is the m ost im portant 
is the simple structure , which typically “has little or no technostructure, few 
support staffers, a loose division o f  labor, minimal differentiation am ong its units, 
and a small managerial hierarchy” [M intzberg (1979, p.306)]. This corresponds 
closely to  W illiamson’s (1975, p.49) ‘simple hierarchy’. This is headed by a ‘peak 
coord inator’, who not only enjoys “the pow er which authority and expertise 
accord him” , but also finds that “having m ore com plete information gives him 
strategic advantage over everyone else” [W illiamson (1975, pp.53-54)]. A lthough 
the m ost obvious example o f  a simple structured business is the small 
entrepreneurial firm, larger firms can also be forced into such forms, claims 
M intzberg, through, for example, crises requiring a fast, coordinated response, 
which “puts pow er in the hands o f  the chief executive, and serves to  reduce the 
degree o f  bureaucratization as well” [M intzberg (1979, p.308)]. Strategy 
form ulation in a simple structure lies with the chief executive (cf. ow ner m anager 
in SBE) and therefore, according to M intzberg (1979, p.307) tends to be “highly 
intuitive and nonanalytical, often thriving on uncertainty and oriented to  the 
aggressive search for opportunities” .
Steiner (1979, p.3) claims that “strategic planning is inextricably interw oven into 
the entire fabric o f  m anagem ent” . H e subdivides management into tw o distinct 
categories: strategic , w here all decisions are made at the top o f  the organisational
4 M i n t z b e r g  ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . 3 0 1 )  i d e n t i f i e s  f i v e  p o s s i b l e  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s :  s i m p l e  s t r u c t u r e ,  
m a c h i n e  b u r e a c r a c y ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  b u r e a c r a c y ,  d i v i s i o n a l i z e d  f o r m ,  a d h o c r a c y .
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hierarchy; and operational, which relates to  “everything else” . S trategic planning  
is therefore seen as an aid to strategic management. H e identifies tw o alternative 
m ethods o f  form ulating strategic plans. First, there is what he calls ‘Intuitive- 
Anticipatory Planning’, which is commonly “in the brain o f  one person ... has a 
com paratively short time horizon and reaction time ... is based upon the past 
experience, the ‘g u t’ feel, the judgm ent, and the reflective thinking o f  a m anager” 
[Steiner (1979, p.8)]. In other w ords it is the sort o f  planning favoured by 
M intzberg [discussed further in section 2.3]. This is fine, says Steiner, so long as 
the business is m anaged by “intuitive geniuses” , but these are few and far between, 
and judgem ents made on intuition alone may not always be correct.
Second, Steiner outlines ‘Formal Strategic Planning’, which is “organized and 
developed on the basis o f  a set o f  procedures ... is explicit in the sense that people 
know  w hat is going on ... is research based ... involves the participation o f  many 
people ... and the result o f  the entire endeavour is a written set o f  plans” [Steiner 
(1979, p.10)]. A lthough conflict can arise in organisations w here these1 tw o 
different m ethods o f  planning meet, Steiner (1979, p. 10) rem arks that “they can 
and should com pliment one another” . As he explains, “formal planning cannot be 
really effective unless managers at all levels inject their judgm ent and intuition into 
the planning process” [Steiner (1979, p. 10)].
M ichael P o rter is well-known for his w ork on competitive strategy and is often 
referred to by w riters on the subject. In his analyses o f  industries \cf. P orter (1980, 
1985)] he distinguishes betw een w hat he calls the ‘Five Forces o f  C om petition’. 
These are: the bargaining pow er o f  suppliers.; the bargaining pow er o f  buyers; the 
threat o f  potential new entrants to the market; the threat o f  new  substitute 
products; and the rivalry that already exists among existing com petitors  in the
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industry. An awareness and understanding o f  these forces, which govern the 
attractiveness o f  any industry, is fundamental if  the firm is to exploit the industry to  
its greatest potential. The five forces ju st outlined “determine industry profitability 
because they influence the prices, costs and required investment o f  firms in an 
industry - the elem ents o f  return on investment” [Porter (1985, p.5)]. As he also 
states, “Com petitive strategy m ust grow  out o f  a sophisticated understanding o f  
the rules o f  com petition that determ ine an industry’s attractiveness” and the 
ultimate aim o f  com petitive strategy must therefore be “to cope with and, ideally, 
to  change those rules in the firm’s favor” [Porter (1985, p.4)]. Once the firm has 
gained a com petitive advantage over its rivals, then the onus is on it to  sustain  this 
advantage.
Porter defines three generic strategies which may be followed in order to achieve 
a competitive advantage over one’s rivals: cost leadership, where a firm aims to  be 
the low est-cost producer in an industry; differentiation , w here a firm aims to  
establish a product with some kind o f  unique attribute, something slightly different 
to that o f  its rivals and which is novel to  the m arket in which it operates; and fo cu s , 
whereby a firm selects a niche in the m arket and targets the custom ers in it 
specifically, to  the exclusion o f  all others. H e further breaks down focus into cost 
fo cu s  versus differentiation focus, and suggests that firms may need to  alter their 
approach to targeting custom ers depending on the specific requirem ents o f  
individual custom ers within the target markets. W hereas a cheaper generic 
product may be m ore attractive to  some [c f  cost focus], others may be persuaded 
to purchase because o f  a unique feature or novelty value o f  the product [c f  
differentiation focus].
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P o rte r’s three strategies may be applied to  any firm in any industry, although, 
depending on the industry, one may prove to  be m ore im portant than the others. 
F or example, “in som e industries, industry structure or the strategies o f  
com petitors eliminate the possibility o f  achieving one or m ore o f  the generic 
strategies, [and] occasionally no feasible way for one firm to gain a significant cost 
advantage exists, for example, because several firms are equally placed with 
respect to  scale econom ies, access to  raw  materials, or other cost drivers” [Porter 
(1985, p.21)]. His w ork o f  1985 describes some m ethods o f  actually implementing 
the outlined strategies within an organisation, and then o f  “sustaining superior 
perform ance” within the firm ’s m arket sector, as com pared to its rivals.
The value chain [see Figures 2 .1a and 2.1b] is a m ethod developed by Porter o f  
analysing the sources o f  com petitive advantage. It assumes that com petitive 
advantage results from a com bination o f  the many different activities a firm pursues 
during the course o f  its business, rather than coming from one individual source. 
Prim ary activities are concerned with the actual production, marketing, delivery 
and after-sale care and servicing o f  the product. Support activities allow the 
primary activities to  occur by providing the necessary inputs and infrastructure. 
Porter further develops a value system , which covers the environment in which the 
firm operates whereas the value chain  relates to  the individual firm within the 
system. Products pass through many value channels and value chains, for 
example, the processes o f  suppliers and buyers As they move through the system 
from supplier to buyer, argues Porter, the products add to the overall value chain 
o f  the firm. This value chain he describes as being “a reflection o f  its [i.e. the 
firm ’s] history, its strategy, its approach to implementing its strategy, and the 
underlying econom ics o f  the activities them selves” [Porter (1985, p.36)].
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D eveloping over time, it com es to  represent the w orth o f  the business, and is tied 
up in both tangible and intangible assets, which together add to the overall value o f  
the business.
Figure 2.1a shows the concept o f  the value chain in its simplest form: primary 
activities aided by support activities add to  a firm ’s overall value. P o rter defines 
the value activities as follows: “Primary activities ... are the activities involved in 
the physical creation o f  the product and its sale and transfer to the buyer as well as 
after sale assistance ... Support activities support the primary activities and each 
other by providing purchased inputs, technology, human resources, and various 
firmwide functions” [Porter (1985, p.38)]. Figure 2.1b shows the nine generic 
value activities and the place they hold in the value chain. As P orter (1985, p.61) 
states, “an organizational structure that corresponds to  the value chain will 
improve a firm ’s ability to create and sustain competitive advantage” , and he 
describes in some detail how  this can be achieved.5
Johnson and Scholes (1984, pp.9-10) break strategies down into three levels. 
First, they define the corporate  level, which is “concerned w ith w hat sorts o f  
businesses the company, as a whole, should be in” . Second, there is com petitive  or 
business strategy, which is “about how  to  com pete in a particular m arket” . Third, 
they define operational strategies as being those concerned with “how  the different 
functions o f  the enterprise - marketing, finance, m anufacturing and so on - 
contribute to  the other levels o f  strategy” . They separate strategy from  planning, 
stating that the latter assists in “the adaptation  o f  the organisation to  its 
environm ent” ; it provides an “integration  role ... acting as a communication
5 S e e  P o r t e r  ( 1 9 8 5 )  C h a p t e r  2 :  ‘ T h e  V a l u e  C h a i n  a n d  C o m p e t i t i v e  A d v a n t a g e ’  f o r  f u r t h e r  
e x p l a n a t i o n .
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Figure la
N otes: Figure la  is a greatly simplified version o f  Porter's value chain.
Figure lb  is a m ore detailed diagram  which identifies the nine value activities which 
together add to  the overall value o f  the  firm.
B ased  on P orter (1985)
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channel” ; and it also provides “a control mechanism to m onitor the perform ance o f  
parts o f  the organisation” . C orporate planning is seen by them to be “an aid to, 
rather than ... the means of, strategic planning” [Johnson and Scholes (1984, 
p.32)].
The authors then concentrate on the strategic environment, and note the 
im portance o f  understanding the nature o f  this environment through detailed 
strategic analysis. One m ethod o f  analysing this is, they say, by use o f  P o rte r’s 
f iv e  fo rces  model. Their w ork relates closely to that o f  P o rter in that they 
advocate “an analysis o f  the nature o f  the environment” w here “the aim is to 
understand the environm ent in such a way as to  generate a credible strategy in 
relation to  the main forces in that environment” [Johnson and Scholes (1984, 
p.69)]. They draw  heavily upon the ideas behind P o rter’s f iv e  fo rces  model and 
develop these to  “provide a fram ew ork by which to understand the influences o f  
the environm ent on organisations and their strategies” [Johnson and Scholes 
(1984, p.82)]. Am ongst factors which m ust be considered when analysing the 
environment are influences on the firm o f  such factors as the econom ic climate, the 
labour m arket, governm ent legislation and technological innovations.6
A nother m ethod o f  formal environmental analysis is to  examine the Strengths, 
W eaknesses, O pportunities and Threats o f  and to the business, carrying out a so- 
called ‘SW O T ’ analysis. This analysis results from a detailed assessm ent o f  the 
resources o f  the business and is, say Johnson and Scholes (1984, p .1 10), “useful as 
a basis against which to judge future courses o f  action” . SW OT analysis is,
6 S e e  J o h n s o n  a n d  S c h o l e s  ( 1 9 8 4 )  C h a p t e r  3 :  T h e  S t r a t e g i c  E n v i r o n m e n t ’ ,  f o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  
o n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t .
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how ever, only one o f  several variations on this theme, and is a formal m ethod o f  
structuring the kinds o f  analyses that managers have used for years.
For example, Steiner (1979, p.20) introduces the ‘W OTS U P ’ analysis which is, 
he believes, “a critical step in the planning process” given that “a cardinal purpose 
o f  strategic planning is to  discover future opportunities and threats so as to  make 
plans to exploit or avoid them ” . In addition, W eihrich (1982, p.27) talks o f  the 
‘T O W S’ m atrix which he calls “a conceptual fram ew ork for a systematic analysis 
that facilitates matching the external threats and opportunities with the internal 
strengths and weaknesses o f  the organisation” . And Kay (1993, p.358), m ore 
recently, has also recognised the usefulness o f  SW OT analysis. It is, he explains, 
“simply a list” which, although it “conveys no information in i t s e l f ... is a way o f  
helping us to  think about the information we already have” . M anagers, therefore, 
should find that a detailed analysis, o f  the sort described above, leads to a better 
understanding o f  the firm ’s environment, and its own internal strengths and 
weaknesses, thereby facilitating decision-making for future development.
The second stage o f  strategic management which follows on from  strategic 
analysis is, according to  Johnson and Scholes, strategic choice. This involves the 
generation o f  various strategic options, com parison and evaluation o f  these 
options, and choice o f  the m ost suitable strategy for the organisation. Johnson and 
Scholes argue that, because a firm must be continually changing and adapting to its 
environment, the generation o f  strategic options should be o f prime concern. They 
support the notion o f  developing strategies , which combine possible directions for 
the firm with methods o f  achieving such development. Once a variety o f  options 
has been developed, the firm must then evaluate each option on its merits. This 
might involve using such techniques as profitability analysis, breakeven analysis,
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and an assessm ent o f  com petitors’ reactions, am ongst many others.7 Finally, under 
strategic choice, com es selection o f  the m ost suitable strategy which, com pared 
with all other possibilities, best m eets the firm ’s objectives. S trategic choice is, 
state Johnson and Scholes (1984, p.167), “concerned with decisions about an 
organisation’s future and the way it needs to  respond to  the many pressures and 
influences identified in the strategic analysis” . It is, they believe, in many ways “the 
core o f  corporate  strategy” .
The third and final stage o f  strategic managem ent is then the im plem entation  o f  
the selected strategy. This must take into account the allocation o f  resources, the 
structural form  o f  the organisation, and the people and systems already in place. 
To implement a strategy, the resource requirem ents o f  so doing m ust be identified. 
R esources can be o f  several types. They might be physical, such as plant and 
materials; human, such as staff o r management; o r financia l, such as debt or equity 
finance. C osts associated with resource allocation should be met out o f  the budget 
for im plem entation o f  the strategy, and care should be taken w hen changing 
strategy that the new one fits in with existing or available resources and that the 
changeover is made as smoothly as possible. In term s o f  organisation, 
m anagem ent should try  not to disrupt too severely the existing hierarchies within 
the firm. A uthority may need to be delegated as the organisation grow s and 
changes, but again this should be done in such a way so as not to  upset existing 
employees o r alter too drastically systems already in place.
The authors recognise that “there is little point in developing strategies if  there is 
no clear, long term  idea o f  how they are to  be financed” [Johnson and Scholes
7  S e e  J o h n s o n  a n d  S c h o l e s  ( 1 9 8 4 )  C h a p t e r  8 :  ‘ E v a l u a t i o n  a n d  S e l e c t i o n  o f  S t r a t e g i e s ’ ,  f o r  a  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  v a r i o u s  a s s e s s m e n t  t e c h n i q u e s .
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(1984, p .260)]. Therefore, they suggest that a financial strategy should be 
developed that sets out in detail how  new  strategies are to  be funded. Johnson and 
Scholes propose several key issues that require consideration w hen developing 
financial strategies. These include: cash and capital budgeting; w hether projects 
should be financed from retained earnings or loan capital; how  to finance an 
increase in w orking capital; an examination o f  the sourcing o f  funds; deciding on 
acceptable levels o f  debt; w hat dividend policy to follow; asset m anagem ent; and 
the deploym ent o f  funds within the enterprise.8
There are several tools available to help m anagement make decisions on suitable 
financial strategies, ju st as there are for any other strategy. Johnson and Scholes 
suggest various m ethods including, for example: ranking strategic options based on 
specific criteria; using decision trees which progressively eliminate options; 
constructing an opportunity analysis matrix to assess options against factors 
relating to  the future environment, com pany resources and com pany values; and 
gap analysis, to  identify shortfalls.9 The use o f  com puter spreadsheets and 
statistical packages can greatly facilitate such operations, in term s o f  speed and the 
easy generation o f  different possible scenarios.
People are all im portant in an organisation, and maintaining harm onious w orking 
relations is vital for improving productivity and business image: “The perform ance 
o f  people, and the resultant success or failure o f  strategic implem entation is 
determined by a num ber o f  factors”, including “the extent to  which people have 
the capability to  perform  the necessary tasks, are willing to  provide sufficient effort
8 S e e  J o h n s o n  a n d  S c h o l e s  ( 1 9 8 4 ,  p p . 2 6 0 - 2 6 1 )  f o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  F i n a n c i a l  S t r a t e g y .
9 S e e  J o h n s o n  a n d  S c h o l e s  ( 1 9 8 4 )  C h a p t e r  8 :  ‘ E v a l u a t i o n  a n d  S e l e c t i o n  o f  S t r a t e g i e s ’ ,  f o r  m o r e  
e x a m p l e s  a n d  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n .
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and the degree o f  satisfaction which they can obtain from their jo b s” [Johnson and 
Scholes (1984, p.310)]. It is suggested that monitoring and control procedures, 
along with information systems, be put in place, and rew ard systems introduced to 
encourage employee cooperation and participation in strategic change. Analysis 
and choice, claim Johnson and Scholes, are both im portant aspects o f  strategic 
m anagem ent but, they conclude, “it is the skill w ith which m anagers (and others) 
actually implement strategic change which determines the success o r failure o f  
strategy” [Johnson and Scholes (1984, p.338)].
P o rte r’s m ore recent w ork  with M illar [c f  P orter and M illar (1991)] looks at the 
impact o f  information technology on com petitive advantage. Inform ation 
technology is defined as having to  be “conceived o f  broadly to  encom pass the 
inform ation that businesses create and use as well as a w ide spectrum  o f  
increasingly convergent and linked technologies that process the inform ation” 
[Porter and M illar (1991, p.33)]. Their definition covers a wide variety o f  items 
ranging from  personal com puters to  communications technologies and factory 
autom ation. They argue that new  technology affects com petition in three different 
ways: it “changes industry structure”, therefore altering the rules o f  com petition 
outlined in P o rte r’s f iv e  fo rc e s  model; it “creates com petitive advantage by giving 
com panies new ways to  outperform  their rivals” ; and it “spaw ns w hole new 
businesses, often from within a com pany’s existing operations” [Porter and M illar 
(1991, p.34)].
Recalling the value chain from  P o rte r’s previous w ork, P orter and M illar (1991, 
p.35) state that “information technology is perm eating [it] at every point, 
transform ing the way value activities are perform ed and the nature o f  the linkages 
am ong them ” . Figure 2.2 shows that IT can be relevant to every value activity.
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The primary activities, as discussed earlier, are to  do with the production, sale and 
after-care o f  the product. Thus, in a high-technology firm, these might include an 
autom ated warehouse, with flexible manufacturing, autom ated order processing, 
telem arketing and com puter scheduling and routing o f  repair trucks. The support 
activities, which assist prim ary activities, in such a firm could encom pass planning 
models, autom ated personnel scheduling, com puter aided design technologies and 
the on-line procurem ent o f  parts.
Integrating inform ation technology into an existing system can facilitate the 
achieving o f  com petitive advantage. For example, it has already been mentioned 
that one m ethod o f  achieving competitive advantage is through cost leadership. 
Inform ation technology can reduce costs in an organisation: com puters have 
greatly increased the speed and efficiency o f  transactions; and autom ated 
machinery has taken over from human labour, thus lowering the wage bill 
considerably am ongst firms in some industries.
The second m ethod o f  achieving com petitive advantage is through product 
differentiation. Inform ation technology has made custom isation an easier process: 
the ability to adapt and produce exactly w hat the custom er needs, o r to  establish a 
product unique in its market, is one way o f  creating com petitive advantage. 
Laptop com puters are enabling increased mobility and flexibility in all kinds o f  
firms, allowing staff to take their own PC along to  a custom er, input details and 
requirem ents, and print o ff estimates or transfer data by electronic m ail.10
P orter and M illar (1991, p.44) conclude by saying that “com panies that
10 F o r  a d d i t i o n a l  e x a m p l e s  o f  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  I T ,  t r y  b r o w s i n g  t h r o u g h  a  c o m p u t e r  p r o d u c t s  
m a g a z i n e ,  w h e r e  t h e  w e a l t h  o f  m a t e r i a l  o n  o f f e r  is  s t a g g e r i n g :  f r o m  h a r d w a r e  s u c h  a s  m u l t i m e d i a  
n o t e p a d s , c o r d l e s s  m i c e  a n d  t e x t  s c a n n e r s ; t h r o u g h  t o  s o f t w a r e  s u c h  a s  C A D  ( c o m p u t e r  a i d e d  
d e s i g n )  d r a w i n g  t o o l s ,  l a n g u a g e  t r a n s l a t i o n  a s s i s t a n t s  a n d  b u s i n e s s  p r o d u c t i v i t y  s o f t w a r e  [cf 
Misco Computer Products c a t a l o g u e ,  M a r c h  1 9 9 6 ] ,
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THE VALUE CHAIN
PERMEATED BY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Figure 2.2
N otes: The diagram shows a typical value chain for a firm that relies heavily on inform ation 
technology in the running o f  its business. Technological activities which may add to 
overall value are individually identified.
Source: P orter and M illar (1991, p .37) How information g ives you  com petitive  
advantage.
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anticipate the  pow er o f  inform ation technology will be in control o f  events. 
Com panies that do not respond will be forced to  accept changes that others initiate 
and will find them selves at a competitive disadvantage” . The examples given 
above o f  inform ation technology are available to  any firm who w ants and can 
afford them, as well as to  its com petitors. Thus it can be seen that information 
technology and the rapidity with which it is changing, should becom e an im portant 
consideration in shaping the strategy o f  an organisation seeking to  achieve 
com petitive advantage.
In the introduction to  a volum e o f  collected papers, D odgson (1989, p.5) states 
that “technology strategy is im portant as it needs to  com plem ent overall com pany 
strategy: encom passing business, marketing, manufacturing, personnel, investm ent 
and financial strategy” . In the same book, Pavitt et a l  report on the draw backs o f  
P o rte r’s w orks and attem pt to  “fill the gaps” with their analyses o f  high-technology 
firms. For example, they criticise Porter for failing to  explore the varied 
technological threats and opportunities faced by firms in different sectors, and for 
not analysing the problems faced by such firms when implementing new 
technologies. They then go on them selves to analyse in some depth these 
opportunities, threats and the differentiation that is evident betw een sectors, 
thereby perform ing the sort o f  SW OT analysis that has been discussed earlier.
Also in D odgson’s (1989) volume, Thom as and Miles (1989, p.95) describe the 
advantages to be gained from new interactive services, which are “com puter- 
m ediated ... rely on text or simple graphics to convey information, and ... permit 
users to  have an influence on data delivered through a telecom m unications 
system” . Firms with a strong information technology base can use these new 
systems to capture their niche m arket and keep in close contact w ith their custom er
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base, for example, using the w orld wide web for advertising, and the internet for 
taking orders and transferring other relevant data at high speed. As Thom as and 
M iles (1989, p.107) point out, “niche m arkets are often (or becoming) 
international in order to  achieve economies o f  scale ... or because the relevant 
inform ation technology is inherently regional o r global” . Inform ation technology 
provides a fast and cheap way o f  communicating with the custom er and o f  
implementing a “niche m arketing strategy” which, they say, “requires the 
identification o f  a suitably encapsulated area which is not already over-occupied, 
and the maintenance o f  extremely close cooperation with custom ers” [Thom as and 
M iles (1989, p.107)].
D odgson and Rothwell (1989) argue that small and medium-sized firms need to 
develop strategies for technology. They claim that “a key defining criterion o f  
future grow th potential is the existence o f  a coherent strategy for technological 
developm ent” [D odgson and Rothwell (1989, p. 153)]. Their study is based on a 
sample o f  “exceptional” companies which w ere “highly technologically advanced” , 
and is interesting in that it shows the potential that exists for firms in high 
technology sectors.
D odgson’s (1989) conclusion to the book neatly sums up the opportunities 
offered by having a technology strategy. Leading firms with extrem ely diverse 
products have all, he says, “been shown to  possess technology strategies” 
[D odgson (1989, p.219)]. This, he continues, is because their products “depend 
upon technology for a num ber o f  im portant characteristics ... which differentiate 
them from com peting products in the m arket place” , through which com petitive 
advantage is achieved. H e ends by saying that “it is hoped that one o f  the main 
contributions [in the edited volume] is the provision o f  empirical evidence showing
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the value for many firms in developing and using an effective technology strategy” 
[D odgson (1989, p.227)].
Sarathy (1994) investigates global strategy in service industries. H e rem arks 
upon the increasing im portance o f  services worldwide, and the differences in 
strategies applied to  firms in service industries com pared to those in the supply o f  
goods industries. H e notes in particular the im portance o f  technology in the 
delivery o f  the service. Inform ation technology is, he states, “a critical element o f  
service delivery [which] permits time and space shifting o f  the service, allowing 
service delivery w ithout the server being present ... it reduces the extent and level 
o f  interaction betw een service provider and custom er, reducing the likelihood o f  
custom er dissatisfaction with perceived mistreatm ent and consequent defection ... 
[and it] can also reduce variation in service quality, as machines replace human 
beings as servers” [Sarathy (1994, p.122)]. His findings support those o f  the 
previously cited w orks on technology, which claim that inform ation technology 
will prove to  be a key factor in making successful firms o f  the future.
Kay (1993) divides the writings on business strategy into tw o distinct schools o f  
thought. The first o f  these he entitles the rationalist school, which considers “the 
definition o f  the objectives o f  the firm as a key element in strategy form ulation” 
[Kay (1993, p.345)]. This conventional approach to strategic thinking, based on a 
formal analysis, form ulation and implementation o f  strategy, is now, according to 
Kay, “unfashionable” , although he admits its dominance persists. Kay (1993, 
p.354) criticises strongly the rationalist school writings, claiming that with them 
“dissatisfaction is w idespread” and that this dissatisfaction “centres ... around 
issues o f  im plem entation” . “If  strategy is nothing more than a vision” , he 
elucidates, “then it is hardly surprising that it seems easy to  form ulate strategy and
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hard to  im plement it” [Kay (1993, p.355)]. H ow ever, w hat Kay does not admit is 
that those firms that choose these difficult courses o f  action (viz. formal analysis, 
strategy form ulation and implementation), and who w ork hard to  succeed at them, 
might also be am ongst the higher perform ing businesses.
The second o f  K ay’s schools o f  thought concerns emergent strategy. H e notes 
[Kay (1993, p.356)] that “ successful firms often seem to  have achieved their 
position w ithout going through the processes o f  analysis, form ulation, and 
im plem entation that the rationalist school implies” . Kay (1993, p .357) defines 
em ergent strategy, based on his reading o f  w ork by M intzberg, as “the 
identification o f  relatively system atic patterns o f  behaviour in w hat the organization 
actually does” . Given that firms appear, in practice, to  use an adaptive m ethod o f  
strategy form ulation, why then, w onders Kay, are the m ethods advocated by the 
rationalist school still so popular? The answer, he proposes, is that “people study 
and analyse strategy because they w ant to  know  w hat to do” [Kay (1993, p.357)]. 
Furtherm ore, rationalist strategy offers m anagers “a process which they can at least 
partially control”, even though it is at once both “necessarily incremental and 
adaptive” .
Kay (1993, p.33) describes the m ost im portant objectives o f  commercial 
relationships as being “co-operation (joint activity tow ards a shared goal), co­
ordination (the need for m utually consistent responses), and differentiation (the 
avoidance o f  mutually incompatible activities)” . Believing that gam e theory can 
help us to  understand such relationships, he cites the Prisoner’s Dilemma as being a 
particularly helpful model. The example is o f  tw o separated prisoners. Each, 
depending on the responses he gives under questioning, and unaw are o f  the 
responses o f  the other, will either go free (if he, and only he, confesses), will spend
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maybe seven years in jail (if both  confess), or will spend ten years in jail (if  the 
o ther confesses and he does not). The optimal decision, with perfect information, 
is for both to  say nothing, and expect a light charge (o f perhaps one year) for a 
lesser offence, as there is no firm evidence on which to  convict; but, given that they 
cannot trust the other to  do the same, and fearing a ten-year sentence, they are 
m ost likely both to  confess, and will therefore receive the seven-year sentence. 
The various possible outcom es o f  such a gam e can be shown on a pay-off m atrix .11
W hen applied to  a business context, the problem  o f  sharing inform ation can be 
linked to  that o f  the tw o prisoners. As Kay (1993, p.36) explains, “typically, the 
best overall outcom e, bo th  collectively and individually, is achieved by free and 
frank exchange o f  information; yet there are almost always gains to  be made by 
withholding part o f  the picture” [<cf. Reid, Terry & Smith (1997)]. H e gives further 
examples o f  the P risoner’s Dilemma that we all encounter in our daily lives, both 
socially and in business, and concludes that w e are all “driven to  select an outcom e 
that everyone recognizes as inferior” [Kay (1993, p.48)]. One o f  the key tasks o f  
managem ent therefore, he remarks, m ust be to  structure situations so as to  
minimise the risk o f  these problems arising.
A  recent w ork o f  M intzberg (1994, p. 107) analyses w hat he calls “the Fall and 
Rise o f  Strategic Planning”, claiming that “Strategic Planning  is not Strategic  
Thinking1’ and that “the m ost successful strategies are visions, not plans” . H e 
argues that only when a business develops a com prehension o f  this difference can 
they return to “w hat the strategy-m aking process should be” . This, he argues, 
should be “capturing w hat the manager learns from all sources ... and then
1 1  S e e  K a y  ( 1 9 9 3 )  C h a p t e r  3 :  ‘ C o - o p e r a t i o n  a n d  C o - o r d i n a t i o n ’  f o r  f u r t h e r  e x a m p l e s  a n d  
c l a r i f i c a t i o n .
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synthesizing that learning into a vision o f  the direction that the business should 
pursue” [M intzberg (1994, p.107)].
H e favours strategic thinking over the planning and “analytical techniques” 
preferred by Porter. Strategic thinking, he says, involves “intuition” and 
“creativity”, resulting in “an integrated perspective o f  the enterprise” [M intzberg 
(1994, p. 108)]. These perspectives evolve through learning and experience and, he 
argues, “m ust be free to  appear at any time and at any place in the organization” 
[M intzberg (1994, p.108)]. Formal planning is, for M intzberg, too  rigid in its 
structure, often based on previous strategies or copied from current ones, and 
lacking any opening for judgem ent or intuition when it comes to  problem  solving 
and decision making.
The draw backs o f  strategic planning are further analysed and M intzberg (1994, 
p. 110) chooses here to  criticise A nsoff (1965, p.44) for his rem ark that “w e shall 
refer to the period for which the firm is able to construct forecasts w ith an 
accuracy of, say, plus or minus 20 percent as the planning horizon  o f  the firm” . 
M intzberg argues that it is impossible for any company to say for how  far ahead it 
can forecast w ith such a given accuracy. The company has no control over 
external factors such as new governm ent legislation or increases in the rate o f  
interest, and is not in a position to predict such influences.
The over-reliance by managem ent on so-called “hard data” (for example, 
accounting statem ents, m arket research reports and opinion polls) also falls under 
criticism by M intzberg. The inform ation this gives is, by its very nature, m ore 
quantitative than qualitative, and therefore tends to miss “im portant nuances” . H e 
points out that many previous studies have shown that “the m ost effective 
m anagers rely on some o f  the softest forms o f  information, including gossip,
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hearsay, and various o ther intangible scraps o f  information” [M intzberg (1994, 
P - l l l ) ] .
M intzberg criticises another o f  P o rte r’s ideas, saying that artificial intelligence 
and expert systems do not in fact improve m ethods o f  dealing with inform ation 
overload. H e accepts that formal systems have the capacity to  process  m ore 
information, but argues that “they could never internalize it, com prehend  it, 
synthesize it” [M intzberg (1979, p .l 11)]. Again, his argum ent stems from  the fact 
that inform ation technology can only do w hat it has been program m ed to  do. It 
“will never be able to  forecast discontinuities, inform detached m anagers, or create 
novel strategies” , he adds.
M intzberg, how ever, is not entirely opposed to  the existence o f  planning in the 
w orkplace. A lthough he does not believe that it can generate strategies, he is o f  
the opinion that, “given viable strategies, it can program  them  [and] make them  
operational” [M intzberg (1979, p .l 12)]. Formal w ritten plans are useful in 
attracting outsiders to  the business, perhaps financial backers. Planning is useful 
too, thinks M intzberg (1979, p .l 13), for “coordination, to  ensure that everyone in 
the organization pulls in the same direction” . B ut although he sees a need for 
“people to  bring order to  ... m anagem ent” and to  “challenge the conventions that 
managers and especially their organizations develop”, he claims that past 
experience o f  strategic planning has dem onstrated “the need to  loosen up the 
process o f  strategy making rather than trying to  seal it o ff by arbitrary 
form alization” [M intzberg (1979, p. 114)].
The discussion above o f  the literature on strategy has looked at those w orks that 
w ere w ritten particularly with large corporations in mind. For the purposes o f  this 
thesis, tw o considerations arise. First, the majority o f  the w orks above are based
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on little o r no specific empirical analysis. Instead they often rely on concepts 
adapted from  earlier studies o f  industrial organisation. For example, P o rter (1980, 
1985) suggests that focusing on com petition is im portant, and com es up w ith a 
whole gam ut o f  concepts such as the Five Forces o f  Competition, Cost and  
Differentiation Focus and the Value Chain, all o f  which seem plausible and 
sensible enough strategies and organisational characteristics in themselves; but, 
rather than develop ideas from  his own direct observation o f  firm behaviour, Porter 
forms his analysis using the w orks o f  others.
Johnson and Scholes (1984) rely heavily upon P o rte r’s w ork and similarly 
advocate formal strategic analysis, choice and implementation, but w ith little 
original evidence to  support their theories. M intzberg (1979) takes an opposing 
view as to  the kinds o f  strategic planning that may or may not be successful, 
coming dow n in favour o f  less formal practices. F or example, he suggests that to  
hold a ‘vision’ as a strategy is by far the best m ethod, but does not support this 
assum ption with any real-life examples.
The second consideration from the standpoint o f  this w ork is w hether or not the 
theories about large organisations can be equally applied to  the small firm. 
A lthough the focus o f  these writings is not specifically on small firms, they are 
considered at num erous points. For example, M intzberg (1979) equates his 
‘simple structure’ to  the small entrepreneurial firm, w ithout seeming to 
acknow ledge that som e such firms can have extremely complex organisational 
forms, despite their small size. And P orter has w ritten about businesses in 
fragm ented industries which are typically the types o f  m arkets in which small firms
37
com pete. H ow ever, again, there is still a lack o f  empirical support for the theories 
generated .12
This section has aimed to  introduce the reader to  the general w orks on business 
strategy. Further enlightenm ent on this topic can be gained from  reading, for 
example, D yson’s selected w orks on strategic planning13, the w ork  o f  M intzberg 
and Q uinn14, o r the recent w ork by K ay.15 As was mentioned previously, however, 
the literature thus far reviewed has tended to concentrate on the experience o f  
larger corporate  firms. The following section aims to redress the balance by 
looking at the recent and em erging literature on business planning and strategy, as 
it relates to  small firms.
2.3 Strategy and the Small Firm
Section 2.2 concentrated mainly on the literature concerning the strategies o f  large 
firms. Until fairly recently, little attention had been paid to strategies in smaller 
firms; perhaps because it w as thought that such firms were unlikely to  participate 
in a formal planning process. Gathering empirical evidence on strategy form ulation 
in small firms is also m ore difficult than for large firms. There is now , how ever, a 
grow ing literature, both theoretical and empirical, which discusses strategy and the 
small firm. It is to  this body o f  evidence that section 2.3 appeals, whilst taking 
note also o f  the grow ing im portance o f  information technology across all sectors,
12 A l t h o u g h  P o r t e r  has a p p l i e d  h i s  w o r k  t o  s o m e  i l l u s t r a t i v e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  [ P o r t e r  ( 1 9 8 3 ) ] ,  t h e  
s a m p l e  s i z e  u s e d  is  n o t  l a r g e  e n o u g h  t o  p e r m i t  t e s t i n g  b y  s t a t i s t i c a l  o r  e c o n o m e t r i c  m e t h o d s .
13 S e e  D y s o n  ( 1 9 9 0 ,  p . l )  w h i c h  d r a w s  t o g e t h e r  a  r a n g e  o f  p a p e r s  w i t h  a n  a i m  t o  “ i n t r o d u c e  a n d  
e x p l o r e  t h e  r a n g e  o f  m o d e l s  a n d  a n a l y t i c a l  t e c h n i q u e s  w h i c h  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  
p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s ” .
14  S e e  M i n t z b e r g  a n d  Q u i n n  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  The Strategy Process.
15 S e e  K a y  ( 1 9 9 3 )  C h a p t e r  2 1 :  ‘ A  B r i e f  H i s t o r y  o f  B u s i n e s s  S t r a t e g y ’ ,  f o r  a  h e l p f u l  r e v i e w  o f  
t h o u g h t  o n  B u s i n e s s  S t r a t e g y .
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and to  all firms, no m atter w hat their size.
The section is sub-divided under five headings, which reflect the existing 
literature in this area, and is organised to  highlight the im portant issues 
surrounding strategic m anagem ent for the small firm. The first, Aim s, Am bitions 
an d  M aking D ecisions, assumes that the direction a small firm will follow  is closely 
linked to the personal goals o f  the owner-m anager. Forward Planning  discusses 
the  increasing emphasis on preparing long-term  plans, recom m ended particularly 
by enterprise support bodies and banks. The question o f  Funding Growth  has 
perhaps received the m ost attention by academics researching small firms, and this 
section summarises a sample o f  the findings. Information, Technology and  
Communications investigates the grow ing im portance o f  new technology, and 
shows how it can be implemented in small firms to  assist them  in information 
gathering and comm unications, or for product differentiation and attacking new 
niches. Finally, Q uality Control and SW OT Analysis are linked together as being 
managem ent practices which can assist the business in strategically attacking or 
defending niche m arkets.
Aims, Am bitions an d  M aking D ecisions
Decision making within very small firms is often necessarily closely linked to the 
personal aspirations o f  the ow ner manager: “According to  strategic theory”, says 
B am berger (1983, p.25), strategic decisions o f  a firm are “determ ined by the flow 
o f  information from  the environment and the internal capability o f  the com pany and 
by the m anagers’ values” . The objectives o f  a small firm are thus similar o r equal 
to  the objectives o f  the ow ner manager, so much so that the “implicit image that 
the m anager has o f  the firm ’s future developm ent overlaps with his/her values”
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[Bam berger (1983, p.26)]. Indeed, a study by Miller and Toulouse (1986), using 
empirical data from  97 small firms in Canada, found that, in some cases, the chief 
executive w as the only firm m ember w ho w as allowed to  make strategic decisions.
B am berger (1983, p.30) summarises results found by others w ho have studied 
the value systems, attitudes and objectives o f  entrepreneurs and m anagers, noting 
in particular that “objectives are strongly influenced by economic conditions; the 
firm’s life cycle phase and the industry it is in influence the pursued objectives and 
their relative im portance; [and] in small and medium-sized firms, the objectives are 
form ulated at the highest level o f  the firm ’s hierarchy” .
The five stages through which a small, grow ing firm passes16 are discussed by 
Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.32), who rem ark that, to  begin with, “the ow ner is 
the business, perform s all the im portant tasks, and is the major supplier o f  energy, 
direction, and, with relatives and friends, capital” .17 They point ou t that the 
demands made by the business on such an ow ner-m anager often becom e so great 
that he succum bs to  the pressure and the business folds or dies.
It is not until stage III, ‘success’, suggest the authors, that the ow ner-m anager 
delegates decision-m aking responsibility to  subordinate managers. A t this point in 
time, they argue, he has the choice betw een ‘disengagem ent’; whereby he 
increasingly m oves away from the running o f  the business to  assum e a non- 
participatory role, allowing managers to  make major decisions; o r ‘g row th ’, which 
requires a g reater ‘hands-on’ involvement on his part. Stage IV  in the Churchill 
and Lewis analysis is ‘take-off, which requires increased delegation o f  m ajor 
responsibilities. A t this stage, they note, “both operational and strategic  planning
16 E x i s t e n c e ,  S u r v i v a l ,  S u c c e s s , T a k e - o f f ,  a n d  R e s o u u r c e  M a t u r i t y .
1 7  S e e  a l s o  S t a n w o r t h  a n d  C u r r a n  ( 1 9 8 6 )  ‘ G r o w t h  a n d  t h e  s m a l l  f i r m ’ .
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are being done and involve specific m anagers ... [although] ... the com pany is still 
dom inated by the ow ner’s presence” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.40)].
The final stage, ‘resource m aturity’, is one in which a firm that retains its 
entrepreneurial spirit can flourish, so long as it also maintains its ability for 
“innovative decision making and the avoidance o f  risks” [Churchill and Lewis 
(1983, p.40)]. Am ong managem ent factors, which Churchill and Lewis (1983, 
p.40) consider to  be central to  a small firm’s success, are the “ow ner’s goals for 
him self o r herself and for the business ... [and the] ... ow ner’s m anagerial ability 
and willingness to  delegate responsibility and to  manage the activities o f  others” . 
The im portance o f  these factors change as the firm grows. F o r example, 
“matching business and personal goals is crucial in the ‘existence’ [first] stage 
because the ow ner m ust recognize and be reconciled to  the heavy financial and 
tim e-energy dem ands o f  the new business” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.42)]. 
A ccording to  this w ork, therefore, the aspirations o f  the ow ner-m anager play an 
im portant part in decision-m aking within the small firm. He m ust be willing to  be 
flexible and realistic about his ambitions and abilities when setting objectives for 
him self or his business.
The model o f  Churchill and Lewis does, however, have some draw backs and, to 
an extent, the authors are guilty o f  their own criticism o f  o thers’ fram ew orks for 
analysing businesses that “assum e a company m ust grow  and pass through all the 
stages o f  developm ent” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.31)]. Assuming that the 
first stage for any new small business is mere existence, Stage I in their model, the 
rather sweeping statem ent that “systems and formal planning are minimal to  non­
existent” appears to  be a rather rash underestim ation o f  the potential o f  some new 
ventures, and it is w ithout grounds [cf. Section 4.3: F orw ard Planning  below]; as
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is their additional com m ent that “the com pany’s strategy is simply to  remain alive” 
[Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.32)] \cf. Section 4.3: Aims, Am bitions an d  M aking  
D ecisions  below].
The main problem is that the authors assume that each stage m ust be passed 
through in chronological order. Overall, the model is unnecessarily complex, and 
does not suggest why each firm moves from one stage to  the next concentrating, 
instead, on w hat considerations are relevant at each stage. As such, the  model is 
merely taxonom ic, rather than predictive and, although an interesting source o f  
ideas, is not particularly helpful in an applied scientific sense.
An interpretation o f  strategic m anagement is given in Shuman and Seeger (1986, 
p . l l ) ,  w ho use the following definition o f  Smith et a l (1985, p.4): “Strategic 
managem ent is the process o f  examining both present and future environments, 
form ulating the organization’s objectives, and making, implementing, and 
controlling decisions focused on achieving these objectives in the present and 
future environm ents” . They develop a model built on this definition and contrast it 
with the planning practice o f  500 fast-grow ing private small com panies in the 
United States. They point out that, in order to plan, a business m ust actually make 
“the decision to allocate some o f  its limited resources to  planning ... [and that] ... 
while many employees should be involved in the preparation o f  the strategic plan, 
only the ... ow ner has the business perspective, the ability to  orchestrate a 
com pany’s activities, the responsibility for setting objectives and the authority to 
review and change them ” [Shuman and Seeger (1986, p. 12)].
They echo earlier w ork  \cf. B am berger (1983), Churchill and Lewis (1983)] in 
noting that the ow ner-m anager’s personal objectives are very much linked to 
company objectives. Such is the complexity o f  the interlinked goals and objectives
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that the ow ner-m anager should, they argue, “develop a careful list o f  specific 
objectives that are related to identified im portant personal needs” [Shum an and 
Seeger (1986, p. 12)]. As far as company objectives are concerned, Shuman and 
Seeger believe that they should be separated from personal objectives, and defined 
under three distinct headings: sales volume, financial perform ance, and physical 
resources.
Results from  their study show that owner-m anagers are likely to  be involved at 
every level o f  decision-m aking, although the setting o f  com pany objectives is 
w here they becom e m ost involved. The majority also appeared to  “prefer an active 
and strong personal involvement in their com pany’s planning process, rather than 
delegating that responsibility to o ther members o f  the m anagement team ” [Shuman 
and Seeger (1986, p. 14)]. The general finding is that, as the firm grow s and 
becom es m ore complex, so planning is m ore likely to  becom e formalised.
Shuman and Seeger offer tw o alternative explanations as to  why planning is 
m ore complex in rapidly grow ing firms: either grow th necessitates the adoption o f  
formal strategic planning; or, it allows the firms in question to  acquire sufficient 
resources (hum an and financial) to  devote to  planning. H ow ever, a major 
drawback, o f  which they show  at least some awareness, is that simple cross-site 
analysis over one time period does not allow a clear distinction to  be made 
between these tw o alternatives. Instead, what is required is a longitudinal analysis 
o f  firms to  establish the reasons for changes as they occur. In addition, to  
distinguish successful strategies from those which are unsuccessful, w e require a 
control group o f  slow grow th firms for com parison with those experiencing faster 
growth.
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David (1989, p.90) discusses the im portance o f  a firm’s “M ission Statem ent” , 
defined as “an enduring statem ent o f  purpose that distinguishes one organization 
from  other similar enterprises” or, put m ore simply, “a declaration o f  an 
organization’s ‘reason for being’” [David (1989, p.90)]. W hen contem plating 
formal, strategic planning, he adds, “a carefully prepared mission statem ent is 
widely recognized by managers and academics as the first step” in the process. His 
study examines mission statem ents gathered from large firms, and provides 
guidelines which he hopes to  be o f  use to  future strategy planners. It is also o f  
interest to  ow ner-m anagers o f  smaller firms, who are very close to  their business, 
the mission o f  which may be linked to  personal objectives. As David (1989, p.95) 
concludes, the im portance o f  a mission statem ent is that it is “essentially a vehicle 
for com m unicating with im portant internal and external stakeholders, and its 
principle role is to  clarify the ultim ate aims o f  the firm” . It would have been both 
useful and interesting to  learn explicitly how firms integrate their mission statem ent 
into their strategic planning processes, but unfortunately David undertakes no 
exploration o f  this im portant avenue o f  research.
Strategic planning in small firms aiming for increased profit is a m atter 
considered by Aram and C ow en (1990). Although, they agree, “many ow ner- 
m anagers realize grow th and increased profitability depend ... upon enhancing 
second level m anager’s experience” , because “high personal stakes are associated 
with the firm ’s future for the owner-m anager, this individual often feels compelled 
to  direct and control planning” [Aram and Cowen (1990, p.64)]. They discuss 
w hat they call “the 5 per cent difference” : the small changes or increases in 
planning effort that can make a large impact on performance. A four stage model 
is presented which attem pts to  explain how to capture this 5 per cent difference.
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First, they suggest that “planning meetings should be centered on goals” , which 
provides, am ong other things, a focus for discussion, the developm ent o f  mutual 
incentives and the com m unication o f  clear expectations [Aram and Co w en (1990, 
p.66)]. Second, ow ner-m anagers should aim to explore specific issues or 
situations, forming, through discussion, new solutions and opinions. Third, 
m anagem ent should w ork together as a team, seeking solutions to  problems. And 
the fourth and final stage in this process is ‘action planning’, which is essentially 
the allocation o f  specific tasks to  individuals, giving them  responsibility for changes 
in planning. The benefits o f  following this planning process, argue Aram and 
Cow en (1990, p.69), are that it can “enhance a firm ’s level o f  entrepreneurship ... 
[and] ... provide a source o f  organizational and managerial renewal by inspiring 
and energizing m anagers to  seek new solutions to  old problems or create new 
opportunities w here none appeared before” .
The authors place much emphasis on w hat should  be done, but with little 
reference to  actual business practice. For example, they state that “effort focused 
on effective planning can obtain step function im provem ents in firm perform ance” 
[Aram and Cow en (1990, p.64)], but fail to  back up this statem ent w ith empirical 
evidence. O f those examples that are given, the turnover o f  the firms concerned is 
$20m to $30m, certainly much bigger than those w e commonly class as ‘small’ 
firms. The paper is largely theoretical and validates its assum ptions about small 
firms w ith evidence from only four rather large businesses. A m ore sensible 
approach w ould perhaps have been to examine actual practice am ongst small firms, 
and then to develop conclusions better grounded on empirical evidence.
M intzberg (1991, p.612) identifies tw o advantages enjoyed by organisations in 
which decision-m aking lies with one single leader. First, there is the ability to
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respond quickly to  changes in the environment, as “only one person need act” . 
Second, the sense o f  “mission” felt in a business run by a strongly charismatic 
personality can lead to  a feeling am ongst firm employees o f  belonging to  an 
enterprise that know s w here it is heading and has the drive and determ ination to  
realise its goals successfully.
Allen (1993, p .16) talks o f  “Faith, H ope and ... expectations” in financial 
forecasting, and relates these to three different levels o f  control within 
organisations. First, the operational level, which is about “converting expectations 
into results” . Level tw o, the tactical level, is about “converting hope into 
expectations” . Third, the strategic level, is about “converting faith into hope” . H e 
argues that “financial m anagers who are proactively involved at the strategic level 
o f  m anagem ent are well aw are o f  the task they have in distilling judgem ents into a 
quantified assessm ent” , but that the reluctance o f  many com panies to  seek outside 
advice has been seen to  act as a “brake” on progress. In other w ords, he believes 
that com panies that are willing to  share their problems with others, and to  seek 
outside advice on strategic planning, often benefit from the know ledge an unbiased 
observer can give.
The prediction o f  new  firm s’ perform ance is considered by C ooper (1993, p.241) 
to  be a “challenge”, largely because o f  the “heavy dependence o f  new  ventures 
upon environm ental developm ent” , but also because “many entrepreneurs pursue 
personal goals, som e o f  which are noneconom ic in nature” . His preliminary 
analysis o f  data, compiled for almost 3,000 young firms over three years, suggests 
that “w hether o r not they stay in business and their patterns o f  developm ent may 
depend greatly upon the goals o f  the founder” [Cooper (1993, p.248)]. As the 
firm begins to  grow , however, so m ore people becom e involved in the decision­
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making process, authority is delegated and the goals o f  the business begin to  
change. C ooper spends m ost o f  the article discussing o thers’ w orks and pointing 
out the draw backs and difficulties o f  their approaches. W hat w ould have been 
m ore interesting, however, w ould have been to  see how  he applied the information 
available from  his substantial database to  addressing the problem s he has 
uncovered.
D iscussed la ter18 are the transitional phases identified by M ount et a l  (1993), 
which see decision-m aking becom ing m ore devolved and systematic as the firm 
passes from  one grow th stage to  the next. On a slightly different note, Peiser and 
W ooten (1983) examine the changes experienced by small fa m ily  businesses as 
they begin to  expand. They argue that family-run businesses may encounter m ore 
problems than other small businesses because “normal grow th problem s are 
com pounded by the difficulties o f  separating family relationships from  business 
decisions” [Peiser and W ooten (1983, p.58)].
The “life-cycle crisis” 19 experienced by grow ing firms is said (p.60) to  be 
exacerbated when “goals o f  the founding generation collide” . Conflicting aims 
betw een mem bers o f  the firm can lead to  high tension and prolonged argum ents, 
and can divert attention from the aim o f  the business itself. It can cause those 
involved to  “lose sight o f  the strategic issues and to  focus instead on daily minutia 
and the irritating w ork  habits o f  the others” [Peiser and W ooten (1983, p.61)]. To 
avoid any such unnecessary and tim e-consuming conflict, Peiser and W ooten 
(1983, p.60) believe that “family members m ust share the same general goals o f  the
18 S e e  Forward Planning b e l o w .
19 S a i d  b y  P e i s e r  a n d  W o o t e n  ( 1 9 8 3 ,  p . 5 9 )  t o  o f t e n  o c c u r  “ a t  t h e  t i m e  w h e n  t h e  s e c o n d  g e n e r a t i o n  
h a s  d e v e l o p e d  e n o u g h  e x p e r t i s e  t o  a s s u m e  m a j o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  
f i r m  b u t  t h e  f i r s t  g e n e r a t i o n  is  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  s h a r e  t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ” .
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firm” and, at the same time, “if  authority is shared, they must agree on how  the 
firm should best proceed tow ards these goals” .
One m ethod o f  resolving crises within a family business, suggest Peiser and 
W ooten, and a m ethod which can also be applied to  other small firms, w ould  be to 
employ an outsider to  mediate; som eone who is detached from the business and 
can take an objective standpoint.20 A  consultant, for example, could collate the 
views o f  all concerned, feed these back to members o f  the organisation and, using 
the inform ation thus gathered, help to  develop a strategic plan for the business to  
follow  into the future. Indeed, they argue, such “outside intervention is strongly 
recom m ended” [Peiser and W ooten (1983, p.63)]. It forces individuals to 
verbalise their thoughts and ideas, and to com m unicate to others any problem s as 
they perceive them  and is, according to  H ofer and Sandberg21, one o f  the key 
behavioural factors leading to  a new  venture’s success.
Peiser and W ooten adopt the model o f  Churchill and Lewis tha t describes 
grow th stages o f  firms, and com pare this to the life-cycle changes o f  the firm s’ 
ow ner-m anagers. They too  seem happy to  accept that small firms and their ow ners 
autom atically go through all o f  these stages. A lthough the concentration is on 
family based businesses, there is little in this paper to  suggest that the  problem s 
they encounter are necessarily any different to  those experienced by any small firm. 
For example, goal conflict can arise equally betw een tw o brothers, or tw o  partners 
or multiple directors from  different families and generations. Explicit empirical
20 S e e  a l s o  J o h n s o n  a n d  D e v i n s  ( 1 9 9 4 ,  p .  1 3 )  w h o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  n e e d  f o r ,  u s e  a n d  s o u r c e s  o f  
a d v i c e  u s e d  b y  n e w  a n d  e s t a b l i s h e d  s m a l l  t o  m e d i u m - s i z e d  e n t e r p r i s e s .  T h e i r  f i n d i n g s  s u g g e s t  
t h a t  “ y o u n g e r  b u s i n e s s e s  a r e  s l i g h t l y  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a n  o l d e r  t o  p u r s u e  a n  i n t e r n a l  s o l u t i o n ” ,  b u t  
a ls o  t h a t  t h o s e  w h o  d o  n o t  s e e k  o u t s i d e  a d v i c e  “ d o  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  v i e w  c o s t  a s  a  m a j o r  b a r r i e r ” .
2 1 S e e  H o f e r  a n d  S a n d b e r g  ( 1 9 8 7 ,  p . 3 7 2 ) ,  w h o  c l a i m  t h a t  “ s u c c e s s f u l  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  seek outside 
help t o  s u p p l e m e n t  t h e i r  s k i l l s ,  k n o w l e d g e ,  a n d  a b i l i t i e s ” .
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evidence w ould be required to  compare and contrast the differences betw een 
family businesses and other small firms, an area in which this paper falls short.
Obviously, it is beneficial to  any new venture to  be aw are o f o thers’ experience 
in the m arket place, in order to  best avoid making mistakes similar to  any they may 
have m ade in the past. As Hay et a l (1993, p.39) remark, “when starting out in a 
new  venture, it pays to  learn from  others w ho have gone before” . Their results 
find that “careful analysis o f  ... product m arket characteristics prior to  start-up 
significantly increases the chances o f  survival and success” [Hay et a l (1993, 
p.31)]. K now ledge o f  one’s existing rivals and o f  custom er demand and 
requirem ents m ust also therefore be o f  im portance if  the small firm is to  keep its 
custom ers, attract new  buyers from com petitors and retain, or im prove upon, its 
position in the m arket place.
A  study o f  over 2,500 small firms by researchers at Aston Business School 
revealed that “only 22%  w ere seeking fast grow th, a further 57% slow but steady 
grow th and 22%  w ere not seeking to grow  at all” [Lee (1994, p.4)]. I f  an owner- 
managed business is providing a com fortable living for the entrepreneur, w ho still 
has total control over the business, then the pursuit o f  grow th might not be a m ajor 
issue. The developm ent o f  such a business must clearly be tied with the aspirations 
o f  the ow ner-m anager, and with his values and personal qualities. As Bhide (1994, 
p. 153) asks, “is the entrepreneur’s goal to build a large, enduring enterprise, carve 
out a niche, or merely turn a quick profit?” The answer to  this question, which 
identifies goals o f  the owner-m anager, should in turn identify the strategic direction 
the business will pursue.
W heelen and H unger (1995, p.368) agree that “personal and family needs may 
strongly affect the small com pany’s mission and objectives and override other
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considerations” and suggest three factors that might lead an ow ner-m anager to  
chose stability over grow th  strategies: “(a) the ow ner is interested mainly in 
generating employment for family members; (b) providing the family a decent 
living, and (c) being the boss o f  a firm small enough to  manage alone com fortably” . 
F o r a full and com plete understanding o f  the goals o f  a small business, it is 
therefore im portant, they say, to  be aw are o f  the m otivations o f  the owner- 
m anager w ho controls the organisation.
U nder the heading o f  Aims, Am bitions an d  M aking D ecisions, various articles 
from  the small business literature have been discussed. It is thought tha t owner- 
m anagers tend to  be very much involved in decision-making, especially in the early 
stages o f  a firm’s life-cycle, and that successful small business m anagers are those 
w ho are willing to  seek an accept advice, and delegate responsibility as the 
business grows.
F orw ard Planning
The production o f  a form al w ritten business plan has becom e a necessity for new 
small firms trying to  acquire seed-corn funding and start-up support. F o r example, 
the N ational Westminster Bank  (1992, p. 18) recom m ends the use o f  a business 
plan: “Y ou need a B usiness Plan. Trying to  run your business w ithout one is like 
floating aimlessly at sea in a fog. You will now  know  where you are going, any 
m ore than w here you have been or w here you are. W hat is worse, sooner o r later 
you will hit som ething” . They provide a p ro  form a  plan as an appendix to  the 
book, which requests inform ation on: the business in general; key staff and their 
qualifications; the product or service and its suggested place in the market; 
available business premises, plant and machinery; and financial funds and needs.
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Furtherm ore, there are form s for compiling an operating budget and cash flow 
forecast. This information, together presented in a neat and logical manner, will 
instil confidence, it is suggested, in organisations with the capacity to  provide 
support to  a new  small firm: “Professional investors usually ask for a w ritten 
business plan because it provides clues about the entrepreneur’s seriousness o f  
purpose, concern for investors, and competence. So entrepreneurs m ust w rite a 
detailed plan even if  they are skeptical about its relationship to  the subsequent 
outcom es” [Bhide (1994, p. 158)].
H ow ever, an article by W elsh and W hite (1981) examines the differences in 
organisation required by a small firm, as com pared to  a large one, and finds that 
forecasting, in particular, is said to  be very difficult in smaller organisations 
because the business is likely to have little or no past experience or data on which 
to base predictions. Constraints on financial and time resources are also likely to  
prove restrictive, as the authors explain: “Because ow ner-m anagers o f  small 
businesses have few, if  any, staff people to prepare plans and analyses, decisions to  
launch new projects are typically based m ore on hunch, necessity or desire, than on 
cold and extensive analysis” [Welsh and W hite (1981, p.28)].
Churchill and Lewis (1983) agree that planning in small firms is, in the early 
stages, minimal. By the ‘survival’ stage (II) in their five-stage analysis, “formal 
planning is, at best, cash forecasting” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.34)]. The 
formal process o f  strategic planning only occurs once the firm reaches stage IV, 
‘take-ofF , and is carried out by m anagers specifically appointed for the task. By 
the final, ‘resource m aturity’ stage, planning is formal and detailed. They believe 
that a key factor o f  a successful small firm lies with the “ow ner’s strategic abilities 
for looking beyond the present and matching the strengths and w eaknesses o f  the
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com pany with his or her goals” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.42)]. The ability to  
do this will enable the ow ner-m anager to prepare for change and ready his 
organisation to  m eet future challenges.
The question as to  w hether a small business should  o r shotdd  not m ake formal 
plans is addressed by Thurston (1983), who observes that plans can be either 
informal and unwritten, or formal and written, and that each may be appropriate, 
depending on the organisation concerned. H e describes various business scenarios 
and the m ethod o f  planning used by the businesses involved, and finds that “the 
presence o r absence o f  formal planning appears not to  be the m ajor variable” 
[Thurston (1983, p. 163)].
Thurston suggests, rather, that the success o f  a new small business and the level 
and form o f  planning required will depend upon a num ber o f  interacting factors, 
which may include: the adm inistrative style and ability o f  the ch ief executive o r 
owner-m anager; the abilities o f  the managers who will implement new  strategies; 
the complexity o f  the business; the strength o f  com petition; the perceived potential 
gain from  strategic planning; w hether or not formal planning is, or can be, a 
substitute for the ow ner-m anager’s own leadership role; the level o f  uncertainty 
faced by the company; and the understanding and effective implem entation o f  
formal planning.
In order to  plan for the future, says Thurston (1983, p. 168), the ow ner-m anager 
must first “gain an understanding o f  [his] business as it has been and as it is now ” 
by getting to  “the heart o f  w hat the com pany’s strengths and w eaknesses are - 
w hat custom ers buy the product or service and why” . This, he adds, should also 
be an on-going part o f  each m anager’s job. Having understood the business, the 
next step is then to set objectives, and finally to “generate, weigh, and choose
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am ong alternatives” [Thurston (1983, p. 176)], before starting on a business plan. 
Thurston (1983, p.184) argues in favour o f  firms laying down a plan, and suggests 
that ow ner-m anagers “ search out ... the appropriate level and structure o f  formal 
planning for [their] com pany’s particular situation”, adding his belief that, in future 
years, “the planner will increasingly have the edge” .
W hat Thurston fails to  note is that, for many small businesses, the only w ay to  
attract any funding support is through the preparation o f  a formal, w ritten business 
plan. This is standard practice amongst UK clearing banks. There are some 
possible explanations for this omission; for example, the paper w as w ritten in 1983, 
and feelings tow ards business plans have changed substantially since then; further, 
practice in the U SA  might be very different to  that in the UK and, particularly, 
Scotland. Probably m ore im portant, though, than merely know ing how  to w rite a 
plan, which may simply be filed or throw n away after appropriate support has been 
achieved, is learning the m ethods by which the plan may be integrated into the 
strategic m anagem ent o f  the business. This is a point upon which Thurston only 
touches, in his section on ‘Implem entation and Feedback’, and which could be 
usefully expanded upon by including some reference to  case study evidence.
A useful summary o f  small business planning research is given in Robinson and 
Pearce (1984), w ho provide a bibliographical analysis o f  w orks dating back to  the 
1950s. They find that, even as recently as the 1980s, there has been a very limited 
am ount o f  empirical research into small firm planning. The conclusions they draw  
from w hat w ork  has been done are that first, it has been “ sufficiently docum ented 
that m ost firms do not formally plan” [Robinson and Pearce (1984, p. 135)]. 
Second, they rem ark upon the existence o f  “ several studies that support a 
favourable perceived or objectively measurable impact o f  strategic planning on
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small firm perform ance” [Robinson and Pearce (1984, p.135)]. Third, they explain 
that “the planning process within small firms deserves considerable attention” and 
propose areas in which research on this topic might be pursued22 [Robinson and 
Pearce (1984, p. 136)].
Actual planning practice in smaller rapid grow th firms is the subject under 
analysis by Shuman and Seeger (1986, p.14), who group their findings under four 
main headings. The first, ‘M anagem ent’s Planning Postu re’, is concerned with the 
attitude o f  ow ner-m anagers to  planning. Although time is a m ajor constraint on 
strategic planning, they still find that m ost people running a small business “feel 
that im proved tim e efficiency, com pany grow th and a better understanding o f  the 
m arket will be achieved through planning” . They also find that those with previous 
experience o f  planning and who had prepared a business plan before start-up “w ere 
likely to  go through the m ajor elements o f  the planning process once their 
companies w ere operating” .
The second category they call the ‘Planning Process’, and this looks at the types 
and m ethods o f  planning in actual use. They find [Shuman and Seeger (1986, 
p. 14)] that, “while one-half o f  the companies did not have a ‘form al’ business plan 
at start-up, the m ajority adopted some form o f  strategic planning once the 
com pany was in operation”, and that grow th, in term s o f  sales, leads to  a m ore 
formal and structured planning process. However, the strategic planning in the 
firms in the sample is typically “primarily concerned with the short-run, updated 
regularly, and operationally oriented” , rather than based on long-term  forecasts and
22 T h e  a u t h o r s  s u g g e s t ,  f o r  e x a m p l e  [ R o b i n s o n  a n d  P e a r c e  ( 1 9 8 4 ,  p .  1 3 6 ) ] ,  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  
t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  ‘ i n f o r m a l ’  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  f o r m a l  p l a n n i n g ;  t h e  u s e  o f  ‘ o u t s i d e r s ’  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  
p r o c e s s ; a n d  a  s t u d y  o f  w h a t  s p e c i f i c  a c t i v i t i e s  w h o u l d  c o m p r i s e  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s .
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budgets.
The ‘Planning A reas’ provide the third grouping, w here it is found that around 
tw o-thirds o f  firms focus on planning with regard to  m arketing23, and one fifth on 
operations; only four per cent target planning in the financial area. And the final 
heading under which Shuman and Seeger choose to  group their results is tha t o f  
‘Planning O rganization’. They find that ow ner-m angers like to  take an active role 
in planning, and that 15 per cent o f  companies have personnel employed 
specifically for planning purposes. O f those companies that anticipated going 
public at som e point, the majority intend to  increase the formal structure o f  their 
planning process before such an event takes place.
K ayser (1990) presents results from an empirical study carried out in Germany 
on business start-ups. The w ork analyses these firm s’ grow th, in turns o f  turnover, 
employees, profitability and investment, over the first seven years o f  existence. A 
surprising result from  the analysis o f  his results is that “planning does not [have] 
the influence on starters’ ability to achieve a com petitive advantage w e had 
supposed” [Kayser (1990, p.237)]. In fact, he goes on to say that “the only 
positive result concerning the well planned start-up is that in these cases problems 
with com petitors appear earlier than in the non or poorly planned new com panies” . 
Kayser (1990, p.237) concludes from these results that “the phase o f  consolidation 
and grow th is the phase in which ... com petitiveness as a result o f  innovativeness 
and know ledge o f  the m arket structures mainly determines the further developm ent 
o f  young firms”, rather than the existence o f  a formal planning process. Kayser
23 F o r  f u r t h e r  e n l i g h t e n m e n t  o n  m a r k e t i n g  i n  s m a l l  f i r m s  s e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  C a r s o n  ( 1 9 8 5 ,  p . 1 5 ) ,  
w h o  p r o v i d e s  a  m o d e l  o f  “ t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  m a r k e t i n g  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s m a l l  f i r m s ” ;  o r  a n  
a r t i c l e  b y  C o l l e r a n  ( 1 9 8 5 )  w h o  e x a m i n e s  ‘ s t r a t e g i c  m a r k e t i n g ’ ,  a n d  p r o p o s e s  a  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  
d e v e l o p i n g  t h i s  i n  a  s m a l l  b u s i n e s s .
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(1990, p.236) points to  his finding that “planning and innovativeness o f  a start-up 
project m ust ... be regarded as a success and grow th factor ... [although] it is not 
the guarantee for starting a successful and long living com pany” . H ow ever, he 
does not describe how  either ‘planning’ or ‘innovativeness’ w ere m easured for this 
sample o f  firms, which leaves the reader curious, and none-the-w iser for having 
read the paper.
B aker et a l (1993, p .82) point out that structured planning had com e under 
criticism in recent years because “form becam e m ore im portant than substance in 
many firms” . Their study reports upon the experience o f  high-grow th US firms 
who have implemented formal procedures for strategic planning, and the m ethods 
by which this has been achieved. They find that “written business plans are used 
m ore for internal m anagem ent purposes than for start-up funding” and also that 
“the com pletion o f  strategic planning is positively associated w ith a firm’s 
profitability” [Baker et a l  (1993, p.82)].
They further note that “for strategic planning to  be most effective, many business 
consultants, business educators, and business people feel that the planning process 
should result in a formal written  business plan that can be used for com m unicating 
with both external and internal audiences alike” [Baker et a l (1993, p.83)]. The 
reasons that a formal w ritten plan is considered to  be better than an idea simply 
held in the mind o f  the entrepreneur are identified as follows: first, a formal plan 
aids “critical thinking and group decision making” ; second, it facilitates “internal 
and external com m unications” ; and third, it can act as a “control mechanism for 
course correction” [B aker et a l  (1993, p.83)].
Prom pted by these thoughts, the purpose o f  the study by B aker et a l  is to 
establish w hether fast-grow th firms develop w ritten business plans and, if  so, how
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they do this and w hat benefits are consequently conferred upon the firm. The 
results show  that the majority o f  plans w ere used to  aid internal m anagement, by 
such means as guiding company operations, measuring perform ance and 
establishing incentives for managers. Interestingly, it was found that less than half 
o f  the firms considered in the study used a w ritten business plan to  help obtain 
funding.
Through a breakdow n analysis o f  m ost profitable versus least profitable firms in 
the sample, B aker et a l  (1993, p.85) establish that there was “no significant 
difference betw een the profitability o f  the firms that d id  and d id  not prepare 
business plans in each o f  the tw o categories” . Strategic planning appeared to  be a 
more im portant predictor o f  profitability, w ith 100 per cent o f  the m ost profitable 
firms taking part in some sort o f  formal planning, com pared with 72.9 per cent o f  
the least profitable firms. Based on their findings, B aker et a l  (1993, pp .87-88) 
suggest a four-phase approach to  implementing strategic planning: first, a one to 
three year strategic plan should be developed to indicate the firm ’s mission using 
an analysis o f  strengths, w eaknesses, opportunities and threats; second, the 
business plan should be prepared w ith full docum entation for m anagem ent and 
employees; third, the plan should be communicated and implemented, with 
employees and m anagers establishing their own goals consistent with com pany­
wide plans; and fourth, there should be a regular (at least quarterly) formal review 
o f  actual perform ance com pared to  that planned for. Adhering to  the stages o f  this 
approach, claim B aker et a l (1993, p.88), will “help produce increases in 
organizational effectiveness” .
Throughout the paper, B aker et a l relate strategic planning to  its effects on 
profitability, assuming that this is the main indicator o f  success in a small firm.
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H ow ever, it is com m on know ledge that many small firms, especially young small 
firms, will often make losses, or ju st break even, whilst still considering their 
business to  be successful according to  criteria set by the ow ner-m anagers.24 
Particularly in the early years, it is often m ore im portant to  them to  invest in plant 
and equipment, building a solid basic infrastructure, before seeking higher profit 
margins. F o r B aker et a l  to  use merely profit as an indicator o f  success, and then 
to  claim tha t following the strategic planning processes adopted by firms with 
higher profits will lead to  increased organisation efficiency, is perhaps both an 
unwise and unsubstantiated claim.
In addition to  providing a clear brief o f  the aims o f  the business to  potential 
investors and organisations geared tow ards supporting new enterprises25, the 
business plan may also serve as a useful checklist to  the owner m anager himself. 
As the business proceeds, so he is able to m onitor budgeted against actual 
perform ance, and to  take corrective action as and when this proves necessary. 
Johnson and Devins (1994, p.6) found “evidence to  suggest that a substantial 
proportion o f  SM Es [Small to  M edium  sized Enterprises] are involved in the 
production o f  a formal w ritten business plan which is regularly review ed” . Their 
w ork is based on a sample o f  SM Es in the Leeds area, and results show  that 43 per 
cent o f  the  SM Es under investigation had a formal w ritten business plan. Bhide
(1994) reports different statistics from an analysis o f  fast-grow ing US companies. 
Only 28 per cent in the sample had a fully w ritten-up business plan, with 41 per 
cent having no plan at all. One reason for this, it is suggested, is that, because o f  
the entrepreneurial nature o f  these new firms, “an ability to roll w ith the punches is
2 4  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t a k i n g  a  s h a r e  o f  t h e i r  r i v a l s ’  c u s t o m e r s .
25 S u c h  a s  t h e  l o c a l  E n t e r p r i s e  T r u s t s  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o m p a n i e s .
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much m ore im portant than careful planning” [Bhide (1994, p.152)] [cf. M intzberg 
(1979, 1994)].
Fass and Scothom e (1990) report on the purposes for w hich Training and 
Enterprise Councils (TEC s) and the Scottish equivalent, Local Enterprise 
Com panies (LECs), w ere originally set up. They aimed to  “im prove the sensitivity 
o f  [public] resources to  local need and to  create a clearer and m ore coherent 
service for its users by bringing together training and enterprise” [Fass and 
Scothorne (1990, p .l ) ] .26 The success o f  these TECs and LECs, they continue, 
had to  depend upon their clear understanding o f  who their clients w ere to  be, as 
well as the  goals they w ere to help their clients achieve. The econom ic 
developm ent task  undertaken by TECs and LECs could be, claim Fass and 
Scothorne (1990, p.7), “justified by wealth creation” , but is, they add, “driven by 
the m otivation o f  individuals who are all seeking their own personal goals” . For 
enterprise organisations, a business plan produced by or with the help o f  the 
entrepreneur will help to  clarify the aims and objectives o f  the business “in such a 
way as to  test the viability o f  converting the idea [o f the entrepreneur] into a 
commercially viable reality” [Bull (1993, p.28)].
The transitional stages through which a small, growing firms passes are the focus 
o f  the w ork  by M ount et a l (1993). They identify five main phases, as follows: (1) 
the ow ner-operated organization; (2) transition to  an ow ner-m anaged organization;
(3) the ow ner-m anaged organization; (4) transition to  em ergent functional 
m anagement; (5) em ergent functional management. As the grow ing business
26  S e e  a l s o  C u r r a n  a n d  D o w n i n g  ( 1 9 8 3 ,  p . 1 4 3 ) ,  w h o  f i n d  t h a t  “ a c t u a l  t a k e - u p  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  
a s s i s t a n c e  w a s  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w ,  [ p r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  o f ]  t h e  p a s s i v e  s t a n c e  o f  d e p a r t m e n t s  o f f e r i n g  
h e l p ,  . . .  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a s p e c t s , . . .  a n d  t h e  t i m e  t a k e n  t o  r e c e i v e  a  d e c i s i o n ” .
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reaches each new  phase, the role o f  the  entrepreneur changes. A t first, “personal 
experience plays a key role in operating decisions” and there is “ little systematic 
consideration o f  marketing, production, personnel, finance and accounting as 
separate functions” [M ount et a l (1993, p. 114)]. Gradually, however, there com es 
a “m ore deliberate approach to  decision-making, and a tendency tow ard shared 
authority” until finally there exists a “m anagement team com prised o f  experts in 
some functional areas, w ho share in the decision-making” [M ount et a l (1993, 
P-116)].
M ount e t a l  (1993, p. 118) believe that the ow ner-m anager needs both a “longer 
term  focus and the ability to  manage change” if  the organisation is to  reach the 
next phase in the line o f  development. Planning is seen to  be particularly im portant 
during the transitional phases, when the organisation is in its m ost vulnerable state, 
and it is during these times that there is a “clear need for direction and objectives” . 
They admit that the dem ands put upon the ow ner-m anager o f  a new  business can 
be so tim e-consum ing that he is unable to  devote a great deal o f  attention to  any 
type o f  planning, but still suggest that “strategic planning can have a positive 
impact on the effectiveness o f  organizations across the phases o f  developm ent” 
[M ount et a l  (1993, p .l  19)].
M ount et a l follow  similar lines o f  research to  others [cf. Churchill and Lewis
(1983)] who seem to think small firms can be classified very neatly into various 
stages or phases in their developm ent. W hat they do not seem to  acknowledge, 
however, is that transition from one stage to  the next is often a slow  and gradual 
process, and that the edges o f  these phases can becom e very blurred. Indeed, m ost 
firms probably could not pinpoint the tim e at which they moved from  one stage to 
the next, so suggesting courses o f  action to be followed in each phase w ould be
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unhelpful to  them. It w ould have been more interesting to  read a discussion o f  
w hat the authors call “the factors which influence success and failure in each 
phase” [M ount et a l (1993, p.120)], rather than simply to  be given a description o f  
the structure o f  the typical firm at each phase o f  its development.
Bhide (1994, p.150) on the other hand is quick to point out tha t a 
“com prehensive analytical approach to planning doesn’t suit m ost start-ups” and 
that “analysis can delay entry [e.g. into a new niche] until it’s too  late o r kill ideas 
by identifying num erous problem s” . H e does concede that at least a little analysis 
and planning can be worthwhile, and suggests [Bhide (1994, p. 150)] the following 
entrepreneurial approaches be adopted: “(1) screen opportunities quickly to  w eed 
out unprom ising ventures; (2) analyze ideas parsimoniously. Focus on a few 
im portant issues; (3) integrate action and analysis. D on’t wait for all the answers, 
and be ready to  change course” . Bhide (1994, p. 161) concludes w ith the 
recom m endation that “entrepreneurs should play w ith and explore ideas, letting 
their strategies evolve through a seamless process o f  guessw ork, analysis and 
action”, which seems to suggest that some planning, although not formally defined 
as such, is a  necessary requirem ent for new small firms.
The usefulness o f  having a business plan, suggest W heelen and H unger (1995, 
p.367) is that it “ serves as a vehicle through which financial support is obtained 
from potential investors and creditors” and, they claim further, “starting a business 
w ithout a business plan is the quickest way to kill a new venture” . They provide a 
suggested table o f  contents for the strategic business plan o f  a new  entrepreneurial 
venture27 and recom m end that “the proposed venture’s mission, objectives,
2 7  S e e  W h e e l e n  a n d  H u n g e r  ( 1 9 9 5 ,  p . 3 6 8 ) .
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strategies, policies, likely board o f  directors (if a corporation), and key m anagers” 
be developed, along w ith the specification o f  internal factors and generation o f  
perform ance projections [W heelen and H unger (1995, p.366)J. They conclude that 
small businesses that use formal plans tend to  perform  better than those that do 
not, and point out that “the process o f  strategic planning, not the plan itself, 
appears to  be a key com ponent o f  business perform ance” [W heelen and H unger 
(1995, p.380)].
Funding Growth
One o f  the m ajor problem s facing a new small firm is that o f  financing its 
operations or its grow th. W elsh and W hite (1981, p. 18) discuss this problem  and 
the differences betw een the financial structures o f  large firms vis-a-vis those o f  
small firms. There are several major points to  be drawn from their work. First, 
they argue that “the very size o f  small businesses creates a special condition ... that 
distinguishes them  from  their larger counterparts and requires some very different 
managem ent approaches” . They term this phenom enon ‘resource poverty’, and 
explain that it results because o f  the highly fragm ented industries in which small 
firms tend to  operate. Second, the salary o f  the ow ner-m anger com m ands a much 
greater proportion o f  revenues than is the case in a larger firm. And third, 
“external forces28 tend to  have more impact on small businesses than on larger 
businesses” .
28 F o r  e x a m p l e ,  c h a n g e s  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  t a x  l a w s ,  l a b o u r  a n d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .
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The authors contend that a small firm is “seldom in equilibrium29, or even near it” 
[W elsh and W hite (1981, p.24)]. In other words, they add, it may be “subject to  
very significant short-term  fluctuations com pared w ith the overall cash flow” . 
They suggest that ‘breakeven analysis’30 is a suitable, and widely used m ethod for 
“determining the sales needed to  support a new  business, a new  product, a new 
sales outlet, or a new plant” [W elsh and W hite (1981, p.26)]. The concept is a 
simple one, and may be com m unicated in a visual manner by plots on a graph. A 
draw back o f  this m ethod, however, is that its accuracy “depends on detailed and 
conservative planning” [W elsh and W hite (1981, p.28)]. Still, ow ner-m anagers 
might find it useful to  visualise future operations in the detail perm itted by 
breakeven analysis, and can, as the authors explain, “portray operations, ... [for 
example, in term s o f  an incom e statem ent], changing the num bers to  reflect a 
variety o f  contingencies and deciding how  to handle these various situations in 
advance” . A ccountants can do this on a simple spreadsheet, and the resulting 
output provides a ‘variance analysis’, which shows the change in income or 
outgoings for a given change in, for example, production.
An interesting observation o f  W elsh and W hite (1981, p.29) is that “a small 
business can survive a surprisingly long time w ithout a profit [but that] it fails on 
the day it can’t m eet a critical payment” . This implies that cash flow is m ore 
im portant in a small firm than profit o r return on investment, at least in the short­
term. Jarvis et a l (1996, p.32) confirm this with “substantial evidence ... that the 
managem ent o f  cash flow  was im portant” in an in-depth study o f  20 small UK
29 W e l s h  a n d  W h i t e  ( 1 9 8 1 ,  p . 2 2 )  n o t e  t h a t ,  “ i n  b i g  b u s in e s s e s  t h e  r a t e s  o f  e x h a n g e  a n d  a n n u a l  
g r o w t h  a r e  n o r m a l l y  s m a l l ;  t h u s  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  d e s c r i b e  a  s y s t e m  i n  a p p r o x i m a t e  
e q u i l i b r i u m ” . T h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  f o r  a  s m a l l  f i r m ,  w h e r e  e v e n  s m a l l  c h a n g e s  c a n  l e a d  t o  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  m a j o r  u p h e a v a l .
30 T h e  ‘ b r e a k e v e n  p o i n t ’  b e i n g  t h a t  a t  w h i c h  r e v e n u e  is  e q u a l  t o  c o s t s .
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firms. To lenders of money, though, a critical factor to be considered, before 
contemplating a loan, is the magnitude of the firm’s ‘debt-equity’ or ‘gearing’ 
ratio. Welsh and White (1981, p.30) argue that “blind application of the debt- 
equity ratio criteria ... can, and often does, threaten ... survival”, as “a small 
business that survives start-up losses may have excellent capacity to service an 
additional debt burden” . 3 1 Losses on its balance sheet, though, which are only too 
common in a new, small firm, will count against it, raising the gearing ratio to a 
level above that at which a lender will even consider giving a loan. 3 2
Churchill and Lewis (1983) believe that financing becomes most important at the 
‘success’ stage (III) in their analysis of small firm growth. In the earlier stages, 
finance usually comes from the owner-manager, friends and/or relatives33, but by 
stage III, the owner-manager can either choose to ‘disengage’ himself from the 
business, or to ‘grow’. Should he take the latter option, they say, then “the owner 
takes the cash and the established borrowing power of the company and risks it all 
in financing growth” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.34)]. A key concern at this 
point is to maintain profitability, and to train managers “to meet the needs of the 
growing business ... [and who have] an eye to the company’s future rather than its 
current condition” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.34)].
3 1 S e e  L e v i n  a n d  T r a v i s  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  w h o  s u p p o r t  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  b e  w a r y  o f  u s i n g  
s t a n d a r d  f i n a n c i a l  i n d i c a t o r s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  g e a r i n g  r a t i o ,  t o  m e a s u r e  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  a  s m a l l  
b u s i n e s s , a n d  p r o v i d e  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  w h y  t h e y  b e l i e v e  t h i s  m a y  b e  p r u d e n t :  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  l i n e  
b e t w e e n  d e b t  a n d  e q u i t y  is  b l u r r e d ;  l i f e s t y l e  i s  a  p a r t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s , a n d  p e r s o n a l  a s s e ts  
m a y  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  s h e e t ;  s t a n d a r d  f i n a n c i a l  f o r m u l a e  d o  n o t  a l w a y s  a p p l y ;  p e r s o n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e  d e t e r m i n e s  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c i e s ;  a n d  b a n k s  o f t e n  c o m b i n e  p e r s o n a l  a n d  b u s i n e s s  w e a l t h .
32 W e l s h  a n d  W h i t e  ( 1 9 8 1 ,  p . 3 1 )  q u o t e  t h e  e x a m p l e  o f  a  s m a l l  f i r m  t h a t  w a s  t u r n i n g  o v e r  $ 1
m i l l i o n  p e r  y e a r ,  h a d  a  n e t  w o r t h  o f  $ 5 ,0 0 0 ,  a n d  r e q u i r e d  $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  d e b t  f i n a n c e .  T h e  g e a r i n g  
r a t i o  w a s  c a l c u l a t e d  a t  6 0  ( 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  5 ,0 0 0 )  a n d  t h e  b a n k ,  t h e r e f o r e , r e f u s e d  t h e  l o a n .  T h e y
b a s e d  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  o n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  r a t i o  o f  2  o r  l e s s , s a y  t h e  a u t h o r s ,  is  c o m m o n  i n  m o s t  
s u c c e s s f u l  b i g  b u s i n e s s e s .
33 T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  s e e m s  t o  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  w o r k  o f  K a y s e r  ( 1 9 9 0 ,  p . 2 3 3 ) ,  w h o  f i n d s  e m p i r i c a l  
e v i d e n c e  t h a t  “ y o u n g  f i r m s  h a v e  n o  t i m e  t o  s t o p  t o  t a k e  b r e a t h  . . .  [ a n d ]  b i g  i n v e s t m e n t s  h a v e  t o  b e  
m a d e  a l r e a d y  a f t e r  t h e i r  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  y e a r  o f  e x i s t e n c e ” .
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A major concern of the authors’ stage IV, ‘take-off, is the financing of rapid 
growth. They pose the question: “Will there be enough [cash] to satisfy the great 
demands growth brings ... and a cash flow that is not eroded by inadequate 
expense and controls or ill-advised investments brought about by owner 
impatience?” [Churchill and Lewis (1983, p.40)]. The owner-manager, they 
suggest, might need to be willing to take the risk of having a high debt-equity ratio, 
always assuming he can command the required resources, if the business is to 
continue along the projected path.
In order to pursue strategies for growth, an owner-manager must be willing to be 
flexible in his attitude to funding. He may need to be willing to forego a 
percentage of current profits or to dilute his equity holding, for example by taking 
on a partner who will inject capital, if this will lead to greater turnover in the long 
run [cf. Storey (1994)]. He should evaluate carefully the various methods open to 
him of utilising profit. Bull (1993) explains that a company basically has a choice 
between two options: they can either distribute or reinvest profit. The owner- 
manager should attempt to weigh up the advantages of both decisions, choosing 
the one that he believes best serves the aims of the business. “Management needs 
to recognise the relative importance of... different forms of return3 4  ... in targeting 
the kind of investor that best satisfies the company’s requirement for growth” [Bull 
(1993, p.29)]. Bhide (1994, p. 154) agrees that “the entrepreneur must be able to 
secure others’ resources on favourable terms and make do with less” .
Entrepreneurs should be wary of depending too much upon customers paying for 
large orders on time, as “an unexpected need for cash ... may shut down a venture”
3 4  W h i c h ,  s u g g e s t s  B u l l  ( 1 9 9 3 ,  p . 2 9 )  c o u l d  b e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  “ d i v i d e n d  p a y m e n t s  o r  c a p i t a l  
g r o w t h  t h r o u g h  r e i n v e s t m e n t ” .
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[Bhide (1993, p. 156)]. They should therefore, according to Bhide (1993, p.156) 
“favor ventures that aren’t capital intensive and have the profit margins to sustain 
rapid growth with internally generated funds” .
Harris (1993) investigates various options for raising finance, considering both 
factoring and invoice discounting. 3 5  From an interview with the chairman of the 
Association of British Factors and Discounters he discovers that “when businesses 
want to expand - which is what is increasingly happening now as growth starts 
again - they turn to factoring to help produce the investment cash they need” 
[Harris (1993, p.40)]. The main reason for companies using factoring, claims 
Harris, is to improve upon or help solve problems with their cash flow. In 
addition, though, they gain other unexpected benefits, according to survey 
evidence36, such as “confidence derived from financial advice, improved financial 
disciplines for the company and reduced stress among managing directors and 
managers” [Harris (1993, p.41)]. However, Harris is writing from the perspective 
of those working in the factoring industry, who are effectively selling their service 
and therefore flagging its advantages. Little empirical evidence exists to suggest 
exactly how small firm owner-managers themselves feel about such possibilities, so 
the benefits identified by the Association of British Factors and Discounters may 
not, in practice, be as much in evidence as they declare.
Hawkins (1993, p.58) agrees that factors are “good at ... helping small to 
medium-sized businesses to expand and develop” , but points out that factoring and 
discounting “work best when the client company has a product or service which is
35 I n v o i c e s  a r e  b o u g h t  o v e r  f r o m  a  c o m p a n y ,  w h i c h  is  p a i d  i n s t a n t l y  i n  c a s h  a  s u m  c o m m o n l y  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  u p  t o  8 0 %  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i t s  i n v o i c e s .  T h e  c o m p a n y  r e c e i v e s  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  
b a l a n c e  w h e n  t h e  d e b t  is  m e t .
36 F r o n t  A I M  M a r k e t  R e s e a r c h .
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capable of strong growth and where, by intelligent use within the business of 
additional funding, management can obtain optimum benefit from the ‘gearing’ 
effect that advance payments against debtors can bring about” . He suggests that 
managers consider the benefits of taking on a full factoring service against the 
additional cost of such a service, for example, savings in management time and 
quicker payment of debts, and concludes that a good relationship with the 
company’s factor can “provide really critical support to a business during its 
formative years” [Hawkins (1993, p.59)]. What both Harris and Hawkins seem to 
neglect is that a young small business that is experiencing a cash flow crisis might 
find the charges levied by factoring organisations particularly burdensome during 
its early life-cycle. Whereas they operate on the premise of being a helpful means 
of improving cash flow management, in reality they may constitute a debilitating 
drain on young firms in their eagerness to profit from businesses in straightened 
circumstances.
A paper by Reid (1996a) reports on empirical evidence of funding shortages 
experienced by mature micro-firms in Scotland. 3 7  The data were collected by 
telephone interviews and his analysis shows that a “variation of part-time 
employees provided the most powerful leverage on the probability of experiencing 
a funding shortage” [Reid (1996a, p.35)]. A key finding is that “a ten per cent 
increase in part-time employees ... lowers the probability of experiencing funding 
shortages by two and a half per cent” . Reid (1996a, p.36) also finds that firms 
with a high turnover are more likely to experience shortages in funding than those 
with a low turnover, and that “owner-managers of small firms that had experienced
3 7  S e e  a l s o  B i n k s  a n d  E n n e w  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  w h o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  p r o b l e m s  f a c e d  b y  s m a l l  f i r m s  i n  t r y i n g  
t o  g a i n  c r e d i t .
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funding shortages tended to think that their plights could be improved by more 
financial support from friends and family, and by a more permissive bank lending 
policy, but that they would only be worsened by an extension of trade credit” . 
These results suggest that micro-firms might be unwilling to take on board the 
facilities offered by factors and discounters, outlined above, if other methods of 
financing were available.
Information, Technology an d  Communications
In Porter and Millar (1991) the authors describe how information can give a firm 
competitive advantage. Technology is improving the speed and reliability with 
which information is passed around the globe. As they point out, “dramatic 
reductions in the cost of obtaining, processing and transmitting information are 
changing the way we do business” [Porter and Millar (1991, p.33)]. Their work 
aims to help firms adapt and respond to the overwhelming threats and 
opportunities that are opened up by major breakthroughs in technological 
innovation.
As has been mentioned previously, technology is affecting Porter’s value chain 
at all stages \c f  Section 2.2: Corporate Strategy], both at the primary activities and 
support activities level. The coordination of all of the activities that constitute a 
successful business requires linkages between these activities, and also to external 
bodies of, for example, suppliers and buyers: “A company can create competitive 
advantage by optimizing or coordinating these links to the outside” [Porter and 
Millar (1991, p.34)]. Information technology (IT) can assist a firm in so doing, 
enabling them to communicate with suppliers and buyers more effectively than 
before. Porter and Millar (1991, p.40) state that “in any company, information
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technology has a powerful effect on competitive advantage in either cost or 
differentiation” . It remains for firms to exploit these opportunities as best they can.
Cooper et a l (1991) agree that technology can assist small firms that use these 
new technologies to differentiate their products or to attack new niches. 
Information technology is about transferring, storing and processing information. 
Electronic mailing systems and networks are growing at a rapid pace, and any 
small firm that is adaptable can take advantage of new opportunities on offer. As 
Cooper et a l (1991, p.620) note, industries in which there is little or no technical 
change offer few opportunities for small firms to break into the market, but 
“changes in the form of deregulation, new technology, organizational and 
management innovations, and changing customer preferences create opportunities 
for new firms” . Indeed, Storey (1994, p. 146) suggests that “it may also be the 
case that more technologically sophisticated businesses, even in conventional 
sectors, are likely to grow more rapidly than those with lower levels of technical 
sophistication” .
Variyam and Kraybill (1993, p. 136) remark that the small scale research and 
development carried out by small firms “may include a greater reliance [than that 
of larger firms] on the acquisition of technical knowledge and the adoption of new 
technologies from external sources such as trade publications, scientific journals, 
and government agencies” . Given that, because of their small size, having a 
separate R&D department would be both unnecessarily costly and time-consuming, 
this would appear to be a reasonable assumption. 3 8  Their results also show that
38 S e e  a l s o  R e i d ,  S i l e r  &  S m i t h  ( 1 9 9 6 ,  p p . 4 1 - 2 ) ,  w h o  f i n d  e v i d e n c e  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  “ n o n  p a t e n t i n g  
f i r m s  a r e  b e n e f i t t i n g  f r o m  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d i f f u s i o n ,  . . .  o c c u r r i n g  b y  f r e e  t r a n s f e r  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
p r o p e r t y  w i t h i n  t h e  l a r g e r  n e t  o f  f i r m  r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  e n m e s h e s  t h e  n o n - p a t e n t i n g  f i r m s ” .
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the better educated the owner manager, the more likely is the firm to follow 
strategies such as planning and the implementation of new technologies to pursue 
growth.
The paper by Variyam and Kraybill is certainly interesting, but it has significant 
limitations. The authors present the results of four regressions, the dependent 
variables of which are defined as strategies; for example, one measures the 
importance of using new technologies to the firm’s competitive strategy. The 
adoption or otherwise of these so-called ‘strategies’ is explored by a number of 
firm-specific variables such as size, age, sector and human capital. To define a 
strategy as being simply the respondent’s perceived importance of a factor at one 
point in time is completely unconvincing if the researchers do not extend the 
analysis over a greater time horizon. Strategy is much more than a single event or 
issue, but is instead a process of interlinked procedures. However, to their credit, 
Variyam and Kraybill do at least acknowledge (1993, p.144) that “a model of firm 
growth in a dynamic framework ... would allow better control of self-selection 
effects and better modelling of the intertemporal aspects of strategy adoption and 
firm performance” . Also, an ordered probit or logit would be a more appropriate 
statistical method than regression analysis, as the dependent variable is not a 
continuous real variable.
Dodgson and Rothwell (1989, p. 145) provide evidence to show that “in some 
cases ... smaller firm strategies [for technology] are just as sophisticated as those in 
large firms, if not more so” . They present data to show that new technology based 
firms and high-tech small to medium-sized firms (SMFs) have become increasingly 
important in recent years, and put his down partly to the opportunities provided by
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information technology. 3 9  The SMFs analysed in the study were highly 
technologically advanced, often with strong technological links to external bodies 
such as universities, research institutes and other companies. These links were to 
prove important as many of the high-tech firms had products of very short life- 
cycles. Research and development were therefore a key part of what they did, 
when seeking to diversify, and links with other similarly-minded institutions were 
an important factor.
A study carried out in Sweden which investigates various tourism enterprises and 
organisations finds that “the networks and relations with which an enterprise 
establishes contacts seem to have a certain effect on whether or not it will be 
successful” [Steene (1991, p.667)]. The study also finds that enterprises whose 
employees are involved in other activities, such as politics or clubs, are also more 
likely to be successful than those who are not. Steene, however, chooses not to 
define success, and provides little evidence to convince the reader of his findings or 
conclusions in this narrative-style note.
Another study, by McNicoll (1994), compares social networking between 
prospective entrepreneurs in Scotland and Boston, Massachusetts, concentrating 
on entrepreneurs who are at the “pre-start-up” stage. The author suggests that 
“social networking is important in the firm formation process ... [and provides] a 
mechanism through which the would-be entrepreneur can access expertise and 
assistance which will assist him/her in taking forward his/her business idea” 
[McNicoll (1994, p.l)]. The sample of American respondents had many more (in
39 O t h e r  f a c t o r s  m e n t i o n e d  i n c l u d e :  b i o t e c h n o l o g y ,  n e w  m a t e r i a l s  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  
s o f t w a r e  i n d u s t r y ;  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  n e w  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ;  g r o w t h  o f  a v a i l a b l e  v e n t u r e  c a p i t a l ;  a n d  a n  
i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  p o l i c i e s  a n d  a t t i t u d e s  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  \cf. D o g s o n  a n d  R o t l n v e l l  
( 1 9 8 9 ,  p .  1 4 6 ) ] .
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both number and frequency) social contacts than their Scottish counterparts, 
received better professional and business advice from within the family group, and 
were more willing to accept in a constructive manner criticism from friends. The 
author concludes that the American sample showed “a greater understanding and 
appreciation of the need to network” and suggests that “there is clear evidence that 
the more active networkers demonstrate more success at accessing the finance, 
advice and assistance which they need to help them develop their business idea” 
[McNicoll (1994, p. 14)]. Compare this with Curran’s (1996, p.23) finding for UK 
firms that “speculative networking or highly proactive networking ... to further the 
aims of the business are relatively rare or, at best, a small proportion of total links 
maintained, [and that] while a small fraction of owner-managers or owner- 
managers in some sectors may act in these ways, most small business owners have 
neither the time nor the inclination to behave in such ways” .
The study by McNicoll (1994), and also, to a degree, that of Curran (1996), is 
essentially an observational and qualitative analysis of the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs, rather than a prescription for ‘best-practice’ as regards networking. 
McNicoll finds that networking is distinctly different between respondents from the 
Scottish and US samples, but falls short of suggesting why these differences are 
important. There may indeed exist a clear distinction between the two groups of 
entrepreneurs, but what McNicoll fails to take into account is that these may be 
due, in part, to social and macroeconomic differences between the two countries, 
rather than a failure on the part of the Scottish entrepreneurs.
To conclude this section, it is suggested that firms that are able to use new 
technologies should find that they begin to experience a competitive advantage 
over rivals who have failed to take on board and exploit the new systems IT has
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made available. To learn from Drucker (1995, p.370), “Advances in scientific and 
nonscientific knowledge can create new products and new markets [and] advances 
in two different areas sometimes can be integrated to form the basis of a new 
product” . Firms that can integrate technology into their existing systems, both for 
information gathering and for communications, are fortunate to be in such a 
position. But those who fail to appreciate in time the importance of IT may find, in 
the future, that technology and customers are leaving them behind.
Quality Control an d  SW O T Analysis
One of the tools that will enable management in small firms to plan more 
effectively is ‘situation analysis’ which, according to Shuman and Seeger (1986, 
p. 1 2 ), will help it to “gain an understanding of its business as it has been and as it is 
now” . It is, they explain, a method of examining both the internal and external 
influences on the firm: “Internally, it defines strengths, weaknesses, and resources 
available or potentially acquirable. Externally, it defines competitive position, 
opportunities and threats in the present and anticipated environment” [Shuman and 
Seeger (1986, p. 12)]. Selection of suitable strategies is thereby facilitated, as the 
firm can see more clearly how it can or should match up its resources with 
strengths and opportunities; while at the same time combating its threats and 
improving upon its weaknesses.
Techniques such as that above are aimed at improving the firm’s performance, by 
helping it to target effectively the correct niche for its product, and to take
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advantage of its core capabilities. 4 0  Competitive advantage can also be brought 
about by the customers’ perception of the firm’s product quality: if they believe it 
to be better than that of its rivals, then they are more likely to switch between 
goods and purchase the new, or improved, product. As Ward and Stasch (1988, 
p.27) explain, “even if the product associated with a new strategy is not a new 
form of an already existing product, it can be a meaningfully different product to 
certain target markets if it is of higher quality than the competitor’s products” .
A recent development in management techniques is that of Total Quality 
Management (TQM) . 4 1 The focus of such a system is on continuous improvement 
and the belief that quality is the responsibility of every employee: “When an 
organisation embraces TQM, it acquires a set of fundamental beliefs and values”, 
one of which is “dissatisfaction with the status quo - always believing that 
something can be done better” [Hand (1993, p.58)]. Recent accounting literature 
stresses the importance of integrating strategic planning and quality systems, as 
Hand (1993, p.58) explains: “As organisations develop in quality maturity, the 
need to be able to integrate planning for quality with the strategic planning process 
becomes increasingly important” . What Hand does not comment on, however, is 
the amount of time, effort and resources that need to be dedicated to implementing 
a TQM system. These may prove to be too much of a drain, especially in smaller 
firms, where each member of staff is usually working very hard already, and time
40 B a k k e r  et al ( 1 9 9 4 ,  p .  1 4 )  s t a t e  t h a t  “ f o c u s i n g  o n  a  c o r p o r a t i o n ’ s c o r e  c o m p e t e n c i e s , 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i t s  s t r e n g t h s  a n d  w e a k n e s s e s , is  o n e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p s  t o  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  c u l t i v a t i n g  
s u c c e s s f u l  n e w  b u s i n e s s  o p t i o n s ” . T h e i r  w o r k  is  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  d e v e l o p i n g  n e w  b u s i n e s s  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  e x i s t i n g ,  l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  b u t  e q u a l l y  m a y  b e  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  n e w  
s m a l l  f i r m  t r y i n g  t o  e n t e r  a  m a r k e t  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e .
4 1  D e f i n e d  i n  C I M A ’ s ( 1 9 9 1 )  Official Terminology a s  “ t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  q u a l i t y ,  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o b t a i n e d  b y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  p r o c e s s e s  
a s  w e l l  a s  o u t p u t s ” .
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and money are scarce resources.
Hankes (1993a, p.32) interviews two businessmen experienced in TQM 
techniques and discovers that “an underlying concept of TQM is that quality 
should be universally ow ned  ... [and] is not a shopfloor problem but the concern 
and responsibility of every employee” . The respondents found that maintaining 
employee commitment and implementing TQM over a long time period was better 
than installing a completely new system in one go. They also warned against 
allowing consultants to “bully” management into taking unnecessary steps and, in 
effect, letting them take over the business, running it to their own plans and ideas.
A TQM plan will obviously involve some changes in the way the business is run, 
but it “ should be integrated into the existing business planning process” [Hankes 
(1993a, p.32)]. Some of the ways in which this can be done are suggested, as 
follows: first, reports of actual results against quality targets should be reported 
along with the monthly accounts; second, an annual “quality plan” should be 
prepared, analysing past performance and setting future targets; third, note should 
be taken of “quality defects” or customer complaints, and appropriate remedial 
action taken.
Once the initial commitment to a quality system has been obtained from all 
employees, this should be maintained through incentives such as training 
programmes and continuous involvement. Communication is thus important for 
both morale building and making others aware of objectives. In a follow-up 
interview with the same two respondents, Hankes (1993b) discovers that SWOT 
analysis4 2  is seen as a useful tool for measuring performance and highlighting areas
4 2  A n  a n a l y s i s  o f  S t r e n g t h s ,  W e a k n e s s e s ,  O p p o r t u n i t e s  a n d  T h r e a t s .  S e e  S e c t i o n  2 . 2  a b o v e  f o r  
f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n .
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for investigation. One firm found it advantageous to set out to achieve the 
environmental British Standard BS5750. Other initiatives were also seen to be 
important in communicating to those external to the organisation the firm’s 
commitment to quality. Specifically mentioned were the government’s “Investors 
in People” programme, “Return to Learn” and other training and youth 
employment schemes.
Partridge and Perren (1993) argue that strategic management can be assisted by 
using Porter’s value chain to compare the current position of the firm with that 
expected from a selected strategy, in order to identify a strategic “gap” . This gap 
can then be filled with the implementation of a plan using a combination of, for 
example, Activity-Based Costing (ABC) 4 3  and the value chain analysis. They claim 
that popular management techniques, including TQM and ABC, “can be integrated 
into Porter’s framework at the implementation phase ... [and] should be seen as 
enabling techniques within the overall context of the strategic direction of the 
company” [Partridge and Peren (1993, p.38)].
An extension of TQM is discussed by Madu and Kuei (1993) who introduce 
what they call “Strategic Total Quality Management” (STQM). This, they say, is 
“driven by customers and environmental needs and looks to identify critical factors 
that determine the survivability and competitiveness of a firm in the near future” 
[Madu and Kuei (1993, p.121)]. It therefore concentrates not only on the quality 
of the products or services provided, but is also “a philosophy that considers 
socially responsible and environmental decisions and integrates them into total 
quality management in order to improve the global competitiveness of a firm by
43 F o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  A B C  s y s t e m s , t h e i r  u s e  a n d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  s e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  G l a d  
( 1 9 9 3 )  o r  M o r g a n  a n d  B o r k  ( 1 9 9 3 ) .
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strengthening and enhancing its quality objectives” [Madu and Kuei (1993,
P-122)].
The first stage to implementing a STQM system is the planning and policy 
making. Again, the use of SWOT analysis is advocated by Madu and Kuei (1993, 
pp. 128-130) as “knowledge of the firm’s strengths and weaknesses will enable it to 
better position itself against its competitors” and develop feasible strategies given 
its resources. 4 4  The second stage is to implement strategies on a small scale, 
considering the risks involved and ensuring the firm is “doing the right thing” . 
Third, is the evaluation and control of the new system, aiming to ensure that the 
firm is “doing the things right” . And finally, there comes the full scale 
implementation of the strategy, where the main objective is to ensure that the firm 
is “getting the best performance with less resources” . Madu and Kuei justify the 
use of a STQM system when they conclude as follows: “In the context of Porter’s 
Value Chain model, protection of the environment is a value-added activity that 
will yield benefits in the long-run. From a social welfare prospective, the social 
responsibility of the firm is enhanced” . Again, though, as with Hand (1993), the 
work of Madu and Kuei (1993) might not be readily applied to the young small 
firm, where the benefits of STQM might be too far in the future to anticipate, and 
for whom its implementation may be too costly or time-consuming.
Bamberger’ s (1989) work on small and medium-sized firms examines the ways in 
which they seek to develop competitive advantage. Managers of some 1,135 firms 
were interviewed using a questionnaire in which a key question was, “On what
4 4  S e e  a l s o  T h u r s t o n  ( 1 9 8 3 ,  p . 1 6 2 )  w h o  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  “ t o  p l a n  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  b u s i n e s s  e x e c u t i v e s  
m u s t  a s s e s s  c o m p a n y  s t r e n g t h s  a n d  w e a k n e s s e s , b u s i n e s s  a n d  p e r s o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  a n d  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  a p p r o a c h e s ” .
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factors do you put specific emphasis in order to achieve or maintain a competitive 
position in your main market?” [Bamberger (1989, p.83)]. Respondents were 
asked to grade a list of 26 given factors4 5  on a scale ranging from ‘no importance’ 
to ‘high importance’ . From the results thus obtained, it was established that 
managers saw their product quality as being a key strength when it came to 
achieving competitive advantage over their rivals.
Bamberger (1989) presents many factors that have been rated by respondents as 
being important to their businesses. Whilst it is useful to hear what the owner- 
managers of small businesses believe, it would have been even more interesting to 
relate their beliefs to a measure of each factor’s actual importance. Further, it 
would be useful to have an indication of how these beliefs translate into 
performance, and whether or not responses are modified in the light of experience.
2.4 Summary
Chapter 2  has introduced the literature on strategy, dating back as far as Ansoff 
(1965), and has thus established the basis for, and put into context, this study of 
small business strategy. Section 2.2 discusses the works on corporate strategy, 
from which emerge two distinct schools of thought. First, there are those who 
recommend a formally structured planning process [cf. Ansoff (1965); Porter 
(1980, 1985)]. These authors believe that firms are able to analyse in detail their 
environment, and develop detailed plans and strategies based on forecasts and 
assumptions. Strategies are formulated on the basis of goals and objectives, taking
45 I n c l u d i n g :  p r o d u c t  q u a l i t y ;  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  d e l i v e r y ;  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r m ;  c o m p e t e n c e  o f  
w o r k e r s ;  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f i r m ;  q u a l i t y  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ;  g o o d  l o c a l  i m a g e  a n d  p e r s o n a l  c o n t a c t s ;  
f i n a n c i a l  c a p a b i l i t y ;  etc.
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into account the constraints of internal resources available, as well as being aware 
of external threats or opportunities.
On the other hand, there are the relatively informal methods preferred by the 
likes of Mintzberg and Steiner. These writers object to the methods of formal 
structured planning mentioned above, and instead suggest that a firm base its 
strategies on a ‘mission’, adapting to the environment as and when needed. They 
argue that planning far into the future is impossible, as no-one can predict future 
events with any great certainty, and that the firm that is able to adapt quickly and 
efficiently will succeed, even if it does not plan or forecast far ahead.
Section 2.3 discusses the literature, including some empirical evidence, on 
strategy and the small firm, and from this the following points become apparent. 
First, decision-making in young, small firms appears to be closely linked to the 
ambitions of the owner-manager, suggesting a ‘lifestyle’ choice of employment. 
As the firm grows, the owner-manager has the choice of two options: either retain 
control, keep growth relatively contained and continue to enjoy the pleasure 
afforded by being one’s own boss; or learn to delegate responsibility, seek extra 
financing and aim for expansion which, while removing an element of control, and 
perhaps therefore also enjoyment, might reap larger financial rewards in the long 
term [cf. Storey (1994)].
Compared to the corporate strategy literature, the literature on small business 
strategy puts more emphasis on the use of business plans. It is argued that, 
primarily, they serve to clarify the ideas of the owners of a new, small business; but 
also that they are a useful aid to gaining start-up finance. It is generally 
acknowledged that new, small firms will have difficulty in producing a plan: first, 
they have no previous history on which to make predictions; and second, the time
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required to develop such plans may be perceived of as ‘wasted’, when what the 
owner-manager feels he should  be doing is getting on with running the business 
and marketing the product.
When seeking external funding, small firms are typically seen by banks as ‘high 
risk’ debtors, so interest rates on loans are often set prohibitively high, and the firm 
is discouraged from applying for bank financing. Few alternatives are feasible. A 
charismatic entrepreneur with a novel idea might be lucky enough to attract 
venture capital or business angel investment but, for most of the rest, their only 
hope lies with family, friends or the small grants that are available from local 
authorities or enterprise agencies. Some writers [cf. Harris (1993); Hawkins 
(1993)] suggest that factoring or invoice discounting might be a suitable alternative 
method of improving cash flow, but there is little evidence to suggest that either of 
these play a useful role in the financial structure of new, small firms.
The opportunities offered by new technologies are discussed next, and writers on 
this topic seem to agree that the integration of new technologies into a business is a 
positive and useful step to take. Advantages are that it can greatly improve the 
speed and efficiency of communications, to anywhere in the world; rapidly 
changing technologies open up new niche markets for exploitation by the alert and 
innovative entrepreneur; and forecasting or generating many possible future 
scenarios, using computer packages, becomes an easy task, where once it might 
have taken days, or even weeks, to develop even a simple plan.
Finally, in section 2.3, was discussed the use of quality control in small firms. 
Basically, a knowledge of one’s strengths and weaknesses, an awareness of 
opportunities and threats, and the ability to monitor and control these attributes 
will ensure that quality is kept at a level acceptable to the target customers. It
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should also assist the small business owner-manager in strategically targeting and 
protecting a specific niche market. Total Quality Management (TQM) systems, 
Activity Based Costing (ABC) and the achieving of a approved quality standards 
such as, for example, the British (now European or International) Standards, were 
all discussed as possible methods of ensuring and advertising quality. However, 
with these, as with invoice discounting and factoring, there is not much empirical 
data to suggest that the use of these systems is either useful or widespread among 
small firms.
In short, the above analysis has identified several gaps in the existing literature, 
which will be addressed by this work. It will examine formal [e.g. Porter] versus 
informal [e.g. Mintzberg] styles of planning, and tiy to find out which is most 
successful for the new small firm. It will use first-hand empirical evidence to 
provide a grounded analysis of factual data. It will establish a multivariate measure 
of firm performance, to incorporate growth, profitability and productivity. It will 
relate strategies used to firm performance, in order to provide guidelines for 
academics, practitioners and policy makers. It will use more than one time period 
of observations, to permit examination of the outcomes of strategic choices. It will 
provide detailed qualitative evidence on strategic processes within small firms. 
And it will question respondents on their beliefs, relate these to performance and 
examine how beliefs change over time.
This analysis of the literature on strategy has suggested several points that are 
worth pursuing empirically, which will be examined through the use of an 
administered questionnaire. This should enable us to discover how relevant are the 
works on corporate strategy to a new, small firm, and whether or not the findings 
in the literature on small firms are equally valid for the micro firm in Scotland.
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This thesis will address such issues, by investigating the experience of micro firms 
in Scotland, using fieldwork methods to develop an empirical body of data, 
providing factual evidence rather than theoretical assumptions, and in this way, it is 
hoped, providing a valuable addition to the existing literature in this field. Chapter 
3 now goes on to discuss the methodology behind the study.
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C h a p te r  3
F ie ld w o rk : sam ple  a n d  q u e s tio n n a ire  design
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 introduces the methodology used in collecting the data for this study. 
First, the means of establishing the sample of firms for interview is explained by 
reference to meetings with Directors of Enterprise Trusts. These meetings are 
shown to provide an overview of new small firms in Scotland. The method of 
sample selection is justified with reference to the relevant literature, and it is shown 
how conversations with Directors were instrumental in the design of the 
administered questionnaire.
Second, the reasons for using an administered questionnaire are explained, and 
the section relating to Business Strategy is analysed in detail. The questions in the 
administered questionnaire are described, as is the reasoning behind their inclusion 
and the issues they are intended to address. Again it is shown how questions are 
related to comments made during conversations with the Enterprise Trusts, and 
also by reference to the literature.
Next, the interviews themselves are discussed. Reasons for the pilot study are 
explained, then the way in which firms were approached for inclusion in the main 
study is laid out. The timescale for interviews is also discussed here, as is the 
importance of the development of a good working relationship between the 
research centre and respondents.
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Following the discussion of the administered questionnaire and of its 
implementation, an outline of the semi-structured questionnaire and its 
development is included. It is shown how the new format was used to develop 
detailed case studies of a subset of the original sample of firms, with reference to 
the process of strategy formulation and choice followed in these firms. There is 
then a discussion of the questions covered during these additional meetings, and 
the reasons for their inclusion, followed by a description of the methods used to 
elicit respondent’s cooperation.
3.2 Establishing the Sample
One aim of the study was to incorporate as wide a range of firms as possible, in 
terms of regional diversity, but at the same time it was essential that the sample 
should be random, in order that assumptions could be made about the population 
as a whole. Sekaran (1992) discusses reasons for and benefits of taking a sample 
from the population. 1 Because there is no national register of start-up firms in 
Scotland, another source had to be found to establish the sample. The Enterprise 
Trusts were the natural choice, as they are often the first port of call for a budding 
entrepreneur seeking to start up a new venture. Table 3.1 describes some of the 
aims of various Enterprise Trusts, as taken from their promotional literature used 
to attract new business ventures. We can see that they place a strong emphasis on 
helping firms to grow and become more profitable concerns, for their own good as 
well as for the local economic community. The method of sample selection
^ e e  S e k a r a n  ( 1 9 9 2 )  C h a p t e r  8 :  S a m p l i n g .
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GOALS OF THE ENTERPRISE TRUSTS
Table 3.1
The Enterprise Trust aims to:
“...encourage the growth and development of both new 
and existing businesses”
Strathkelvin Enterprise Trust
“...aid your company to a more successful and profitable 
future”
Glasgow Opportunities
“...provide assistance for expansion and survival plans for 
small and medium sized enterprises”
North East Fife Enterprise Trust
“...provide help and support for the smaller business, both 
new and expanding”
South Fife Enterprise Trust
“...improve the economic outlook and employment 
prospects for Clackmannanshire ... to build on the strong 
manufacturing traditions of the area and play our part in 
developing a diverse and environmentally responsible 
local economy which can be sustained”
Alloa Clackmannanshire Enterprise
“...[help] you to get your business right”
Falkirk Enterprise Action Trust
Source: E n te r p r i s e  T r u s t  P r o m o t io n a l  L i te r a tu r e
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described above was previously used with success by Reid (1993)2, and a good 
reputation in the field was to prove beneficial for this study.
A contact at Scottish Business in the Community (SBIC) was a great help in 
familiarising the ‘team’3 with current practice within the Enterprise Trust 
movement in Scotland. A meeting was held at the SBIC offices in Edinburgh, 
during which the team were advised as to who might be the most helpful contacts. 
A general discussion was had about the role of the Enterprise Trusts in helping 
small firms to become established, and a list of Scottish Local Enterprise Trusts, 
together with the contact name of the relevant Director, was provided to form the 
basis for sample selection.
Following this meeting, a random sample of 15 Enterprise Trusts was drawn up 
to provide the sample of 150 firms.4 It was originally intended that 12 firms from 
each Enterprise Trust should make up the sample, thus allowing a comfortable 
safety margin to cover for those firms unwilling to participate, unable to be traced, 
or even already out of business.
In practice, the sample of Enterprise Trusts had to be broadened. Regimes vary 
widely across the Enterprise Trust movement: some had records which proved to 
be out-dated, whereas others kept a close eye on the firms they had helped; several 
of the provided firms were “too busy” or unwilling to help, usually those who had 
not been contacted previously by the Enterprise Trust about their willingness to
2See also Reid (1987) Applying Field Research Techniques to the Business Enterprise, in which 
he describes in detail the methodologies he has used in his own previous research.
3Here, ‘team’ refers to Professor Gavin C Reid and Miss Julia A Smith.
4It should be mentioned here that the Highlands and Islands were excluded from the sample for 
reasons of practicality (e.g. remoteness, financial constraints) and because the Enterprise Trust 
structure in this area differs quite significantly from that in the rest of Scotland. See, for 
example, Reid (1992b) Small Firms, Finance Gaps and Venture Capital, in which he reports 
upon the differences in funding shortages experienced between small firms in the Highlands and 
Islands compared with those in the rest of Scotland.
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become involved in the study; and 14 of the original sample were used for a pilot 
study. Further Enterprise Trusts were therefore contacted, resulting in a sample 
which covered practically the whole country, and provided the 150 firms for the 
main study. Table 3.2 details the areas covered by these 150 firms, and Figure 3.1 
shows the interview clusters, indicated by circles superimposed onto a map of 
Scotland. It is clear to see that the Enterprise Trusts selected gave a good 
coverage of the most densely-populated areas of the country, ranging from as far 
North as Gordon Enterprise Trust in Inverurie, through the central belt of Stirling 
and Falkirk, down as far as Cumnock & Doon in the West, and Midlothian in the 
East.
M eetings with D irectors o f  Enterprise Trusts
In order to acquaint the Enterprise Trusts with the purpose of the project, to 
reassure them of the professional conduct of the investigators, and also to learn 
about regional diversity and traits, meetings were held with the Directors. These 
meetings, although generally unstructured, can be broken up under the broad 
headings of Introduction , General D iscussion and Request fo r  Sample o f  Firms. 
Sekaran (1992) describes the advantages to be gained from conducting 
unstructured interviews. The interviewer starts without a questionnaire or any 
planned agenda, but instead asks broad questions which are intended to “surface 
some preliminary issues so that the researcher can formulate a good idea of what 
variables need further in-depth investigation” [Sekaran, 1992, p.190]. At the initial 
stage of a project, therefore, unstructured interviews can be instrumental in the 
formulation of a structured questionnaire.
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AREA COVERED BY THE STUDY
Table 3.2
REGION ENTERPRISE TRUST
GRAMPIAN Gordon Enterprise Trust 
Aberdeen Enterprise Trust
TAYSIDE Angus Enterprise Trust 
Dundee Enterprise Trust 
Perthshire Enterprise Company Ltd
CENTRAL Stirling Enterprise Park
Alloa Clackmannan Enterprise Ltd
Falkirk Enterprise Action Trust
FIFE North East Fife Enterprise Trust 
South Fife Enterprise Trust
LOTHIAN The Capital Enterprise Trust 
Midlothian Enterprise Trust
STRATHCLYDE Glasgow Opportunities 
Govan Initiative 
Strathkelvin Enterprise Trust 
Clydesdale Development Company Ltd 
Hamilton Enterprise Development Company
BORDERS Cumnock & Doon Enterprise Trust
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INTERVIEW CLUSTERS
Figure 3.1
Note: The circles on the map indicate the areas around which the interviews were 
clustered.
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The interviews with Enterprise Trust Directors shall now be discussed under the 
previously defined headings.
(i) Introduction
The aims of the main project were explained, and the reasons for the research 
clarified. It was also mentioned that a separate study on Business Strategy was to 
be carried out. The reactions of the Enterprise Trusts were generally favourable, 
with comments such as “we will obviously be interested in the study”, “I’m not 
aware of many consultancies or people doing these types of studies” and “they 
[small firms] occasionally like to talk to people - they feel flattered” .
The Directors were typically keen to assist in the study, and were especially 
interested in receiving, in due course, summary results, particularly with regard to 
their own area. To encourage their cooperation, it was therefore explained that 
annual summary reports would be distributed to those who had helped and that, 
eventually, Discussion Papers would also become available.
(ii) General Discussion
Once the basis of the study had been explained, the meeting led on to a general 
discussion of entrepreneurship in the area covered by the individual Enterprise 
Trust, and the experience of start-up firms in the region. Directors were asked 
what they thought might be points worth investigating, and comments they made 
were taken on board when it came to writing the questionnaire. This was intended 
to make them feel that they were taking a part in the project, and that the results 
would therefore be of more relevance and interest to them. It also assisted the
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interviewers in getting a feel for the environment in which small firms were 
operating.
One Director said that “the Enterprise Trusts have been criticised for saying that 
self-employment is an alternative to unemployment” while another admitted 
dealing with “the unemployed who start their own business as a means of 
employment” . Another possible reason pointed out for starting up a new venture 
was that some people, for example, might “break away from a company to set up a 
subsidiary of it” , but Enterprise Trusts found that these businesses typically had 
more trouble in gaining financial support. This posed the question: why did the 
entrepreneur himself choose to start up a new business and what did he hope to 
gain from it? One of the interviewees expressed the following concern: “We’ve 
become a bit disturbed because people think about survival first and foremost, not 
about expanding”. How true, in fact, was this statement to prove?
Questions on financing were prompted by comments such as “We would put 
people towards venture capital” and “one or two private investors have shown an 
interest” . It was also said, though, that “when talking about private sector 
involvement and risk/return received, the business angel5 becomes almost a 
predator” . How then, in practice, do small businessmen finance their operations, 
and are venture capitalists and these so-called ‘business angels’ used at all? The 
administered questionnaire sought to answer this question.
One Director lamented the “lack of aggression and effective market research” 
carried out by small businesses, concluding that “maybe it does not exist” . He also
5In The Venture Capital Report Guide Lucius Cary describes Business Angels as follows: 
“Business Angels are rich individuals who invest in small companies ... are likely to be actively 
involved in the businesses in which they invest ... [and usually] ... become a director of the 
investee company”. [Cary, 1995, p.684]
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remarked upon the inability to “have a market and to capitalise on it” , adding that 
“people have good ideas, but the ability to capitalise on potential does not exist, 
especially in export market opportunities” . Another said that, “in our experience, 
clients who come through this programme gain from networking and social 
contacts” . Together these comments helped to suggest questions on gathering 
trade intelligence on rivals, self-analysis and awareness of strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats, including here the possibilities offered by the breakdown 
of barriers to trade in the European Community. The administered questionnaire 
would look into where and how the entrepreneur gathered his information.
The administered questionnaire was to probe quite deeply into the entrepreneur’s 
awareness of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, following 
comments such as “very few actually do long-term planning or SWOT analysis” . 
One Director thought that “the main constraints are the red-tape put in place by 
those who are said to be there to help small businesses” , and another believed that 
small businesses had “a mental block against bureaucracy (the SDA6, Local 
Development Boards, and so on) who never deliver on their promises” . These 
items were therefore to be incorporated into the SWOT analysis that respondents 
were asked to complete to see if the problems of small businesses as perceived by 
Enterprise Trust Directors matched with those of the entrepreneurs themselves.
’’Financial handling is not a great problem - it is always achievable and can be 
taught” is a comment that led to questions about seeking outside advice or buying- 
in expertise in order to achieve certain tasks or help in developing new business 
strategies. For example, would the entrepreneur attempt to handle all accountancy
Scottish Development Agency.
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and insurance matters himself, or would he rather seek outside help, which could 
either involve free training and advice from the Enterprise Trust, or the paid for 
assistance of a professional accountant. The observation that “they need training in 
areas other than their craft [such as] general management and financial control, 
[but] to get the small business enterprise to understand the benefits of training is 
often quite difficult” was also instrumental in the design of the questionnaire.
One of the people interviewed said that the “Enterprise Allowance was an 
employment measure at one time [but] over the last two years it has become more 
of an enterprise measure.... [Now] there is less money, but we are spending more 
on supporting firms [who in turn] are treating it more as a business [and] are 
making, understanding and using a business plan” . Contrast this with the Director 
who said that “business plans have been debased, and are now worthless. It used 
to be an indicator of endeavour” . These remarks were to prompt questions on 
business plans as well as, again, reasons for start-up. Do entrepreneurs have 
business plans; if so, why are they formed, who is involved in writing them, and are 
they subsequently used?
Some Directors seemed to be in favour of small businesses developing quality 
systems saying, for example, “ [in this area] they typically have no management or 
marketing experience. They have good job skills but need to introduce quality 
systems” ; and “the greatest problem is to get people to understand that they can 
improve their business by increasing managerial skills” . However, others seemed 
less supportive of such plans, which take both time and money to implement, 
saying “I don’t agree with BS5750, ‘hoop-jumping’, and so on, when the business 
is there to make money” .
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These interviews covered many topics and uncovered useful points, which were 
during the process of designing the questionnaire. Directors were obviously keen 
to be kept informed about the progression of the firms they had helped to support. 
Typically, they lose contact with firms after the initial year or so of involvement, 
and any insight to be gained from the long-term tracking used by this study would 
be both helpful and informative to them. They were therefore extremely 
cooperative and enthusiastic about the work to be carried out.
fill) Request fo r  Sam ple o f Firm s
Once the Directors had been made aware of the project and were sufficiently 
comfortable with its aims, they were asked to provide a random sample of the 
firms on their client list. The only conditions put on this sample were that the firms 
should be less that three years old, and that they should have started up through 
the Enterprise Trust. It was also important that the sample be representative. In 
other words, if the client list was grouped into those who had started up because of 
unemployment, compared with those who had left unemployment to start, for 
example, a subsidiary of their previous firm, as was the case in at least one 
Enterprise Trust interviewed, then the sample should be stratified proportionately 
to reflect this.
Sekaran (1992, p.233) outlines the benefits of stratified random sampling: it 
“involves stratifying the elements along meaningful lines and taking proportionate 
or disproportionate samples, from the strata. This sampling design is more 
efficient than the simple random sampling design because, for the same sample 
size, we get more representativeness from each important segment of the
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population” . By following this format for each Enterprise Trust approached, the 
best random sample could be, and was, achieved, as far as was possible.
Many Enterprise Trusts had records held on computer databases and it was 
therefore a fairly simple task for them to pull out a random sample of 15 to 20 
firms. There were, however, occasional conflicts where, for example, other 
researchers had been active in the field and respondents were likely to be subject to 
‘survey fatigue’ . On these occasions, the Enterprise Trusts took a little longer, but 
eventually delivered a list of randomly selected firms that they considered would be 
‘survey happy’, and willing to cooperate in the study.
Given that this work is a subset of the larger study of Reid, the investigator had 
little control over the sample of firms to be examined.7 However, there is purpose 
to be served by exploring the extent to which the sample is representative of 
Scottish firms in general, and the level of confidence that can be had in the 
statistical inferences made throughout this work. First of all, 150 firms is certainly 
a sufficient number to constitute a statistically ‘large’ sample, as defined, for 
example, by small sample distribution theory.8
Second, recent figures released by Scottish Enterprise (1996) suggest that the 
sample corresponds very closely to the much larger picture of new Scottish firms in 
the 1990s. For example, by legal form, the 1993-94 sample used in this study 
comprised 26% sole traders working from home, 29% sole traders operating from 
business premises, 19% partnerships and 27% private limited companies. The 
Scottish Enterprise figures for 23,000 new firms in 1996 give sole proprietorships
7The sample was originally defined in Reid’s project proposal submitted to the Leverhulme Trust 
in early 1993.
8From the perspective of the student t-distribution sample sizes above 70 are effectively ‘large’ 
samples.
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at 48% , partnerships at 21%  and limited companies at 30% .9 The categories, 
although slightly different, show clearly that there is a high similarity o f  breakdow n 
by legal form  betw een the tw o samples.
The division by sector is a slightly m ore contentious issue, but is nonetheless still 
w orth  addressing. Scottish Enterprise state that 68%  o f  new  businesses in 
Scotland in 1996 w ere in services, com pared to  64%  in this study [cf. C hapter 4 ] .10 
Figures from  the D epartm ent for Education and Em ployment suggest that, for the 
U K  as a whole, “service sector firms represent just over 70% o f  all small firms in 
the econom y” [Labour M arket Quarterly R eport (1996, p. 11)].11 H ow ever, it is 
often very difficult to  classify firms by sector, as it is the product, and not the 
business, to  which the SIC applies. Some firms, offering different products or 
services, may be identified by tw o or m ore sectors, and it is not uncom m on for 
firms to  fall into both  the services and m anufacturing divisions.
The focus o f  this w ork  is not on identifying individual strategies associated with 
the many varied sectors into which small firms fall. Indeed, such a task  w ould be 
tim e-consum ing and arguably futile. Instead, the study aims to  identify generic 
strategies which may be applied equally to any young micro firm. This should 
prove m ore useful to  policy makers, for example, who cannot possibly afford the 
time or m oney required to  create policies for each class and type o f  small firm but, 
instead, are looking to  devise incentives and assistance that can apply to  any new
9Storey (1994) reports on the findings of Bannock and Partners, who calculated that, in 1986, for 
the UK as a whole, 55% of small firms were sole proprietorships, 26% partnerships and 19% 
limited companies. By 1989, Daly & McCann (1992) found a similar breakdown of UK firms by 
legal form.
10Again, the Scottish Enterprise categories vary slightly in definition from those used in this 
study.
n See Reid (1993, Chapter 1) for detailed comparisons of the Scottish small firms sector with that 
of the UK.
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young business.
In term s o f  legal form and industrial classification, there can be relatively high 
confidence that the sample is representative o f  Scottish firms, although adm ittedly 
there may be slight bias tow ards firms with greater start-up support. F o r example, 
this study uses the Enterprise Trusts for the sampling frame, and the Scottish 
Enterprise figures are based on bank records, both o f  which show that the firms in 
question had either advice or financial support available to them  from  an early 
stage. H ow ever, it may be that the regime in Scotland is currently very supportive 
o f  new businesses generally, and it is cheering to  note the similarities, given the 
difference in sample size {viz. 150 com pared to  23,000). It is w ith some 
confidence, therefore, that the sample is used to  provide a representation o f  new 
micro firms in Scotland in the early 1990s.
3 .3  T h e  A d m in is te re d  Q u es tio n n a ire
As has already been m entioned, the administered questionnaire w as developed 
following extensive reading o f  the relevant literature and conversations w ith the 
D irectors o f  Enterprise Trusts. The main project involved a lengthy and detailed 
questionnaire covering seven main topics, one o f  which, devised especially for this 
particular study, w as Business Strategy , and it is mainly upon this section that this 
w ork is based .12 Table 3.3 summarises the points covered by Section 4 o f  the 
questionnaire, on Business Strategy, discussed in detail below. The full section
12The main headings of the administered questionnaire were: Market Data; Finance; Costs', 
Business Strategy', Human Capital', Organisation', Technical Change. This study also draws 
upon various data (for example, performance data such as turnover or profits) from sections other 
than that of Business Strategy. See Appendix II for the actual questionnaire.
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SUMMARY OF ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION 4: BUSINESS STRATEGY
Table 3.3
Aims, Ambitions and Making Decisions
® reasons for becoming involved in the business
• main aim of the business
® personal vs financial decisions
• considering the experience of others when making decisions (strategic and 
operational)
• autonomous decision vs negotiated decisions
• strategies formulated in-house vs outside advice sought
Forward Planning
® existence of a business plan
® formal, written plan vs idea held in the head of the entrepreneur 
® people involved in writing the plan 
• frequency of revision of plan 
® how far ahead entrepreneur plans
Funding Growth
® preference for capital injection vs restructuring existing financial operations 
® methods of restructuring debtors and creditors payback terms 
® previously used sources of finance
® willingness to give up a percentage of equity to promote growth 
® willingness to accept smaller profits to aid expansion
Information, Technology and Communications
• feedback from customers actively sought or given freely
• actions taken as a result of customer feedback
• entrepreneur’s gathering of information on rivals’ activities 
® form, regularity and methods of information gathering
• importance of information technology to the business
• kinds of information technology used, and its applications
Quality Control and SWOT Analysis
® total quality management systems installed 
® benefits of total quality management system
® formal quality approval gained for products, operations, personnel, business as a 
whole
® benefits of quality approval
® analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
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from  the adm inistered questionnaire is held in Appendix II, with the results inserted 
from  years one and two.
The use o f  an adm inistered questionnaire permits the gathering o f  an extremely 
large num ber o f  data points which can be readily coded and entered onto a 
com puter database. From  then on the data can be manipulated w ithout much 
effort, and they are easily transferable from one piece o f  softw are to  another. 
Specific item s may be ‘pulled o u t’ and treated individually, or com pared w ith data 
from  other sections. An administered questionnaire is also easier to  com plete 
quickly, w ith respondents having to pick one o f  several possible answ ers rather 
than com e up with a solution themselves. Consistency is thus established within 
the sample and such results betw een firms are m ore easily and legitimately 
com pared. Consequently, data from large sample numbers o f  firms can be 
assimilated and broad com parisons drawn. Average impressions can be given o f  
the survey sample as a w hole and summary statistics reported upon. Firms which 
vary widely from  the average can then be readily identified and analysed further if  
desired. An administered questionnaire is a good way o f  establishing a large 
database which can be either expanded or com pared easily with o ther studies. It 
provides a detailed and easily manipulated set o f  primary source data and is 
therefore a valuable reference containing much useful information.
Personal contact is a key factor in the success o f  administered questionnaires. 
The response rate is likely to  be much higher with a personally conducted face-to- 
face interview  than with, for example, a mailed questionnaire, which may simply be 
throw n away. Results should also be much m ore accurate as a well-trained 
interviewer, w ho understands the questionnaire, is able to reply to  and explain 
respondents’ queries about meanings and exact requirem ents o f  the questions. The
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interview er is able to  build a rapport betw een him self and the respondent, and can 
encourage frank and honest answers as far as is possible. Thus, w orking together, 
a m uch m ore accurate response is achieved than might otherwise be the case.
Sekaran (1992, p.220) conveniently summarises the advantages o f  face-to-face 
interviews: they “provide rich data, offer the opportunity to establish rapport with 
the interviewees, and help to  explore, and understand complex issues. M any ideas 
that are ordinarily difficult to articulate can also be surfaced and discussed during 
such interviews” . The adm inistered questionnaire developed for this study kept the 
interview er to a strict agenda, but room  was made for observations w here it was 
felt that the respondent might wish to  expand upon a point. There was thus 
established a rich and detailed body o f  quantitative data, com plem ented, where 
relevant, with additional qualitative data, which was both inform ative and 
interesting.
Aims, Am bitions an d  M aking D ecisions
Section 4 o f  the adm inistered questionnaire, on Business Strategy [cf. Table 3.3], 
shall be discussed under the same headings as have been used earlier in this work; 
first, under that o f  Aim s Am bitions an d  M aking Decisions. The respondent was 
asked why they first becam e involved in the business in question. The objective 
here was to  find out w hether the business was started up out o f  necessity, out o f 
some ambitious need to  succeed, or simply as an enjoyable pastim e that would 
bring in a small income. The question w as prom pted partly by the w ork  o f  C ooper 
(1993)13, and also by that o f  Bam berger (1983). Next, respondents w ere asked
I3References throughout this chapter are to the literature discussed in Chapter 2.
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about the main aim o f  the business. H ere, they respondent could choose from  a list 
o f  answers which ranged from very short term  objectives, such as plain survival, to  
rather m ore long term  ambitions such as an increased m arket share or high rate o f  
return. On a similar vein to  these questions, the respondent was asked to  say w hat 
percentage o f  decisions w ere made for personal reasons, and w hat percentage for 
financial reasons. Again, this was intended to  give an idea o f  the aspirations o f  the 
ow ner m anager, and w as linked to the aims o f  the business.
R espondents’ aw areness o f  rivals w as being examined when they w ere asked 
whether, w hen making decisions, they took  into account the experience o f  other 
businesses similar to that o f  their own. The question was asked with respect to 
both strategic and operational decisions, to  establish any difference betw een 
decision making in the long term  and that in the short term. Did the entrepreneur 
learn from the m istakes made by others, or did they continue, blissfully unaware, 
dow n the same road they had gone previously? A nother question w as concerned 
with w hether decisions w ere made by a sole individual or w hether they came about 
through discussion and negotiation w ith others. Again, this question w as asked for 
both strategic and operational decisions, and follows from M intzberg’s (1991), 
w ho points to  the advantages o f  having a single charismatic leader.
Finally in this section, respondents w ere questioned about their developm ent o f  
new strategies. For various activities they might be required to  perform  (for 
example, new  investment, marketing, accounting matters), w ould they consider 
seeking outside advice, as recom m ended by Hay et a l (1993), or w ould the 
appraisal be carried out ‘in-house’? Further, if  they were willing to  obtain outside 
help, w ould they also be willing to  pay for it? W ork by Johnson and Devins (1994) 
suggests that they would. These questions sought to discover how  keen the
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entrepreneur was to  seek out the advice they needed, either through training or 
bought-in expertise. It w as also intended to establish w hether or not the business 
had w ithin it the internal capabilities to  carry out key functions o f  management. 
F orw ard Planning
Respondents w ere asked w hether o r not they had a business plan, and if  they did, 
was it a formal, w ritten plan, advantages o f  which are noted by B aker et a l  (1993), 
and w ho w as involved in preparing it? The aim here w as to  establish w hether the 
respondent had decided to  w rite such plan under their own initiative, or w hether it 
had been w ritten because it was said to be a ‘good thing to  d o ’, as is recom m ended 
by the N ational Westminster Bank  (1992); or was such a plan formed simply 
because it w as necessary to  obtain financial support such as the Enterprise 
Allowance, grants or low  interest loans?
The questions that followed w ere intended to  help to  establish the reasons for 
developing a business plan. The respondent was asked first o f  all how  often the 
plan w as reviewed. It was thought that responses such as ‘never’ w ould ‘w eed 
o u t’ those w ho had form ed a plan simply to gain start-up support. On the other 
hand, it w as considered that those who made frequent reference to  their plans, with 
regular reviews o f  it, w ould prove to be those who knew the value o f  having and 
following structured plan, and w ere m ore likely to  have w ritten it o f  their own 
accord.
Related to  this question was another about forward thinking. H ow  far ahead 
does the small businessman look when considering the impact that planned 
decisions might have? Do they, as is often thought, w orry only about w here the 
money is coming from to pay the next bill? O r do new  small ventures have the
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inclination and capability to  plan further ahead, a procedure M ount et a l (1993) 
believe small firms should adopt?
Funding Growth
This section enquired as to  how the entrepreneur was willing to finance their 
business. I f  an im provem ent in cash flow w ere required, would they rather inject 
m ore capital finance into the business, either from their own funds o r from, for 
example, a venture capitalist; or w ould they seek to restructure the payback 
m ethods o f  their debtors and/or creditors? The latter offered various choices to 
the respondent. For example, it might be that they would contem plate various 
factoring or invoice discounting arrangem ents, which Hawkins (1993) believes can 
assist a small business during the early years o f  its life; or perhaps they would 
rather extend their credit w ith suppliers, or cut down on the credit allowed to  their 
custom ers.
The respondent w as then asked which m ethods o f  raising finance they had 
actually used in the past. This ranged from choices such as ‘personal financial 
injection’ to  ‘venture capital’ and ‘business angel’ equity stake. This question 
sought to  discover which options o f  funding their operations new  small firms were 
aw are of, had access to  and had used, and further options in the question were 
prom pted by R eid’s (1995b) work. For example, did they rely on bank loans and 
money from friends or family, or were reinvested profits a major source o f  finance.
R espondents w ere next quizzed about their willingness to g row  the business. 
W ould they be willing to dilute their equity holding, as favoured by Bhide (1994), 
if  this w ould increase possibilities for business expansion, for example by taking on 
a partner willing to inject capital finance. Alternatively, was the urge to remain in
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control o f  their ow n destiny such an overriding concern that any decrease in share 
ownership w ould not be considered \c f  Storey (1994)]? I f  they were willing to  
give up a percentage o f  equity, w hat w ould be the minimum share that they w ould 
wish to  continue to  hold? W ould they w ant to  remain in control, w ith no less than 
51 per cent, or w ould they be willing to go low er than that, for the good o f  the 
business? Along the same line, another line o f  questioning w as concerned with 
w hether respondents w ere agreeable to  accepting smaller profits if  this could aid 
expansion.
Information , Technology and Communications
In the previous chapter, the im portance o f  information to  the developm ent o f  a 
com petitive advantage w as stressed. This led to  the inclusion o f  a num ber o f  
questions designed to  provide data on how  information is collected and used by 
new  firms. This section o f  the questionnaire therefore started o ff w ith a question 
about custom er feedback. C ustom er service and their satisfaction is obviously o f  
param ount im portance to  any business, large or small. Is the small-firm m anager 
aw are o f  custom ers’ reactions to  his product or service, through feedback, and do 
they actively seek this information or merely accept it when it is offered? The 
follow-up question enquired into w hat use, if  any, was made o f  the information 
gained from custom ers.
Further to this investigation o f  the entrepreneur’s awareness o f  the actions and 
opinions o f  those who might affect his business, respondents w ere then asked if  
trade intelligence on rivals was actively sought. Trade intelligence was broken 
dow n into several different categories o f  information that a business might wish to 
know  about his com petitors, for example on their new products, and product
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quality, to  discover in detail how  much information w as gathered. They w ere also 
asked how  regularly this activity was carried out, and from which sources this 
information w as taken.
Q uestions on Information Technology took  Porter and M illar’s (1991) 
definition14 as a starting point, when asking how im portant information technology 
was to  the small business. Respondents w ere then asked to  identify, from  a list o f  
various possible sources o f  inform ation technology, those which they used during 
the course o f  his business, and subsequently w hat they used information 
technology for. This latter question included the option o f  ‘netw orking’, am ongst 
other things. The aim o f  these questions was to discover how  great an effect 
information technology is having on new Scottish businesses, and to  identify its 
uses. They w ere also intended to  show w hether netw orking in Scottish firms has 
improved along w ith rapidly improving technologies, or w hether it has remained at 
a level inferior to  that of, for example, its US counterparts.15
Quality Control an d  SW O T Analysis
In this final section, the goal w as to identify Total Quality M anagem ent (TQ M ) 
systems, such as those reported upon by Hankes (1993a,b) that may have been 
implemented by the small business. Respondents w ere also asked, w here relevant, 
why they considered that the installation o f  such a system was im portant to  their 
business. They w ere then further asked w hether any other formal quality approval 
(for example, British Standard B S5750) had been sought o r achieved for each o f
14See Chapter 2: Strategy, for this definition.
15 See McNicoll (1994) for an empirical study contrasting networking between would-be 
entrepreneurs in Scotland, and those in Boston, Massachusetts.
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their products, operations, personnel or business as a whole; and again, w hat they 
hoped to  gain from having achieved such approval.
The purpose o f  these questions was, first o f  all, to  see if new small firms in 
Scotland are aw are o f  and implementing quality controlled systems, be it to  
improve m otivation, gain a better image, increase efficiency, achieve g reater cost 
control, o r for some other reason. Ample room  was allowed here for extra 
com m ents and details o f  any awards achieved. In addition, it was hoped to  elicit a 
general opinion o f  such systems. Those who advise businesses are often heard to 
advocate quality systems, but w hat do small businesses themselves m ake o f  these 
systems? D o they consider them  to be o f  use, or do they rather see them  as 
expensive, tim e-consum ing and ultimately restrictive controls? It w as hoped that 
the administered questionnaire could shed some light on this topic, under­
researched as it is for the case o f  the small firm.
Last, although it was not identified specifically as such, a SW OT analysis was 
carried out for the respondent’s business, such as that recommended by M adu and 
Kuei (1993), who find that an awareness o f  the strengths and w eaknesses o f  the 
firm can confer upon it the advantage o f  knowing how  to position itse lf in the 
m arket vis-a-vis its com petitors. Respondents w ere provided with three sheets 
upon which to  tick their responses. First, they w ere required to  rate  a  list o f  
item s16, as they related to  his business, on the scale ‘good’, ‘fair’ o r ‘could be 
be tte r’. This latter response was substituted for ‘bad’ after piloting suggested that 
respondents might be unwilling to  agree that any aspect o f  their business was
16Including: adaptability, faith in the business, foresight/forward planning, values of 
management, plant and resources, managers, employees, product quality, product range, 
organisations structure/systems, sources of finance, customers, suppliers, market share, 
technological/specialist know-how, innovativeness/new ideas, image.
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anything less than satisfactory. From  the 17 answers, the respondent w as then 
asked to  identify the single biggest strength and w eakness o f  their business, as they 
perceived them; unless o f  course something other than those on the given list w ere 
applicable.
Similarly, the second sheet addressed potential threats to the business. It 
considered therefore mainly rivals, and included m ost o f  the previous list’s options, 
but with relation to  rival firms. Thus the respondent w as asked, for example, to 
say w hether rivals’ adaptability was considered to pose a ‘w eak’, ‘m edium ’, or 
‘s trong’ threat to  their ow n business. This sheet also included some additional 
items which did not fit easily into the previous sheet.17 In this case, the respondent 
was asked to  identify the single biggest threat to  their business.
Finally, the respondent w as handed a sheet on which were listed various items 
that might offer opportunities, for example, for expansion, increased profitability, 
entering a new m arket niche, and so on. They w ere asked to m ark for each item, 
as it was in their ow n business, w hether they thought it offered ‘a lo t’, ‘som e’ or 
‘no ’ opportunity. This sheet included a combination o f  the items listed in the tw o 
previous sheets. Thus the respondent was asked, for example, the extent to which 
the breakdow n o f  barriers to trade in the European Community offered an 
opportunity to  their business. Finally, they w ere asked to identify w hat they 
thought to  be the greatest source o f  opportunity.
These three concluding sheets would obviously generate an immense am ount o f  
data. A  ‘not applicable’ column was included on each, which respondents could 
choose if  the item did not relate to their business (for example, no employees), or if
17Including: ‘red tape’/govemment legislation, breakdown of barriers to trade in the European 
Community, substitutes, and competition in general.
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they w ere unaw are o f  their rivals’ activities (for example, rivals’ forw ard planning). 
It w as therefore anticipated that responses to  these questions w ould help to 
identify those businesses who did not keep a watchful eye on the com petition and 
might be liable to  succumb to  unanticipated threats. It was also thought that 
respondents’ perceptions might change as the business progressed. F or example, a 
naive respondent who rated their business ‘g ood ’ for almost everything might, w ith 
another year’s business experience, rate each item m ore realistically if  perform ance 
had been poor. It was considered that the m ore realistic the appraisal, the better 
perform ance might be. An awareness o f  the firm’s strengths, w eaknesses, 
opportunities and threats can help to identify problems that need to  be tackled, and 
early corrective action should prove to  be beneficial in the long run.
The single biggest strength, weakness, opportunity and threat identified by the 
respondent could be followed up at a later point. So if, for example, som eone 
identified their adaptability to be the firm’s biggest strength, then they could be 
asked, in a sem i-structured interview, how this was used to  gain m arketplace 
advantage. This w as also true for the remaining responses.
3.4  T h e  A d m in is te re d  In te rv ie w s
P ilo t Study
During the early m onths o f  1994, a pilot study o f  14 firms was conducted. There 
were several reasons for this. First, the questionnaire had to  be tested in ‘real’ 
situations, to  ensure that it read well, w as comprehensible, and gave the 
information required. At this stage, a casual research w orker was drafted in to
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augm ent the team 18, and initial interviews w ere carried out with all three people 
involved in the project present; one to  conduct the interview, and tw o to  take notes 
for later discussion. Following an interview, the team  then com pared notes, any 
necessary am endm ents w ere m ade to the questionnaire, and the new  version w as 
used for the following interview. These early interviews helped to  restructure or 
rephrase questions, suggested where show cards19 might be necessary, and 
prom pted additional alternatives in multiple-choice questions.
In addition, the pilot study was used as a training ground for the interviewers, 
who took  it in turns to  administer sections o f  the questionnaire, gaining in 
confidence and fluency as they became more familiar with the layout and order o f  
the questions. It w as im portant too  that the interviewers becom e accustom ed to 
replying to  respondents’ questions and that they understand and be able to  explain 
exactly w hat w as wanted. Piloting helped to  answ er any queries and surface any 
problem s early on. During this initial period the questionnaire was am ended and 
improved, and only when it was thought that all problems had been ironed out, and 
that interview ers w ere well-trained, did the main study interviews proceed.
M ain Study
The 150 interviews that constituted the first year’s sample w ere com pleted within 
the period April 1994 to M ay 1995. The same pattern was followed for each 
sample o f  firms in the main study as for those in the pilot study. First o f  all, a
18Sekaran (1992, p.193) remarks that “when several long interviews are to be conducted, it is 
often not feasible for one individual to conduct all the interviews [and] a team of trained 
interviewers then becomes necessary”. This was indeed the case in this study.
19Show cards are handed to respondents in questions where, for example, long lists of 
alternatives are used. They facilitate understanding, act as a visual aid and can be used as a sheet 
for ticking responses.
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preletter w as sent from  CRIEFF20 to  each firm on the list. This letter described 
briefly the aims o f  the study, explained the involvement required o f  each 
participant, told from which source their name had been obtained and promised 
annual reports for all who agreed to take part.21
The preletter w as followed by a telephone call, typically to the ow ner m anager 
direct, to  arrange a date and time for the interview. In general, the interviews w ere 
held at the respondent’s place o f  work, which was often their ow n home, although 
one or tw o chose to  com e to  the research centre, and others occasionally 
suggested meeting on mutual ground, for example, in a local cafe. The 
questionnaire w as fairly lengthy and took  anything from betw een 50 minutes and 
tw o hours or m ore to  administer. On average, though, it could be covered 
com fortably in ju s t over an hour.
To allay any fears held by respondents, it was stressed at all times that 
confidentiality w ould be respected. Throughout the fieldw ork process, from 
gaining sample lists o f  firms, to  arranging meetings and eliciting the agreem ent o f  
ow ner m anagers to  participate, right through to  interview, data collection and 
follow-up ‘thank-you’ letters, confidentiality was a key w ord in establishing a 
trusting relationship betw een interviewer and respondent. I f  the firms felt at ease 
with the process, it was thought, they w ould be m ore likely to  divulge detailed 
information. Know ing that they would only be identified by one num ber among 
150 m eant that they need have no w orries about custom ers’, suppliers’ or rivals’ 
reactions to  the findings o f  the study, and this helped to  put them  m ore at ease.
20Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Finn, Department of 
Economics, University of St Andrews.
2Advantages noted by Reid (1987) of sending out preletters include a lower refusal rate and 
increased cooperation.
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Following an interview, respondents w ere sent ‘thank-you’ letters. W here 
particular interest had been shown in the results or future use o f  the  data, a 
com plem entary sample o f  previous w ork in the area was sent to  give an idea o f  
w hat might result from  the study. A good relationship with respondents was 
therefore developed and it was hoped that this w ould maintain their cooperation 
over the remaining life o f  the study.
The second year o f  interviews commenced immediately after the first ended. An 
amended preletter w as again sent to respondents, but this time it w as accom panied 
by a summary report o f  the  first year’s findings. This provided respondents with 
an idea o f  the environm ent in which they, as small firms, w ere operating, and 
enabled them  to identify w hether they were perform ing any better or w orse than 
other, similarly-sized firms. It was expected that this would captivate their interest 
and encourage them to  continue their cooperation.
3.5  T h e  S e m i-S tru c tu re d  Q u es tio n n a ire
The adm inistered questionnaire was developed with the aim o f  generating a large 
body o f  quantitative data on which could be perform ed statistical and econom etric 
analyses and, as such, it w as to prove successful. However, in order to  illustrate in 
a m ore discursive fashion the experience o f  various firms in their planning or 
decision-m aking procedures, a sem i-structured questionnaire was developed. The 
intention was to  create an additional number o f  case studies, o f  firms included in 
the original sample, and to  link the perceived trends from a qualitative analysis o f  
these cases to  the quantitative findings o f  the administered questionnaire.
The use o f  tw o questionnaires is not uncom m on amongst researchers. For 
example, M iles and Huberm an (1984, p. 151) point out that “qualitative researchers
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are using multisite, m ulticase designs, often with multiple m ethods” . Sekaran 
(1992, p.219) agrees that “good researchers try to  obtain data ... through multiple 
data-collection m ethods” . The main advantage is that, while the administered 
questionnaire allows us to  identify tendencies for the larger full sample, using 
statistical analysis, the sem i-structured interview schedule perm its further probing 
o f  already observed tendencies, and generates detailed descriptive evidence. As 
with the adm inistered questionnaire interviews, face-to-face meetings with 
respondents, using the sem i-structured questionnaire, are im portant for the reasons 
outlined previously \cf. Section 3.3 above]. These include the clarification o f  any 
doubts by the interviewer, the ensuring o f  the respondent’s comprehension, and a 
higher rate  and accuracy o f  responses.
The questionnaire w as based upon a developm ent o f  the ‘Strategic M anagem ent 
M odel’ presented in W heelen and H unger (1995, p.360). Being a highly structured 
model, this allows us to  examine which parts o f  the strategic planning process are 
followed by micro firms, and to identify the areas in which they fall down. Figure
3.2 reproduces this model, showing the four main headings into which the 
questionnaire was to  be split: Environmental Scanning, Strategy Form ulation, 
Strategy Im plem entation, and Evaluation and Control. B eneath each heading can 
be seen the sub-headings which w ere to  becom e separate categories in the 
questionnaire. Table 3.5 summarises the sem i-structured questionnaire, and the 
full version, as used during the fieldwork, is reproduced in Appendix III.
Environmental Scanning
The first heading, therefore, is ‘Environm ental Scanning’, which involves an
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MODEL ON WHICH
SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE WAS BASED
Figure 3.2
Environmental
Scanning
Strategy Formulation
Societal
Environment
Task
Environment
Structure
Culture
Resources
i
Strategy
Implementation
Evaluation 
and Control
Feedback
Source: ‘Strategic Management Model’ in Wheelen, T.L. and J.D. Hunger (1995, 
p.360) Strategic M anagem ent a n d  Business Policy
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SUMMARY OF SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE 
ON BUSINESS STRATEGY
Table 3.5
I Environmental Scanning
Analysis of internal and external factors affecting the business
• line of business; resources, set-up costs, experience
• market; quality, price, location
• external relationship; suppliers, customers
• capitalising on strengths and exploiting opportunities
• improving weaknesses and combating threats
II Strategy Formulation
Mission, Objectives, Strategies, Policies
• direction and goals of the business
• use (or not) of business plan
• definition of growth
• actions taken to achieve goals
• development and communication of long-term plans 
® protection of business from rivals and substitutes
• attracting customers from competitors
• development of alternatives strategies
• importance and use of information technology
• enhancing and maintaining quality
• assuring customers of ‘fitness for purpose’ of product
• motivating employees
i n  Strategy Implementation
Programmes, Budgets, Procedures
• actions taken to help achieve goals; investment, new products, staff
• use of customer feedback in improving quality
• problems in implementing strategies
• speed of implementation of new strategies
• constraints on growth of business
o financing growth
• cost cutting versus increasing sales
• financial restructuring
• budgetary procedures
• external sources of advice; accountants, auditors, bank managers
• usefulness of local or central government grants
• communication and implementation of new plans
• changing role of the owner-manager
IV Evaluation and Control
Performance
• measures of assessing new strategies; profitability, budget versus actual 
o methods of assessment; milestones, appraisals, targets
• policies changed because of performance appraisal
• what gives business the edge over rivals
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analysis o f  both internal and external factors affecting the business. W heelen and 
H unger (1995, p.368) argue that “environmental scanning in small businesses is 
much less com plicated than in large corporations” , and that “top managers, 
especially if  they are the founders, tend to believe that they know  the business and 
can follow it better than anyone else” . To test this assumption, therefore, the 
respondent was asked specifically why they had chosen to  enter his particular line 
o f  business, being prom pted on such things as their existing skills, personal assets, 
areas o f  expertise, experience, set-up costs, resource accessibility, a new  product 
idea or a new  niche or gap in the m arket that they had identified.
W ith one aim o f  the sem i-structured interviews being to link the results to  those 
o f  the adm inistered questionnaire, some questions were incorporated to probe 
deeper into the reasoning behind answers previously given. The first o f  these 
asked why the ow ner-m anager had chosen their particular m arket area, previously 
identified in the adm inistered questionnaire from a list that included the local, 
regional, Scottish, British and international market. R espondents w ere prom pted 
to  answer with reference to  any m arket research carried out on potential custom ers 
or com petitors already in the m arket-place. Also with reference to  the target 
market, respondents w ere questioned about the level o f  price and quality they had 
decided to  offer, and w hether this was chosen because o f  the products o f  existing 
rivals and the price and quality they w ere currently offering \cf. H ay et a l  (1993)].
External contacts o f  the ow ner-m anager w ere thought to offer potential benefits 
to  the entrepreneur w ho could take advantage o f  them. Curran (1996), for 
example, reports upon evidence that ow ner-m anagers o f  small firms used “the 
personalisation o f  relations with custom ers [as] a calculative strategy to  reduce the 
influence o f  m arket factors such as differences in price, delivery and quality offered
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by other firms” [c f  Bhide (1994)]. The sem i-structured questionnaire examines 
this finding, by asking respondents to describe their firm’s relationship both  w ith its 
suppliers and w ith its custom ers; the form er defined by reference to  delivery, 
timing, quality, discounts, reliability, favouritism  and regular suppliers; and the 
latter by repeat orders, custom er loyalty, complaints and the actual num ber o f  
custom ers the firm had on its books.
Finally, under the heading o f  ‘Environmental Scanning’, respondents w ere asked 
effectively to  perform  a SW OT analysis22 on their firm; a discussion o f  its 
strengths, w eaknesses, opportunities and threats [c f  Johnson & Scholes (1984)]. 
These w ere already know n from previous interviews, but the respondent was asked 
now to clarify or explain further the reasoning behind their choices, and w hat each 
meant to  their business; how  do they capitalise on, or exploit their strengths; how  
do they take advantage o f  opportunities on offer; how  do they try to  im prove upon 
weaknesses; and how  do they com bat existing or potential threats?
Strategy Formulation
The second heading o f  the sem i-structured questionnaire, as suggested by the 
model, is that o f  ‘Strategy Form ulation’. It can be further sub-divided into the 
categories o f  M ission, Objectives, Strategies and Policies. The first, ‘M ission’, 
asks ‘W hat does the business stand for?’ [c f  David (1989)]. R espondents w ere 
asked, specifically, to  identify the mission o f  their business, in term s o f  directions 
and goals, and also w hat the business stood for. They were then asked either how  
they used their business plan to help in the running o f  the firm, in order to  achieve
22Considered by some to be an extremely important factor in small business success. See, for 
example, Wheelen and Hunger (1995, p.369).
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the mission. I f  the firm had no plan, respondents were asked how  they knew  or 
decided w here their business w as heading.
The section on ‘O bjectives’ probed further into w hat the ow ner-m anager hoped 
to  achieve through running their business [c f  Aram and Cowen (1990)]. As nearly 
all respondents had previously expressed the hope or wish to grow  the firm, the 
respondent w as asked w hat they meant or understood by grow th. In other w ords, 
w hat w as grow th with respect to  their business; was it m easured by an increase in 
employees, output, profits, sales, m arket share, product range or turnover? The 
respondent w as then asked why they w anted to  achieve their goals [c f  Thurston 
(1983)], both o f  grow th and w hatever else they had previously identified as being a 
m ajor ambition. The object o f  this line o f  questioning was to  discover w hether the 
aims o f  the business w ere for personal o r purely business reasons.
The next section looked in detail at the strategies used by the small firm; how  did 
it aim to reach its objectives and what was it doing to  beat the competition? 
Respondents w ere first questioned on how  long-term  plans w ere developed [c f  
B aker et a l (1993)]. F or example, w ere project team s or formal meetings an 
aspect o f  the firm ’s operations, or did plans com e about through informal 
discussions and consulting employees? W hat kind o f  information w ere long-term  
decisions based upon; w as it ‘hard’ information, such as accounts, financial or 
business perform ance, or projected cash flow; or was it on ‘soft’ information, like 
hearsay, gossip or conversations with contacts?
The respondent was asked w hether they w ould consider a so-called ‘m enu’ o f  
strategic options [c f  Johnson & Scholes (1984)]. In other w ords, did they 
generate a list o f  possible alternative courses o f  action? I f  so, how  did they choose 
betw een these different ideas? Did they evaluate options by decision analysis using
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com puter packages [c f  Bhide (1994)], or through advice from consultants; or was 
it through less formal information gathered from networking? [c f  M intzberg 
(1994)].
The gaining and retaining o f  custom ers was investigated by reference to  specific 
actions taken by the entrepreneur. First, they w ere asked w hat they did to  protect 
their business from  the threat o f  new or existing com petitors, or alternative or 
substitute products. D id the respondent, for example, use trade intelligence, 
feedback or o ther information to  protect their market; did they block threats or 
pose counter-threats; did they perhaps bargain over m arket segm ents or becom e 
involved in any horse-trading with com petitors? Then the ow ner-m anager was 
asked about m ethods used to try and attract custom ers away from rivals. Did they 
use such tactics as special offers, m arketing and other prom otional material, o r did 
they rely on some technological advantage as being a draw  to new  custom ers? [c f  
Porter & M illar (1991)].
W ith the speed o f  change o f  information technology, it was considered that the 
successful implementation o f  new technologies in the business might confer some 
com petitive advantage upon the firm. It was already know n from  previous 
interviews how  the respondent rated the im portance o f  information technology to 
their business, on the scale o f  ‘scarcely’, ‘m oderately’ or ‘very’ im portant. They 
w ere now  asked, therefore, why they had rated it as they did. Did they think it was 
im portant because o f  the flexibility and adaptability it facilitated, because o f  the 
speed o f  communication it enabled, or because o f  the instant access it could give to  
news o r o ther trade intelligence. The respondent was next asked in w hat ways 
information technology was implemented, for example, in budgeting, cash flow
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forecasting, accounting, stock control, or for communications and information 
retrieval [c f  D odgson & Rothwell (1989)].
The investigation o f  the ‘Policies’ followed by the small firms in the study 
involves an analysis o f  w hat ground rules are being followed to  m ake sure the job 
is done correctly. First, the ow ner-m anager is asked about the maintaining and 
enhancing o f  the quality o f  their product. Do they have regular spot checks o r an 
approved TQ M  (Total Quality M anagem ent) system [c f  H ankes (1993a)], is their 
firm registered as BS (British Standard) or ISO (the international equivalent) 
approved, or do they have their own systems?
O w ner-m anagers w ere next questioned about the kind o f  assurances given to 
potential custom ers about the ‘fitness for purpose’ or the quality o f  their product 
or service? H ow  do they ensure the custom ers that their goods will be suitable for 
the custom er’s intentions? For example, they might offer guarantees, w arranties or 
w ritten assurance o f  the quality. Or, depending on the industry in which they 
operate, respondents might find that the provision o f  an after-care service is 
reassurance enough to potential customers.
Finally, in this section on ‘Policies’, respondents w ere asked to  explain how  
employees w ere m otivated to  assist in helping to  achieve the firm ’s mission. They 
were prom pted on such issues as efficiency bonuses, staff participation or 
involvement in decision-making, prospects for prom otion, the pow er and status 
they w ere awarded, and various other fringe benefits that might be used to  elicit 
their cooperation [c f  Johnson & Scholes (1984)].
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Strategy Implementation
The third section o f  the sem i-structured questionnaire examined the m ethods used 
by the small firm to implement the strategies they had developed. First, it looked 
at the ‘P rogram m es’ they w ere following; how did the respondent organise their 
operation to  get w hat they w anted done as quickly as possible, and w ith the 
highest quality possible? First, then, the ow ner-m anager was asked directly w hat 
they w ere doing to  help achieve their goals. F or example, w ere they bringing on­
line new products, investing further capital or taking on m ore staff? [cf. Shuman & 
Seeger (1986)].
The next question asked about feedback from custom ers. The administered 
questionnaire had already provided the answer as to w hether or not the respondent 
asked for feedback. N ow , they were asked first, if  they did receive feedback, how  
did they use it to  improve their product or service \cf. Thurston (1983)], perhaps 
formalising it, and modifying systems, methods, processes or products because o f  
it. I f  they did not receive feedback, how  could they be sure that the custom er was 
or w as not satisfied with their product or service, and how  w ould they know  w hat 
needed to  be improved?
The questionnaire next asked if  the respondent had ever encountered any 
problems in trying to implement new strategies, and to describe such problems and 
how  they w ere dealt with. Here, they w ere prom pted on things like goal conflict, 
his adaptability and flexibility, re-focusing the business and re-positioning the firm 
in the m arket place. It w as thought that speed might be im portant in implementing 
new strategies, so they w ere asked what would determine the speed at which they 
implemented new courses o f  action; was it, in fact, im portant to  his business, were
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costs or the time required to communicate new plans a constraint, and w ere they 
affected by rivals’ actions o r m arket trends?
Finally, under ‘Program m es’, the respondent w as asked to  identify anything that 
they thought w as currently constraining the further grow th o f  their business. 
Again, given prom pts, they w ere asked o f  the relevance o f  financial constraints \cf. 
Reid (1996b)] and governm ent policy in grow ing the firm. Then, w here relevant, 
they w ere prom pted to  discuss the possibilities that training courses o r further 
learning might enhance their, and their s ta ffs , ability to  grow  the business, and 
asked w hat they thought might help them to overcom e the constraints they had 
identified.
The next section under ‘Strategy Im plem entation’ was that o f  ‘B udgets’; how 
much w as implem entation going to  cost the business, and w here did it intend to  get 
the cash? The respondent w as asked directly, then, how  they w ould finance the 
grow th they expected to  occur. W ould it be through reinvested profits \cf. Bhide 
(1994)], through extra debt \cf. W oods et a l (1995)] or  additional equity? Then, 
they w ere asked to  choose the m ost im portant issue to  them at the moment, 
betw een controlling costs \cf. P o rter (1980, 1985)], and generating revenue by 
extra sales.
The ow ner-m anager w as next questioned about the changing financial structure 
in the firm, as it grew  [cf. Harris (1993); Hawkins (1993)]. For example, had there 
been much change in the debt/equity, o r gearing, ratio; had the business managed 
to  a ttract investm ent from outside backers; or had bank loans been paid off, or 
becom e a larger part o f  the firm ’s financing?
Next, they w ere asked to  identify the principal com ponents o f  their budgetary 
procedures; in other words, to  say w hether the business used profit and loss
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accounts, balance sheets and other financial reports [c f  Welsh and W hite (1981)], 
o r a m ore short-term  based monitoring o f  things like cash flow, o r debtors and 
creditors invoices. Did it, in fact, use any budgeting at all? [cf. Thurston (1983)]. 
H ow  im portant, it w as w ondered, were the roles played by accountants, auditors, 
bank m anagers o r any other small business advisors [cf. Fass & Scothom e (1990)], 
when it came to  preparing budgets; did they assist by having oversight o f  plans, by 
preparing feasibility studies, or did they give advice on investment? And finally, as 
regards budgets and financial concerns, had local o r central governm ent subsidies 
o r grants influenced the firm ’s budgetary procedures in any way; had the firm 
received grants for equipment, premises, advertising or staff, and had these played 
an im portant part in the decision to go ahead with plans?
The final section under ‘Strategy Im plem entation’ is that o f ‘P rocedures’. This is 
related to  the detail required to ensure that everybody know s w hat to  do [cf. 
Johnson & Scholes (1984)]. The respondent was first asked, therefore, how  new 
plans were com m unicated and implemented. They were prom pted, in their replies, 
to  make reference to  any such policy books, leaflets and plans o f  action that the 
firm might use [cf. A nsoff (1965)]. H ow  did they get employees involved and 
m otivated to assist in the firm ’s mission, and how  w ere the plans com municated; 
was it verbal, through conversation [cf. M intzberg (1979)], or w ere they written 
down? Perhaps resources had needed to  be re-allocated to  implemented a plan. 
W ere employees party to  any system o f  rew ard or bonus schemes, and was the 
em ployment o f  new full or part-tim e staff m ore im portant than sub-contracting 
labour elsewhere?
Then the respondent w as asked to describe the changes, if  any, that they had 
experienced in their own role since starting-up the business. For example, had
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their authority now  been delegated to  subordinates; w as the decision-m aking now, 
to some extent, out o f  their hands; had they changed the time allocated to various 
factors o f  the business; and had they experienced a move from the shop-floor level 
o f  production, to  a m ore senior and managerial role?
Evaluation an d  Controls
This final section o f  the questionnaire examined how, once plans had been 
developed and implemented, the managem ent would evaluate the perform ance o f  
these strategies, and control for any deviations from target; w hat w ere those few 
key things that w ould determine w hether o r not the business w ould make it, and 
how  did it keep track  o f  them? [cf. Thurston (1983)]. First, then, the  respondent 
was asked how  they described the success, or failure, o f  new  strategies. For 
example, w ould it be through increased productivity as m easured by, perhaps, a 
rising output/labour ratio; w ould it be through increased profits, m ore orders, an 
increased m arket share or asset grow th; w ould the firm set targets and m easure 
actual perform ance against these targets [cf. Johnson & Scholes (1984)]; or w ould 
success be evaluated in term s o f  the lifestyle goals o f  the owner-m anager?
I f  the firm had some m ethod o f evaluating the success o f  strategies, which 
m ethods did it then use to evaluate these? So, for example, the respondent was 
prom pted to  refer to  any use o f  milestones, personal perform ance appraisals [c f  
B aker et a l  (1993)], check-lists o f  tasks requested and completed; as well as to 
more formalised m ethods o f  appraising perform ance, such as com puterised targets 
or variance analysis.
The respondent was then asked about their attitude to changing policies, given 
their appraisal o f  perform ance. This question was meant to discover w hether or
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not they w ere willing to  accept that some things just would not w ork, and that they 
should change tack  if  they realised this w as the case. They w ere prom pted, 
therefore, on m ethods o f  negotiating change and re-focusing the business, the 
redeploym ent o f  personnel, and w hether they had needed to  downsize, or to 
upscale their operations because o f  their perform ance appraisal.
Finally, the ow ner-m anager w as asked to  identify the main item or items that 
singled their firm out from all others in the market; w hat did they have that gave 
them  the edge over their rivals? In other words, what gave the firm a com petitive 
advantage? Here, they w ere prom pted, w here necessary, to  respond on their 
product quality and range, on the personal service they offered, on the after-sales 
care the business provided, and on the value for money or the com petitive price 
that they thought the business gave.
3 .6  T h e  S e m i-S tru c tu re d  In te rv ie w s
Sampling Frame
During the course o f  the first year’s administered questionnaire interviews, 
respondents w ere asked w hether they w ould be willing to take part at a later date 
in an additional sem i-structured interview, about their business strategy. The rate 
o f  agreem ent w as high, so there was no concern about getting enough 
respondents. The target was to  com plete up to twenty such interviews. In the 
event, seventeen w ere concluded, but the information they provided w ere thought 
to  be sufficient for the purposes o f  this study.
The aim w as to  develop detailed case studies for the firm’s interviewed, and to 
group these under the categories o f ‘H igh’, ‘M edium ’ and ‘L ow ’ perform ers. This 
grouping was carried out, by cluster analysis [cf. Chapter 4, p. 145] after few o f  the
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sem i-structured interviews had taken place, so the investigator w as then able to 
target specific firms which fell in each o f  the perform ance categories, in order to 
ensure that the sample covered firms from each o f  the perform ance groups.
There w ere few conditions put on the firms chosen for interview. It was 
im portant that they had provided data for the first tw o years o f  the study, and that 
the investigator had met w ith the firms on at least one occasion previously, so that 
she knew the ow ner-m anager and would be able to  elicit the required information; 
personal contact and the developm ent o f  a trusting relationship w as im portant in 
the study. The ow ner-m anager had to have agreed to  the additional interview  at an 
earlier point; there w as the issue o f  ‘keeping faith’ with respondents, and not 
putting them  o ff taking part in the larger study, which still required an additional 
tw o interviews. And finally, there had to  be a good representation o f  firms from 
each o f  the three perform ance groups.
B efore going to  m eet these firms for the next administered questionnaire, the 
investigator w ould therefore check that the firm met all o f  the above criteria. I f  it 
did, she w ould request the additional sem i-structured interview, and make an 
appointm ent there and then for the meeting. I f  the firm did not m eet the criteria, or 
the respondent w as now  unwilling or unable to  take part in a further interview, 
then he o r she was not pressurised to take part. Having agreed to  the meeting, the 
respondent was sent a preletter, outlining the reasons for this additional study, and 
an agenda for the interview. Thank you letters also formed part o f  the protocol, as 
for the administered questionnaire interviews.
B etw een the m onths o f  M arch and D ecem ber 1996, therefore, the seventeen 
sem i-structured interviews were conducted. In the end, there w ere three from the 
high perform ance (the smallest) group, six from amongst the medium perform ers
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(also the m edium group by number o f  firms), and eight from the low  perform ers 
(the largest group in the  sample). The data generated from these questionnaires 
w ere developed into w ritten  case studies, which are included in Appendix IV  to 
this w ork, and which form  the basis for the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6.
3 .7  S u m m a ry
Chapter 3 has described the means by which a sample o f  150 small firms in 
Scotland w as selected fo r interview. The D irectors o f  18 Scottish Enterprise 
Trusts w ere shown to  be o f  great assistance in this procedure, and conversations 
w ith them  proved to  be instrumental in the design o f  the  administered 
questionnaire. An aw areness o f  the role o f  the Enterprise Trusts w as developed 
and a picture em erged o f  the climate in which new  small firms in Scotland operate.
The m ethodology o f  the  project was described and justified. Section 4 o f  the 
adm inistered questionnaire, on Business Strategy, was analysed, section by section, 
relating questions to both the literature and com m ents made by the Enterprise 
T rust D irectors. The reasons for which questions were included and the 
know ledge it w as hoped to  be gained from  them  w as outlined.
The actual adm inistration o f  the questionnaire was then discussed. It w as shown 
how  a pilot study o f  14 firms helped to  refine the questionnaire and establish its 
final form. The way in which the main study was carried out was then described, 
as w ere the m ethods used to  gain and retain the cooperation o f  respondents. It 
was show n how  a prom ise o f  confidentiality and feedback o f  results helped to  elicit 
the continued participation o f  owner-m anagers o f  new small firms.
Following on from this, the developm ent o f  a sem i-structured questionnaire was 
discussed, along with the reasons behind wishing to do so. It was found that such
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a questionnaire w ould enable the respondent to  develop lines o f  thought 
established in previous interviews, and to  explain and further illustrate the m ethods 
implemented in forming and implementing new strategies in his business. A 
num ber o f  detailed case studies w ere written, based on the fieldwork evidence thus 
gathered, and their usefulness in illustrating points raised from statistical and 
econom etric analysis w as observed.
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C h a p te r  4
D a tab ase : co n stru ctio n  an d  analysis
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 introduces the database used to store the information gathered from the 
administered questionnaire. It shows how Paradox  was used to create a relational 
database which could grow as the study evolved, and from which data could be 
transferred easily between software packages for analysis. The data relevant to this 
study are held, primarily, in the Table, STRATEGY, but use is also made of other 
performance characteristics from the MARKET and FINANCE sections.
Section 4.3 discusses the summary statistics of all 150 firms in the study, 
comparing the data from years one and two. First, it presents some general 
characteristics, in terms of size by employment, number of products, target market, 
rivals, the manufactures/servicing split, and financial measures. It then takes the 
summary responses for each section of the administered questionnaire in turn, 
comparing results from years one with those in year two, to give an impression of 
the general tendencies amongst the sample as a whole.
In section 4.4, the firms are grouped into classes of high, medium and low 
performers, using a method called cluster analysis. This provides a convincing 
ranking of the 150 firms in the study, with a small group of high performers 
standing out well above the remaining low and medium performers. These clusters 
are to form the basis for the detailed analysis of strategies carried out in Chapters 5
1 2 8
and 6 .
The general characteristics of firms in each cluster are discussed in section 4.5. 
this analysis looks at various measures of performance that have been used 
commonly to describe success or failure. It is found that these measures generally 
accord well with the rankings suggested by the cluster analysis. Subjective 
evaluations by the chief investigators, and reference to company information 
gathered during fieldwork, confirm the groupings. For the high performers, the 
values of the variables under consideration are clearly distinct from those for the 
other firms, in general, with only one or two discrepancies. Similarly, the low 
performers suggested by the clustering do worse, on average, by reference to these 
additional performance measures. It is with some confidence, therefore, that the 
clusters generated are used as the focus for the remainder of this work.
4.2 Database Construction
The administered questionnaire as a whole generated an immense amount of data: 
there were some 500 quantitative variables, and an additional 50 or so qualitative 
variables; 150 firms were to be investigated; and the main study was to include 
four interviews with each firm still in business. It was therefore important to 
choose the correct software on which to store this valuable data. It had to have 
the facility to grow as the study grew, to incorporate quantitative as well as 
qualitative responses, and to allow data export to other packages for statistical and 
econometric analysis. In addition, it had to allow the investigator to pick out 
specific information from any part of the questionnaire, for any firm, in any given 
year or years.
129
Spreadsheets were therefore ruled out as infeasible. Even if one could have been 
found that was large enough to hold all of the data acquired, the inflexibility of 
using such a device was a major drawback. Searching for the required data, screen 
by screen on the computer, would be just too time-consuming, and also likely to 
result in errors. The preferred method was a database management system, and the 
specific package chosen, B orland Paradox fo r  Windows Version 5.0.
The advantages of using this system are several-fold. As it states in the 
introduction to the U ser's Guide [Borland (1994, p.l)], “the paradox of Paradox  
is that this sophisticated database program is powerful and fast, yet easy to learn 
and use. Paradox  is designed for computer users with all levels of experience, 
from beginners to advanced. It gives you the power of a full-featured relational 
database without the need for programming” . 1 In a database, the data are stored in 
tables; each column of a table contains a different variable or ‘field’ , and each row, 
a record. A ‘flat file’ system would enable the user to look at only one table at a 
time. The advantage of a database like Paradox is that is a ‘relational’ database. 
In other words, it recognises that there is a relationship between the tables, and 
enables the user to extract the specific information he wants from a combination of 
tables.
The database was therefore divided into eight tables; the first for general 
information, such as the respondent’s name and address, the business’ name, the 
date of interview, and the person who had conducted the interview; and seven 
tables, each covering a separate section of the questionnaire. For this thesis,
] S e e  a l s o  R e i d  ( 1 9 9 2 a )  f o r  a  d e t a i l e d  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  u s i n g  a  r e l a t i o n a l  d a t a b a s e , 
w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a  p r e v i o u s  s t u d y  o n  s m a l l  f i r m s .
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therefore, the relevant data are held in the table entitled ‘STRATEGY’, and 
additional information on performance indicators such as turnover, for example, 
may be found in the ‘MARKET’ or ‘FINANCE’ tables.
In order to extract correctly the data from several tables at once, it is important 
to define one or more ‘key’ fields. These are fields which are identical in each 
table, and enable the database programme to identify and link related information. 
In this study, two key fields were named: the first, Firmid, denoted the firm’s 
identification number, allocated during interview, and was a number between ‘ 0 0 1 ’ 
and ‘ 150’ ; the second key field was Yrstud, which showed the year of the study in 
which the interview took place, and was a number between ‘ 1 ’ and ‘4’ (or ‘2’, for 
the purposes of this study). Thus it was possible to extract, for example, variables 
from the ‘STRATEGY’ table relating to firms 001 to 150 in year 1, and compare 
this to performance indicators for those same firms taken from the ‘FINANCE’ 
table in year 2 .
The data gathered were in one of four possible forms. First, there was the simple 
‘yes/no’ response, where a ‘tick’ on the questionnaire would denote a positive 
response. Second, were the categorical variables, where the respondent was asked 
to choose from a list of options, for example, ‘slightly, moderately or very’ . Third, 
the reply was in numerical form, for example, number of months. And fourth, the 
respondent might have given a textual response. Each of these will now be 
discussed in turn.
In questions where the response could only be either positive or negative, for 
example, ‘Do you have a business plan?’ , the variable was coded in binary [0,1] 
form. In other words, a positive response was coded as ‘ 1 ’ on the database, and a 
negative response as ‘O’ . Similarly, if the respondent were asked to choose
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between two alternative responses, a ‘ 1 ’ was used to indicated one response, a ‘O’ 
the other. If, in the latter case, the question was irrelevant, this was then coded as 
**’ . Where any answer was unknown and could not be estimated by the 
respondent, a ‘?’ was used to signify such a response.
Several questions asked the respondent to estimate the degrees of intensity of 
some particular item, for example, whether they felt that competition posed a 
strong, medium or weak threat. These so-called categorical variables, where only 
one of a few possible categories is relevant, were coded on a sliding scale from, in 
the case just given, ‘3’ , through ‘2’ to ‘ 1 ’ . The number ‘3’ therefore represented a 
very strong threat, and the number ‘ 1 ’, only a weak threat.
The third possible kind of response expected was in numeric form, for example, 
‘How long have you been ...’ . Such answers were typically given in months or 
years. So long as responses were standardised, usually to months, given that the 
firms in question were so young, there was no problem. Paradox  accepts many 
different forms of data entry, including numeric, date and alphanumeric, but 
allocating a variable the correct form was not usually difficult, and it could, in any 
case, by changed or modified at a later date.
Finally, there were some responses that could be input only as text. Paradox  has 
so-called ‘memo’ fields for this purpose. When the table is called up on screen, 
only the number of characters, say the first 25, that are user-defined are visible. 
However, the operator is able to access this memo field, which opens up to reveal 
perhaps a whole page of text. This was more than adequate for the purposes of 
the study. Examples of possible text responses might come from the question, 
‘What is your main line of business?’ . More frequently, they might provide 
additional examples to the given options. For example, if the given possible
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reasons for starting the business did not adequately describe the respondent’s own 
reason, then his answer to that question would be entered into an additional memo 
field.
Paradox also has the facility to limit the data input to specified responses, which 
in turn helps to maintain the accuracy of the data. For example, where a response 
can be only either ‘ 1 ’ or ‘O’, the user can set up the database to accept only one of 
these two numbers. Similarly, if a range of variable entries must total 100%, again 
Paradox can be programmed to alert the user to incorrect entries. From the 
discussion above, it is clear, therefore, that it is vitally important that the database 
be set up carefully, before data entry can even begin.
With so many variables and different coding options, it is obviously important to 
keep an accurate record of these. To this end, a data dictionary was produced. 
This gives a complete listing of every variable name, a brief description, the table in 
which it is to be found, and reference to a ‘note’, which defines how responses to 
that variable are coded. Appendix I gives the information thus produced for the 
‘STRATEGY’ database table. Field names were limited to a maximum of eight 
characters, in keeping with the limited length of variable names permitted in the 
software used for analysis.
To present a clearer explanation of how the database was set up, Figure 4.1 
shows an extract from the top, left-hand side of the ‘STRATEGY’ table. The 
format of menus and toolbars along the top of the screen will be familiar to anyone 
who has used a Windows operating system. There are the usual ‘print’, ‘cut’, 
‘copy’ and ‘paste’ commands, as in any good word processor. The icon that 
includes a spanner (viz. fifth from the left) allows the user to ‘reconstruct’ the 
table, adding new variables of modifying the existing fields, then there are various
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EXTRACT FROM PARADOX DATABASE
‘STRATEGY’ TABLE 
Figure 4.1
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database tools allowing the user to ‘search’ or ‘filter’ the data. The directional 
arrows in the middle, at the top of the screen, allow the user to scroll through the 
records, one or a page at a time, or to go straight to the last (or back to the first) 
record immediately. On the right are tools for constructing ‘forms’, and providing 
specialised layouts, as well as the obligatory ‘help’ and ‘tutorial’ buttons.
And so to the table itself, whose name is given in the top left of the screen. 
Along the top of the table are given the field names, translated to variable names in 
the later analyses. The two key fields (viz. F irm id  and Yrstnd) are on the left, 
followed by the binary variables, Busplan (‘do you have a business plan?’), and 
Form writ (‘is it a formal and written plan, or is it in your head?’). The following 
five variables enquire into who was involved in preparing the firm’s business plan; 
a ‘ 1 ’ signifying that the particular option was relevant, and a ‘0 ’ that it was not. 
And finally, just to the right of the screen can be seen the edge of the memo field, 
Whoplan, which gives textual replies to the question ‘who was involved in 
preparing the plan?’ . Down the left of the screen, under ‘STRATEGY’, Paradox  
numbers the records automatically. Careful observation shows that this table 
contains data for firms over the first two years of the study, and that firm 9, for 
example, had formulated a written business plan since his first interview in year 
one, where the plan was only ‘in his head’ .
Data are selected from a database by means of a ‘query’ . ‘Structured Query 
Language’, or SQL, is one method of doing so, and is commonly used by older 
database packages, or those that do not run under Windows. However, its use 
involves some computer programming and therefore requires more detailed 
computer knowledge, and also more time. Paradox can be queried using SQL, 
which is a useful facility when needed, particularly for complicated queries; but an
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easier was of doing this is by using its ‘Query By Example’, or QBE, function. 
Basically, the user provides an example of the query he wishes to perform, and 
Paradox  applies this to the relevant data.
Figure 4.2 shows how a query might be set up under Paradox. The top screen 
shot shows the query, as defined by the user. The two tables to be queried are 
shown on the left by their names, with the attachment ‘ .DB’ to denote a Paradox  
table. The links between tables are created by ‘joining’ the key fields in each table
(cf. J o in l, Join2). Each field that contains a 0  has been selected by the user for
display. To the right of these ‘ticked’ boxes, there is space for the user to modify 
the query, or to request only specified data. For example, in the Bnsplan  field, the 
user could put ‘ 1 ’ to receive data only from firms who had business plan. 
Alternatively, a ‘0’ would provide data entry from firms who had no plan. 
Likewise, under Grprof, the user could define limits to receive, for example, only 
data relating to firms with gross profits between £100,000 and £150,000. To run 
the query, the user need only ‘click’ with a mouse on the fourth icon from the left, 
and Paradox  will perform the data search.
The resulting answer table is displayed in the screen shot below the query in 
Figure 4.2, and its meaning is fairly self-evident. The table name, ‘ANSWER’, is, 
as always, to the top left. Under Firmid, each firm is listed twice, as two years 
worth of data are given per firm. Then are given the gross profit and turnover 
figures per firm, per year. Firm id  and Yrstud are repeated, as they now relate to 
the second table from which data have been queried, and finally, the results are 
given from Busplan. The table as it stands is now ready for export, but it can be 
reconstructed beforehand if the user so wishes. For example, it might be useful to
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EXAMPLE OF PARADOX QUERY FROM 
‘STRATEGY’ AND ‘FINANCE’ TABLES 
Figure 4.2
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sort the data into two groups, by whether or not they have a business plan, or by 
year. Paradox  can deal with this quite simply.
Once the table is in a form acceptable to the user, and to the software package to 
which it is being exported, the task is performed quickly and easily. Typically, the 
data were exported to M icrosoft Excel spreadsheet files, where they were then 
saved. In this format, the data could be read easily by several programmes, 
including the econometric package, Shazam , and the Statistical Package f o r  the 
Social Sciences, better known as SPSS.
This section has shown how a new database was set up using primary source 
fieldwork-collected data. It has explained why the Paradox  database was chosen 
for this task, and detailed the advantages of using such a system. These include 
facility, clarity and speed of operation. The following section now discusses the 
results obtained from years one and two of the study, as generated by the methods 
described above.
4.3 Statistical Analysis
The average results for each of the two years of the study have been inserted onto 
the administered questionnaire, and are contained in Appendix II. The results from 
year one are given to the left, and those from year two to the right, and are 
distinguished by their typeface, as explained in the N otes to Appendix II. 
Discussion of the results from the Business Strategy section of the Administered 
Questionnaire will appeal to the data contained in Appendix II.
First, though, a brief discussion of the sample in general is in order. Table 4.1 
shows the main characteristics of firms from years one and two. 150 firms were 
interviewed in year one of the study, with an average age of 2 1  months, and six
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MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS 
IN YEARS 1 AND 2
Table 4.1
Mean Values: Year 1 
n=150
Mean Values: Year 2 
n= 1 2 2
B usiness A g e  an d  E m ployees H H H H n H H
Time in business 2 1  months 33 months
D irectors 1 1
M anagers 0 0
Full-tim ers 3 3
Part-tim ers 2 4
Trainees 0 0
Total em ployees 6 8
M arket Characteristics
W M m m m
Product groups 4 4
Products 48 33
M ain m arket local (34%) local (40%)
M ajor rivals 1 1 7
M inor rivals 24 26
M anufactures1 36% 35%
Servicing1 64% 65%
F inancia l M easures
Turnover £233,510 £233,600
Gross Profits £49,860 £66,994
N et Profits £14,705 £14,504
Notes:
1 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) <50
2  Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) >50
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total employees, including the owner-manager. By the second year of the study, 
122 were still in business, average age was 33 months, and total employees had 
increased by two part-time workers to number eight altogether. Given that the 
majority of firms were very close to inception at the first interview, a relatively 
high failure rate had been expected by the second year, so the ‘deaths’ of 28 firms 
(19%) was not totally unexpected.
The number of product groups or categories2  into which each firm could divide 
their total products was consistent, at four each year; but the number of individual 
products had dropped from an average of 48 to 33. This effect might be due either 
to firms in general narrowing their product range; or by firms with a large number 
of products in year one failing, and dropping out of the sample by year two. The 
most popular market area targeted was the same in both years, being the local 
market. The number of major rivals with whom firms thought they competed 
directly fell from 1 1  to seven, whereas the number of minor, or all other, rivals was 
fairly steady, in the mid-twenties. Taking the firm’s SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) number, at the two-digit level, as an indication of whether it falls 
under the ‘manufacturing’ or ‘service’ industries heading, there is a slight drop 
shown in the level of manufacturing firms, from 36% in year one to 35% in year 
two, although this difference is not significant.
In terms of financial measures, average annual sales, or turnover, were 
remarkably similar in each year, at around £233,000. Net profits were equally 
close, at just under £15,000 in year one, falling slightly by the second year of
2 F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t o a s t e r s  a n d  h a i r d r y e r s  w o u l d  b e  t w o  p r o d u c t  g r o u p s ;  f o u r  kinds o f  t o a s t e r s  a n d  
t h r e e  kinds o f  h a i r d r y e r s  w o u l d  b e  s e v e n  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o d u c t s .
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interviews. 3 The most interesting difference is in the gross profits figure; just 
under £50,000 in year one, but rising to almost £67,000 in year two. It seems 
surprising that, with turnover and net profits hardly changed, there should be such 
an increase in gross profits. In fact, the average gross profit margin (Gross Profit
Turnover x 100%) grew from 21% to 29%, while the average net profit margin 
(Net Profit -s- Turnover x 100%) is constant at 6 % per annum.
One might expect an improvement in the gross profit margin to lead in turn to an 
improvement in the net profit margin, but this is not the case here. For gross profit 
to be so much higher relative to turnover, the average cost of sales must have 
decreased. 4  This might be because of the failure of more manufacturing firms than 
service firms in the sample; their cost of sales, which includes direct labour and raw 
materials, is likely to be much higher than that of a business in the service industry, 
so their exclusion from the sample will lower the average cost of sales. However, 
it seems more likely to be due to the fact that expenses must have risen 
substantially from one year to the next; which perhaps can be explained by the 
noted increase in average employment by two part-time workers, whose wages 
might be deducted under the heading o f ‘other expenses’ (for example, if they were 
occasional or sub-contracted workers), after gross profit has been calculated.
3 S e e  R e i d  ( 1 9 9 6 a ) ,  w h o  f i n d s  t h a t  f i r m s  i n  t h e  s a m e  s a m p l e  w h o  c o n t i n u e  t o  t r a d e  f r o m  o n e  y e a r  
t o  t h e  n e x t  h a v e  a  n e g a t i v e  n e t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( m e a s u r e d  a s  N e t  P r o f i t s  N e t  F i x e d  A s s e t s ) ,  
c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h o s e  w h o  c e a s e  t r a d i n g ,  w h o s e  n e t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  is  p o s i t i v e .  H e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  o n e  
e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  is  t h a t  t h e  f i r m s  w h o  c o n t i n u e  t o  t r a d e  p a y  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  w a g e  r a t e s  
t h a n  t h o s e  w h o  c e a s e  t o  t r a d e .
Profit &  Loss Account £
T u r n o v e r X
L e s s :  C o s t  o f  S a l e s ( 2 Q
G r o s s  P r o f i t X
L e s s :  O t h e r  E x p e n s e s ( 2 Q
N e t  P r o f i t / ( L o s s ) M X )
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However, it is difficult to make any firm conclusions along these lines, given that 
such small firms have different accounting techniques and adopt different reporting 
conventions, as there is no standard for organisations of their size.
The above discussion has served to describe the average firm in the sample, and 
key differences in these businesses between years one and two. It is shown that the 
firms are very small, ‘micro’ firms, and that they are fairly close to financial 
inception. They typically target a local niche market, and admit to having few (less 
than ten) major rivals. Sales are, on average, under £l4m, with little change 
between interviews. With this idea of the sample now in mind, Chapter 4 
continues by presenting the results from an analysis of the business strategy section 
of the questionnaire.
Aims, Am bitions an d  M aking D ecisions
In year one, the two most popular reasons for the respondent having started the 
business were that it was an alternative to unemployment (25%), and to satisfy 
their need for achievement (25%) [cf. Bamberger (1983)]. In the second year, the 
question was re-phrased slightly to ask why they were still running the business. 
By this stage, the need for achievement had become by far the most important 
reason (36%), with an alternative to unemployment and to ‘get rich’ being the next 
most important (17% each).
None had taken or handed over a family business, and very few were in it just to 
‘profit from a hobby’ (3% in year two). A modest amount (from 18% to 13%) 
were most keen to be their own boss. Disappointingly few were trying to exploit a 
new market opportunity (11%  in year one, falling to 9% in year 2 ). Some 
respondents suggested other reasons for starting the business, including: “I like
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running things and enjoy running businesses” ; “It’s my life now ... I know the 
industry” ; “To provide a good livelihood and be financially worthwhile and 
interesting” ; and “To come out of the rat race” [c f  Cooper (1993)].
When asked what was the main aim for the business, long term profit (30%) and 
general growth (20%) [c f  Lee (1994); Bhide (1994)] were most common choices 
in year one, followed by survival (16%). By the second year, these three were still 
regarded as being most important, although the degrees of importance had 
changed; long term profit was up to 38%, growth to 23%, and those who were 
seeking mainly to ‘survive’ had dropped to 13%, reflecting the greater confidence 
that comes with experience [c f  Churchill and Lewis (1983)]. Many respondents 
commented that one aim would lead to another, or that they were aiming for 
several complementary goals5, but the three identified above accounted for 74% of 
all responses. Short term profit, increased sales, increased market share and a high 
rate of return were singled out by only a few as being the main aim of the business. 
Again, some alternative responses were given to this question, including: “To build 
a business I can sell” ; “To keep money coming in” ; “To pay off our debts” ; and 
“To develop a sizeable organisation in small business terms, which can be sold at a 
reasonable profit in about 1 0  years time - a business that is fun and exciting, and 
that I can enjoy, but that is worth something” .
Respondents were asked if, when making decisions, they would consider the past 
experience of other, similar businesses. For strategic decisions, 56% said ‘yes’ in 
year one, rising to 67% in year two [c f Hay et a l (1993)]. For operational, or day
5 S e e  J a r v i s  et al ( 1 9 9 6 ,  p . i i i ) ,  w h o  f i n d  t h a t  “ t h e  m o t i v a t i o n s  o f  t h e  o w n e r  m a n a g e r s  o f  s m a l l  
b u s i n e s s e s  a r e  o f t e n  c o m p l e x  a n d  t h e y  t e n d  t o  h a v e  a  r a n g e  o f  b u s i n e s s  o b j e c t i v e s ” .
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to day, decisions, the figures were slightly lower, at 54% in year one, and 60% in 
year two. They were then asked whether one single person had responsibility for 
each of these categories of decisions, or whether they came about through 
negotiation between more than one person. In year one, 55% said that strategic 
decisions were negotiated, falling to 53% in year two \cf. Miller and Toulouse 
(1986)]. Understandably, fewer (45%) would negotiate over operational decisions 
in year one, falling again to 41% by year two. There was little change in the 
underlying bases upon which decisions were made; over two-thirds of decisions in 
each time period were made for purely business or financial reasons, compared 
with under a third for personal reasons [cf. Wheelen and Hunger (1995)].
Respondents were asked whether they would seek outside advice when 
formulating new strategies, and if they would be willing to pay for this advice. In 
year one, outside advice was said to be sought on decisions about new investment 
(51%), legal matters (65%), insurance (89%) and accounting matters (8 6 %). In- 
house capabilities were typically thought to suffice on matters of marketing (62%), 
personnel (77%), research and development (74%) and new product design (78%). 
By year two, the same four matters would require outside advice, and three of 
these had increased in importance. Outside advice on new investment would now 
be sought by 73% of respondents, legal matters by 94%, insurance by 72% and 
accounting matters by 91%. There was little change in the percentages who would 
carry out marketing, personnel, research and development and new product design 
entirely in-house. For the older companies, therefore, it seems that growth and 
experience has led to an increased awareness of the need to call in professionals for 
important decisions, particularly on new investment (up 2 2 %) and legal matters (up
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29%) [cf. Peiser and Wooten (1983); Johnson and Devins (1994)].
In terms of a willingness to pay for the outside advice received, in year one, 
respondents thought that help on new product design (61%), legal matters (84%), 
insurance (76%) and accounting matters (8 8 %) would be worth the investment. 
By year two, legal and accounting matters were still thought to be things that 
warranted payment, but advice on insurance was much less likely to be paid for 
(down 33%), as was advice on new product design (down 39%). This can perhaps 
be explained by the fact that product design and insurance are associated with 
start-up firms. Once they are in place, there is no further need for advice; firms 
might be willing to pay for help on product design in the early stages, to assist 
them in becoming established, but the evidence is that this becomes less important 
as they grow in age and experience.
Legal and accounting matters, however, are on-going concerns and, in general, a 
small firm does not have the specialisation required to carry out these functions in- 
house [cf. Hofer and Sandberg (1987)]. To conform to statutory requirements it 
is, therefore, obligatory to pay the relevant specialists to carry out such tasks. 
Very few respondents mentioned the advice, both legal and financial, that was 
available to them free through the various agencies set up to help small firms; but 
even if they were aware of its existence, they rarely seemed to use the facilities on 
offer. It is interesting to notice too that, by the second year of interviews, 
respondents were more likely to pay for advice on marketing (up 1 1 %) and 
personnel matters (up 23%) than previously. This reflects the increase in 
employees (viz. two extra part-timers) and their wish in general for growth, as 
discussed above.
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F orw ard Planning
In year one, 89% of respondents admitted to having a business plan which was 
typically (79%) formal and written, as opposed to the 21% who had a visionary 
plan [cf. Mintzberg (1994)] simply held in their head. All respondents had been 
personally involved in the development of the plan, along with others in the 
business (25%) and outside help (6 8 %), which often included an accountant, bank 
manager or enterprise trust agency.
By the second year, the number of respondents who still had a business plan had 
dropped to 64%, with a higher percentage (37%) claiming to hold the plan in their 
head. Outside help in formulating (or re-formulating) the plan had become much 
less important, with only 33% asking others to assist them in constructing their 
plan. There seems, therefore, to be a loss of interest in having a formal, written 
business plan, contrasting with the general enthusiasm near start-up. This may be 
explained in a couple of ways. First, there is evidence to suggest that some early- 
stage plans were only formulated to gain the start-up grants and allowances 
available to a small firm, or to obtain a bank loan; for example, as one respondent 
admitted, “I did it just to get the grant” [cf. Bhide (1994)]. In other words, 
respondents were often only developing plans under the external pressure put upon 
them by funding bodies. Second, once the business is up and running, and the new 
business grants have dried up, the time and effort required to constantly revise, 
update and stick to plans may become too much for the owner manager of a new 
firm, who is very often a sole trader [cf. Churchill and Lewis (1983)].
However, those who did have plans reviewed them regularly, on average twice a 
year, and this remained unchanged at the time of each time of interview [cf. Baker 
et a l (1993)]. The forward planning horizon of the firms in the sample was also
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encouragingly long. When asked how far ahead respondents looked when 
evaluating the impact that decisions might have, the average response in year one 
was 15 months, rising to 19 months in year two. Some had even produced plans 
forecasting up to five years ahead [cf. Shuman and Seeger (1986)].
Funding Growth
Funding the operations of a small enterprise is, more often than not, a major 
problem. In the first year of the study, 91% of respondents had invested their own 
savings in the business \cf. Churchill and Lewis (1983)], 73% had received a grant 
or subsidy, very often the Enterprise Allowance of £40 a week, and 49% had taken 
out a bank loan or were running on overdraft. By the second year, these were still 
the main sources of funding, although the importance of debt finance from the bank 
had risen to 67%. Family and/or friends had been moderately helpful in providing 
loan funding (15% in year one, 11% in year two), but only a few of them (3% by 
year two) held an equity stake in the business. A tiny proportion had gained 
venture capital backing (1 % in year one, 2 % in year two) or business angel support 
(1 % in each year).
Respondents were questioned about preferred methods of improving their cash 
flow. When asked whether they would rather inject more capital or restructure the 
payback terms of debtors and creditors, 64% chose the former in year one, rising 
to 69% in year two. Of those who favoured the restructuring method, very few 
would opt for factoring (3% in year one, 0% in year two) or invoice discounting 
(3%  in year one, 2% in year two) saying, for example, “I wouldn’t touch factoring 
with a barge pole” [cf. Harris (1993); Hawkins (1993)]. The most popular option 
was to extend their trade credit with suppliers (51% in year one, 46% in year two)
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[c f  Bhide (1993)], or in other words, to give themselves longer to pay: for 
example, “we would put off paying invoices” or “put off the rent for a month” [c f  
Reid (1996a)]. This option was followed by chasing up debtors more quickly 
(24% in year one, 34% in year two): again, examples given included “telling clients 
who are misbehaving that we can’t accept this any more” and “we’re going to go 
into direct debiting” .
Some provided fairly novel ways of improving their cash flow. For example, 
one, who wanted to make their bad debtors pay up, gave the following example: 
“We don’t go through the legal system. We use a company who uses the methods 
they feel fit to get the money, for example, intimidation” . Several though they 
would probably speak to the bank manager about extending their overdraft or 
taking out a loan, before resorting to using any of the methods mentioned above 
[c f  Welsh and White (1981)].
Just under a half (49%) of respondents would be willing to sacrifice a proportion 
of their equity stake in the business, if it were expected that this might lead to 
further growth [c f  Bull (1993); Bhide (1994)] . This figure had risen to 56% by 
the second year of interviews. In both periods, the majority wanted to retain a 
controlling share of the business (on average, 52% in each year). A much higher 
proportion (89% in each year) were willing to accept smaller profits to help 
business expansion. In other words, they were willing to forgo present benefits by 
investing in the business, if this would lead to long-term future financial gain; but 
were less happy about giving up a share of the ownership of the business to 
achieve the same result.
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Information, Technology and Communications
Almost all respondents received some form of feedback from their customers about 
the product or service they were providing. In year one, about a quarter (23%) 
received information simply by asking for it, just under a third (30%) said it was 
given freely, and almost a half (48%) said it came from a combination of requested 
and voluntary information. By the second year, fewer (19%) were leaving things 
to chance by expecting feedback to be given without prompting. It was now asked 
for by 18%, and was both volunteered and requested for 63% of firms. 
Respondents were therefore showing an increasing tendency to ask for feedback to 
ensure that their product was of a good enough quality, and if it were not, to find 
out why.
Reactions to customers’ comments changed only slightly from one year to the 
next. Note would be taken of them (84% in year one, 83% in year two), for 
referral later, either mentally or, often, written down, respondents would discuss 
comments with other customers (60% in year one, 55% in year two) to find out if 
feelings were similar or widespread. The vast majority (8 6 % in year one, 85% in 
year two) would implement changes based on the suggestions of customers, if this 
were required and deemed necessary. Very few (2% in year one, 3% in year two) 
would do nothing at all. Some respondents had quite sophisticated ways of getting 
and logging information: for example, one owner manger explained: “I have a form 
which every customer receives. I ask them to complete and return it, and 
investigate any bad point” ; “I document it and feed it into the computer. Then I 
run a graph which gives peaks and troughs” ; and “I keep record cards - everything 
you say and do has to be written down” .
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Two-thirds of respondents said that they actively sought to gather trade 
intelligence on their rivals in year one \cf. Hay et a l (1993)], falling to 55% by year 
two, possibly because of the time involved in doing so. In the first year of the 
study, respondents were most likely to have an idea of their rivals’ product quality 
(92%), customer relations (83%), new products (81%) and personnel (64%). 
They were less aware of the size of rivals’ market share (39%) and financial 
performance (30%). By year two, they were still likely to know as much as they 
did before, but were becoming slightly more aware of rivals’ financial performance 
(32%), and particularly of their market share (52%). The awareness of the level of 
rivals’ pricing was not questioned in year one, but its popular mention led to its 
inclusion in year two. It turned out that 8 6 % of respondents had an idea at what 
level there rivals were pricing.
The gathering of such information was a fairly frequent occurrence; every two 
months on average. Frequently, respondents said that it was an ‘on-going thing’, 
and that they gathered information as they came upon it. In fact, 99% in year one 
(98% in year two) said that they received intelligence through conversations, 
hearsay or ‘gossip’ . Newspapers were also an important source (65%), as were 
trade journals (57%), followed by the contacts they made through membership of 
trade associations (41%). The relatively frequent use of the latter supports Curran 
and Downing’s (1993, p. 145) finding that “business owners’ commonest contacts 
after customers and suppliers were with accountants, bankers, chambers of 
commerce and trade associations” . There was little change in the use of these 
sources from one year to the next, but electronic databases were becoming more 
common (from 9% to 18%), as was the use of government publications (from 12% 
to 16%).
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Information Technology (IT) was defined for respondents as “the devices 
businesses use to transmit, store and process information” [c f Porter and Millar 
(1991)], and so included phones, faxes and personal computers. Two-thirds (64%) 
replied, therefore, that IT was very important to their business in year one, 20% 
moderately important, and 15% just scarcely or not at all important. By year two, 
it was thought to be slightly less important in general, with 54% claiming it was 
very, 22% moderately and 25% scarcely important.
The phone was used by 99% of respondents in year one, followed by telephone 
answering machine (75%), fax (72%) and personal computer (71%). These were 
again the most commonly used by year two, and were all even slightly more 
important. There was also an increase in the use of cellular or mobile telephones 
(from 42% to 62%), electronic databases (from 40% to 50%) and electronic mail 
(email) (from 12% to 18%). Telephone and video conferencing were both rarely 
used, as were satellite links and radio communication (all less than 1 0 %). 
Microfiche was used by only 5%, and was typically seen by those who actually 
knew what it was as being a piece of outdated technology.
By far the most popular use of IT in year one was for administrative purposes 
(95%), or keeping track of buyers and suppliers. It was next used for producing 
accounts (58%) and networking (57%) [c f  Steene (1991); McNicoll (1994)], or 
keeping in touch with contacts in the business to be aware of any changes. By year 
two, IT was only used by 40% for networking, although it was increasing in use as 
regards producing accounts (72%) and administration (96%). It was also more 
commonly used for forecasting or producing a business plan (from 48% in year 
one, to 55% in year two), and for designing new products (from 33% to 41%) [c f  
Cooper et a l (1991)]. Relatively few used IT to track the activities of their
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competitors, though this amount was increasing (from 16% to 18%).
Quality C ontrol an d  SW OT Analysis
Quality systems and the recognised approval of such were not popular amongst 
firms in the sample. Only 15% in year one claimed to have installed a quality 
system [cf. Hand (1993)], from which it was hoped to gain mainly increased 
efficiency (31%), followed by better cost control (23%) and an improved business 
image (19%). Several claimed to have installed their own quality systems without 
the help of any external bodies or consultants [cf. Shuman and Seeger (1986)]: for 
example, “We have our own system, and sell the company by saying we have the 
safest chemicals and equipment” . One or two had used university business 
students on secondment, who would carry out an in-depth study of the business, 
perhaps as work towards an MBA, and then provide a suggested plan of action.
Few again had taken steps towards achieving a recognised formal quality 
approval, for example British Standard BS5750 or the international equivalent 
IS09000 series. For the business as a whole, 17% (18% in year two) claimed to 
have made efforts in this direction. Less than 10%, though, in each case, had 
gained certificates or approval specifically for any of their products, operations or 
personnel. Of those who had, two-thirds (67%) thought quality approval of their 
products would lead to a better image; half thought approval for operations would 
lead to an improved image, and a half to increased efficiency; approval of 
personnel was thought to improve motivation (38%) and image (38%) equally, 
followed by increased efficiency (19%); and approval for the business as a whole 
was thought most likely to lead to a better image (50%), followed by increased 
efficiency (22%) [cf. Hankes (1993b)].
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In firms where quality was actively being sought, and systems put in place to 
achieve this, it was commonly found that the respondent had gained knowledge of 
such systems through working in previous businesses, usually large corporations. 
However, they were not always convinced of its effectiveness: a typical comment, 
for example, was: “I have done it in a previous business, but it’s not a guarantee of 
quality; because so many people have it now, it doesn’t stand for quality” ; 
“BS5750 involves too much administration” ; “IS09000 is too much disruption and 
cost to the business, and we would lose business through it” ; and “We have our 
own system because BS5750 is such a disaster with other people - it’s a waste of 
time” .
Respondents were asked to perform a self-assessment of their strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats [cf. Johnson and Scholes (1984); Madu and 
Kuei (1993)]. In year one, their biggest strength was thought to lie in the quality 
of their product or service (25%) [cf. Bamberger (1989)], followed by their 
adaptability (17%) then faith in the business (14%) and their own technological or 
specialist knowledge (14%). By year two, product quality had increased in 
importance (to 31%), adaptability was still second (23%), and the respondent’s 
innovativeness or generation of new ideas had increased in importance, with 11%  
now believing it to be their biggest strength.
In terms of weaknesses, respondents were often reluctant to admit to having any 
at all, so they were prompted to suggest the item that they would most like to 
improve upon. Market share came out top in year one, at 19%, followed by 
sources of finance (18%) and foresight or forward planning (11%). By year two, 
respondents were even more keen to increase their market share (27%), while 
sources of finance, an increase in product range, and an improvement in
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organisation and systems were all thought to be equally important (14% each).
Respondents were most likely to think that new opportunities would stem from 
their product quality (16%) \cf. Bamberger (1989)], adaptability (15%) or their 
capacity for innovation and new ideas (14%). By year two, adaptability (19%) was 
thought to be a most likely source of opportunity, followed by product quality 
(18%) again. In year one, 12% suggested customers offered great opportunities, 
as did 10% in year two. However, this generally referred to an increase in 
customers, rather than the possibilities offered by existing customers. Although, 
therefore, opportunities are commonly thought to be external to the firm, most 
respondents focused instead on their internal strengths, hoping that improvement 
of these would, in turn, lead to new opportunities.
Very often, respondents saw few threats to their business but, when pushed, 
were able to pick out a major one from the list. The biggest threat to their business 
was thought to come from their rivals’ market share (16%) in year one, then 
competition in general (14%) and rivals’ plant and resources (13%). By year two, 
these were still identified as posing the largest threats, though competition was 
now thought to be the strongest (22%) [cf. Porter’s (1980, 1985) ‘Five Forces of 
Competition’].
When grading their business in terms of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats, respondents seemed a little uncomfortable, or even wary of, 
communicating a detailed and honest assessment.6 Strengths, therefore, were 
generally over-rated, and weaknesses under-estimated. As for opportunities,
6 This supports evidence found by Reid, Terry and Smith (1997, p.46) of “the tendency to 
overstate returns and to understate risk” amongst firms trying to gain venture capital investment.
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respondents were often quite unaware of where these might lie, and practically 
wrote off any thought of trading in Europe. They were similarly unaware of 
threats to their business, either from substitutes, government legislation or overseas 
competitors.
4.4 Cluster Analysis
The summary statistics and discussion presented above give a broad overview of 
the small firms covered in this study. As a general guide, it provides a useful basis 
upon which to build a more detailed picture. Further analysis now involves delving 
deeper into the underlying tendencies that lie hidden within the data. The way in 
which this shall be done is, first of all, by grouping the 150 firms into similar 
performance bands, using the method o f ‘cluster analysis’ . This involves selecting 
a number of performance measures and then, one by one, grouping together in 
clusters those firms that appear to be ‘most similar’, in terms of these indicators, 
until all 150 firms have been assigned to a cluster. There can be any number of 
clusters between one (being all 150 firms together) and 150 (being all 150 firms 
separately), and it is up to the investigator to choose the number of clusters that 
best represents the groups he wishes to investigate.
The clustering is performed using three measures of performance available for all 
150 firms in the sample. These are summarised in Table 4.2. E m ployg  shows the 
percentage change in total employment from year one to two, which serves to give 
an indication of the investment by each firm into the tools by which it carries on its 
trade (viz. its workforce). A negative figure for Em ployg would indicate that staff
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EM PLOYG
P R 0 F 2 E 0 U
SALESEMP
PERFORMANCE MEASURES USED IN 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS
Table 4.2
= % growth in employees from year 1 to year 2
= E m ploy2 -  Em ployl ^ 10Q%
E m ploy1
= Net profit (£) in year 2 divided by owner-manager’s cash 
injection (£) at start
_ N e tp r o f l  
Owncash
= Sales (£) in year 1 divided by total employees in year 1
_ SalesX 
Em ploy 1
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cut-backs had been made, possibly because business was slack; whereas a positive 
figure would suggest that business was going well, and more people were required 
to carry out the increased workload.7 A positive result for this variable therefore 
suggests good performance because an increase in expenditure on staff generally 
follows an increase in business (i.e. sales), leading to further expected future 
growth. Storey (1994, p. 112) points out that small firms that “plan to and achieve 
rapid growth in employment [are] of interest [because] they are the major 
providers of new employment within the small firms sector, ... they are likely to 
purchase a wide range of financial services, ... [and] they are much more likely to 
be seeking a wide range of advisory services than is the case for firms experiencing 
modest growth or no growth at all” .
A further indication of business performance, and one that will be of interest to 
many small business owner-managers, is one that can assist those who hold a stake 
in the business in assessing the value and quality of the investment they have made. 
Ansoff (1965, p.42), for example, suggests that “rate of return on investment is a 
common and widely accepted yardstick for measuring business success ... [and] 
for comparison of business prospects in different industries” . An accounting ratio 
that measures such a return is the Return on Capital Employed, or ROCE. The 
variable Prof2equ  is an approximation of this ratio, and measures the net profit 
earned by the business divided by the amount of financial capital injected by the 
owner-manager at the start of trading. A high figure here would represent a high 
return on the owner-manager’s investment, and therefore is taken to be an
7 In the long-term, a strategy might be to shed ineffective labour, or to ‘downsize’ the workforce 
in order to cut costs or because of technological innovations. This would make sense if the 
retained workforce were enhancing their skills, perhaps through training. However, here, we are 
observing short-term effects amongst very young finns, so the argument stands.
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indication of good performance.
The third and final variable upon which the clusters are based is Salesemp. 
Similar to Prof2equ  in that it represents a return on inputs to the production 
function, Salesem p measures the amount of turnover in year one that can be 
attributed to each employee; in other words, it is turnover in year one divided by 
total employment in year one. Salesemp is one indicator of the efficiency of the 
business in converting effort (in cooperation with other firm resources) into sales. 
The higher the value of this variable, the greater the sales attributable to each 
employee, which may be interpreted as a greater measure of productivity within the 
business.
It should be pointed out here that, in trying various clustering methods, some 
attempt was made to normalise figures such as sales and profit by age of the 
business. However, these results give no advantage over the simple sales measure, 
and it is to be noted, in any case, that the mean age is very similar across clusters. 
Table 4.3 shows the results of a one-way ANOVA8 test for the age of the firm by 
the performance group to which it is assigned. The null hypothesis to be tested is 
that the mean value (jJ) of Age (age of the firm, in months) is the same for each 
performance level, 1, 2 or 3:
H0: n i=  ju2 = Ms
If this hypothesis were true, the F-statistic generated would be close to one. Here, 
its value is 1.2535, with a probability of 0.2885, which falls outside the critical 
region, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the clusters come from 
populations with the same mean age.
8 ANalysis Of VAriance. See, for example, Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1969).
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ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
FOR FIRM AGE BY PERFORMANCE LEVEL
Table 4.3
Variable AGE
By Variable PEFORM
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean F FSource D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between Groups 2 637.5188 318.7594 1.2535 .2885Within Groups 147 37381.0746 254.2930Total 149 38018.5933
Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variances
Statistic dfl df 2 2-tail Sig.1.0424 2 147 .355
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Further confirm ation can be attained from the results o f  the Levene Test for
H om ogeneity o f  Variance. The test statistic for this model, at 1.0424, is less than 
the critical value for F(2,147), where F(2,oo) = 3.00. This supports the finding 
above that w e cannot reject the null hypothesis o f  homogeneity o f  variance. In 
other w ords, w e cannot prove that the age o f  the firm has a statistically significant 
effect upon its perform ance, and m ust therefore conclude that other factors are 
responsible for the differences observed in performance.
W hilst the above argum ent may be used to  refute claims that the perform ance 
indicator may be biased by the firms’ ages, there remains one criticism that may yet 
be levied against the use o f  such a measure. That is, that perform ance may, to  
some extent, be dependent upon sectoral differences viz. services com pared to  
manufactures. In earlier w ork  \cf. Reid and Smith (1996)] sectoral dummies9 w ere 
incorporated into a logit model to  test for significance against the perform ance 
indicator described above. In fact, none w ere shown to have a significant effect on 
perform ance, and it w as therefore concluded that, for young micro firms, it is not 
necessarily the sector in which they operate that is im portant so much as how  they 
position them selves within that m arket and organise themselves to  com pete against 
rivals.
Statistical support for these findings is provided by Table 4.4, which shows the 
levels o f  high, medium and low  perform ance cross-tabulated by the binary variable 
SIC , w here SIC  = 0 if  the firm operates primarily in the m anufacturing sector, and 
SIC  =  1 if  it is in services. The chi-square m easures o f  association for this model
9 T w o  m o d e l s  w e r e  t e s t e d . I n  t h e  f i r s t ,  n i n e  v a r i a b l e s  w e r e  u s e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  S I C  c o d e s  a t  t h e  2 -  
d i g i t  l e v e l .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  m o d e l ,  a  s i n g l e  b i n a r y  v a r i a b l e  w a s  u s e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  
b e t w e e n  s e r v i c e s  a n d  m a n u f a c t u r i n g .
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CROSS-TABULATION OF PERFORMANCE BY S I C
Table 4.4
SIC by PERFORM
PERFORM Page 1 of 1
Count
Exp Val
Row Pet
Col Pet Row
Tot Pet 1.00 2.00 3.00 Total
SIC ------------
.00 32 20 2 54
32.6 17.8 3.6 36.2%
59.3% 37.0% 3.7%
35.6% 40.8% 20.0%
21.5% 13.4% 1.3%
1.00 58 29 8 95
57.4 31.2 6.4 63.8%
61.1% 30.5% 8.4%
64.4% 59.2% 80.0%
38.9% 19.5% 5.4%
Column 90 49 10 149
Total 60.4% 32.9% 6.7% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value DF Significance
Pearson 1.60372 2 .44849
Likelihood Ratio 1.70787 2 .42574
Mantel-Haenszel te s t for .07637 1 .78228
linear association
Minimum Expected Frequency - 3.624
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 1 OF 6 ( 16.7%)
Note:
Definitions are: SIC  =  ‘O’ = m anufactures (SIC  0 to  49) 
SIC  = ‘ I ’ = services (SIC  50 to  99)
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[viz. Pearson (prob. value =  0.449), Likelihood Ratio (prob. value = 0.426)] and 
M -H  test for linear association (prob. value = 0.782)] are all insignificant, and 
therefore support the conclusion that, for the firms under exam ination here, the 
sectoral differences have little or no bearing on performance. As both firm age and 
sector are shown not to  be significant, there m ust be other reasons for the  observed 
differences in perform ance, which are investigated in greater detail below.
O f course, the m easurem ent o f  perform ance is som ewhat arbitrary, and w hat 
constitutes g o o d  perform ance will depend to some extent upon the needs o f  the 
users o f  the information, referring to  firms generically, and the requirem ents by 
stakeholders in the com pany concerned. For example, employees will be interested 
in long-term  job security and prom otion prospects, and so will w ant to  see 
evidence o f  m anagem ent’s investment in the w orkforce, in term s of, for example, 
training or pension plans. H olders o f  equity will be looking for a high return on 
their investment, and so will m easure perform ance by profits available for re­
distribution as dividends. And creditors will be interested in the liquidity o f  the 
firm, to  satisfy them selves that invoices will be paid. See, for example, Jarvis et a l 
(1996, p.13), who suggest that “business perform ance is not synonym ous with 
profits nor with any other single indicator” .
H ow ever, here w e are investigating the prospects o f  very small, ‘m icro’, owner- 
m anaged firms. The ow ner-m anagers is the major, and often only, stakeholder in 
the business, and will be seeking a good return for their investment o f  both time 
and money. In addition, a com m on aim am ongst these businesses is that o f  
grow th, so m easures o f  change in employment, profit over initial equity and sales 
per employee should indicate to some degree how  successful they have been in 
achieving this goal in the short time they have been in business.
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Having established the bases upon which clusters will be form ed, it is now 
necessary to  choose the m ethod for perform ing clustering. The program m e used 
for doing this, SPSS, has a wide range o f  possible alternatives, and many w ere tried 
before a satisfactory response was obtained. There are three points to  consider 
w hen carrying out an agglom erative hierarchical cluster analysis.10 First, the 
m ethod for calculating the distance betw een tw o cases needs to  be established; 
second, the m ethod for combining the clusters should be ascertained; and third, 
data may need to  be standardised or transform ed before calculations can 
commence.
The m ethod used here to estimate the distance between any tw o cases is the 
Euclidean D istance  measure. Intuition for this can be gained by appealing first to  
Pythagoras’ Theorem  [Figure 4.1]. The theorem  states that: ‘the square o f  the 
hypotenuse o f  a right-angled triangle is equal to  the sum o f  the squares o f  the other 
tw o sides’. In Figure 4.1 therefore, the distance between point C  and point B  is 
equal to the square root o f  the sum o f  the distance from A to C  squared, and the 
distance from  A to B  squared. Algebraically, this is expressed by the following 
equation:
D istan ce('x ,, y 2 ), (x2 , y , ) )  = yj (x2 - x j 2 + ( y 2 - y j 2
The shortest distance betw een the tw o points C and B,  can therefore be deduced 
using Pythagoras’ Theorem.
10 F o r  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  o n  c l u s t e r  a n a l y s i s  s e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  N o r u s i s  ( 1 9 9 4 )  SPSS Professional 
Statistics 6.1, C h a p t e r  3 :  C l u s t e r  A n a l y s i s .  S e e  a l s o  E v e r i t t ’ s ( 1 9 7 4 )  u s e f u l  t e x t ,  Cluster Analysis.
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PYTHAGORAS* THEOREM
Figure 4.1
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The Euclidean D istance m easure w orks along similar lines to  calculate the 
shortest distance betw een any tw o cases. It is an extension o f  the ideas behind 
Pythagoras’ Theorem , and can be extended to  multiple dimensions, which m akes it 
ideal for multivariate analysis. Figure 4.2 shows a graphical interpretation o f  a 
three-dim ensional Euclidean Distance measure. The distance betw een the tw o 
points A and B  is now  written:
Di s  tance( (xx, y x, z x) , ( x 2, y 2, z 2))  = yj (x2 - x x) 2 + ( y 2 - y x) 2 + ( z 2 - z x) 2
Extending this further, for i dimensions, the basic Euclidean D istance form ula can 
be w ritten as follows:
D is ta n c e (x ,y )  = J ^ C xi ~ y t f
This simply states that the distance betw een any tw o items, x and y,  is the square 
roo t o f  the sum o f  the squared differences betw een the values for those items. 
Inserting the variable names used for clustering the 150 firms in the sample gives 
the following equation:
D is ta n c e (x ,y )  — y* PROF2EQU y PROF2EQU)2+0 y*
So the distance betw een tw o cases or firms, x and y , is the square roo t o f  the sum 
o f  squared differences betw een the values o f  the three given variables.
Next, the m ethod for combining the clusters should be selected. This will tell us
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3 DIMENSIONAL EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE MEASURE
Figure 4.2
N ote: A dap ted  f r o m  M anly (1986, p. 44) M ultivariate S ta tistica l A nalysis
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which clusters should be joined at each stage o f  the cluster formulation. There are
various types o f  m ethods to  choose from, including linkage m ethods, variance
m ethods and centroid methods. The m ethod chosen is one which is used
frequently, called W ard’s  M ethod, and it is calculated as follows.
“F o r each cluster, the means for all variables are calculated.
Then, for each case, the squared Euclidean distance to the  cluster 
means is calculated. These distances are summed for all o f  the 
cases. At each step, the tw o clusters that m erge are those that 
result in the smallest increase in the overall sum o f the squared 
w ithin-cluster distances” .
N orusis (1994, p.98) SPSS Professional Statistics
Having chosen both  the m ethod for calculating distances and for cluster 
form ulation, it only remains now  to ensure that the data are in a suitable form for 
analysis. As Euclidean distances are very sensitive to  the scales o f  m easurem ent 
used, variables m ust be standardised before clustering takes place. For example, a 
figure for Salesem p  will likely have a much greater weighting in the equation than 
will the figure for Employg, unless the data are in some way transform ed. All data 
are therefore standardised to  fall betw een the range o f  -1 and +1, thereby ensuring 
that each variable is w eighted on an equal basis \c f  Reid and Smith (1996)].
The data  thus ready, the cluster analysis is run, and results show that firms can be 
allotted to  one o f  three clusters. These are labelled, by perform ance groupings, 
‘Low  Perform ers’, ‘M edium  Perform ers’, and ‘High Perform ers’. Figure 4.3 
shows the dengrogram  achieved from clustering the 150 cases. This is a graphical 
depiction o f  which case falls into which cluster, and w orks in a similar way to  a 
decision-tree. Starting from the right, we see tw o branches breaking o ff into two 
clusters, then w orking left, a further breakdow n into three clusters, and so on, until 
w e have 150 clusters. The column on the left shows which cases fall into either o f
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Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: Dendrogram  
Figure 4.3
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the low, medium or high perform ance brackets. The case num ber identifies the 
case and is identical to  the label, beside it, which is the firm identification num ber - 
a number betw een 1 and 150.
A  helpful discussion o f  the problems o f  cluster analysis is contained in the classic 
w ork  o f  Everitt (1974). Perhaps the main difficulty is in deciding w hether o r not 
the clusters obtained do actually describe the relationships desired. Everitt (1974, 
p.45) describes clusters as “continuous regions o f ... space containing a relatively 
high density o f  points, separated from other such regions containing a relatively 
low density o f  points” . For the firms under investigation in this w ork, Figure 4.4 
shows a three-dim ensional scatter plot o f  the clusters. The low  and medium 
perform ers are grouped closer together and are therefore harder to  distinguish, but 
the high perform ers stand out quite clearly from the rest.
A nother problem  lies with the choice o f  variables. As was m entioned previously, 
many different com binations w ere tried, but the three variables settled upon gave 
the best and clearest results. For one thing, data were available for each o f  the 150 
cases. For another it was felt that the variables selected gave as good  an indication 
o f  perform ance and m easurem ent o f  grow th as it would be possible to  obtain using 
such methods. As a test o f  the reliability o f  the cluster breakdown, Everitt (1974) 
suggests trying several cluster techniques, based on different assum ptions or using 
different variables, on the same set o f  data. Then, only clusters which are 
produced by all o r the majority o f  these m ethods should be accepted. Several 
cluster analyses w ere therefore perform ed, using various perform ance m easures 
such as simply staying in business, employment grow th, asset g row th  and the ratio 
o f  profit to  sales. They generally suggested a similar set o f  high-perform ing firms, 
with some, but not excessive, variance in the groupings o f  medium and low
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3-DIMENSIONAL SCATTER PLOT OF 
PERFORMANCE CLUSTERS
Figure 4.4
Employg
Ward Method
♦ High 
Low
* Medium
Note: The scatter plot is based on absolute values, rather than the re-scaled values used to
compute the clusters. However, it can still be seen clearly that the high performers stand 
out from the rest of the sample.
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perform ers. It is therefore felt that the final clusters arrived at identify successfully 
the three main groupings.
Finally, as regards clustering, a simple analysis o f  the figures is som etim es not 
enough to  assure the investigators o f  the validity o f  the clusters. Som e elem ent o f  
subjective judgem ent m ust also be applied to  decide which o f  the three clusters is 
indeed the high, o r medium or low  perform ance group. Firms from  each cluster 
w ere identified by name, and the tw o main investigators who had first-hand 
know ledge o f  the businesses through face-to-face meetings, w ere agreed that the 
firms could legitimately be grouped into the three categories given, w ith no 
apparent anomalies.
Table 4.5 summarises the mean cluster variables, w ith standard deviations, for 
each group. First, let us consider the variable Em ployg , which m easures the 
percentage grow th in employment, o r total headcount, from year one to  year two. 
For the low  perform ers, mean employment fell (Em ployg  =  -6.04), for the medium 
perform ers, it grew  by 76.72 per cent, and for the high performers, it grew  the 
most, at 97.92 per cent. The second variable in the cluster equation is P ro fieq u , 
which m easures net profit in year tw o divided by the ow ner-m anager’s initial cash 
injection. F or the low perform ers, the mean value o f  Prof2equ  is 117, for the 
medium perform ers, 137, and for the high perform ers, 1,036. Finally, the last 
cluster variable is Salesemp, measuring turnover in year one divided by total 
headcount, or sales attributable to  each employee. For the low  perform ers, the 
mean value for Salesemp is £15,120, for the medium perform ers, tw ice this, at 
£32,008, and for the high perform ers, an impressive £127,550.
The three variables are therefore consistent, each improving as one m oves from
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M E A N  V A L U E S  F O R  C L U S T E R  V A R IA B L E S
Table 4.5
Low
Performers
Medium
Performers
High
Performers
n=91 n=49 n=10
(=61%)* (=33%)* (=7% )*
Em ployg M ean 
(Std Devn)
-6.04
(18.10)
76.72
(63.65)
97.92
(199.49)
Prof2eqn M ean 
(Std Devn)
117.47
(349.93)
136.88
(262.79)
1,036.14
(2,236.01)
Salesem p M ean 
(Std Devn)
15,120.70
(9,989.40)
32,007.52
(23,950.07)
127,550.30
(59,272.27)
Notes: * There are some small rounding errors in percentages 
E m ployg : percentage change in employment
Prof2equ\ net profit in year tw o + ow ner-m anager’s initial investm ent 
Salesem p : sales -s- to tal employment in year one.
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the  low, through the medium, to  the high perform ers, and thus supporting the 
assum ption that the groups into which the firms have been clustered accurately 
represent low, medium and high perform ing businesses. In term s o f  the grow th 
(Em ployg), profitability (P rofiequ) and productivity (Salesemp) m easures used 
here, the low perform ers have mean values that are smaller than those o f  the 
medium perform ers, which are in turn smaller than those o f  the high perform ers, 
for all three variables.
4.5 Cluster Characteristics
Table 4.6 presents the mean values for several descriptive statistics, which help to 
give an idea o f  the  firm characteristics in each group. Their definitions are included 
In Table 4.7. B efore analysing these statistics, one or tw o points m ust first be 
noted. Som e o f  the variables are for year tw o data, with 150 observations, 
w hereas others relate to  year tw o information, after which several firms had failed 
and, additionally, some w ere not available for interview, leading to  missing 
observations. So there may appear to  be discrepancies betw een some o f  the 
variables presented in Table 4.6 and those used to  com pute the cluster analysis. 
F o r example, one might assume that the mean value o f  Prof2equ  can be calculated 
from  the mean values o f  Netprof2  and Owncash. However, this is no t the case, as 
the ratio o f  tw o means {viz. Netprof2  and Owncash) is not equal to  the mean o f  the 
ratios {viz. Prof2eqn). To prove this algebraically, it is asserted that:
£ = | A * - y ; — = z  
y  l > ,
w here X  =  mean value o f  Netpro/2  
Y =  mean value o f  Owncash 
Z =  mean value o f  Prof2equ
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M E A N  V A L U E S  F O R  A D D I T I O N A L  D E S C R I P T I V E  V A R IA B L E S
Table 4.6
L o w  P e r f o r m e r s  
n = 9 1  ( = 6 1 % ) *
M e d i u m  P e r f o r m e r s  
n = 4 9  ( = 3 3 % ) *
H i g h  P e r f o r m e r s  
n = 1 0  ( = 7 % ) *
Inbusin M e a n 0 . 7 5 0 .9 0 1 . 0 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 0 . 4 4 ) ( 0 . 3 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 )
Age M e a n 2 0 . 1 8 2 0 . 3 7 2 8 . 5 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 1 7 . 8 3 ) ( 1 0 . 6 8 ) ( 1 9 . 1 5 )
Assets 1 M e a n 1 7 , 1 5 4 . 7 3 1 3 , 8 9 1 . 2 5 6 6 , 0 1 7 . 8 8
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 3 2 , 4 7 0 . 9 5 ) ( 2 0 ,6 3 6 . 6 0 ) ( 1 3 5 , 5 6 4 . 0 5 )
As sets 2* M e a n 2 3 , 1 3 5 . 1 9 3 7 , 0 4 7 . 5 6 3 1 , 4 0 0 . 7 5
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 4 6 , 0 1 4 . 6 4 ) ( 8 6 ,4 0 3 . 8 3 ) ( 3 6 , 1 7 2 . 9 4 )
Employl M e a n 5 .2 0 8 .0 6 9 .2 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 6 . 9 0 ) ( 2 3 . 2 8 ) ( 1 3 . 1 8 )
Em ploy 2^ M e a n 3 . 2 7 1 2 .6 3 4 . 8 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 6 . 2 0 ) ( 4 4 . 3 4 ) ( 3 . 6 1 )
SalesJ M e a n 9 4 , 7 2 9 . 0 5 1 9 2 ,5 9 9 . 4 3 1 ,5 5 6 , 0 7 5 . 0 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 1 8 0 , 1 2 9 . 4 4 ) ( 3 7 1 , 8 6 5 . 1 0 ) ( 2 , 8 9 2 6 1 5 . 8 6 )
Sales2* M e a n 1 3 0 ,9 0 2 . 8 5 2 5 6 , 3 2 1 . 0 2 7 6 0 , 4 7 5 . 3 8
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 2 2 8 , 6 1 4 . 0 9 ) ( 5 2 0 , 1 4 1 . 2 6 ) ( 7 2 1 , 1 3 0 . 7 0 )
Netprofl M e a n 7 , 8 7 3 . 2 9 2 1 , 6 9 5 . 1 1 2 3 ,0 0 0 . 0 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 1 5 , 6 1 3 . 8 3 ) ( 3 9 ,5 8 3 . 8 9 ) ( 4 4 , 7 7 4 . 4 3 )
Net prop} M e a n 1 2 , 8 0 2 . 5 4 8 ,5 5 9 . 9 2 5 3 ,0 5 0 . 5 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 4 1 , 0 2 4 . 2 7 ) ( 1 7 , 8 3 2 . 3 5 ) ( 5 0 , 6 0 7 . 3 1 )
Owncash M e a n 1 0 , 8 1 7 . 3 0 1 5 ,3 0 9 . 4 6 2 4 , 2 5 0 . 0 0
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 2 4 , 4 7 5 . 7 6 ) ( 3 7 ,6 5 0 . 4 3 ) ( 3 4 ,6 0 2 . 8 5 )
Outeq M e a n 0 . 0 4 0 .0 6 0 . 1 1
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 0 . 2 1 ) ( 0 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 3 3 )
Bankloan M e a n 0 . 2 7 0 .3 9 0 . 4 4
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 0 . 4 5 ) ( 0 . 4 9 ) ( 0 . 5 3 )
Grant M e a n 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 2 0 . 6 7
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 0 . 4 2 ) ( 0 . 3 9 ) ( 0 . 5 0 )
Gearst M e a n 1 6 5 . 9 2 1 3 6 . 1 3 1 8 8 . 7 8
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 3 5 9 .8 3 ) ( 2 9 0 . 2 7 ) ( 3 2 2 . 5 4 )
Gearnow M e a n 1 8 2 . 4 6 1 6 7 . 4 0 4 3 .3 3
( S t d  D e v n ) ( 3 7 1 . 9 5 ) ( 4 5 0 . 2 8 ) ( 7 7 . 8 7 )
Note: *  T h e r e  a r e  s o m e  s m a l l  r o u n d i n g  e r r o r s  i n  p e r c e n t a g e s .
t  C o m p u t e d  o n  s m a l l e r  s a m p l e  s i z e  o f  1 2 2 .
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DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
IN TABLE 4.6
Inbusin
Age
A sse ts l
Assets2
E m ployl
Em ploy2
Sales!
Sales2
N etprofl
Netprof2
Owncash
Outeq
Bankloan
Grant
G earst
Gearnow
Table 4.7
=1 if the firm is in business in year 2, =0 otherwise
age o f  the firm at first interview, in months
value (£) o f  net fixed assets in year one
value (£) o f  net fixed assets in year tw o
total num ber o f  employees in year one
total num ber o f  employees in year tw o
value (£) o f  turnover in year one
value (£) o f  turnover in year tw o
net profit (£) in year one
net profit (£) in year tw o
value (£) o f  ow ner-m anager’s cash injection at start 
=1 if  firm has outside equity investment, =0 otherw ise 
=1 if  firm has a bank loan or overdraft, =0 otherwise 
=1 if  firm received a grant at start-up, =0 otherwise 
=gearing (debt/equity x 100%) at start-up 
^gearing (debt/equity x 100%) at time o f  first interview
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That the equality does not hold, may be illustrated by counter-example:
Let x t =  9 * 2 = 1 1
y i  = 1 8  y 2 =  70
20
=> —  = 0.2272727 *
88
=> 0.2272727 ±  0.3285714
A discussion o f  the data presented should help to clarify these points, and enable us 
to  gain an understanding o f  the characteristics o f  each perform ance group.
First, Inbusin tells us w hat percentage o f  firms were still in business in year two. 
All o f  the high perform ers w ere still trading, com pared to  90%  o f  medium and 
75% o f  low perform ers. It might appear odd that 10% o f  medium perform ers 
should have failed; one might ask why these w ere not classed as low performers. 
The point is that som e small firms are set up by ‘serial entrepreneurs’, who start a 
business with the sole intention o f  exploiting a profitable niche, before w ithdrawing 
and moving on to  a new  project. Ceasing to  trade, therefore, is not necessarily an 
indicator o f  failure. The high perform ers are around 8 months older than medium 
and low perform ers, but the age difference is not statistically significant, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter.
A sse ts l and Assets2  refer to the net value o f  fixed assets for years one and two; 
in other w ords, their value after depreciation has been deducted. F or the first year, 
higher perform ers also had the largest asset base. For the second year, they were 
again larger than the low performers, although smaller than medium perform ers, on 
average. The differences can probably be explained by some missing observations 
in the second year, giving an unusually low asset figure for the high performers.
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L ater w ork  might involve interpolation o f  the available data to  generate m ore 
accurate measures.
In year one, the ranking o f  employment accords with the firms’ perform ance; the 
larger they were, the better they perform ed, on average. By year tw o, however, 
both low and high perform ers had reduced their total employment. In the form er 
case, this w as probably to  reduce costs in an effort to  avoid failure; and in the 
latter, it w as m ore likely to  be to  prom ote efficiency. F or both years, sales accord 
with the ranking by perform ance, with the better perform ing firms generating a 
much higher turnover than the low  and medium performers.
The net profit averages for year one rise according to  perform ance rank, but for 
year tw o the medium perform ers show a smaller average figure than the low 
perform ers. The financial accounts o f  very small firms are not well regulated, so 
problems o f  m easurem ent do exist. F or example, the smallest, one-m an business, 
might not even have formal accounts; the owner-m anager may take money from 
the business as he needs it, and any balance remaining in the bank is the net profit. 
Firms with m ore formal managem ent accounting practices will generate a net profit 
figure before taking directors drawings as a salary.11 The m easures used are 
clearly no t consistent, but it is obvious here that the high perform ers do much 
better, in term s o f  profit m easurem ents, than the lower perform ing firms.
The better the perform ance, the greater is the average initial cash investm ent by 
the owner-m anager. The greater, too, is the percentage o f  equity held by the 
external investors, and the higher is the level o f  bank indebtedness, the better is
11  S e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  L e v i n  a n d  T r a v i s  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  w h o  d is c u s s  r e a s o n s  w h y  c o m m o n l y  u s e d  s t a n d a r d  
m e a s u r e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  c a n n o t  a l w a y s  b e  u s e d  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  s m a l l  f i r m .
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perform ance. By showing his com m itm ent to  the future o f  the firm, therefore, the 
ow ner-m anager is able to  attract further funding, in both debt and equity form, 
which, in turn, helps to  enhance perform ance.
The level o f  grant or subsidy support is generally high, w ith 78%  o f  low, 89%  o f  
medium and 67%  o f  high perform ers receiving some kind o f  assistance. This is 
probably due, in part, to  the fact that the sample w as provided by the Enterprise 
Trusts, w ho allocate the Enterprise Allowance funds. The Grant variable is binary, 
and so only indicates the existence or absence o f  funding support, and not its level. 
H ow ever, w hether or not a business receives such assistance w ould appear to  be 
an irrelevant factor in predicting perform ance.
The gearing ratio at inception, measured as debt divided by equity, is highest for 
the high perform ers, which w ould appear to suggest a higher level o f  risk am ongst 
these firms. H ow ever, all firms w ere relatively highly geared, with debt being, on 
average, g rea ter than equity, for each perform ance level. By the time o f  their 
second interview, however, the high perform ers had reduced gearing from  189% at 
inception to  only 43%, w hereas both low and medium perform ers had increased 
their gearing. Such results support the view that high gearing at inception is 
acceptable, if  it is followed by a rapid reduction soon afterwards \cf. Reid (1991)], 
w ith low er gearing being consistent w ith better perform ance.
This discussion o f  various o ther com m on indicators o f  perform ance has leant 
support to  the assum ption that the clusters generated are accurate indicators o f  
firms’ perform ance. The rankings accord particularly well w ith turnover, net 
profit, the ow ner-m anager’s cash injection, the level o f  outside equity and bank 
loans, and support the theory that the rapid reduction o f  a relatively high initial 
gearing is associated with better performance. The overall conclusion is that w e
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can be confident in the rankings suggested by the cluster method, and the variables 
used, and can take these rankings as a basis from which to  analyse the strategies o f  
low, medium and high perform ing firms.
4 .6  S u m m a r y
C hapter 4 has discussed how  a new database was designed, using P aradox , to  hold 
all o f  the data from the administered questionnaire. The variables w ere o f  several 
types, including binary, categorical, real or integer, and text strings. E ight tables o f  
data w ere formed; one for each section o f  the questionnaire, w ith an additional 
table to hold interview  notes and business addresses. Extracts from  the actual 
database are used to  illustrate the m ethods o f  querying the database to  draw  out 
specific data for analysis.
The average firm ’s characteristics are then discussed under section 4.3, for years 
one and tw o o f  the study. The firms are shown to fall under the classification o f  
‘m icro’ firms, with an average total headcount o f  less than ten in each year, and a 
main target m arket being the local area. The sectors into which the firms fall can 
be split roughly as one-third manufactures and tw o-thirds services, and the average 
annual sales figure is slightly under £%m for both years examined.
The data from the STRA TEG Y  table are then discussed for each year, under the 
headings o f  the administered questionnaire, by appeal to the data contained in 
Appendix II. It is found that the need for achievement and prospect o f  
unemployment w ere im portant factors in the inception o f  these small firms. Main 
aims w ere for long-term  profit and overall grow th. M ost firms had developed a
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business plan at start-up, and their average planning horizon was a year-and-a-half 
in year two.
Funding had com e primarily from  the owner-m anagers themselves, followed by 
grants o r subsidies, and bank loans. M ost respondents gathered some inform ation 
on rivals, and also thought information technology w as o f  some im portance to  their 
business. Form al systems o f  quality m anagement w ere uncommon, although firms 
occasionally had implemented their own systems. M ain strengths w ere the product 
or service, w eaknesses lay in the m arket share, opportunities w ere available 
through product quality and adaptability, and threats came largely from rivals’ 
m arket share and com petition in general.
Section 4.4 describes the m ethod used to group the 150 firms into a ranking o f  
low, medium and high perform ers. This was achieved through cluster analysis, 
using three m easures o f  perform ance to  group together those firms with the m ost 
similar attributes. The variables m easured grow th (as the percentage change in 
employment betw een year one and tw o), return on capital (being the net profit in 
year tw o over the ow ner-m anager’s initial financial injection), and productivity 
(being sales generated per employee in year one). It is shown that only a small 
percentage (7% ) o f  firms fall into the high grow th category \cf. Storey (1994)], 
com pared to  33%  o f  medium and 61%  o f  low performers.
Finally, in this chapter, section 4.5 discusses some general characteristics o f  each 
o f  the three perform ance groups generated above. The rankings o f  these additional 
perform ance m easures generally accord well with the clusters to  which each firm 
has been assigned, most notably in term s o f  sales, profits, the ow ner-m anager’s 
commitment o f  personal cash, outside equity held in the firm and bank funding. 
High perform ers are shown to  reduce an initial high value o f  gearing very quickly,
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supporting R eid’s (1991) assertion that low er gearing leads to  enhanced 
perform ance. Overall, the clusters appear to  divide the firms into realistic groups 
by perform ance level, and it is these groups which will now  form the basis for the 
detailed analysis o f  Chapters 5 and 6.
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Chapter 5
Case Study Evidence: environmental scanning 
and strategy formulation
5.1 In tro d u c tio n
C hapter 5 is the first o f  tw o chapters discussing the data generated by the 
additional sem i-structured interviews with seventeen owner-m anagers. M aking 
appeal to  the resulting case studies contained in Appendix IV, it analyses data from 
the first tw o sections o f  the questionnaire, namely ‘Environmental Scanning’ and 
‘Strategy Form ulation’. This analysis is perform ed by reference to  the three 
perform ance groups (high, medium and low) into which the firms fall.
The qualitative evidence is supported by quantitative results taken from  summary 
statistics o f  the earlier administered questionnaires. Conducting this analysis leads 
to  the generation o f  five propositions about the perform ance o f  the small firm. 
These propositions are investigated, again using the data from years one and tw o 
o f  the adm inistered questionnaire. Results are illustrated by the use o f  boxplots, 
graphs and cross-tabulations and supported with appropriate chi-square statistics.
First, let us consider how  the seventeen firms in the case studies relate to  the 
firms in the study as a whole. I f  w e call the main group o f 150 firms the ‘full 
sam ple’, and the firms examined by additional sem i-structured interviews the ‘sub­
sam ple’, w e can com pare the full sample and the sub-sample, looking at each o f  the 
high, medium and low  perform ing groups in turn. Table 5.1 presents the statistics 
used in the cluster analysis, both for the 150 firms, and for the cases, individually,
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VALUES OF CLUSTER VARIABLES FOR FIRMS 
INTERVIEWED BY SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE
Table 5.1
E m p lo y g  (% ) P ro f2equ  (%) S a le sem p  (£)
High Performers
C A S E C 300 0 200,000
C A S E  K -17 1,158 122,396
C A S E L 33 1,800 88,667
sub sam ple mean 105 986 137,021
fu ll  sam ple mean 98 1,036 127,550
Medium Performers
C A S E  B 50 500 74,417
C A S E  G 60 808 50,000
C A S E  H 175 0 37,500
C A S E  I 17 67 40,504
C A S E  J 100 0 18,000
C A S E N 0 0 43,400
sub sam ple mean 67 229 43,970
fu ll sam ple mean 77 137 32,007
Low Performers
C A S E  A -25 0 12,744
C A S E D 0 318 9,000
C A S E E -33 -96 21,667
C A S E F 0 0 31,525
C A S E M -20 75 22,325
C A S E  O 0 200 16,000
C A S E P -29 157 9,000
C A S E  Q 0 91 19,717
sub sam ple mean -13 93 17,747
fu ll  sam ple mean -6 118 15,121
Note: Employg =  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  e m p l o y m e n t
Prof2equ =  s e c o n d  p e r i o d  p r o f i t  -f- i n i t i a l  e q u i t y  
Salesemp =  s a le s  r e v e n u e  h e a d c o u n t  i n  y e a r  o n e
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and by average for their perform ance group. Looking, first o f  all, at the high 
perform ers, the firms interviewed by sem i-structured interview seem to  be 
representative o f  the high perform ers as a whole. The mean value for E m ployg  is 
98 per cent for the sub-sample, com pared to  105 per cent for the full sample. The 
mean Prof2equ  ratio is 986 for the sub-sample, com pared to  1,036 for the  full 
sample. And the Salesem p  ratio is £137,021 per head for the sub-sample, 
com pared to  £127,550 per head for the full sample.
Turning now  to  the medium perform ers, we see that the value for Em ployg  is 67 
per cent for the sub-sample, and 77 per cent for the full sample. F o r P ro flequ  the 
difference is m ore pronounced between the sub-sample (229) and full sample (137) 
means, but that the actual value is still very much smaller than for the high 
perform ers. And finally, as regards medium perform ers, the value for Salesem p  is 
£43,970 per head for the sub-sample, and £32,007 per head for the full sample. 
Although, therefore, the medium perform ers who took  part in the sem i-structured 
interviews showed a slightly smaller percentage grow th in employment, they 
perform ed som ew hat better than the medium perform ers as a whole, in term s o f  
the profitability and productivity m easures used.
Finally, to  the low  perform ers. First, they show an employment decline, as 
m easured by Em ployg , o f  -13 per cent, for the sub-sample, and -6 per cent for the 
full sample. The values for Prof2equ  are fairly similar, at 93 for the sub-sample 
mean, and 118 for the full sample. And the values for Salesemp too  are relatively 
close, at £17,747 per head for the sub-sample, and £15,121 per head for the full 
sample.
Taking all three perform ance groups, it is clear that the sub-sam ple o f  firms 
selected for sem i-structured interviews are together reasonably representative o f
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the groups defined for the full sample: for each o f  the cluster variables, Em ployg , 
Prof2equ , and Salesemp, the mean value decreases as one m oves dow n the 
perform ance scale. Obviously, taking the cases individually, there are slight 
discrepancies. For example, high perform er Case K  shows a value for E m ployg  o f  
-17 per cent, but this is offset by the high values for Prof2equ  and Salesemp. 
Similarly, medium perform er Case N  shows values o f  zero for bo th  E m ployg  and 
P rofleqn , but is granted its status because o f  its relatively high value for Salesemp. 
In general, however, it is fairly clear why each case falls into the category it does, 
and that the 17 sem i-structured interviews should give a fair indication o f  the 
perform ance characteristics o f  each group.
Table 5.2 now  shows some additional descriptive statistics for the cases, again 
individually, and by mean for the group as a whole. The Standard Industrial 
classification (SIC) numbers, as identified by the owner-m anagers, and the firms’ 
main m arkets are given to  illustrate the sectors targeted by each firm. The SICs 
range from the chemical industry (25), through construction (50) to  recreational 
services and other cultural services (97), with an emphasis on the service sector. 
The main m arkets range through every given option, from local, through regional, 
Scottish and British, to  International, with little evidence to  suggest that 
perform ance is related to m arket area.
In term s o f  age, the high perform ers investigated by sem i-structured interviews 
w ere on average slightly younger (mean 17 months) than the full sample from 
which they w ere drawn (mean 29 months). They had a slightly smaller total 
number o f  personnel in year one (mean 5) than the full sample (mean 9). And 
turnover for the first year o f  trading considered by this study was £644,917 for the
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FIRMS INTERVIEWED 
BY SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE
Table 5.2
SIC* m o n th s  in h e ad c o u n t tu rn o v e r m ain  m a rk e t
business y e a r  1 y e a r  1
H igh  P e rfo rm ers
CASEC 64/65 7 1 200,000 local
CASE K 61 19 12 1,468,750 local
CASEL 50 24 3 266,000 Scottish
sub sample mean 17 5 644,917
fu ll  sample mean 29 9 1,556,075
M ed iu m  P e rfo rm e rs
CASES 66/63 24 6 446,500 british
CASE G 83 30 5 250,000 local
CASE H 83 30 4 150,000 international
CASE I 46/66 31 53 2,146,725 british
CASE J 96 8 1 18,000 regional
CASEN 49 36 5 217,000 Scottish
sub sample mean 27 12 538,038
fu ll  sample mean 20 8 192,599
Low  P e rfo rm ers
CASE A 43/96 15 4 45,000 local
CASED 97 30 5 45,000 regional
CASEE 64/65 7 3 65,000 local
CASEF 50/66 8 4 126,100 british
CASEM 25/50 30 10 223,250 local
CASE 0 83 20 1 16,500 regional
CASEP 50 20 7 63,000 Scottish
CASE Q 96 18 2 39,500 local
sub sample mean 19 5 77,919
fu ll  sample mean 20 5 94,729
Note: *  S t a n d a r d  I n d u s t r i a l  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  n u m b e r :
25 chemical industry
43 textile industry
46 timber and wooden furniture industries
49 other manufacturing industries
50 construction
61 wholesale distribution
63 commission agents
64/65 retail distribution
66 hotels and catering
83 business services
96 other services provided to the general public
97 recreational services and other cultural services
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sub-sample, com pared to  £1,556,075 for the full sample.
The m edium perform ers in the case study sub-sample were slightly older (27 
m onths), on average, than both their own full sample (20 m onths) and the high 
perform ers. Their headcount too  w as higher, at 12 for the sub-sample, com pared 
to  8 for the full sample. And turnover for the first year in the study w as £538,038 
for the sub-sample, com pared to £192,599 for the full sample.
Finally, the sub-sample o f  low  perform ers included in the case study analysis 
appears very similar to the full sample o f  low perform ers as a whole. They had 
been in business on average 19 months, com pared to  20 months for the full sample. 
H eadcount w as identical, at mean value 5 for both the sub-sample and the full 
sample. And turnover w as £77,919 for the sample, com pared to  £94,729 for the 
population.
In term s o f  turnover, the cases selected for sem i-structured interview are 
consistent w ith the Fill sample o f  150 firms, decreasing in size, the low er the 
perform ance. The main differences are that the medium perform ers in the case 
studies are, on average, slightly larger (in term s o f  headcount) and slightly older 
than the m ean o f  their group as a whole; they are additionally som ew hat older than 
the high perform ers. H ow ever, the clusters analyse firms by their perform ance 
over time, using three standardised measures, and not by reference to  any one 
particular m easure at only one point in time. It is assumed, therefore, that the 
relative age and headcount values will make little difference to  the analysis o f  
strategies by low, medium or high perform ers. This analysis now  proceeds, by 
reference to  the first section o f  the sem i-structured questionnaire.
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5.2 E n v iro n m e n ta l S can n in g
The first heading under which the firms are discussed by perform ance group is that 
o f  ‘Environm ental Scanning’. It examines both internal and external factors 
affecting the business, in order to  develop a picture o f  the ow ner-m anager’s 
awareness o f  the environm ent in which his firm operates [c f  A nsoff (1965)]. It 
discusses the rationale for the firm’s inception, and the target m arket chosen, in 
term s o f  locality, price and quality. It then touches on the firm’s relationship with 
suppliers and custom ers, and ends with an analysis o f  the firm ’s strengths, 
w eaknesses, opportunities and threats.
High Perform ers
The high perform ers had chosen to set up in their line o f  business, partly because 
they knew already som ething about the industry, but also for reasons that included 
spotting a new  m arket niche, and being forced into it through a previous company 
going into liquidation. Case C  said that “the fundamental reason w as that it w as a 
business w ith low  set-up costs, and my access to  capital was limited, I knew 
something about it, and I identified a gap in the m arket”; Case K , that “the 
com pany I w orked for w ent into receivership” ; and Case L, that “it’s in the blood; 
I started in a family business, and took  over my father’s firm, but that w ent into 
receivership” .
Two o f  the high perform ers targeted the local m arket at the tim e o f  interview: 
Case C, “purely because o f  logistics and the cost involved; it was convenient” ; and 
Case L, because “it’s easier to control” than a larger market. Case K  thought that 
the Scottish m arket was the largest with which they could cope comfortably,
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because “the roofing business is very parochial and relationship-driven”, so being 
able to  maintain regular custom er contact was vital.
In term s o f  price and quality, these firms said they aimed to provide an excellent 
product or service, at a com petitive price, and took  into consideration the m arket 
conditions prevailing at the time. Case C  w anted “to be com petitive, [although] 
with pricing, the industry standard margins apply” ; Case K  thought “w e are 
competitive, and our rivals are cheap and nasty; w e’ve been low price, low quality 
and high price, high quality, and over the last 11 years, through experience, our 
formula has evolved”; and Case L  said that “we are on the quality end, [because] 
shoddy w ork  neither lasts nor impresses” , and prices w ere “pre-set by the building 
trade, [where] the m ark-up on labour is about 100 per cent, and the m ark-up on 
materials, 20 per cent” . Their decision to provide high quality products supports 
W ard and Stasch’s (1988, p.27) assertion that “even if the product associated with 
a new  strategy is not a new form o f  an already existing product, it can be a 
meaningfully different product to certain target m arkets if  it is o f  higher quality 
than the com petitor’s products” .
The high perform ers typically described their firm’s relationships w ith suppliers 
as good: w e have regular suppliers and good relations with them; w e have am ongst 
the best deals available for a firm o f  our size” (Case Q ;  Case K  said relations w ith 
suppliers w ere “excellent” , although they were “bad at times on delivery” ; and 
Case L said they w ere “very good, the quality is OK, and 75 per cent o f  the time 
they deliver on tim e” .
Similarly, relationships with custom ers w ere thought to  be very good, with much 
repeat business through custom er loyalty and w ord o f  m outh referrals, supporting 
the statem ent that “successful entrepreneurs depend on personal selling skills,
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contacts, their reputations for expertise, and their ability to convince clients o f  the 
value o f  the services rendered \cf. Bhide (1994, p. 155)]. Complaints w ere few  and 
far betw een. Case C  said they w ould “build relationships with our custom ers and 
have a very high level o f  referred business” ; Case K  said that relations w ere 
“excellent w ith the majority” o f  custom ers, and that “w e are now  m oving on to 
other custom ers; other people com e to the trade counter [because] w e have a 
higher profile site than before” ; and Case L  described his custom er relationships as 
being “very good” , saying that “if  any other w ork is wanted, they call us, and I 
don’t  know  o f  anyone w e’ve lost” .
The biggest strengths identified by the ow ner-m anagers o f  the high-perform ing 
firms came dow n to the quality o f  the team  o f  staff involved in running the 
business, and the quality o f  the product or service they offered, supporting the 
findings of, fo r example, Bam berger (1989). Case C  thought that the biggest 
strength o f  his firm was “the values w e have com m unicated to  our custom ers 
before the sale, which are that w e are friendly, professional, and have com plete 
integrity, and w e really care about the job  we do” ; Case K  thought that their team  
spirit was im portant: “the boys are all self-starters, and they know  their future is in 
the com pany” ; and Case L thought their adaptability and product quality w ere 
m ajor strengths: “w e’re flexible enough to carry out any aspect o f  the trade, and 
we use it in our m arketing” [cf. C arson (1985)].
The biggest strengths o f  these firms w ere often also thought to  offer the greatest 
opportunities. Case C  tried to  exploit the opportunities provide by his staff, by 
trying to  “give them  autonom y and encourage them to innovate” ; Case K, w ho 
thought the technological and specialist know -how  o f his in-house team  o f  staff 
offered the business opportunities, w ould try to  “piggy-back on the technology” o f
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their suppliers [cf. Reid, Siler & Smith (1996)], thus exploiting their 
innovativeness; and Case L  tried to  “keep producing the quality and service that 
the clients are looking for” , believing that this would enable them  to  take 
advantage o f  opportunities as and when they arose.
The high perform ers had identified weaknesses as being a lack o f  suitable skilled 
staff, poor organisation and difficulties in coming up with new ideas. How ever, 
since mentioning these w eaknesses during the original administered questionnaire 
interview, they had often taken steps to  improve upon weaknesses: “the situation 
has changed and things are getting better; w e have m ore skills on board now  and 
less things cause us hassle, w e have trained som eone and the team  w e have now 
are beginning to understand” {Case C). Case K  had aimed to im prove plant and 
resources, and said, “w e have a w arehouse now  [but], with organisation, w e don’t 
have enough people, and it’s not as organised as w e’d like” . H ow ever, Case K  
was now  registered as an IS 0 9 0 0 0  approved supplier, which w as a sure sign that 
the organisation was improving. Case L found planning for new  ideas quite 
difficult, and said “w e don’t m arket new products, but we use them  w hen they 
arise” .
Finally, in this section, the high perform ers were unanimous in their opinion that 
rivals, or com petition in general, posed the greatest threat to their firms, and so 
had decided to  try  and offer a slightly different product or service to  com bat this 
threat: “w e operate in our own niche and are prepared to do things that the 
com petition are not, w e provide service above and beyond, and w e are 
differentiated” {Case C); “w e are battling and doing the business, and trying to 
develop the yard to  stock slates and tiles outside” {Case K)\ and “you have to  keep
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up with it [i.e. the competition]; I have to beat their quality, service and price, and 
I give the correct information to clients” {Case L) [cf. Porter (1991)].
The high performers seemed to have clearly identified their market, and had 
chosen to provide a product that was equal in quality to that of their rivals, if not 
better, and competitively priced for the industry in which they operated, thus 
creating for themselves a competitive advantage [cf. Porter (1980, 1985); 
Bamberger (1989)]. They all had previous experience of their own particular 
industry, and had set up their own business partly because of this knowledge 
gained from working in other similar firms. They chose to restrict the market area 
they sold to, keeping it within a reasonable travelling distance, because the ‘hands- 
on’ approach and maintaining of customer contact was very important to their 
business. Relationships with suppliers and customers were generally thought to be 
good, with quality of delivery and regular suppliers, as well as repeat orders and 
customer referrals generating new business. The owner-managers were able to 
identify key strengths, an idea recommended by Thurston (1983), as being staff and 
product quality, and opportunities as being provided by these strengths. 
Weaknesses, too, could be identified, but steps had often been taken to improve 
upon these; and threats were thought to come primarily from competition in 
general. These high performing firms realised where the biggest threats came 
from, and adopted an aggressive and attacking manner, choosing to compete 
directly with rivals for the same customers; they were clearly focused on the 
market to which they wanted to sell, and tried to beat competitors, either through 
differentiation, in terms of quality, product range and service, or by cost-cutting 
and beating them on price [cf Porter (1980, 1985); Reid (1993)].
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Medium Performers
Several of the medium performers mentioned having identified a gap or niche in the 
market, that they felt they could usefully fill, often having been trained in the 
industry through previous employment. Case B said “it was a natural 
progression”; Case G that “I felt there was a niche I could fit into [and] I wanted 
to be able to make my own decisions”; Case H, “it was something I was trained in, 
something I’ve always enjoyed, and the market sector seemed really buoyant”; 
Case I  said that his previous employers “sold off the company I worked for, who 
then disbanded the in-house shopfitting division”; Case J  “wanted to be 
independent and saw a gap in the market”; and Case N  “felt there was a gap in the 
market place I could fill”.
The market areas targeted by the medium performers ranged from local to 
international. Case G said that “local markets are easier [because] you finger’s on 
the pulse, and you’ve got to get to know the business community”; Case J  targeted 
the regional market because “just local wouldn’t work in this industry”; Case N  
sold to the Scottish market, because “there is not enough trade to support the 
business in the immediate area”; Case B targeted the British market because “it’s 
the market we know, and know well”; Case /, similarly, targeted the British market 
because “you have to go where the work is; it’s a national thing, and we are a 
member of the National Association of Shopfitters”; and Case H  targeted the 
international market because “of all the sectors, it fits that one best; it offers the 
best market, the best growth and the most opportunity for a small company like 
this”.
The levels of price and quality offered by the medium performers were often 
based on what competitors were doing. Case G wanted “to go on a like-for-like
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service, but we were offering the extras that they [i.e. rivals] didn’t; I looked at 
what the customer wanted”; Case H  said that “quality has to be the best it possibly 
can [and] price has to equate with costs”; Case /, that “you’re only as good as the 
quality you can produce; if it’s not of a high standard, then you’d not be 
considered on any tender list; the rates are based on what we need to achieve a 
break-even [point], and it has a lot to do with what rivals price at”; Case J  decided 
upon price and quality “from seeing what the competition was doing, and from 
supplier prices”; and Case N  “wanted to do the price that would give a good return 
on the finances invested in it, whilst offering the customer a good price”.
These firm’s relationships with suppliers were sometimes good, and sometimes 
variable. Case B said that they were “good, and we do get favouritism”; Case G, 
that they were “awful” as he was forced to buy from “The Channel”, through 
distributors and dealers; Case H  said “they give us discounts, which are probably 
similar to those of other companies”; Case I  said “delivery is first class, and we see 
our suppliers as partners of ours”; Case J  thought suppliers were “understanding 
of cash flow problems [as] I cannot always pay on time”; and Case N  said “it 
differs from one to another” and was “very variable”, but that “the mark of success 
is how a business deals with the problems that arise”.
Again, the medium performers were very happy with their customer base. Case 
B enjoyed “a high rate of repeat business, and few or no complaints”; Case G 
thought “all customers love us [and] keep coming back”; Case H  described their 
relationship as “a partnership”; Case I  said they were “first class, measured by 
repeat business”; Case J  said “I get repeat business, and word of mouth is 
important”; and Case N  said “we have a lot of good accounts and repeat orders, 
and not a lot of complaints”.
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Medium performers generally thought that their biggest strengths were their 
employees, the quality of their products and their specialist knowledge about the 
products. The tried to capitalise on their strengths in various ways: Case B would 
“run training and incentive programmes [because] too many businesses 
underestimate the physical cost of staff turnover; so if you keep good staff, it saves 
you money”; Case G invested in “staff training, we pay well, we make sure they’re 
happy, and give them the perks that come with a good job; pay a good wage and 
they become loyal to you and don’t leave you”; Case H said “our level of 
management and process control is vastly superior to other companies, which 
makes us much more efficient”; Case /, that “as we get stronger and bigger, our 
competitive edge becomes sharper than that of the smaller companies”; and Case N  
believed that “I can put a good product on the market-place, with an attractive 
style and price, and it will be a blessing to people”.
Opportunities for these firms lay in many diverse areas. Case B thought that 
government legislation would require much re-training, the programmes from 
where the majority of their conference clients came, saying “we ring our contacts 
and ask where the training courses will be carried out, and who will be running 
them”; Case G thought opportunities lay with staff, and said “we invest in training, 
our competitors don’t”; Case H took advantage of his staffs specialist knowledge 
“by developing unique and custom technologies for our games” [cf. Porter’s
(1985) ‘primary activities’ (viz. Operations) in his Value Chain; Porter and Millar 
(1991)]; and Case I  thought their new brochure offered opportunities, as “we have 
had the brochure for a year, and the dividends have been enormous; we adjust the 
brochure to the client’s needs”.
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Weaknesses amongst the medium performers came down to a lack of specialist 
knowledge, under-funding, poor management and bad planning. Case B explained 
that “we wanted to buy another, existing, business, but we lacked the expertise to 
run it on a day-to-day basis; new opportunities need existing skills”; Case G said 
that “with a growing company, cash flow is always a problem, and we have relied 
very heavily on the bank until recently”; Case H  had improved its organisation, 
with its “own systems, which are like IS09000, where we want them to be”\ Case I  
had “made a lot of inroads with management; we’re getting there now”; but Case J  
thought “forward planning is still bad, [although] the product range has increased”; 
and Case N  was trying to improve his firm’s market share, “by a constant effort to 
spread the knowledge of our own product further afield, to appoint agents and 
open new accounts”.
Medium performers were more likely to think that threats were the kind of things 
that would affect the whole market, than to think, as high performers did, that 
rivals were the biggest threat to their firm. Case B was worried by red tape, and 
by the laws and by-laws, and Health and Safety requirements, saying “you often 
contravene them unknowingly”; Case G thought that a potential threat would be 
“rivals spotting the gaps I’ve identified”, but added that “they don’t seem to want 
to copy us”; Case H said that “it’s not a particularly threatening market”; Case /, 
that “construction can be a nightmare for getting payment from; if there’s a choice, 
we will always drop the construction client”; Case Jwas “aware of [rivals], but not 
bothered at the moment”; but Case N  was aiming for “efficiency in manufacturing, 
so you have a price advantage over them”.
The medium performers had often spotted a niche that, because of their skills, 
they thought they could fill [cf. Baker et al (1994)]. The area their market covered
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seemed dependent upon the industry, and ranged from local to international, but 
whichever it was, they all seemed to have a good awareness of who were their 
target customers. Quality was often based on that of rivals’ products, and tended 
towards the higher end of the scale, with price being competitive and set at a level 
aimed to cover costs, with a comfortable profit margin. These firms were 
generally on good terms with suppliers, often able to negotiate discounts or 
payment conditions, and customers were thought to be plentiful and good, in terms 
of repeat business. Medium performers knew where their strengths lay and tried to 
take advantage of them, and of the opportunities on offer. Again, they knew what 
were their weaknesses, and some had taken steps to remedy them, improving their 
organisation, product range and marketing. They were less likely, however, to 
admit to feeling any threats, mentioning only what would potentially cause 
problems. Only one, Case N, seemed to think that rivals posed the greatest threat, 
and was taking active steps to compete directly with them.
Low Performers
Many of the low performers seemed to have fallen into the line of business they 
now ran, either by chance, or because the firms they had worked for previously 
could no longer afford to keep them on as paid employees. Case A said “it’s all I 
can do, so I was forced into it, and the town hasn’t got a lot of competition for this 
line of work”; Case D had worked “in the industry before, down in England, and I 
thought there was a gap in Scotland”; Case E  said “I don’t know really” why he 
had started the line of business, but he had “always been interested in music”; Case 
F  “were all made redundant from our employers, who worked in this type of 
business”; Case M  said “the company we were with was closed down”; Case O,
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that “I always wanted to be my own boss, and the illustration side was very 
lucrative at the time”; Case P said “we were all made redundant, and I went out on 
my own”; and Case Q had “lost my other jobs through cutbacks, and I’d always 
wanted to start my own business; it was the only thing I knew”;
Most of the low performers found that the majority of their work came from the 
local or regional market, although some went further afield for business. Case A 
said “if we covered a larger area, costs would be bigger; it consumes more time 
and is more expensive to do it”; Case D targeted commuters to the city, covering 
“a 35-40 mile radius”; Case E  had simply “opened the shop and hoped it would 
make a profit we could live on”; Case F  had started off with their previous 
employers, but moved to a national audience “because English companies were 
working up here; now 80 per cent of our business starts from a non-Scottish 
source, although 95 per cent of it is done in Scotland”; Case M  targeted the 
regional market because “it was the one we were familiar with”; Case O had 
“started off locally, because I was known in the area”; Case P ’s market was 
Scottish, because “you’re put on tender lists and the jobs can be anywhere”; and 
Case O targeted the local market because “I knew a number of people and had 
built up customer relationships with them”.
Most of the low performers aimed to offer a good or high quality product, 
although several offered a range of products from very low to very high quality. 
Case A would “like to give the best quality I can”; Case D said it is “always high, 
because you’re dealing with children”; Case E  would “go for good quality, though 
I keep some cheap rubbish to let them think they’re getting a bargain; quality is 
cheaper in the long run, and you don’t get so many returns or faulty products”; 
Case F  said “quality has always been reasonably high, because of the type of work
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[our previous employers] did”; Case M  had been “doing it for that long that we 
worked out what our company needed, so quality is high”; Case O said that, for 
his industry, “quality is your own illustration style”; Case P had “always believed in 
‘doing it right’”; and Case Q said “there are markets for high and low quality, and 
we go for everything”.
Pricing amongst low performers was often based on cost plus a mark-up, or pre­
determined profit margin. Case A said it was “based on expenses and what we 
think”; Case D “worked out what it would cost me and added 20 per cent on”; 
Case E  used “a percentage mark-up, and [would] round it up or down”; Case F  
used a pricing structure they had developed for their previous employers, “but we 
add on 20 to 25 per cent extra”; Case M  said “price is based on our knowledge of 
other industries, and what we need to survive, plus profit”; Case O priced at the 
same level as competitors; Case P gave “value for money”; and Case Q said “price 
is dictated by the suppliers, [who] put the price in the catalogue”.
On the whole, the low performers were happy with their suppliers. Case A had 
“regular suppliers” and received “a small discount if we pay them on time”; Case D 
said “they favour us”; Case E, that “they all compete head-on with one another; 
they are not always on time, and I refuse to take late deliveries”; Case F  said “we 
get a good deal and service” from suppliers; Case M  received discounts, “but not 
more than our rivals”; Case 0  said “the quality of the goods is fine”; Case P said “I 
don’t buy anything without getting a discount”; and Case 0  had “two main 
suppliers, and they look after us”.
These firms also claimed to have good relationships with their customers, who 
would often make repeat orders. Case A said “it must be very good, because most 
of them come back, and I’m happy with the number of customers”; Case D said
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“most of our business comes from word of mouth, so it is imperative that we 
create the right impression”; Case E  said, “we now get a lot of customers coming 
back”; Case F  said “we rely on repeat business”; Case M  received “repeat orders 
from larger clients”; Case O has experienced some trouble because “companies are 
keeping orders in-house and cutting back a lot on their spending”; Case P said “we 
get repeat orders from virtually the whole lot of them”; and Case Q admitted that, 
in order to keep the customer happy, “we’re too soft sometimes”.
Low performers said that their strengths were in the quality of their product or 
service, and the knowledge or experience of themselves and their staff. Case D 
used the staff quality in his advertising; Case E  would “bend over backwards for 
our customers”; Case F  relied on their specialist knowledge to mark them out as 
being “different from the bog standard plumbers and electricians”; CaseM  thought 
that “we, as owners and directors, take a more personal interest in the business 
than if we were working for someone else”; Case P thought he could “get work 
out of the way they [i.e. the staff] are trained, the way they conduct themselves, 
and the way they look”; and Case O thought their experience was important, 
because “we know how to tackle most jobs and have probably done them 
sometime during the course of our career”.
Opportunities were thought to lie with the firm’s product quality, their 
adaptability and, for some, in new ideas or technological change. Case A thought 
quality was useful, because “we get 90 per cent of our work from 
recommendations, and quality speaks for itself’; Case D tried to be “as flexible as 
possible; we will adapt our business to the client’s needs”; Case F  said “we are 
flexible and, if we saw an opportunity to diversify from our own standard, we 
would take it”; Case M  said “when you deal, you deal with us, rather than a name
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on the phone; we treat our customer better”; Case O thought that his adaptability 
offered opportunities for entering new market niches, because “I know I can turn 
about and do military illustration”; Case P said “we get a lot of our work from 
recommendation, or people are sufficiently impressed by what you say that they 
give you a try”; and Case Q, who thought new technology offered them 
opportunities, were “saving time by having the computer, and we are the only ones 
in the area to have it”.
When asked what were the biggest weaknesses in their firm, low performers 
were most likely to suggest plant and resources, or finance, a lack of staff, and a 
small market share or client base. Case A had “very limited access and parking 
area”, and said “we can lose customers because of it”; Case D had improved on his 
staffing problems, but still wanted to make a part-timer full-time; Case E  was 
trying to improve his market share by “targeting different areas on different days”; 
Case F  had improved their customer base, “but could probably do with expanding 
it again”; Case M  said advertising was helping them to gain more business; Case 
O, too, said “getting out there and visiting clients” was helping; Case P had “pretty 
well bought the last bit of equipment I think we need” and said “turnover has 
gradually built up”; and Case Q aimed “to get the computerised work-station, so 
we could then accept bigger jobs, which we haven’t sought in the past”.
Several of these firms thought that rivals’ market share was a great threat to the 
existence of their own business, while others thought red tape or government 
legislation was a major problem. However, they were not always actively trying to 
do anything about such threats. Case A would “just plod on and stick to our guns 
and our principles”; Case D said “with government legislation, you have to go with 
the flow”, although he did also “try to keep a tab on what rivals are doing and
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match the activities they’re undertaking”; Case E thought that larger rivals could 
“compete on a more level playing field”; Case F  said that “the competition is 
basically one guy, and we’ve all found our own niche”; Case M  would “try to do 
better all round, and be more honest than our rivals”; Case O used “vigorous 
marketing and cutting my price” to try and take some of his rivals’ market share; 
Case P thought that “red tape ties me to the desk, rather than talking to people”; 
and Case 0  was “not really doing anything” about rivals, because “we are only 
interested in our own price, and I hope the word will spread about our quality”.
The low performers had quite often been forced into self-employment through 
redundancy, or as an alternative to retirement, and they usually had some previous 
experiences of the trade into which they moved. They tended to work within the 
local or regional market because it was easier and cheaper than moving further 
afield. Low performers hoped to provide a good quality product at a competitive 
price, although some would offer a whole range of quality and prices. They rarely 
said that rivals had influenced either their price or quality. These firms enjoyed 
relatively good relations, both with suppliers and customers. Delivery and the 
quality of supplies were satisfactory, discounts sometimes given, and repeat orders 
or customer referrals were important for generating extra business. The low 
performers were able to identify strengths and hoped that these were enough to 
draw in extra customers in and of themselves. Similarly, they could identify 
opportunities, or things that they thought would offer opportunities, and were 
sometimes able to say how they might exploit them. Where the low performers 
had identified weaknesses, they had sometimes taken steps to improve them, but 
they were less likely to have done anything to combat potential threats, often 
believing that there were few, if any, that could affect their business.
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Conclusions
The high performers had clearly defined reasons for starting up in their line of 
business, often having spotted a niche or gap in the market, identifying set-up costs 
[c/ Porter’s (1980, 1985) ‘cost and differentiation focus’] and a knowledge of the 
industry as being important, and having a history of entrepreneurship in the family. 
Medium performers, too, had often identified a new niche, and commonly wanted 
to be able to make their own decisions. Low performers, on the other hand, were 
often quite vague about why they had started up in their particular line of business 
\cf. Kayser (1990)]. They were the most likely group to have been forced into it, 
often through redundancy, rather than having chosen to become self-employed. 
Again, they often had experience of the industry, although some were completely 
new to their chosen line of business \cf. Johnson and Scholes’ (1984) ‘corporate 
level strategies’] .
The high performers wanted to control the area they targeted because customer 
relations were very important to their business, and they wanted to be able to 
maintain a close contact with clients. Medium performers were also quite clear 
about the reasons for targeting the area they did, even though these ranged from 
local to international markets, for industry-specific reasons. The low performers 
were restricted to the local or regional market because it was simpler. In any case, 
they often seemed not to target a specific market, but rather to take business as 
and when it arose, from wherever it came.
High performers took into account the levels of rivals’ price and quality when 
deciding upon their own products’ standard and price, supporting the idea that 
“when starting out in a new venture, it pays to learn from others who have gone 
before” [Hay et al (1993, p.39)]. They aimed for a high quality, but at a
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competitive price. The medium performers, too, paid attention to competitors, and 
tried to offer at least as good a quality as them, at a price that would cover their 
costs and generate a profit. Low performers were the only ones to offer low 
quality products at all, although the majority aimed for a high quality good 
wherever possible. Quality was reflected in their pricing structure. The low 
performers were the most likely group of firms to set quality and price without 
reference to rivals, simply choosing levels with which they were happy, and that 
would let them earn a small profit, after covering costs.
Firms across all three performance groups claimed to enjoy good relationships 
with suppliers, who provided a satisfactory quality of goods, and occasional 
discounts. Delivery was the major difficulty, where one was mentioned, with 
problems of timing causing most concern. Again, nearly all firms were happy with 
their customer relationships. They were satisfied with the clients they had, often 
unable to cope with any more, they received repeat orders from the majority of 
customers, and referrals were an important method of gaining new business. It is 
hard to differentiate between the owner-mangers’ perceptions of the quality of 
relationships with external contacts, in terms of the performance group into which 
they fall. Perhaps there is a tendency for the lower performers to overestimate the 
efficacy of customer relations in generating further business1, or perhaps the firms’ 
relationships have little effect upon the overall quality of their performance.
The high performers were very clear about the strengths of their firms, and used 
these to impress the customer, and to try and persuade them to buy. Medium
1 S e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  B h i d e  ( 1 9 9 4 ,  p .  1 5 5 ) ,  w h o  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  “ g o o d  m a n a g e m e n t  p r a c t i c e s  l i k e  
l i s t e n i n g  t o  c u s t o m e r s , m a i n t a i n i n g  q u a l i t y ,  a n d  p a y i n g  a t t e n t i o n  t o  c o s t s , w h i c h  c a n  i m p r o v e  t h e  
p r o f i t s  o f  a  g o i n g  b u s i n e s s , c a n n o t  p r o p e l  a  s t a r t - u p  o v e r  . . .  s t r u c t u r a l  b a r r i e r s  [ s u c h  a s  p a t e n t s , 
l o c a t i o n  a n d  b r a n d s ] .  H e r e  a  c r e a t i v e  n e w  t e c h n o l o g y ,  p r o d u c t  o r  s t r a t e g y  is  a  m u s t ” .
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performers, too, knew what were their strengths, and did their best to capitalise on 
them \cf. Johnson and Scholes (1984); Kay (1993)]. In addition, low performers 
were very good at pointing out what they thought were the strong points of their 
business. Opportunities were clearly identified by high performers, who tried to 
exploit them to the best of their ability. Medium performers were also able to 
identify opportunities, and methods they were using to exploit them. However, 
low performers seemed to have more trouble in identifying existing opportunities, 
stating more often that things that were, in effect, their strengths would offer 
opportunities, but often being unable to specify how they took advantage of these.
Weaknesses amongst high performers had often been made better since the initial 
interview, and these firms were willing to accept that there were things upon which 
they could and should improve. The medium performers were also still trying to 
improve upon weaknesses, being clear about what these were. Low performers, 
when asked about weaknesses, had often found it difficult to identify one, but were 
more forthcoming when asked what aspects of their business they would like to 
improve upon. They too were trying to improve upon their weaker points, but 
were less satisfied with progress than were the higher and medium performers, 
often believing such things required more work on their part.
High performers were the most likely to be sure that rivals, or competition in 
general, posed the biggest threat to their business, and to be taking active steps to 
combat this threat, using both cost and differentiation to achieve their goals. 
Medium performers were less likely to compete head-on with rivals in the way that 
higher performers did, and were more inclined to believe that they posed little or 
no threat. Again, low performers had slight problems in identifying threats, but 
many seemed to think that the fact their rivals had a greater share of the market
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was potentially harmful. Despite this, they were unlikely to try and do anything 
about potential threats, often believing that they could carry on their work, 
regardless of rivals’ activities, and that, in any case, there was little they could 
usefully do.
Supporting Evidence
To augment this analysis of the firm’s ‘Environmental Scanning’, a new variable 
was generated from a combination of the respondent’s perceived strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats, using data on the 150 firms interviewed by 
the administered questionnaire. Fifteen variables2, common to all groups, were 
taken together to generate the net strength variable Strweak. Strengths (a) were 
valued on the scale of 0, 1,2 and 3, with 0 being the weakest, and 3 being the 
strongest. Similarly, threats from rivals or other sources (J3) were scaled as 0, 1,2 
and 3, with 0 representing no threat, and 3 a very strong threat. Strweak is a 
measure of the sum of net strengths, as perceived by the respondent, of his firm 
vis-a-vis his rivals or external threats, measured as a-p.
So, for example, if a respondent rates his adaptability as ‘3’, or very strong, and 
his rivals’ level of adaptability as ‘1’, or posing a weak threat, then the net value 
for the variable Adapt, for this firm, would be 3-1 = 2. In other words, the 
respondent believes his adaptability is relatively stronger than that of his rivals. 
Conversely, if he rates his image as ‘1’, or relatively poor, and his rivals’ image as 
‘3’, or a very strong threat, then the value for this firm, for the variable Image,
2 A d a p t a b i l i t y ,  f o r w a r d  p l a n n i n g ,  p l a n t  a n d  r e s o u r c e s , m a n a g e r s ,  e m p l o y e e s ,  p r o d u c t  q u a l i t y ,  
p r o d u c t  r a n g e ,  o r g a n i s a t i o n ’ s s t r u c t u r e / s y s t e m s , c u s t o m e r s , s u p p l i e r s , m a r k e t  s h a r e ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
o r  s p e c i a l i s t  k n o w - h o w ,  i n n o v a t i v e n e s s /  n e w  i d e a s , i m a g e ,  b r e a k d o w n  o f  b a r r i e r s  t o  t r a d e  i n  t h e  
E C .
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would be 1-3 = -2. In other words, he believes his image is relatively poor 
compared to that of this rivals.
Figure 5.1 expresses this, simply, in algebraic form. The variable Strweak is 
essentially an index measurement (7) of the net effect of strengths versus threats to 
the business, calculated as described above. It takes the fifteen variables of 
comparison (/) and sums the resulting figures to give an index value (7) for each 
firm (/). For cases where h>  0, the firm is said to believe, on balance, that it is 
relatively stronger than its rivals; for 7y = 0, the firm believes, on balance, that it is 
on a par with its rivals; and for h<  0, the firm believes, on balance, that rivals are 
relatively stronger. The proposition to be tested, prompted from earlier discussion 
of the data, is thus as follows:
Pi: most firms in the early stage of their life-cycle are prone to an 
over-exaggeration of their own strengths, and an under-estimation 
of threats from rivals and other factors external to the firm.
Having calculated the Strweak index for each of the 150 firms in the study, the 
so-called boxplots of Figure 5.2 were then generated.3 These plots show the 
dispersion of results for the net strength index 7,, grouped by the firms’ 
performance levels of iow ’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’. They are a good visual aid to
3 B o x p l o t s ,  s o m e t i m e s  c a l l e d  b o x - a n d - w h i s k e r s  p l o t s ,  d i s p l a y  s u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  t h e  d a t a .  
T h e  b o x  c o n t a i n s  t h e  v a l u e s  f o r  f i f t y  p e r  c e n t  o f  c a s e s , f r o m  t h e  2 5 th t o  t h e  7 5 th p e r c e n t i l e ,  a n d  t h e  
l e n g t h  o f  t h e  b o x  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  i n t e r q u a r t i l e  r a n g e . T h e  l i n e  t h r o u g h  t h e  b o x  is  t h e  m e d i a n  
v a l u e  ( i . e .  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  i t e m  w h e n  t h e  i t e m s  a r e  a r r a n g e d  i n  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  o r  
d e c r e a s i n g  o r d e r  o f  m a g n i t u d e  [cf. F r e u n d  a n d  W i l l i a m s  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ] ) ,  a n d  it s  p o s i t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  b o x  
d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  s k e w n e s s  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  viz. t h e  l i n e  c u t s  t h r o u g h  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  t h e  b o x  w h e n  
t h e  m e a n  e q u a l s  t h e  m e d i a n  a n d  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is  p e r f e c t l y  s y m m e t r i c a l ;  t h e  l i n e  is  t o  t h e  t o p  o f  
t h e  b o x  w h e n  t h e  m e a n  is  le s s  t h a n  t h e  m e d i a n  a n d  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is  n e g a t i v e l y  s k e w e d ;  a n d  t h e  
l i n e  is  t o  t h e  b o t t o m  o f  t h e  b o x  w h e n  t h e  m e a n  is  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  m e d i a n  a n d  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is  
p o s i t i v e l y  s k e w e d .  T h e  ‘ w h i s k e r s ’  e x t e n d  a b o v e  a n d  b e l o w  t h e  b o x  t o  t h e  l a r g e s t  o b s e r v e d  v a l u e  
t h a t  is  n o t  a n  o u t l i e r .  O u t l i e r s  a n d  e x t r e m e  v a l u e s  a r e  d e n o t e d  b y  ‘ O ’  a n d  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  S e e , 
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  N o r u s i s  ( 1 9 9 3 ,  p . 1 8 6 )  SPSS Base System Users Guide f o r  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  o n  
h o w  B o x p l o t s  a r e  c o n s t r u c t e d .
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CALCULATION OF INDEX (I) OF 
NET STRENGTH OF FIRM j
Figure 5.1
15
Strw eakj = I { = ^ J( a ij - f i v )
1=1
where
i is the variable being measured, = 1, 2, 3 ... 15 
j  is the firm’s identity number, = 1, 2, 3 ... 150
is a measure of the firm’s own strengths, = 0, 1, 2, 3 
is a measure of rivals’ relative strengths, = 0, 1, 2, 3
Ij >  0  => firm believes it is relatively stronger 
than its rivals
I j =  0  => firm believes it is as good as, but no 
better than its rivals
Ij <  0  => firm believes rivals are better than it
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BOXPLOT OF PERCEIVED NET STRENGTHS 
BY PERFORMANCE GROUP
Figure 5.2
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the pattern of the data, and help comprehension and inferential analysis. First, it is 
to be noted that the boxes look very similar across performance levels, in terms of 
the spread of results, with a minimum of roughly zero, and a maximum of roughly
10. Next, the ‘whiskers’ of the boxplots, are longest for the low performers, 
shorter for the medium performers, and shorter again for the high performers. This 
contraction of the dispersion of observations, as one moves from the lower to 
higher performing firms, suggests that the high performers are closer to giving a 
better estimate of their own ability, and a more accurate appraisal of their relative 
strengths, than are the lower performers, who range from being highly optimistic to 
highly pessimistic, providing support for theories of entrepreneurship \cf. 
Jovanovic (1982); Frank (1988)] that emphasise the relatively rapid learning of 
skilled entrepreneurs.
The low performers show an almost symmetric distribution of perceived net 
strengths, the medium performers show a distribution that is slightly negatively 
skewed, and the high performers have a distribution that is positively skewed. 
More of the high performers observations, therefore, have 7, indices closer to zero, 
showing that they do not underestimate the threats posed by rivals, nor do they 
over-exaggerate their own strengths, quite so much as do the medium and low 
performers.
By direct inspection of these boxplots, one observes that around three-quarters 
of all firms rate themselves as being as good as, or better than, their rivals; 
reflecting the fact that the majority of the Strweak indices are greater than zero. 
However, the high performers are less likely to be so dismissive about the relative 
threats posed by rivals or external influences, with nearly all observations for this 
group falling below a value of ‘ 10’. The medium performers produce indices of up
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to 20, and the low performers, of up to about 25, which suggests that they might 
over-exaggerate or overestimate their own strengths, while at the same time 
underestimating rivals’ threats. On the other hand, the medium and low 
performers also produce indices as low as about -13 and -15, respectively, which 
suggests that they can sometimes overestimate, or be extremely fearful of, threats, 
while at the same time understating their own capabilities. In other words, their 
self-appraisals and analyses of competitors are somewhat erratic, to say the least, 
and we can therefore accept proposition 1.
From this overview of the data presented in the boxplots, a further proposition 
may be developed, as follows:
P2: those firms that are most likely to perform better are also most 
likely to be those with a more realistic appraisal of their strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
Whilst the descriptive evidence for Propositions Pi and P2, is suggestive, leading 
to the interpretation that high performers have a more realistic appraisal of their 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, than do low performers, an 
appeal to a more inferential procedure is desirable. If higher performing firms do 
indeed have a better appraisal of net strength than do lower performing firms, one 
would expect a lower variance of the net strength index the higher the 
performance. This would require that we reject the null hypothesis that the 
performance groups have the same variances for the net strength index.
An SPSS routine was used to compute a one-way ANOVA4 model with the 
Levene Test for Homogeneity of Variance, to test the hypothesis described above.
4 ANalysis Of VAriance. See, for example, Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1969) Introductory 
Statistics.
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In fact the Levene test implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis5, so we do 
not have enough evidence to suggest that the variances are unequal, and in 
particular that higher performers have a lower net strength variance.6 This is not 
to confirm that the variances are equal; as possibly the propositions suggested 
above would find better support from a larger sample size. As it stands, the data 
are at least suggestive, in a descriptive sense, of a more realistic appraisal of net 
strength being a feature of high performance.
The administered questionnaire reveals further details on the ‘Environmental 
Scanning’ of the 150 firms in the main sample. The respondent is asked why he 
became involved in the business in the first place. Twenty-nine per cent of low 
performers said that the main reason was that it was an alternative to 
unemployment, compared to 24 per cent of medium and only 10 per cent of high 
performers, which supports the case study evidence that the low performers were 
the most likely to have been forced into self-employment. One fifth of the high 
performers were in it ‘to get rich’, compared to 10 per cent of medium and 3 per 
cent of low performers. The low performers were most likely (11 per cent) to 
want to profit from a hobby, compared to 6 per cent of medium and none of the 
high performers. Almost one quarter (24 per cent) of low performers thought it 
was important to be their own boss, compared to one-fifth of high performers. 
Medium performers seemed to think this was not such a relevant concern (8 per 
cent). The need for achievement was greatest amongst low (26 per cent) and 
medium (27 per cent) performers, compared to 20 per cent of high performers.
5 The test statistic of .1011 with (2,147) d.f. is very low, and has a .904 prob. value.
6 In addition, the chi-square test statistics for Strweak cross-tabulated by performance [viz. 
Pearson (0.37218), Likelihood Ratio (0.25894) and Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association 
(0.43087)] imply that we cannot reject the hypothesis of no association.
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High performers were the most likely (30 per cent) to have started the business to 
exploit a new market opportunity, followed by medium (12 per cent) and then low 
(9 per cent) performers.
High performers were therefore most likely to have come into the business 
through so-called ‘pull’ factors, having developed an attractive idea and wishing to 
exploit what they saw as a profitable niche market. The low performers were more 
likely to have gone into business because o f ‘push’ factors, such as unemployment, 
or because of lifestyle-associated benefits, such as being in charge of their own 
destiny, or gaining some sense of achievement through what they were doing. 
Medium performers fell some way between the two other groups, with the need for 
achievement, an alternative to unemployment, making money and exploiting a new 
niche market all being important to them.
Seventy per cent of high performers said that they would gather trade 
intelligence on their rivals, compared to 69 per cent of medium and 62 per cent of 
low performers. On average, high and medium performers would do this every 
two-and-a-half months, while low performers would do it slightly more often, 
every two months, probably because their sources of information were more often 
informal, and they took information as it became available.
Most firms would get some information about their rivals’ customers, pricing and 
product quality. High performers were most likely (100 per cent) to have an idea 
of their competitors’ methods of marketing, compared to 82 per cent and 75 per 
cent of medium and low performers, respectively, and also of rivals new products 
(100 per cent), compared to 74 per cent and 84 per cent of medium and low 
performers, respectively. As regards financial performance, again high performers 
were more aware (43 per cent) than medium (35 per cent) and low (25 per cent)
213
performers of competitors’ performance. Similarly, high performers were more 
likely (57 per cent) than medium (47 per cent) and low (32 per cent) performers to 
have some idea of what share of the market was held by rivals. High and medium 
performers were equally likely (71 per cent) to know something about their 
competitors’ personnel, compared to 59 per cent of low performers.
By far the most important method of gathering information on rivals was 
‘through the grapevine’, from hearsay or gossip, with almost 100 per cent of all 
firms saying that this was useful. Newspapers were another common source, used 
by 71 per cent of high, 68 per cent of medium and 65 per cent of low performers. 
A similar amount across performance categories used trade associations to gather 
trade intelligence, with 43 per cent of high, 47 per cent of medium and 35 per cent 
of low performers saying that they found these helpful. High performers were the 
most likely (71 per cent) to use trade journals, compared to 62 per cent of medium 
and 52 per cent of low performers. The least commonly used methods of 
information retrieval, namely electronic databases, government publications and 
library sources, were all used by almost one third (29 per cent) of high performers, 
but by no more than 16 per cent of medium and low performers in any case.
Does the quantity of trade intelligence gathered on rivals have any bearing on the 
performance of the small owner-managed firm? A new variable, Intellig, was 
calculated to test the theory that a greater knowledge and awareness of rivals’ 
activities will in turn be reflected in the performance of the firm. This variable 
takes the sum of values for seven possible variables7 representing information that 
may be learned about rivals, where each is coded as ‘1’, if the firm does know such
7 Market share, new products, product quality, financial performance, customer relations, 
personnel, marketing methods.
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information, and ‘O’, if it does not. The maximum possible value for the variable 
Intellig is, therefore, ‘7’, representing full information, and the minimum value is 
‘O’. The proposition to be explored is as follows:
P3: the more information that is gathered on rivals, the better will be 
the firm’s performance.
Figure 5.3a shows the boxplots generated by grouping the quantity of trade 
intelligence gathered by performance level. Although it appears that each 
performance group shows a similar dispersion in the intensity of information 
gathered, ranging from very little (value ‘zero’) to very much (value ‘6’ or higher), 
there is a clear increase in the median value as one moves from low, through 
medium to high performers. For low performers, the median number of items of 
information gathered on rivals is 3, for the medium performers, it is 4, and for the 
high performers, it is 5. The data become increasingly negatively skewed, the 
higher the performance level, which suggests that the level of information which is 
gathered clusters towards a more intensive use of outside information, the better 
performing are the firms.
The graph below the boxplots, Figure 5.3b, presents the same information in a 
slightly different way. The x-axis measures the intensity of information gathering, 
by Intellig which, again, takes a value between 0 and 7. The y-axis shows the 
mean performance for each level of information-gathering, where ‘ 1 ’ represents the 
lowest performance group, and ‘3’, the highest; mean values between 1 and 3 are 
interpolated on the graph, with higher values representing higher average 
performance. After an initial small dip in performance, the graph shows a rising 
tendency, with higher intensity of information gathering appearing to be correlated 
with a higher level of firm performance.
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CROSS-TABULATION OF QUANTITY OF TRADE INTELLIGENCE 
GATHERED BY PERFORMANCE GROUP
Figure 5.4PERFORMCount 
Exp Val Row Pet
Col Pet Tot Pet Low Medium High
Row
Total
.00 35 15 3 5332.2 17.3 3.5 35.3%66.0% 28.3% 5.7%
38.5% 30.6% 30.0%23.3% 10.0% 2.01
2.00 5 1 0 63.6 2.0 . 4 4.0%83.3% 16.7% .0%5.5% 2.0% . 0%3.3% .7% .0%
3.00 8 4 0 127.3 3.9 . 8 8.0%66.7% 33.3% .0% '
8.8% 8.2% . 0%5.3% 2.7% .0%
4.00 11 8 1 20
12.1 6.5 1.3 13.3%55.0% 40.0% 5.0%12.1% 16.3% 10.0%7.3% 5.3% .7%
5.00 22 8 3 3320.0 10.8 2.2 22.0%66.7% 24.2% 9.1%
24.2% 16.3% 30.0%14.7% 5.3% 2.0%
6.00 10 9 2 2112.7 6.9 1.4 14.0%47.6% 42.9% 9.5%11.0% 18.4% 20.0%6.7% 6.0% 1.3%
7.00 0 4 1 53.0 1.6 .3 3.3%. 0% 80.0% 20.0%
.0% 8.2% 10.0%.0% 2.7% .7%
Column 91 49 10 150Total 60.7% 32.7% 6.7% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value DF Significa
Pearson 13.92484 12 .30553Likelihood Ratio 16.73254 12 .15994Mantel-Haenszel test for 3.55890 1 .05923linear association
Minimum Expected Frequency - .333Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 12 OF 21 ( 57.1%)
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Developing this point further, Figure 5.4 presents the data for Intellig, cross- 
tabulated by performance level, and shows in more detail how each group is 
divided. It confirms the inferences made from an overview of Figure 5.3. First of 
all, a greater percentage of low performers (38.5%) than medium (30.6%) and high 
performers (30.0%) gather no information at all on rivals, either through 
inclination, or perhaps because of time constraints. Of those who do gather 
information, low performers are the most likely to gather only two (5.5%) or three 
(8.8%) pieces of information, compared to medium performers (2.0% and 8.2%, 
respectively) and high performers (0% in each case). A difference emerges when 
we move to four items of information gathered, with more medium performers 
(16.3%) than both low (12.1%) and high (10.0%) performers in this group. And at 
the level of five items of information gathered, high performers (30.0%) overtake 
both medium (16.3%) and low (24.2%) performers. Above this level, the amount 
of information gathered accords with the firms’ rankings by performance. So, 
higher performers are more likely to gather six (20.0%) or seven (10%) items of 
information than both medium (18.4% and 8.2%, respectively) and low (11.0% 
and 0.0%, respectively) performers.
The general pattern seems to be that those firms who know more about their 
rivals also tend to be those who perform better. Put another way, an owner- 
manager who has a greater awareness of the potential threats posed by rivals is 
better able to position himself and his firm in the markets in such a way that he is 
able to exploit opportunities and defend against attacks from competitors. 
Although the descriptive evidence is quite persuasive, the inferential evidence is 
equivocal. Pearson and Likelihood Ratio tests produce statistics which just fail to 
fall in the critical region. The Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association provides
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a x2 statistic which is certainly significant at the 10% level, and almost significant 
at the 5% level. One therefore has modest inferential evidence for rejecting the 
hypothesis of no association between the pursuit of trade intelligence and small 
firm performance. Given the strong association between performance and trade 
intelligence suggested by the boxplots and graphs, it seems reasonable to argue 
that greater knowledge of the environment in which the firm operates will enable 
the owner-manager to make more informed, and therefore better, decisions, 
leading in turn to enhanced performance [cf Madu and Kuei (1993)].
Overall, in terms of environmental scanning, the picture which emerges is of high 
performers who are proactive in gathering trade intelligence on their rivals on a 
regular basis. When they decide to seek out information, they know which sources 
to use and do so systematically, being effective in gathering the knowledge they 
seek. Medium performers are not as likely to be quite so focused, and low 
performers even less so, often learning what their rivals are up to through informal 
conversations or gossip. This evidence supports the conclusions reached through 
the case study analysis of high and medium performers who are found to be more 
aware of the market in which they operate, than low performers, who often pay 
very little attention to the activities of their competitors.
5.3 Strategy Formulation 
(i) Mission
The mission of a business is a statement of what the business stands for, what it 
hopes to achieve, its directions, aims and ambitions [cf. David (1989)]. Business 
plans can perhaps help to clarify the thoughts the owner-manager with respect to 
the mission of the business. This plan might contain, for example, a market
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analysis, plans for marketing products, financial targets and plant or staffing 
requirements, as well as milestones and timetables for achieving their goals. It can 
provide a useful benchmark against which to judge actual performance.
High Performers
The existence and use of business plans amongst the firms in the case study 
analysis is summarised in Table 5.3. Of the three high performance case studies, 
two had a formal, written business plan, and one had used a plan previously. The 
latter {Case L) was “sceptical” about such plans, saying that he found it difficult to 
project what the future might hold. He was unable to see the point in spending 
time predicting what he hoped might happen. This echoes earlier findings that “if 
the ... owner does not perceive that his/her company is better off for having 
planned, he/she will no longer allocate resources to planning” [Shuman and Seeger 
(1986, p. 12)]. However, the other two both had detailed formal plans, and had 
updated them when required, for expansion, moving premises, or reformulating 
budgets, lending support to the view that “high-growth firms are strongly 
committed to frequent strategic planning sessions” [Baker et al (1993, p.87)]. 
These were long-term plans, projecting several years into the future.
Case C specifically mentioned having a “strategic vision”, as well as a “mission”, 
the former being to keep the business focused, and the latter “to please our 
customers”; whereas both Cases K  and L wanted to “make as much money as 
possible” and to “increase turnover year by year”, respectively. Their responses 
support Johnson and Scholes (1984, p. 156) notion that a mission “may be an 
unwritten concept ... a written ‘creed’ ... [or] a generally accepted view of what
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EXISTENCE AND USE OF BUSINESS PLANS
Table 5.3
F ir m  h a s  a  
p la n
P la n  is  
F o r m a l
P la n  u s e d  
in  b u s i n e s s
P la n s  i s  ‘ in  
h e a d ’
H ig h  P e r f o r m e r s
C A S E C
C A SE  K
C A S E L x
M e d i u m  P e r f o r m e r s
C A S E D
C A SE  G
C A SE  H V
C A SE  I S V
C A SE  J S
C A S E N X
L o w  P e r f o r m e r s
C A SE  A X
C A S E D
C A S E E
C A S E F
C A S E M >/
C A SE  O
C A S E P
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Note: S -  y e s  
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the firm is about that is accepted by most of those working in the company”. 
Medium Performers
Amongst the six medium performers, four had formal, written plans, one {Case G) 
a plan ‘in their head’ and one {Case N) had no plan at all. Case G’s respondent 
said that his business was “forever striving to make money”, and preferred to deal 
with shorter-term goals, say of up to twelve months, than to aim to reach longer- 
term targets. Case J  had a formal plan, which was considered “maybe once a year” 
in consultation with the accountant. The remaining three used their plans mainly to 
analyse markets, staff levels and premises, but they also typically included financial 
forecasts.
Case G was the only medium performer to have a “company statement”, which 
covered the desire for a good product quality and competitive prices. The 
remainder also expressed a wish to provide a good product and service, which 
would eventually lead to the development of a successful business. Case B wanted 
“to build up a business over the next ten or fifteen years that can become a saleable 
item”; Case G, “to deliver the highest quality of service that both meets and 
exceeds customer expectations”; Case H, “to develop a quality and high value 
product, which will let us grow to be a big and successful business”; Case /, “to be 
as big and as good as we can”; Case J , “to let women who come into my shop go 
out feeling a million dollars, and to make a profit”; and Case N, “to put a stylish 
and affordable product on the market, and to earn ourselves a good livelihood 
while doing so”.
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Low Performers
Three of the eight low performers had a formal, written business plan [c f Table
5.3], four, a plan ‘in their heads’ and one (Case A) had no plan, because the 
respondent found it “hard to sit down and make a plan, and stick to that plan” [cf. 
Welsh and White (1981)]. Of those with an informal and unwritten idea, the 
thoughts were typically of seeking out new markets. For example, Case D hoped 
to “take all the ideas and put them into Glasgow”; Case M  was considering 
“branching into different sectors”; and Case O had “a marketing plan in my head”. 
Case F  claimed only to “come up with brilliant ideas”, but was not specific about 
what these ideas were. Of the three low performers with a formal business plan, 
there was little evidence to suggest that they were used to help in the actual 
running of the business: Case E  said “I know basically what’s in it”; Case P, that 
“projected figures are only ‘pie in the sky’”; and Case 0 , that it was “three years 
since we wrote it and we haven’t looked at it since”.
Personal issues were prevalent amongst the missions of the low performers, with 
Case A desiring “a secure future for my family”; Case E , “a decent living”; Case 
M, “a good name and respectability in the market”; Case O, “to make a lot of 
money ... take it easy ... and job satisfaction”; Case P, “to keep me in a reasonable 
livelihood and leave my son something to follow on with”; and Case O, “to survive 
till we retire”. The other two wanted “to provide a quality product and service” 
(Case D) and to be the top of their profession in Scotland (Case F).
Conclusions
The characteristics of each performance group, in terms of their firm’s mission, can 
be quite neatly summarised as follows. The high performers had a clear idea of the
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direction they w ished the business to  follow: tw o used formal business plans o f  up 
to  five years tim e horizon, and the o ther thought or planned ahead at least six 
m onths, having attained the targets set by his original tw o-year plan. This evidence 
thus supports the belief that “top managem ent should be proactive in initiating 
planning so that its fullest value can be achieved” [Aram and Cow en (1990, p.65)]. 
These w ere also m ore likely to  suggest that ‘making m oney’ was the m ajor mission 
o f  the business. The medium perform ers, too, very often had business plans, 
though w ere likely to  have shorter planning horizons. Their missions typically 
mentioned the product quality or custom er service as being o f  prim e concern, 
leading eventually to  the developm ent o f  a profitable business.
The low perform ers w ere less likely to  have a formal plan, or to  use it if  one 
existed which, to  some extent, refutes M intzberg’s (1994, p.107) suggestion that 
“the m ost successful strategies are visions, not plans” . It w as very often 
form ulated simply for the firm to  qualify for start-up funding support [cf. B aker et 
a l  (1993)], and had often been recom m ended as a course o f  action by the local 
Enterprise Trust, rather than coming from the ow ner-m anager’s ow n initiative. 
L ow  perform ers w ere m ost likely to  suggest that the ‘m ission’ o f  the business w as 
personal, o r simply to  provide a living, than anything else. Com pare this w ith the 
w ork  o f  David (1989, p.95) who suggests that “developing a mission statem ent is 
often overlooked in [some] firms as managers rush too  quickly to  establish targets 
and implement strategies w ithout spending sufficient time in clarifying their 
strategies” .
D ata  from  the adm inistered questionnaire support the popularity o f  business 
plans. Eighty per cent o f  high perform ers had one, 25 per cent o f  which w ere both 
formal and w ritten; 92 per cent o f  medium perform ers had a plan, 18 per cent o f
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these being formal; and 89 per cent o f  low  perform ers had plans, w ith 22 per cent 
being formal. H ow ever, the m ost telling result com es from the question which 
asks the tim e horizons over which respondents look, when considering the impact 
o f  new decisions. W hile both  medium and low  perform ers w ould think, on 
average, 14 to  15 m onths in advance, the high perform ers w ould consider 
outcom es on an average o f  up to  31 months, or tw o-and-a-half years ahead; tw ice 
that o f  the lesser-perform ing business [c f  A nsoff (1965)].
This variable {Impact), gives a better impression o f  planning procedures in small 
firms, as it asks specifically about planning time horizons [cf. AnsofF (1965)], as 
opposed to  simply asking w hether or not a business has a plan. In fact, in Reid and 
Smith (1996), the authors find, for the same sample o f  firms, that the variable 
Im pact had one o f  the strongest positive effects on perform ance o f  any variable, 
and that a firm with an ow ner-m anager who thought far ahead w as much m ore 
likely to  perform  well than one with a leader who had only short-term  vision. The 
actual existence o f  a business plan is not, therefore, the m ost im portant 
consideration. Instead, perform ance appears to  rely to  some degree on the actual 
process and use o f  on-going formal planning [cf. Thurston (1983); B aker et a l 
(1993)].
(ii) O bjectives
An analysis o f  a firm’s objectives will aim to discover w hat the business is trying to 
achieve and w hat are its long-term  goals [cf. Aram and Cowen (1990)]. Given that 
almost all (97 per cent) o f  the firms in the sample said that they hoped o r expected 
their businesses to  grow  over the following years, further insight may thus be 
gleaned by asking w hat the ow ner-m anager means, or understands, by grow th;
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what, in fact, is grow th to  his or her business? An additional and interesting line o f  
questioning will then examine the reasons for wanting to  achieve the identified 
objectives.
High Perform ers
The three high perform ers had all specified a main aim as being ‘long-term  profit’, 
w ith Case K  also seeking a ‘high rate o f  re tu rn’, and Case L an ‘increased m arket 
share’. G row th w as clearly identified as “an increase in the num ber o f  branches” 
(Case C); “higher profile ... m ore clients and m ore business ... m ore money, and 
respect” (Case K)\ and “increased turnover and profitability ... an increase in the 
client base” . All o f  the high perform ers hoped, therefore, to  augm ent the  number 
o f  custom ers w ith w hom  they dealt, as well as improving sales and making higher 
profits. These firms could be classed under Stanw orth and C urrans’ (1986, p.88) 
“m anager identity” , w here “the entrepreneurial latent social identity centres on 
meanings and goals concerned with the recognition ... o f  managerial excellence 
[and where] other goals ... are security and a concern to  ensure that the 
entrepreneur’s children will eventually receive the benefits o f  his enterprise” .
Although personal reasons w ere im portant to  these businesses - “I w ant to  be 
com fortable financially and provide for the family “ (Case C), and “I w ant to  have 
a good quality o f  life” (Case K) - it was also apparent that the higher perform ers 
enjoyed the satisfaction they gained by providing employment and a living for their 
staff: “The com pany will provide an opportunity for the employees to  develop” 
(Case  C); and “I like to  help employment” (Case L ). Their objectives are thus 
consistent w ith A nsoff s (1965, p.61) recognising “both institutional influences and 
personal objectives as affecting strategic decisions in the firm” , w here institutional
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attitudes cover such aspects as job  security for key personnel and prom otion 
prospects for staff.
M edium Perform ers
Four o f  the medium perform ers sought ‘long-term  profit’ as a m ajor goal, w ith one 
{Case B) striving for a  ‘high rate o f  re turn’ and one {Case N) “to  achieve 
profitability” . The definition o f  grow th varied across firms, with Case B  wanting 
to  move into different areas that provided a higher rate o f  return, and Case G  
aiming to  “build the tiers” o f  management, by taking on m ore senior staff. The 
other four, however, all defined grow th in term s o f  an increase in sales o r custom er 
base: Case H  sought an “increased volume o f  sales, profits and the value o f  the 
com pany” ; Case / ,  “m ore money, in term s o f  turnover and profit” ; Case J , “m ore 
custom ers, m ore m oney and a salary for me” ; and Case N, “a doubling o f  the 
num ber o f  accounts w e have” w ith custom ers.
The reasons for wishing to  attain the goals m entioned above varied quite 
markedly from  one business to  another. Case B  w anted to  have the tim e to  “stand 
back and see w here w e w ant to  be in the long term ”, which w ould be facilitated 
through grow th and the employment o f  m ore staff. Case N  thought that an 
increased client list w ould “even out the flow o f  business instead o f  having peaks 
and troughs” . Tw o cases w ere chasing their goals for pecuniary benefits: “I want 
my money back at the end o f  the day” {Case G ); and “to be wealthy” {Case I). 
And the remaining tw o cases thought similarly that “if  you ’re going to  run a 
business, [you should] run the best business you can” {Case H)\ and that “there’s 
no point in doing it unless you can achieve [your goals]” {Case J). Their 
ambitions are consistent with those o f  Stanw orth and C urrans’ (1986, p.88)
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“classical entrepreneur”, w here “earnings and profit becom e a core com ponent in 
the entrepreneur’s definition o f  his role and hence in the way he acts out his role” .
Low Perform ers
H alf o f  the low  perform ers said that ‘survival’ was still the m ajor objective, with 
tw o o f  these hoping eventually for ‘long-term  profit’, and tw o for ‘increased sales’. 
The others w ere all seeking ‘grow th’, leading to  ‘long-term  profit’. Five o f  these 
cases defined grow th in m onetary terms: to  Case D  it w ould mean “a pure rise in 
profit” ; to  Case E, “to  run at a profit, and increase sales” ; to  Case F, “to  make 
some money” ; to  Case M , “increased turnover” ; and to  Case 0 ,  g row th occurs 
when “turnover im proves” . Case A w anted to  widen its product range, enabling it 
therefore to  “exploit m ore custom ers” ; and Case O  defined grow th similarly as 
“getting m ore w ork” . Only tw o o f  the low perform ers thought o f  grow th as an 
increase in staff; Case M , who had taken on tw o further employees; and Case P, 
who w anted “to increase perm anent staff and have a girl in the office to  do the 
books” .
The vast m ajority o f  the low  perform ers sought their goals for mainly personal 
reasons, taking advantage o f  “the opportunity to  take into account their own goals 
w hen corporate objectives are set” [Thurston (1983, p. 176)]. Case A w anted “to 
give people jobs and have m ore security” ; Case D , “satisfaction from  seeing 
som ething I ’ve created succeed” ; Case E, “to live ... and to pay the m ortgage” ; 
Case F, “to  get something back ... w e have to  show something for all this extra 
outlay”; Case O , to “make a living at w hat I really w ant to do” ; Case P, to  “get ... 
costs in relation to  your sales figure ... so your salary increases too” ; and Case 0 , 
because they “w ant to  be successful, and don’t w ant to  be a failure” . Case M , the
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only one o f  the group to  suggest a non-personal ambition, said that they w ere 
hoping for extra staff to  enable them  to “diversify into other things” , bu t adm itted 
that, in any case, “w e don’t w ant to be too big” . These firms correspond m ost 
closely to  the “artisan identity” o f  Stanw orth and Curran (1986, p .87) w here “the 
entrepreneurial role centres around intrinsic satisfactions o f  which the m ost 
im portant are personal autonom y at work, being able to  pick the persons you w ork  
with, status within the w ork-place and satisfaction at producing a quality product 
backed with personal service” .
Conclusions
A summary o f  the objectives o f  each perform ance group suggests the  following 
grouping by characteristics. First, the high perform ers tend to specify longer-term  
goals such as ‘long-term  profit’ or a ‘high rate o f  re turn’. These w ere am ongst the 
m ost rational econom ic objectives from which the respondent could choose, and 
are consistent w ith P o rte r’s (1985) advocacy for the pursuit o f  sustained  
profitability, and Ansofifs (1965, p.41) assum ption that “the prim ary econom ic 
objective is to  optim ize the long-term  rate o f  return on the equity em ployed by the 
firm” . They all sought grow th, and w ere able to  define it in relation to both 
internal and external factors; as an increase in the firm’s product range or outlets, a 
greater client base, higher tu rnover and, especially, improved profitability. These 
firms m entioned a desire to  generate employment for others, as well as to  provide a 
good living for them selves and for their families.
The objectives o f  the medium perform ers differed, although ‘long-term  profit’ 
was, as with the high perform ers, a popular choice. These businesses defined 
grow th in varying ways, which ranged from an extension o f  product range, through
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the em ploym ent o f  m ore staff, to  an increase in sales and profits, or greater size o f  
client base. N o one clear reason stood out from any other for seeking goals o f  
grow th and profitability. There w ere both personal and purely professional reasons 
for aiming to  achieve goals, but these reasons w ere not generally as clear, nor as 
obviously grouped, as those o f  the higher performers.
The low perform ers typically had a shorter-term  view o f  their goals, with 
‘survival’ being a common response, followed by ‘increased sales’ and, hopefully, 
‘long-term  profit’. They spent more time on the operational considerations o f  
running their business, often to  the neglect o f  strategic issues \cf. Peiser and 
W ooten (1983)]. M ost thought that grow th would mean ‘more m oney’, although 
others w anted ‘more w ork ’ and ‘more s ta ff . Objectives were mainly personal, and 
intended to  provide an incom e for the owner-m anager, and in some cases, for their 
staff.
Supporting Evidence
The administered questionnaire provides further details about the main aims o f  the 
business. The evidence suggests that low  perform ers w ere the m ost likely group to  
specify a main aim as being ‘survival’ (23 per cent), compared to  only 8 per cent o f 
medium perform ers, and none o f  the high perform ers. About one third o f  each 
perform ance group sought ‘long-term  profit’ as a m ajor goal, and betw een one- 
fifth and one-quarter o f  each group specifically identified ‘grow th’ as their main 
aim. The higher perform ers w ere m ore likely (20 per cent) than the others to 
identify ‘increased m arket share’ as being their main aim, as com pared to  16 per 
cent o f  medium and 10 per cent o f  low perform ers. M ost interestingly, though, 
w as the fact that 30 per cent o f  high perform ers sought, as their main objective, a
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‘high rate o f  re tu rn’, as com pared to  only 12 per cent o f  medium and 4 per cent o f  
low  perform ers. This suggests a greater flexibility, as those seeking the highest 
rate  o f  return possible will be m ore likely to  go where they can m ake the m ost 
money, even it if  involves changing tack  completely. See Reid and Smith (1996), 
w ho identify the latter goal o f  high rate o f  return as having a positively significant 
effect upon perform ance.
(iii) S trategies
This section o f  the questionnaire concentrates on the strategies o f  the business, 
looking at how  it aims to  achieve its objectives; how  it will beat the competition. 
It considers, for example, the actions taken to  protect the firm from  com petitors, 
or to  a ttract new custom ers away from rivals to  assist in achieving their objective 
o f  grow th. The decision-m aking process within the firm is also discussed, along 
w ith the use o f  inform ation technology and its im portance to  the  business in 
assisting both operational and strategic functions.
High Perform ers
Table 5.4 summarises the responses to  the question ‘do you consider a menu o f  
strategic options?’ [c f  Johnson and Scholes’ (1984, p.167) ‘S trategic Choice’]. 
O f the three high perform ers interviewed, tw o said that they w ould not consider a 
menu or list o f  strategic options: Case C  explained that this w as because his 
business w as “focused” and that “the strategic aim is always there” . On the other 
hand, Case K  w ould  consider various options, deciding betw een them  by “feeling 
out the m arket and talking to  people” . Long-term  decisions w ere dependent, to
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RESPONSES TO QUESTION:
‘DO YOU CONSIDER A MENU OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS?’
Table 5.4
YES NO
High Performers
CASEC Y
CASE K Y
CASEL
Medium Performers
CASES
CASE G Y
CASE H Y
CASE I Y
CASE J Y
CASEN Y
Low Performers
CASE A Y
CASED Y
CASEE Y
CASEF Y
CASEM Y
CASE O Y
CASEP Y
CASE Q Y
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some extent, on the financial implications o f  that decision. F or example, the 
decision when to  grow  “is dependent upon the funds being available” (Case C); “if  
a potential client had no credit risk insurance, w e would not deal with the guy” 
(Case K); but, according to  Case L, “the financial implications are irrelevant”, and 
decisions w ere m ore likely to  be “based on w hat’s available in the m arket” .
Long-term  plans typically w ere not discussed on a regular and formal basis, 
according to  these respondents. F or example, Case C  said that they w ere “m ore 
driven by me at this stage” , although he did “consult people in and out o f  the 
business” ; Case K  had “regular sales meetings” , but w ould m ore often “deal with 
things on a day-to-day basis” ; and Case L said that he w ould not generally 
form ulate in a structured fashion long-term  plans, although he did think up to  six 
months ahead w hen making decisions.
All three high perform ers used advertising, either to  pro tect their business from 
the threat o f  new  or existing com petitors, or to  attract new clients away from  their 
rivals: “W e advertise regularly and often - th a t’s a real barrier to  entry” {Case C); 
and by “maintaining m arket presence through sales calls ... making sure w e’re 
visible” {Case K). Case C  also thought that his unique selling point w as im portant: 
“W e are differentiated” ; as did Case L, w ho believed you should “ensure you keep 
the service going above and beyond w hat they [i.e. rivals] offer” , and maintain 
“com petitiveness” by lowering prices if  rivals try to undercut [cf. P orter (1980, 
1985)].
Each high perform er thought that information technology w as very im portant to  
the running o f  their business, for reasons which included speed and the facilitation 
o f  communications: “it gives us advantages on both our larger and smaller 
com petitors [and] gives us opportunity  as a sales too l” {Case C ); “it gives you
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sales on a daily basis and allows you to make decisions” {Case K ); and “we use it 
in the day-to-day running o f  our business ... things change rapidly” {Case L ) [c f  
Porter and M illar (1991)].
The belief o f  im portance o f  IT  to  each firm considered under this case study 
analysis is summarised in Table 5.5. Inform ation technology was used for different 
activities, including operational activities such as accounting, administration and 
keeping track  o f  buyers and suppliers. In addition, it w as used strategically, to  
differentiate the firm :: “we try and send a letter to  our custom ers to  say thank you 
... it’s som ething our larger com petitors can’t do” {Case C) [cf. Porter and M illar 
(1991)]; Case K  said that “w e are going to  use it for stock control” ; Case L , that 
“w e use pagers and mobile phones to  get in touch with w orkers on site” .
The high perform ers all seemed fairly clear about the directions they w anted their 
business to  take, and so the question o f  deciding betw een different courses o f  
action did not necessarily arise. Finance was an important consideration when 
deciding w hether o r not to  accept a new idea, but was not the sole overriding 
factor; m arket conditions w ere also relevant. Advertising and maintaining a 
com petitive edge w ere thought to  be crucial to the firms for retaining and 
enhancing their custom er base; and information technology was implemented and 
adapted as needed, to  help in this process. All respondents w ere aw are o f  its 
extrem e im portance, because o f  the advantages it offered in term s o f  speed, 
communications and differentiation.
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SUMMARY OF OWNER-MANAGER’S BELIEF OF 
IMPORTANCE OF I.T. TO HIS FIRM
Table 5.5
IMPORTANCE OF I.T. 
Scarcely Moderately Very
High Performers
CASEC
CASE K
CASEL
Medium Performers
CASE B
CASE G
CASE H S
CASE I s
CASE J
CASEN
Low Performers
CASE A
CASED
CASEE
CASEF
CASEM
CASE 0
CASEP
CASE Q
N o t e :  S  -  yes
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M edium Perform ers
Four out o f  the six medium perform ers said that they w ould  consider a menu o f  
strategic options [c f  Table 5.4], Case B  w ould “think o f  an idea and narrow  it 
dow n to (1) ideas, (2) potentials and (3) realities” , using outside advice to  assist 
them  in quantifying and qualifying the possible outcom es; Case H  w ould “look at 
the return on investm ent on everything” ; Case I  said that “we use com puters a lot, 
and have done a business plan” for the proposed expansion; and Case N  w ould 
decide upon which actions to  follow based on a subjective assessm ent o f  their 
“viability” . Case G  adm itted that, “ if  you ’re new to  a business you w ould do that 
[i.e. consider a menu o f  options]” , bu t explained that “as you get m ore into the 
business, o r are naturally good at it, you go through things in your mind” .
Decisions w ere m ost likely to  be based on m arket inform ation in the medium 
perform ing firms: Case B  based long-term  decisions on m anagem ent’s specialist 
knowledge, built up over many years in the trade; Case G  had his “finger on the 
pulse” and w ould “never look at finance”, preferring instead to  rely on “gut 
feeling” ; Case H  relied on “m arket research, m arket inform ation o f  other 
companies and m arket information on the global m arket in general” ; Case I  on 
keeping “in the know ” about w hat potential custom ers w ould be spending in the 
future; and Case N  on “a mixture o f  things” . Only Case J  w ould base decisions 
purely on the com pany accounts.
Tw o o f  the medium perform ing firms w ere unlikely to make form al plans; Case J  
and Case N, w ho w ould “bounce my ideas o ff other staff I have” . Case G  w as 
slightly m ore formal and would “speak to  the accountant once a year” , but w ould 
also have quarterly meetings on m ajor goals. Case B  had “brainstorm ing m eetings 
every six m onths”, or w henever a new  opportunity would arise; Case H  had
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“regular staff, managem ent and B oard meetings” ; and Case I  had “regular B oard 
meetings and strategy reviews.
The actions taken by medium perform ers to  protect their custom er base varied 
from firm to  firm; Case B  kept themselves “aw are” o f  com petition and w here it 
was operating; as did Case J. Case I  relied on their quality: “w e are constantly 
looking over our shoulders to update and improve our quality” ; and Case N  relied 
on his new  products and developm ents: “you’ve go t to keep on innovating” . Case 
H  hoped to  encourage custom ers to  stay with them, partly “through P .R .”, 
w hereas Case G  thought that “maintaining private ownership” gave his com pany 
an “edge” , allowing him to keep his accounts private.
Two o f  the medium perform ers w ere proactive in trying to attract new clients: 
“we use teletext ... and direct mail” (Case B ); and “w e show w hat our com pany 
can do through presentations” (Case H). H ow ever, the rem ainder w ere fairly 
relaxed about getting new clients: “the custom ers tend to  com e to  us through 
recom m endation” (Case G); “w ord o f  m outh and recom m endations are im portant” 
(Case 7); “I rest on my reputation and w ord o f  m outh” (Case J); and “I ’m not 
really trying to  [i.e. a ttract custom ers away from rivals]” (Case N).
Five medium perform ers thought that information technology was im portant to 
their business [cf. Table 5.5], Advantages identified included the speed o f  
information gathering, savings on labour, and cheap and accurate communications: 
Case B  found it invaluable “because o f  the number o f  outlets w e have to  deal 
with” ; Case G  thought it was both  a “labour-saving option” and helped to  maintain 
the “custom er ‘feel-good’ factor” ; Case H  appreciated “the speed w e can turn 
around a budget and feed in real information” ; Case I  believed that “if  you keep 
up-to-date w ith technology, there are new ways always on the m arket-place” ; and
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Case N  liked inform ation technology because “it is quick and inexpensive and 
accurate across distance” . Case J  w as not currently a great user o f  IT , but hoped 
to  change this situation in the near future because she thought it w ould “im prove 
the way I do business with suppliers, as you can com m unicate faster and get a 
quicker response” .
Inform ation technology was integrated into the medium perform ing businesses in 
a variety o f  ways. Case B  used it mainly to  obtain “immediate inform ation” from  
on-line databases; Case G, for “contact management, accounting and 
administration” ; Case H  said that “everything is on the PC ” ; Case I  had 
implemented a sophisticated CA D 8 technology system; and Case N  used IT to  “fax 
orders and sketches” to  the USA. Case J, the lesser user o f  technology, had a PC 
at home, on which w ere held her accounts, and she used her phone for “stock 
enquiries, ordering, and details o f  forthcom ing events such as fashion shows and 
trade fairs” .
Tw o-thirds o f  the medium perform ers would generate a list o f  options before 
deciding on the specific direction they w anted their business to  follow, using often 
quite technical m ethods to  appraise and decide betw een them. Perhaps this 
distinguishes them  from the risk-taking high perform ers, in that they have a slightly 
less focused vision, and are less confident to follow their instincts, instead taking 
the m ore risk-averse route o f  carefully evaluating different options \cf. Bhide 
(1994)]. This group o f  firms based decisions mainly on m arket information, with 
financial implications typically being less important. The scale o f  formality in 
making new  plans, am ongst medium perform ers, ranged from relatively informal
8 C o m p u t e r  A i d e d  D e s i g n .
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discussions to  regular m eetings with the Board o f  D irectors. They relied on their 
quality and an awareness o f  com petition to retain the custom ers they already had, 
but w ere not generally so good at seeking new clients; reputation and w ord o f  
m outh w ere the prime m ethods o f  attracting new business. Information technology 
was used fo r the transm ission and storage o f  information, often in quite specialised 
ways.
Low Perform ers
Six out o f  eight low perform ers said that they w ould  consider a list o f  strategic 
options \c f  Table 5.4]. O f the tw o that would not, one (Case Q) said simply that 
there w ere only “three things w e can do”, and they w ere already doing them. Case 
A , being a partnership, had tw o very different personalities, generating many 
possible options: “we think opposites all the time; w e chat about it” . Case D  
w ould think about options “over and over in my head” , whilst also carrying out 
“com prehensive financial forecasts” ; Case F  had “considered a lot o f  things” , but 
the lack o f  m oney and suitable opportunity had stopped the implementation o f  new 
ideas; Case M  used com puter softw are packages to  evaluate alternatives; and Case 
P  w ould “th row  a lot o f  ideas at people and see which ones they accept” .
Long-term  decisions w ere often based on the financial implications o f  those 
decisions. Case A used experience from the past to  help them  decide, saying 
“financially, w e look back” ; Case D  would tend to  use a combination o f  “financial 
forecasting and gut feeling” ; Case E  said it would depend simply on “finance” ; and 
Case M  w ould look at “m onthly m anagement accounts, and use everything” . The 
other half o f  the low perform ers relied on ‘so ft’ rather than ‘hard’ inform ation 
w hen making m ajor new decisions, which contradicts M intzberg’s (1994, p . l l l )
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suggestion that “ the m ost effective managers rely on some o f the  softest forms o f  
information, including gossip, hearsay, and various other intangible scraps o f  
inform ation” [italics added]. Case F u s e d  a project conducted by a local university 
student, which examined the local m arket and advertising requirem ents o f  the 
company; Case O w ould m ake “my own decisions” , based on the occasional w ord 
through hearsay; Case P  claimed not to be able to  make long-term  decisions; and 
Case Q  had based one m ajor decision on the benefits it offered to  the firm, in term s 
o f  saving time.
A m ongst the low  perform ers, long-term  plans w ere nearly always developed on a 
very informal basis. Case A had ideas “in the back o f  my head” ; Case D  would 
“m ostly knock ideas about with people I trust” ; Case E  would “discuss it w ith my 
em ployee” ; Case F  had “informal discussions” ; Case M  said tha t “every day, we 
talk  about som ething” ; Case O would “test the tone o f  the m arket and decide 
m yself’; Case P  w ould “sit and have a blether” ; and Case 0  w ould “sit and speak 
about things” .
W hen trying to ensure custom er loyalty to  their firm, the low  perform ers 
mentioned that quality, advertising and good custom er relations all played an 
im portant role: “w e m ake sure our quality is up to standard, the w ork  is done 
within a reasonable time, w e are not overspending and are keeping our prices at a 
reasonable level” (Case A ); “all you can do is try and advertise and keep it in 
peoples’ minds” (Case D); Case E  relied on “the service I give them ” ; Case M  on 
“our name and our history” ; and Case O  on having “good custom er relations” . 
Three o f  this group o f  firms thought that there was nothing that could be done to 
retain custom ers if  they w anted to go elsewhere: “there’s not that much w e can 
do” and cutting prices “doesn’t w ork” (Case F)\ “you can’t really; it’s dow n to the
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personal relationship with your client” {Case P ) and “we don’t take any action; 
there’s nothing much w e can do” {Case Q).
Again, in an effort to  attract new  custom, the low  perform ers w ould often rely 
on quality and advertising: Case D  specified “the quality o f  our service and the 
uniqueness o f  the activities we offer” ; Case M  relied on “advertising, w ord o f  
mouth, then eventually our expertise” ; and Case Q on “the quality o f  our w ork” 
and occasional advertising. O f the others, very few made a consistent effort to  
attract new clients: Case E  said that “now  and again I have offers” ; and Case F  
w ould “give people 20 per cent o ff if  we think it will mean repeat business” ; but 
Case A adm itted “I don’t know  w hy they come to us; they just do” ; Case O  said 
that “I don’t like stepping on peoples’ toes; I don’t like conflict” ; and Case P  that 
“w e don’t deliberately try” to get new  custom ers.
H alf o f  the low  perform ers thought that information technology w as scarcely 
im portant to  their business [cf. Table 5.5], whilst the o ther half considered it to be 
very im portant. O f those who m ade little use o f  IT, one {Case A ) said that they 
“seemed to cope with our heads” and, in any case, “we don ’t know  w hat’s 
available to  us” ; Case D  said his “industry as a whole is quite slow  in moving into 
IT ”; Case O , the artist, explained that “the line o f  w ork is basically pencils and 
pens” ; and Case P  said that “if  I ’m looking for something for a specific purpose, I 
read a lot o f  magazines and send aw ay for information on the products” .
Those w ho used IT recognised its im portance in assisting fast com m unications 
and the transfer o f  information: “speed is im portant” {Case E); “ it gives you instant 
know ledge” {Case M )\ and “the trade is changing all the time; it’s very fast- 
moving” {Case 0 ) .  Inform ation technology within these firms w as not typically as 
advanced as in the higher perform ing groups, but it w as used for storing and
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transm itting information: “I use the phone and fax for telesales and custom er 
contacts and queries” {Case E ); “w e have a com puter database and w e use it for 
estimating” , but “we use it as a w ord processor m ore than anything else” {Case F); 
“w e fax surveys through all the time; ten years ago it didn’t happen” {Case M ); but 
Case Q  used IT  “for producing the product rather than administration” .
Low  perform ers w ere even m ore likely than the other firms to generate a menu 
o f  strategic options; perhaps because they w ere less likely to  have a focused idea o f  
w hat they hope to  achieve from their business. Decisions w ere m ade by half o f  the 
firms on ‘h ard ’ facts, often financial information; and by the o ther half on ‘so ft’ 
information, o f  things heard ‘through the grapevine’. Plans w ere typically 
developed on an informal, often ad hoc basis, through chats o r discussions 
am ongst the staff. Low  perform ers hoped that their quality and advertising w ould 
help them  to retain custom ers, but were less likely to  seek actively new  or 
additional business, relying instead upon referrals and w ord o f  mouth. Inform ation 
technology in these firms was not highly sophisticated; very often it consisted o f  
mainly fax and telephone communications. H ow ever, m ost recognised the speed 
and accuracy it allowed w ere beneficial, even if  they w ere unaw are o f  the various 
other facilities available, or applications for which it could be used.
Conclusions
Summarising the firms in term s o f  their strategies, the high perform ers, first o f  all, 
appeared to  have the clearest focus, as regards w here they w anted the business to 
go. They tended to adopt an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach, and appeared to be less 
risk-averse o r m ore risk-loving than the lower perform ers, supporting B hide’s 
(1994, p.160) assum ption that “by taking a personal risk, the entrepreneur
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convinces o ther people that the venture w ill succeed” . W itness their decision to 
choose a plan and stick to  it, o r to  disregard the financial costs o f  a new  strategy, 
w ithout spending too  m uch tim e on deliberation. An analysis o f  finance and 
m arket conditions helped them  in developing new plans, but these w ere not 
generally too  tightly formalised, and depended veiy much on the ow ner-m anager’s 
drive. The high perform ers all actively sought new  business, and used advertising 
and differentiation to  both  keep old and attract new custom ers. Inform ation 
technology w as integrated into all o f  these firms, and used for accounting, 
administration, stock control and communications, am ongst other things.
The m edium perform ing firms w ere slightly less well focused than the higher 
perform ers, generating options rather than creating and following a predeterm ined 
plan. They used various evaluation m ethods to  choose betw een options and 
seemed to  base m ost o f  their decisions on financial followed by m arket 
information, being o f  a m ore risk averse nature than the high perform ers {viz. their 
tendency to  perform  detailed analysis o f  options before making a choice). Plan 
form ulation was often highly structured, and based on the outcom es o f  regular 
meetings. M edium  perform ers were less active in trying to seek and retain new 
custom ers, but some w ould use advertising to  help in this. High technology was 
not so extensively used as in high perform ing firms, but its im portance was 
recognised by the majority.
Low  perform ers appeared to  be even less well-focused than the others, with 
m ost choosing to  develop optional strategies or courses o f  action. They seemed to  
be searching for a plan, rather than having one already in mind. These firms are 
typical o f  the “equivocators” in C arter ei a l (1994, p.31) for w hom  “uncertainty 
seemingly characterizes strategy form ulation” , and who are com pared to  P o rter’s
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(1985) classification o f  firms that are “stuck in the middle” . Informal discussions 
form ed the main arena for generating new ideas, which w ere often based on ‘soft’ 
information o r historical data, rather than projected o r expected outcom es. They 
w ere m ost unlikely to  seek new custom ers, often appearing to  lack the ruthlessness 
and strong nerves required if  a small firm is to  gain business in a tough competitive 
environment. Inform ation-technology w as not greatly used, and respondents often 
showed a lack o f  aw areness as to  w hat use it could be put in their ow n firm.
Supporting Evidence
From  the data generated by the adm inistered questionnaire, the evidence on 
planning, discussed above, is supported. Twenty-nine per cent o f  low  perform ers 
w ould form ulate business plans with the help o f  others in the company, represented 
in the case analysis by the frequent informal discussions the ow ner-m anagers w ould 
have with either fellow directors, or with staff. In descending order o f  im portance, 
20 per cent o f  the medium perform ers, and 17 per cent o f  high perform ers w ould 
similarly form ulate plans through consultation with others in the business. Equally 
revealing is the fact that only one-third o f  high perform ers would seek outside help 
in form ulating plans \cf. B aker et a l (1993)], com pared with three-quarters o f  the 
medium perform ers and tw o-thirds o f  the low performers. This suggests that high 
perform ers are both m ore able, and have the capability to w ork on their own 
initiative, or that their so-called ‘core com petencies’ or ‘distinctive capabilities’ are 
higher [cf. Kay (1993); B akker et a l  (1994); Prahalad and Hamel (1990)]. It also 
supports the evidence that low er perform ing firms are m ost likely to  have 
form ulated business plans following the suggestion of, say, their accountant or 
local enterprise trust. Interestingly, one third o f  the high perform ers w ere likely to
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have consulted family or friends when formulating business plans, com pared to  
only eight per cent o f  medium and seven per cent o f  low  perform ers. This suggests 
that high perform ers are m ore likely already to  have a netw ork o f  useful sources to  
w hom  they might appeal for advice, when required, relative to  less well-perform ing 
firms.
High perform ers w ere slightly m ore likely (60 per cent) to  take into account the 
experience o f  other, similar businesses when making strategic decisions \cf. H ay et 
a l (1993)], as com pared to  55 and 56 per cent o f  medium and low  perform ers, 
respectively. Conversely, they w ere slightly less likely (50 per cent) than both 
medium and low  perform ers to  consider other firms’ experience in term s o f  
operational o r day-to-day decisions, as com pared to  57 and 53 per cent o f  the 
medium and low  perform ers, respectively. This again supports the case study 
evidence, which suggests that high perform ers are less likely to  need help in the 
daily running o f  their business, knowing what they want to  do and how  to do it; 
w hereas they are m ore likely to  acknow ledge the fact that w hat w ent w rong for 
som eone else could also go w rong for their own firm, unless they actively try to 
prevent it; and they also show  a much greater self-awareness than the low er 
perform ers o f  their rivals, and o f  the need to  ‘poach’ custom ers, if  necessary.
In term s o f  who makes decisions in the business, the administered questionnaire 
data confirm the case study evidence that both strategic and operational decisions 
are m ost likely to  be made by one person in the high perform ing firms (60 and 70 
per cent, respectively); com pared to  medium perform ers (49 and 53 per cent) and 
low perform ers (41 and 54 per cent), who are generally m ore inclined to  discuss 
decisions, w hether they have long-term  strategic or short-term  day-to-day
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im plications.9 This suggests that the low perform ers are perhaps spending too 
much tim e discussing plans, while the highest perform ers ju st ‘get on w ith it’, 
doing the job  w ithout too  much time being w asted on talking about things, 
reflecting the fact that “only the ... ow ner has the business perspective, the ability 
to  orchestrate a com pany’s activities, the responsibility for setting objectives and 
the authority  to  review  and change them ” [Shuman and Seeger (1986, p. 12)]. The 
hours spent by the low er perform ers on chatting about the business might be 
diverting their attention away too  much from the actual goal o f  carrying ou t the 
w ork  and getting the business completed. C ontrast this with H ofer and Sandbergs’ 
(1987, p .22) “successful entrepreneurs” , who “focus on opportunities, ... are goal- 
oriented ... are able to  envision w here the com pany is going and thus are able to 
provide a strong sense o f  strategic direction” .
Turning now  to  the question concerning advice sought w hen form ulating 
strategy, is it sought from outside, or is the business capable o f  dealing w ith such 
decisions in-house? The results w ere fairly similar across perform ance groups for 
m ore operational decisions, involving advice on accounting, insurance or legal 
representation; m ost w ould employ the relevant experts, paying them  for their 
services. F o r im portant strategic m atters such as new investm ent, the high 
perform ers w ere m ore likely (60 per cent) than the medium (34 per cent) 
perform ers to  seek outside advice, although 59 per cent o f  low perform ers w ould 
also seek such advice. H ow ever, high perform ers w ere by far the m ost likely (83 
per cent) to  pay for it, com pared to  around one-quarter o f  the o ther tw o groups. 
Again, high perform ers w ould seek advice on personnel m atters 44 per cent o f  the
9 S e e  B a m b e r g e r ’ s ( 1 9 8 3 )  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  o w n e r - m a n a g e r ’ s v a l u e s  o n  t h e  
s t r a t e g i c  b e h a v i o u r  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  f i r m .
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time, com pared to  17 and 23 per cent o f  medium and low  perform ers; about one- 
quarter o f  each group w ould pay for such advice.
A lthough low  perform ers w ere the m ost likely (45 per cent) to  seek advice on 
marketing, com pared to  27 and 30 per cent o f  medium and high perform ers, 
respectively, reflecting their awareness o f  a need to  m arket their business and a 
lack o f  know ledge in how  to  do so, they w ere only half as willing (34 per cent) as 
the high perform ers (75 per cent) to pay for such advice. Similarly, for advice on 
new  products, betw een 20 and 27 per cent o f  all firms w ould ask others for advice 
but, while 100 per cent o f  high perform ers showed a willingness to  pay for this, 
only 43 per cent o f  medium and 58 per cent o f  low perform ers w ould pay, 
preferring instead to  rely on friends or local enterprise agencies and netw orks who 
might offer free advice [cf. Johnson and Devins (1994); Storey (1994); W oods, 
B lackburn & Curran (1995)].
The adm inistered questionnaire asked for the level o f  im portance o f  information 
technology to  the firm, graded on the scale zero to  two, representing least to  m ost 
im portant. The results are consistent with the case study evidence, w ith high 
perform ers ranking IT on average at 1.8, medium at 1.5 and low  at 1.4; in other 
words, decreasing in im portance, the low er the perform ance group. By far the 
m ost heavily used information technology was the phone, with ju s t under 100 per 
cent using it to  assist in the running o f  their business, followed by answering 
machines, which w ere used by betw een 74 and 79 per cent o f  firms. High 
perform ers made m ost use o f  mobile phones (70 per cent), fax machines (90 per 
cent) and personal com puters (90 per cent), com pared to medium perform ers (51, 
72 and 70 per cent, respectively), and low  perform ers (33, 70 and 70 per cent, 
respectively). An electronic database w as said to  be used by around 40 per cent o f
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all firms, although it w as sometimes unclear as to  w hether this w as the firm’s own 
custom er database, or an external source o f  information, for example, an on-line 
database on the industry o r com petitors.
H igh perform ers w ere also the highest users o f  radio communications (10 per 
cent), satellite links (10 per cent) and telephone conferencing facilities (20 per 
cent), w ith others making relatively little use o f  these. Electronic mail, o r ‘e-m ail’, 
was used by only 8 per cent o f  low  perform ers, but was slightly m ore im portant to  
medium (19 per cent) and high (10 per cent) perform ers; but video conferencing 
was rarely used, if  at all, and the microfiche was seen to be old technology, 
although 10 per cent o f  high perform ers still used it to  some degree, com pared to  5 
per cent o f  all others.
The m ajority o f  all firms who had implemented information technology used it 
for adm inistrative purposes, to  keep track  o f  their buyers, suppliers and invoices. 
Forty per cent o f  each o f  the high and medium perform ers used it to  develop a 
business plan, com pared to  54 per cent o f  low  performers; perhaps a higher 
number because the low er perform ers were m ore likely to use a com puterised 
custom -m ade package, whereas the m ore knowledgeable higher perform ers might 
have better capabilities to  design their own plan. It is interesting to  note that the 
low er perform ers admitted to  using IT relatively infrequently for netw orking (46 
per cent), which lends support to the argum ent o f  Curran (1996) that m ost small 
firms have neither the time nor the inclination to  network. Com pare this to  the 70 
per cent o f  bo th  medium and high perform ers who claim that they do  netw ork, 
supporting Steene’s (1991) and M cN icoll’s (1994) theories that greater 
netw orking capabilities lead to  higher performance. Similarly, one fifth o f  high
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perform ers also used technology to  track or follow the activities o f  their 
com petitors.
Perhaps quite a telling point is that 80 per cent o f  high perform ers used IT to  
carry out their own accounting procedures, com pared to 56 and 57 per cent o f  
medium and low perform ers. This shows that they w ere the m ost likely group to  
have at their fingertips an up-to-date  picture o f  how  their firm w as performing; and 
an understanding o f  the financial implications o f  various actions. The lower 
perform ing firms w ere m ore likely to  employ an independent outsider to  produce 
the figures on behalf o f  their business.
It is perhaps surprising to  note that the high perform ers are the least likely (10 
per cent) to  use IT  in the actual production process o f  m anufacturing their product 
o r providing their service, com pared to  a high 49 per cent o f  medium and 26 per 
cent o f  low  perform ers. It may be that the current economic climate in Scotland 
favours the service sector over manufacturers, so service providers are m ore 
successful and IT is not so valid in the provision o f  their product. There are many 
service sector firms w ho might use IT to assist in providing their service, such as 
distributors, business services and education providers; but these do not appear 
am ongst the high perform ers. The evidence suggest that those businesses in high- 
technology industries are not necessarily m ore likely to succeed than those in low- 
technology industries which, to  some extent, refutes the assum ption o f  C ooper et 
a l (1991) that firms producing high-technology products will automatically 
perform  better. Instead, it seems that a firm is likely to perform  better if  it can 
successfully install and implement technology to  improve the speed and efficiency 
o f  its inform ation retrieval, analysis and communications.
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Let us now  investigate a new proposition:
P 4: m ere b e lie f  in the im portance o f  information technology is not 
directly related to  small firm perform ance.
The variable Infotech  is a m easure o f  the respondent’s belief o f  the  im portance o f  
information technology to  his firm. It is coded as ‘O’ for scarcely, ‘1’ for 
m oderately and ‘2 ’ for very im portant. The results for this variable have been 
cross-tabulated against perform ance group, and are presented in both  boxplot and 
tabular form at in F igure 5.5. From  the boxplots, it can clearly be seen that the low 
and medium perform ers have very similar beliefs about the im portance o f  
inform ation technology to  their business. The responses range from  scarcely, 
through m oderately to  very im portant, with the majority believing it to  be o f  at 
least some use. The high perform ers, however, all appear to  think IT  is im portant, 
the m ajority saying that it is very important.
The cross-tabulated results break dow n this information into m ore detail. 17.8 
per cent o f  the low  perform ers believe IT is scarcely im portant to  their business, 
com pared to  14.3 per cent o f  medium, but none o f  the high perform ers. One-fifth 
o f  each perform ance group believe it to  be m oderately important. And 62.2 per 
cent o f  low  perform ers, 65.6 per cent o f  medium perform ers and 80 per cent o f  
high perform ers believe IT  to  be very im portant to  their business.
These results are interesting in that the descriptive statistics suggest a high 
perceived im portance o f  IT to each perform ance group, but especially so am ongst 
the better perform ers. However, given the sample size, any formal statistical 
inferences that may be made on the basis o f  this evidence are equivocal. For the 
Pearson and the Likelihood Ratio tests, relatively high probabilities are indicated to 
the effect that the results obtained may be due to  chance (67% and 45% ).
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BOXPLOT AND CROSS-TABULATION OF BELIEF OF 
IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY BY 
PERFORMANCE GROUP
Figure 5.5
Xo111
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H ow ever, the M antel-H aenszel test for linear association indicates there is only a 
20%  probability that the pattern is due to  chance. W e conclude that a 
respondent’s b e lie f  in the im portance o f  IT  to  the firm does not necessarily 
translate into perform ance. A  further proposition may now be formulated:
P 5: actual use o f  inform ation technology is directly related to  small 
firm perform ance.
This will now  be investigated by creating and examining a new  variable for the 
actual use o f  IT, called Ituse. This variable m easures the actual use o f  IT by the 
firm, by taking the sum o f  the responses for 12 possible uses10 o f  IT, w here a 
positive response to  use takes the value ‘1’, and a negative response, the value ‘O’. 
The maximum value o f  Ituse is therefore 12, and the minimum, zero, w here a 
higher value indicates m ore intensive use o f  technology.
This ‘count’ variable is used as an indexation factor11 to generate new  boxplots, 
as shown in F igure 5.6. It suggests that actual use o f  IT  is greater, the higher 
perform ing are the firms. The median value for both low and medium perform ers 
is 4, com pared to  5 for the high perform ers. W hat is m ore, the spread or 
dispersion o f  values is g reater for the low and medium perform ers, com pared to  
the high perform ers. The boxplot displays a considerably low er dispersal o f  the 
Ituse variable for high, com pared to  low  performers. High perform ers appear to  
agree on a level o f  IT that maximises its use and potential for their firms, whereas 
the low er perform ers have yet to agree on an optimum strategy for IT 
implementation.
10 T e l e p h o n e ,  f a x ,  a n s w e r i n g  m a c h i n e ,  e l e c t r o n i c  m a i l ,  t e l e p h o n e  c o n f e r e n c i n g ,  v i d e o  
c o n f e r e n c i n g ,  m o b i l e  p h o n e ,  s a t e l l i t e  l i n k ,  r a d i o  c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  m i c r o f i c h e ,  p e r s o n a l  c o m p u t e r s ,  
e l e c t r o n i c  d a t a b a s e s .
1 1  T h e  a u t h o r  is  g r a t e f u l  t o  P r o f e s s o r  C h r i s t o p h e r  J e n s e n - B u t l e r  o f  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S t  A n d r e w s ,  
f o r  s u g g e s t i n g  a  v a r i a b l e  s u c h  a s  t h i s  m i g h t  b e  w o r t h  e x p l o r i n g .
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B O X P L O T  A N D  C R O S S -T A B U L A T IO N  O F  A C T U A L  U S E  O F
IN F O R M A T IO N  T E C H N O L O G Y  B Y
P E R F O R M A N C E  G R O U P
Figure 5.6
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F or expository purposes, IT has been divided into the three groups o f  low, 
medium and high intensity o f  use, with ‘low ’ containing values o f  0 to  2, inclusive, 
‘m edium ’, containing values o f  3 to  6, inclusive, and ‘high’, containing values o f  7 
to  10, inclusive, w ith 10 being the maximum observed. This creates a new  
variable, Itusage , which may assume ju st three values. Figure 5.6 shows the cross­
tabulation o f  w hat is now  called Itusage (rather than Ituse) with perform ance. The 
low users are also m ost likely to be low  performers, with 33 per cent o f  them  
falling into this category, com pared to  20.4 per cent o f  medium and no high 
perform ers. In the medium category o f  IT use fall 63.7 per cent o f  low, 63.3 per 
cent o f  medium and 80%  o f  high perform ers. And finally, only 3.3 per cent o f  low 
perform ers fall into the category representing the highest use o f  IT, com pared to
16.3 per cent o f  medium and 20 per cent o f  high perform ers. In this case, the 
Pearson te s t’s %2 value has a probability o f  just 0.01148, and the Likelihood Ratio 
te s t’s x 2 value has a probability value o f  0.00391. The M antel-H aenszel test for 
linear association gives a highly significant (0.0008) test statistic. In other w ords, 
the probability o f  obtaining these results simply by chance is extremely small. 
Taking full account o f  the form s o f  evidence presented, w e conclude that the 
greater the  level IT  use in the firm, the better it is likely to  perform. Thus 
Proposition 5 is supported, leading to  the conclusion that operationally using IT  is 
w hat counts for perform ance [cf. D odgson and Rothwell (1989)], as distinct from  
merely a belief that IT is useful [cf. Proposition 4],
To conclude, w e saw  that the majority o f  firms believe that IT is very im portant 
to  their business, but that this belief is not significantly related to  perform ance. 
H ow ever, w e also found that actual use o f  IT is related to  perform ance; and the 
m ore it is used, the higher is perform ance, to an extent which is highly statistically
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significant. The relative inability o f  firms to  relate their belief in the  im portance o f  
IT  to its actual im portance is consistent with earlier findings [c f  Reid and Smith 
(1996)] tha t low er perform ers also have a low er awareness o f  their capabilities and 
opportunities than do higher perform ers. The latter are m ore focused, with m ore 
similar strategies within their group, than firms at the o ther tw o levels o f  
perform ance, w ho vary widely in their capacities for self-analysis and evaluation.
(iv) Policies
This final section under the heading o f  ‘strategy form ulation’ considers the policies 
adopted by the firm; w hat are the ground rules it is following to  m ake sure the job  
is done properly? It looks at the maintaining and enhancing o f  product quality; for 
example, has the  firm installed a total quality management system, or TQM ? [cf. 
Hankes (1993a)]. W hat kind o f  assurances does the firm give to  its custom ers that 
the final product will be ‘fit for their intended purpose’, and o f  a suitable quality? 
And how  are employees m otivated to  co-operate with m anagem ent in the 
implementation o f  new policies?
High Perform ers
The three high perform ers all either used or supplied products that had been 
m anufactured elsewhere, so to  some extent they were dependent upon the quality 
produced by their suppliers: “the m ajority o f  our suppliers are IS 0 9 0 0 0 12” {Case
K). Quality therefore very often came down to  the service provided by the firm. 
Case C  said that, “if  there was a recurring fitting problem, I ’d address this in a
12 A n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t a n d a r d  o f  q u a l i t y ,  r e c e n t l y  s u p e r s e d i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  B S 5 7 5 0 .
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training w ay” , and often relied on “the custom er telling us” about any trouble they 
had; Case K  w ould inspect all materials as they received them, saying “it’s all 
checked and signed” ; and Case L  said that quality was “m onitored on a daily basis 
by the personnel in here” , who w ould go out regularly to  make on-site inspections.
The products w ere often supported by a m anufacturer’s guarantee, but the  high 
perform ers all tried to  assure potential custom ers in o ther ways. Case C  w ould try  
to guide them  to  the correct selection o f  product for their need”, and “match the 
right price w ith som ething that will give them long-term  use” ; Case K  played on 
the fact tha t custom ers w ere “dealing with a company that has a reputable track  
record for supplying a good quality product” , and that “if  w e supply a sub-standard 
product then w e will replace it” ; and Case L  offered “a standard guarantee” , 
allowing custom ers to  “hold a retention o f  up to  2.5 per cent o f  the contract 
value” .
Two o f  the high perform ers thought that their staff w ere very much self- 
m otivated, but they all nonetheless offered incentives to  keep and im prove their 
m otivation. First, there w ere the non-pecuniary benefits offered by management: 
“I encourage them ” {Case C); “they are involved in decision-m aking and we value 
their opinions” {Case K ); and “w e have a good w orking relationship; w e make 
decisions together” {Case L). Then, there were the financial rew ards and various 
other perks: “one is on commission, and one has a net profit-related bonus; the 
fitters are paid on a piece-w ork basis so there are financial incentives for them  to  
be profitable” {Case C); “at the end o f  the year they get a bonus, and they get a 
good Christm as party” {Case K ); and “money is the first m otivator; there’s a bonus 
for the site w orkers o f  one-and-a-half or double pay on Saturday and Sunday” 
{Case L).
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Quality and reputation w ere im portant to  the high perform ers, w ho followed 
policies that would assist them in their search for excellence. M aterials w ere 
checked on delivery, and the installation or provision o f  the service w as m onitored 
regularly by senior personnel. Custom ers w ere offered guarantees and 
replacem ents if  quality w as not quite up to scratch. The personnel o f  each high 
perform ing group w ere obviously highly valued. They were encouraged to  
participate in decision-m aking and offered financial incentives to  m otivate them 
and encourage their loyalty to  the firm.
M edium Perform ers
O f the m edium perform ers, tw o thought it very im portant to  be aw are o f  the 
m arket in helping to  maintain and enhance quality: Case B  tried to  “stay one step 
ahead o f  the gam e”, and Case G  used trade journals to  find out “w hat’s happening 
and w hat’s going on” . O thers relied on regular m onitoring o f  the products and 
services: “w e have various levels o f  quality assurance as it goes into production, 
then w e have formal quality assessm ent tests” {Case H ); Case I  carried out 
“regular checking” and had forem en on site w ho w ere responsible for quality on a 
daily basis; Case J  w ould ask suppliers “about the quality o f  the fabric and how 
they’re cleaned” , checking personally all items when returned from hire; and Case 
N  w ould “randomly check items, w here I think something could go w rong” . Only 
Case G  m entioned a “procedure manual”, in which w ere held the “basic functions” .
The medium perform ers used various m ethods to  assure their custom ers about 
quality and ‘fitness for purpose’. Case B  w ould tell the custom ers that their 
product (i.e. the hotel) always had an approved rating, and w ould “tell them  w hat 
has to be achieved for this rating” ; Case J  w ould be “completely honest” about her
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hired goods, and their previous use; and Case N  offered a “no quibble guarantee” , 
which m eant that p roducts w ould be replaced if  faulty. Som e involved the 
custom ers in the actual m anufacturing process: Case H  said “they assure 
themselves; the client is involved throughout the developm ent o f  a new  product” ; 
and Case J  w ould “follow  the specifications o f  their designer and architect” . Case 
G  relied on “payment” to  assure the custom er that his product w ould be suitable: 
“if  doesn’t do w hat it should, then they don’t pay m e” .
Som e o f  the medium perform ers m otivated their employees through a form  o f  
financial reward, or intended to  do so: Case B  offered “bonuses based on targets” ; 
Case G, a “company car, non-contributory pension, and salary linked to 
profitability” ; Case H  w as “going into share options and profit-related bonuses” , 
and Case I  had pension schemes in place” , and was considering profit-related pay. 
O ther form s o f  m otivation included Case B: “they are very m uch involved in 
decision-making; w e listen to  their ideas” ; Case H : “w e try and provide a quality 
w ork  environm ent and social events; w e em pow er them, so they are in charge o f  
their own w ork” ; Case I: “w e are thinking o f  ‘Investors in People’, to  let the guys 
know  w hat w e’re trying to  achieve and how we intend to achieve it” ; Case J : “they 
are very closely involved in the business and decision-making” ; and Case N : “I try 
to  share the vision o f  the business with them  and keep them informed o f  the 
happenings o f  the business” .
The medium perform ers w ere quite likely to  have been developing a structured 
type o f  quality assessm ent, w ith regular checking or monitoring o f  the product. 
Custom ers w ere assured o f  quality partly through some form o f  guarantee, and 
partly through the reputation o f  the company for supplying a quality product or 
service. Em ployees w ere m ost likely to  be m otivated through their involvement in
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decision-making; but medium perform ers w ere also making efforts to  install or 
increase financial rew ards; and m ost seemed to  be currently in a transitional phase, 
w ith ideas for im provem ent soon to  be implemented.
Low Perform ers
M ost o f  the  low  perform ers were unlikely to  have com plicated procedures for 
assessing quality: “w e take our time and concentrate on what w e’re doing” {Case 
A); “it’s m ore w ith the m anufacturers; I take their w ord for it” (Case E ); “we rely 
on our ow n judgem ents as to  w hat’s acceptable” {Case F)\ and “I ’ve been in it for 
a few years and you get a standard you set” {Case O). O thers relied on occasional 
‘spot-checking’; Case D  would either “always be there, or turn up unannounced” ; 
Case M  w ould “inspect every job w hen it’s finished” , as well as having foremen 
on-site; and Case P  w ould “keep a regular check on w hat they’re doing” .
Low  perform ers w ere likely, in m ost cases, to  give a guarantee only if  the 
custom er requested it, relying instead on their reputation being enough to  assure 
custom ers. Case A w ould “have a five minute discussion” with the custom er, and 
“if they ask for it, w e give guarantees” ; Case D  said that reassurance “has to  be 
verbal”; Case E, that “they know  I exchange things”; Case F, tha t “we will go 
back and sort out any problems” ; Case P, that “I f  th ey’re anxious, I phone up 
suppliers and ask for a ten or fifteen year guarantee” ; and Case Q, “I f  there’s 
anything w rong w e replace it” . Case O  used payment to reassure custom ers, 
though not through his own volition: “if  it’s not up to scratch o r standard, they 
don’t pay you” ; and Case M  offered “an insurance-backed thirty-year guarantee” .
N o t all o f  the low  perform ers had employees, so motivation for them  w as not an 
issue. O f the others, only tw o offered financial incentives: Case M  %ave a “profit­
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sharing percentage and bonuses” ; and Case P, “a productivity bonus related to  the 
individual jo b ” . The rest relied on encouragem ent and a convivial w orking 
atm osphere. Case A said “it’s easy come, easy go” ; Case D  used “pure 
encouragem ent” ; Case E ’s employee “w orks flexible hours” ; Case F  treated  their 
employee “as if  he was a partner” ; Case M  would “consult them  for a decision” ; 
and Case P , on encountering a problem with his employees, w ould give them  
(metaphorically) “a size eight boo t in the w rong place” .
Low  perform ers w ere informal in their quality procedures, preferring not to  
mention guarantees unless pressed by the custom er. There w ould be occasional 
m onitoring or on-site checking, but this appeared to  be less regular than the 
procedures followed by the higher perform ers. Perhaps because they were low er 
perform ers, and therefore had little spare cash to  distribute, this groups o f  firms 
rarely offered employees financial incentives. Instead, they tried to  create an 
environm ent that was friendly, w here everyone had a say in decisions and the 
future o f  the  company.
Conclusions
Classifying the case studies by perform ance groups, in term s o f  the policies they 
had adopted, suggests the following characteristics relate to each group. First o f  
all, the high perform ers relied mainly on the quality o f  their suppliers, in term s o f  
the actual products, but service quality was maintained by regular checking or 
monitoring, and addressed by training if  it were not up to  standard. Perhaps the 
greatest difference betw een the high perform ers and other groups lies in the 
pecuniary benefits paid to ensure s taff loyalty and motivation; these being much 
greater am ongst the higher com pared to  the low er performers.
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M edium perform ers very often had a regular monitoring or checking system in 
place. They reassured their custom ers by their reputation and occasional 
guarantees; and m otivated em ployees through their involvement and financial 
bonuses, though to  a slightly lesser extent than the high perform ers. Low  
perform ers rarely gave guarantees to  custom ers, and quality was not typically 
formally checked on a regular basis. They w ere the group least likely to  give 
m onetary rew ards to employees, relying instead on their self-motivation through 
the encouragem ent they received.
Supporting Evidence
Once m ore making appeal to  the quantitative data available from the adm inistered 
questionnaire, the evidence show  that high perform ers w ere the m ost likely (20 per 
cent) to  have implemented a total quality m anagement system, w ith half doing so 
because they thought it increased efficiency, and half because o f  the cost benefits it 
conferred \cf. Hankes (1993a); M adu and Kuei (1993)]. Twelve per cent o f  the 
medium and 16 per cent o f  the low  perform ers had implemented such a system, be 
it a formally approved system, installed with the help o f  consultants, o r one 
developed through their own initiative. M edium perform ers w ere m ost likely to  
think it helped to  improve their business image (50 per cent); w hereas low 
perform ers w ere using it mainly to  increase efficiency (36 per cent).
One-fifth o f  high perform ers had achieved formal accreditation for some aspect 
o f  their personnel handling, and all w ere convinced that this had helped to  im prove 
m otivation. This supports the case study evidence that suggests higher perform ers 
value their s taff m ore than other groups. They are also the m ost likely to  provide 
staff with financial motivations. Only tw o per cent o f  medium, and seven per cent
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o f  low  perform ers had achieved similar approvals for personnel. All o f  the medium 
perform ers had sought such approval to improve motivation, whilst the low 
perform ers thought it helped m otivation (33 per cent), improved the business 
image (17 per cent), and led to  increased efficiency (17 per cent).
5.4 Summary
Chapter 5 has discussed in detail the data generated by the case studies, analysing 
the firms by the low, medium and high perform ance group into which they fall. 
The discussion is supported by quantitative data from the administered 
questionnaire, which provide summary statistics for each perform ance rank. In 
addition, five propositions w ere developed, prom pted by the analysis o f  the data. 
These propositions w ere tested  using statistical methods, and illustrated by 
boxplots, cross-tabulations and graphs, with supporting chi-square statistics, where 
relevant.
In term s o f  environmental scanning, the higher perform ers seemed to have a 
better aw areness o f  the m arket, clearer reasons for start-up and m ore o f  an idea o f  
their environm ent than did the low est perform ers, w ith medium perform ers falling 
som ew here betw een the tw o. The majority o f  all firms were pleased w ith both 
custom er and supplier relationships, perceiving few, if  any, problems.
The key results from  this section are found in the analysis o f  propositions one to 
three. First, there is evidence that young, small firms will over-exaggerate their 
strengths, and under-estim ate w eaknesses or potential threats, either through 
naivete [c f  Jovanovic (1982)] o r through a deliberate attem pt to withhold 
information, perhaps in order to disguise any problem s from outside backers [c f  
Reid, Terry & Smith (1997)]. Second, the proposition that those ow ner-m anagers
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who are m ore realistic that about strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
will also perform  better is supported to  some degree by the data. And examination 
o f  the third proposition, that the m ore inform ation a firm has on its rivals, the 
better will be perform ance, shows some linear association betw een information 
gathering and perform ance {c f  M adu and Kuei (1993)].
In term s o f  strategy form ulation, high perform ers w ere m ost likely to  plan further 
ahead, and to  have clearly defined goals. Low  perform ers often had a business 
plan which was not used in the running o f  the business, but instead had been 
developed to  attract start-up support {c f  B aker et a l (1993)]. H igh perform ers 
sought long-term  econom ic objectives, such as a high rate o f  return, medium 
perform ers often w anted long-term  profit, and low  perform ers often hoped for no 
m ore than m ere survival or, eventually, increased sales.
High perform ers w ere clearly focused, medium perform ers less so, and low 
perform ers seemed even less certain o f  w hat they w anted to  achieve from  their 
business. The high and medium perform ers could be said to  have well-defined 
strategies, whilst the evidence appears to  suggest that low perform ers do not 
generate strategies in a formal, text-book sense. O f those firms w ho do have 
strategies, the high perform ers seemed m ore able to make quick decisions on 
which options to  take, perhaps because the ow ner-m anagers w ere m ore natural 
entrepreneurs. M edium  perform ers, on the other hand, would spend much time 
analysing options, generating budgets and projections, before deciding which route 
to  take, possibly because they w ere less naturally entrepreneurial by nature, but 
w ere perhaps higher educated or open to  the idea o f  technical project appraisal.
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The educational level o f  each perform ance group might be w orth  examining to  
investigate this proposition .13
The use o f  inform ation technology within small firms w as thought to  be w orth  
exploring in further detail, leading to  the developm ent o f  tw o m ore propositions. 
The first examined the belief o f  the im portance o f  IT  to  the firms under 
examination. Given that m ost respondents appeared to  think it w as im portant, the 
proposition w as that the belief o f  this im portance was not reflected in perform ance. 
Exam ination o f  the  evidence shows that we can, with some confidence, take this to  
be the case. The final proposition in this chapter suggests that the actual use o f  
information technology does  translate into perform ance. A  new indexation 
variable is created to  test this proposition and, when cross-tabulated with 
perform ance rank, it is found to  be highly statistically significant. In other w ords, 
the higher the use o f  information technology in a new small firm, the better will be 
its perform ance.
13 S e e , f o r  e x a m p l e ,  M i n t z b e r g  a n d  Q u i n n  ( 1 9 9 1 ,  p . 8 1 7 ) ,  w h o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  “ f o r m a l  m a n a g e m e n t  
e d u c a t i o n  p r o g r a m s  t y p i c a l l y  e m p h a s i z e  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g  a n d  d e c i s i o n ­
m a k i n g  s k i l l s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b u t  g i v e  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d  t o  f i n d  
t h e  p r o b l e m s  t h a t  n e e d  t o  b e  s o l v e d ,  t o  p l a n  f o r  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t s ,  o r  t o  c a r r y  o u t  
o p e r a t i n g  p l a n s  o n c e  t h e y  a r e  m a d e ” .
264
C h a p t e r  6
C a s e  S t u d y  E v id e n c e :  im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  
s t r a t e g ie s  a n d  t h e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 concludes the discussion o f  case study evidence, again making appeal to 
the case studies in Appendix IV, and supporting the discussion w ith further detail 
from the adm inistered questionnaire. It begins with an examination o f  the process 
o f  strategy implementation, looking at the firm s’ program m es, budgets and 
procedures. The chapter concludes with a discussion o f  the  m ethods used to  
evaluate and control strategies.
In a similar w ay to  the m ethods used in C hapter 5, a further tw o propositions are 
developed, and illustrated by boxplots, cross-tabulations and chi-square statistics. 
The first proposition suggests that access to more sources o f  funding will in turn 
lead to enhanced perform ance. It is shown that, in fact, this supposition cannot be 
supported by the available evidence. The second proposition is that a willingness 
by the ow ner-m anager to dilute their equity shareholding in the firm will 
correspond to  higher perform ance [cf. Storey (1994)]. Again, w e cannot accept 
this proposition and, indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the willingness to  
accept a higher dilution o f  equity will not improve performance.
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6.2 Strategy Implementation 
(i) P rogram m es
The first section under the heading o f  ‘Strategy Im plem entation’ investigates the 
program m es followed by the firm; how  does it organise its operation to  implement 
its strategic plans as quickly as possible with the highest quality possible? It 
examines w hat is being done by the firm to  help it achieve its goals in term s of, for 
example, the  introduction o f  new products, investment or additional staff. It then 
looks at feedback from custom ers, and how this is used to improve the firm ’s 
product o r service. Following this, the study looks at problems encountered by the 
business in implementing new strategies, factors determining the speed o f  their 
im plem entation and potential constraints on the future grow th o f  the firm.
High Perform ers
The three high perform ers w ere all taking positive steps to  help achieve their goals 
o f  grow th  and high profitability, employing new staff, moving into new premises 
and seeking ou t new lines o f  business as “the lack o f  resources to  carry out some 
aspect o f  [a] plan must be identified before implementation begins” [Shuman and 
Seeger (1986, p. 13)]. Case C  w as “creating and maintaining a profitable core that 
will drive forw ard grow th, taking on new  staff, and looking at new  premises”, with 
a view to  opening a new retail outlet. Case K  had “m oved to  new  premises and 
paid people o ff  to  bring the overhead dow n” and was “taking on new products”, 
whilst their main asset, the newly-purchased premises, was appreciating in value; 
and Case L  w as “always trying to  increase the m arket” and had “built up a bit o f  
finance that can be invested” [cf. Bull (1993)].
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RECEIPT AND USE OF CUSTOMER FEEDBACK
Table 6.1
Receive Use of Feedback
Feedback?
High Performers
CASE C S
CASE K S
CASE L S
Medium Performers
CASE B v '
CASE G S
CASE H </
CASE I S
CASE J  S
CASE N ^
Low Performers
CASE A v''
CASE D v '
CASE E v/
CASE F
CASE M V
CASE O S
CASE P ^
CASE Q v '
quality control
naive and ignorant to ignore it 
use as reference to  o ther custom ers
clients are unpaid inspectors 
for m otivation and im provem ent 
to  constantly adapt 
com m ents go to  the shop floor 
absorb and alter 
put into effect
to  im prove
questionnaires seek custom er reaction
to im prove quality
note any problems
to correct
take it on board
recom m endation to clients
letters o f  com m endation on door
Note: S  - yes
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All o f  the high perform ers received feedback \cf. Table 6.1] from their custom ers 
which, if  relevant, they w ould use to help im prove the quality o f  their p roduct or 
service \cf. Thurston (1983)]. Case C  w ould have “ad hoc” meetings with his key 
fitter, during which any problem s w ere discussed; he used custom er feedback for 
“quality control” , to  help keep him informed if  things w ent wrong. Case K  said 
that actions taken  because o f  custom er feedback w ere “very spontaneous” , and 
that it was “naive and ignorant to  ignore com plaints” ; and Case L  used feedback 
“as a reference, if  nothing else” .
One o f  the high perform ers, Case C, said that he could not recall encountering 
any problem s in implementing new strategies, mainly because his business was 
“quite firmly focused” [cf. Table 6.2]. The tw o others had both  had difficulties at 
some point. Case ICs solution was “to bite the bullet” because it w as to  be 
expected that “things don’t go right” . Their reaction to  problems w as that “if  you 
believe in it and stay the course, then you ’ve go t to  follow it through” . Case L  had 
experienced difficulties in the past with trying to  attract new custom ers, because 
“the probable client is already happy w ith who he’s got w orking for him, and is 
reluctant to  m ove” ; he therefore had to  use advertising and price-cutting to  try  and 
get their custom . See M intzberg and Quinn (1991, p .8 18), w ho believe that, 
“while the analytical skills needed for problem  solving are im portant, m ore crucial 
to  managerial success are the perceptual skills needed to identify problem s long 
before any evidence o f  them  can be found by even the m ost advanced m anagement 
inform ation system ” .
This group o f  firms had mixed reactions as to  the im portance o f  speed in 
implementing new  strategies. Case C  said it w ould depend partly upon the
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INDICATION OF PROBLEMS 
ENCOUNTERED IN THE FIRM
Table 6.2
Problem Nature of Reaction to
Encountered? Problem Problem
High Performers
CASEC X [
CASE K to  be expected; 
stay the course; 
follow through
CASEL attracting new 
custom ers
advertising and 
price-cutting
Medium Performers
CASED changing systems; 
time constraints
re-training
CASE G people break dow n 
barriers o f  society
CASE H X illllilllllffliilM
CASE I X h h m b m
CASE J s organisation changing
procedures
CASEN staff tidiness built m ore shelf 
space
Low Performers
CASE A X
CASED ✓ logistical rew ork tim etable
CASEE s money and space
CASEF s skills lacking
CASEM X
CASE 0 X illiilliiSfiPfliffi
CASEP V staff failure to
abide by Health &
Safety regulation
CASE Q V product lines not
selling
Note: S  - yes 
* - no
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financial situation o f  the firm at the time, although “people are key at the  end o f  the 
day”, so not having the right staff w ould prevent things from m oving too  quickly. 
Case K  adm itted that they w ere very slow at following new ideas because “it’s our 
lives w e’re playing with, so we like to  be belts and braces sure” ; but Case L 
thought that “you’ve go t to  be fairly swift if  you make a decision” .
All three firms w ere quite sure about w hat w as the biggest constraint on the 
future grow th o f  their business: Case C  said that it was, quite simply, “finance” ; 
Case K , “the m arket, and lack o f  local governm ent spending at the m om ent” ; and 
Case L, “a lack o f  confidence in the building trade as it is at the m om ent” . The 
latter tw o w ere both, to  some extent, dependent upon the local building trade and 
local governm ent contracts, so the recent re-organisation o f  local governm ent had 
affected their trade and made them  slightly cautious about the future.
The high perform ers w ere investing heavily in the future prospects o f  their firms, 
buying premises and trying to create a core team  o f  staff who w ould see the firm 
through its future stages. Trying to  maintain high profitability w as a key concern, 
so Case K  had taken the difficult step o f  letting some staff go. These firms w ere all 
open to  hearing feedback from custom ers, and using it when necessary to  im prove 
their service. Tw o firms, realistically, adm itted that problems did occur, though 
they fought hard to  com bat them; and one said that his firm w as so well-focused 
that problem s w ere infrequent. Speed w as not always im portant in implementing 
new courses o f  action, which w ere dependent on the financial situation o f  the firm, 
or the current state o f  the market.
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M edium  Perform ers
The medium  perform ers, too , w ere investing heavily to  try and achieve grow th, 
with many taking on new  staff to  assist in the process. They also m entioned 
various o ther actions being taken, for example, to  help increase turnover: Case B 
w ould “target an area” offering “specials” to  attract new  custom ers; Case G  was 
“reinvesting a ll  the money back into the business, bringing in new ideas, and taking 
on m ore com plicated jobs” ; Case H  had “new  contracts, new staff, and equity 
investm ent from  venture capital” ; Case I  had “regular Board m eetings w here we 
review strategy analysis and implement various stages throughout the year” , and 
w ere “im proving the machinery” whilst “looking for another person for the sales 
side” ; Case J  had “additional s ta ff’ and had “taken on premises double the size” , 
with an increased product range; and Case N  was “advertising, prospecting” and 
w orking on “a continual all-over upgrading in our appearance” .
All six o f  the  medium perform ers received some form o f  feedback from  their 
custom ers \c f  Table 6.1], which was noted and used, when relevant. Case B  said 
that “clients are our unpaid inspectors” ; Case G  passed feedback to  his staff, using 
good com m ents as a m otivating factor, and bad to  try  and improve; Case H  used 
on-going feedback to  “constantly adapt” ; Case I  listened to “everything they have 
to  say” , again passing com m ents to  the shop floor; Case J  w ould “absorb” 
feedback, altering things if  there w ere a justified complaint; and Case N  said that 
“if  it sounds reasonable, w e put it into effect” .
Tw o thirds o f  this group had experienced problems in implementing new 
strategies [c f  Table 6.2], associated with time constraints, organisation and staff 
problems. Case B  pointed out that, although “strategies always seem a good idea 
at the time, it often involves changing systems and re-training, and finding the time
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to  do it is very difficult” [cf. Shuman and Seeger (1986)]; Case J  had also found 
that grow th had m eant that “the organising o f  the hire side is much m ore 
com plicated” . Case G  found difficulties w ith people, who “get certain ideas, like 
‘it’s not my job; you can’t teach an old dog new tricks’”, and spent tim e trying to 
“break dow n the barriers that society has built up with people” , supporting 
Johnson and Scholes’ (1984, p.312) finding that “many o f  the difficulties which can 
arise during the implem entation o f  strategic change are due to the  natural tendency 
o f  people to resist change and to fight for the status quo” ; and Case N  had 
experienced problem s w ith staff, and “trying to  get them  to  be tidy” . O f the tw o 
that had not yet experienced any difficulties, one, Case / , suggested that a 
“shortfall o f  quality labour would be the only one” .
M ost o f  the medium perform ers agreed with Case B  that “timing in implementing 
strategies is very im portant” . Case G  said that, “for a small com pany like us, 
w e’ve go t to  be very fast and very reactive to  the custom er” ; and Case H  thought 
that, “if  it’s going to  make a big impact, then w e need to  turn it around 
immediately” . O ther factors influencing the speed o f  im plem entation w ere mainly 
external: “the m arketplace dictates to us “ (Case I); “I had to m ove premises very 
quickly because o f  the landlord” (Case J); and Case N  had to  wait for “the 
availability o f  prem ises” before he could change location.
Different factors w ere said to  be constraining the grow th o f  these small firms, 
ranging from a lack o f  suitable staff, a lack o f  business due to  a slump in the 
industry, and a lack o f  finance to  fund the growth. Case B  w orried that 
com petitors might take their custom  away: “when we first started short breaks it 
was the only one in the m arkets place [but] now  there are others” ; Case G  was 
looking for “controlled grow th as opposed to  the explosive-type, which leads to
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over-trading and bad m anagem ent” ; Case H  was restricted by “the speed at which 
w e can recruit” suitable staff; Case J  by the feeling that “there is a lack o f  funds 
generally” and that people simply w ere not buying; and Case N, by a lack o f  
“finance, space and suitable, skilled s ta ff’. Only Case I  said that “nothing at the 
m om ent” w as constraining his firm ’s growth.
The medium perform ing firms w ere implementing new program m es to  assist in 
their aims o f  grow th  and profitability, both investing new  capital and employing 
new staff. Feedback from custom ers was used constructively either to  m otivate 
employees, if  it w ere good, or to  im prove the product o r service, if  bad. Problem s 
in implementing new  strategies w ere likely to  arise through difficulties in finding 
either suitably qualified staff, o r the time necessary to  deal with it. The timing o f  
new strategies w as generally thought to  be im portant, w ith some saying 
im plem entation should be fast, and others that it depended upon factors external to 
the firm. C onstraints on grow th ranged from a lack o f  spending pow er am ongst 
consumers, through a lack o f  suitable s taff to implement it, to insufficient capital to 
fund the grow th.
Low Perform ers
Only tw o out o f  the eight low perform ers had actually invested som ething m ore 
into the business to  help achieve their goals o f  growth: Case M , w ho had “taken on 
new staff and prem ises” and reinvested any profit; and Case P, who had “bought 
all the equipm ent w e need to  w e’re cutting out the hire charges” . The others w ere 
trying to  grow , either by completing the w ork they had, or chasing new contracts: 
“w e’re trying to  catch up on w ork  that needs doing” (Case A)\ Case D  w as busy 
“getting feedback” so he knew w here to go next; Case E  was “going out and about
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m ore to  be seen and to  m eet prospective custom ers” ; Case F  w as w orking on 
introducing a new product line; Case O  was also “moving into different m arkets 
and tying to  find the m ost lucrative” ; and Case 0  was “extending the product 
range, w orking harder, and trying to  reduce outgoings” .
All o f  the  low  perform ers received feedback from their custom ers \cf. Table 6.1], 
and some used positive feedback as a marketing tool: “we usually use it as a 
recom m endation to  new clients” (Case P); and “w e put letters o f  com m endation 
on the back o f  the door” (Case Q). O thers would use negative feedback to 
improve their service: “if  the custom er says something w e’ll listen intensely and 
improve on that” (Case A); “if  it’s o f  poor quality, I let the reps know  so it w on ’t 
happen again” (Case E ); “w e note any problems” (Case F); “w e get the occasional 
complaint, and w e try to  correct as w e go along” (Case M); and “if som eone says 
‘do som ething’ you have to  take it on board” (Case O). Only Case D  seemed to 
be actively seeking feedback: “w e send out questionnaires to  people” to  gauge 
custom er reaction and requirem ents.
Five o f  this group o f  firms had experienced problems in implementing new ideas 
or w ith existing operations [cf. Table 6.2], These centred around issues such as 
money, time, space and staff. Case D  said that problems w ere “logistical” and 
concerned “how  to cram everything into one day” ; Case E  said “I have not had the 
money, and space” ; Case F  needed to  employ a skilled sales person to  help to 
m arket the company; Case P  had trouble “trying to get the staff to  abide by Health 
and Safety regulations” ; and Case 0  had experienced difficulties with new product 
lines that w ould not sell. O f those who claimed not to  have experienced problems, 
Case A said, confidently, that “if  w e have an idea, and go and do it, it w orks” ; and 
Case O  w ould get a “b rie f’ from his client, and would “have to stick to  it” .
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Some o f  the low  perform ers recognised that speed was an issue in implementing 
new  strategies. Case A w ould “jum p on an opportunity [because] speed is very 
im portant” ; Case E  agreed that “speed sometimes comes into it” ; and Case O  said 
that “w hen you’re doing something you have to  get in there pretty  quickly before 
anyone else catches on; you have to react quite quickly” . H ow ever, others w ere 
held back from making instantaneous decisions: “cost is a very, very im portant 
issue when it com es to  any action”, said Case D; “it depends upon the suppliers, 
and they’re not always reliable” (Case £ ) ;  “the main problem is that w e’re too busy 
to do it” (Case F); speed depends upon “the circum stances at the tim e” (Case M ); 
and “money is holding us back from doing different things” (Case 0 ) .
M ost o f  the firms thought that the main thing holding them back from grow ing 
was a lack o f  funds: Case A thought that “if  w e had finance w e could rapidly 
expand” and that “grants w ould help, but you never hear about them ” ; Case D  
that, “if  w e had unlimited am ounts [o f money] we could move into all sorts o f  
areas” ; Case E  found cash flow a problem, saying: “if you don’t have the money, 
you can’t  get it in” ; Case M  said that “if interest rates go up, w e’ll be affected” ; 
and Case P  said, “I don’t have unlimited cash” . O thers needed m ore staff to  help 
them grow , such as Case F, “the problem is that w e haven’t go t enough labour” ; 
and Case P: “you have go t to  set up a proper system and have the proper people in 
place” ; and Case O  w as w orried about “ruthless com petitors”, w ho might steal his 
business.
The low  perform ers seem ed primarily to be hoping for grow th, based on w hat 
they had already in the firm, in terms o f  staff, money and premises, rather than 
investing further capital o r assets. They w ere looking for new business, stocking 
new  products or seeking alternative markets, but w ere making very little effort to
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increase the actual w orth  o f  the firm in term s o f  labour or assets. The firms w ere
m ostly likely to  be grateful for positive feedback, using it for m arketing; to  use 
negative feedback to  im prove their product o r service; but were unlikely to actually 
ask for feedback. They had experienced som e problems in im plementing new 
strategies, w ith tim e and money being the key factors. Some thought that speed 
was im portant, but m ost w ere held back by constraints, mainly on finance.
Conclusions
To summarise the perform ance groups in term s o f  their program m es for strategy 
implementation, let us start, first o f  all, w ith the high perform ers. These businesses 
w ere adding to  the value o f  their firms by investing in premises o r new staff, and 
additional products [cf. Johnson and Scholes (1984)]. They w ere willing to  take 
on debt to help in this investment, or to  make difficult decisions, such as dismissing 
employees, to  cut costs and thereby im prove profitability. They used feedback 
from custom ers in a positive manner, holding meetings with staff to  discuss 
problems, in an effort to  maintain quality control.
Those high perform ers who did experience problems in implementing new 
strategies w orked hard to  overcom e them, whilst one had such a focused strategy 
that any difficulties w ere negligible. The speed at which new courses o f  action 
w ere followed w as not as im portant as might have been expected am ongst high 
perform ers, perhaps because these firms knew  well enough w hat they w anted to  
do, and had enough tim e to  evaluate a decision before implementing it; although 
once a decision w as m ade it was im portant to  follow it through. Finance w as not 
the greatest constraint on grow th for the high perform ers [cf. Reid (1996b)], who
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w ere m ore likely to  w orry about business falling o ff through a dow nturn in trade in 
the industry generally.
The medium perform ers w ere investing in the future o f  their firms, realising that 
one m ust ‘speculate to  accum ulate’. Several mentioned taking on new  staff, and 
others w ere looking for larger and m ore com plicated contracts. They listened to 
feedback from  custom ers and made changes to  their operations if  it w as thought 
these w ould enhance the product or service. M ore than half o f  the medium 
perform ers had experiences problems, usually concerning organisation o r staff 
management. M ost seem ed to think it im portant to be quick and reactive to 
changes in the m arketplace, although some had been forced into making fast 
decisions because o f  external influences. G row th o f  medium perform ers w as being 
constrained partly through their own reluctance and uncertainty about future 
business, and partly through a lack o f  finance, suitable staff or available time.
The low perform ers w ere the least likely to  have invested any m ore in term s o f  
taking on new  staff o r further assets, possibly because they w ere the m ost likely 
not to  have available profits to  reinvest. Instead, they were trying to  heighten 
custom er aw areness by ‘cold-calling’ on new  clients and offering a w ider product 
range. They paid attention to  custom er feedback, and often used letters o f  
com m endation as an advertising tool. Again, m ost o f  the low  perform ers had 
experienced problem s in the running o f  their business, largely on the organisational 
o r staffing side. Some o f  the low perform ers thought that speed w as im portant 
w hen it cam e to  implementing new courses o f  action, but finance w as a major 
constraint on any new  idea.
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Supporting Evidence
The adm inistered questionnaire offers additional insight into the gathering and use 
o f  custom er feedback by the small firms in the study. One hundred per cent o f  
bo th  high and m edium  perform ers said that they did receive feedback, com pared to 
only slightly few er (97 per cent) o f  the  low  performers. Sixty per cent o f  high 
perform ers w ould ask for feedback, and 70 per cent were also given it freely, 
com pared to 63 and 82 per cent, respectively, o f  medium perform ers; and 76 and 
76 per cent, respectively, o f  low perform ers.
O f those who did receive feedback, 80 per cent o f  high perform ers, slightly m ore 
medium perform ers (82 per cent), and again m ore low perform ers (86 per cent) 
w ould take either a w ritten or mental note o f  the comments. B etw een one half and 
tw o thirds o f  all firms w ould discuss com m ents with other custom ers. All o f  the 
high perform ers (100 per cent) w ould make changes based on custom ers’ 
suggestions, com pared to  80 per cent o f  medium and 87 per cent o f  low 
perform ers; and none o f  the high perform ers (0 per cent) w ould do ‘nothing’ about 
feedback, com pared to four per cent o f  medium and one per cent o f  low 
perform ers, showing that nearly all firms realised the im portance o f  adapting to  the 
custom er’s specific requirements.
(ii) B udgets
This section investigates the m ethods by which small firms aim to finance their 
stated aim o f  grow th. It will examine the ow ner-m anager’s aw areness o f  budgets; 
how  much is it going to  cost, and w here can they get the cash? Is cost control 
im portant to their operations? W hat are the principal com ponents o f  their 
budgetary procedures; and have outside sources o f  advice on finance, such as
278
accountants, bank m anagers and local developm ent companies, helped in 
form ulating budgets?
High Perform ers
The high perform ers all thought that they could sustain grow th through reinvested 
profits, and w ould rather seek equity investment than debt financing if  further 
funds w ere required. Case C  expected grow th to  occur “organically, through 
reinvested profits” and w ould “consider both debt and equity, but not at the 
moment; and I w ould favour investm ent” . Case K  also expected profits to finance 
grow th, and had received grants and a loan to  help. In addition, they w ould “do 
deals with our suppliers to extend trade credit, and m onitor stock; w e’re sensible” . 
Case L  was, again, funding grow th through profits, although he “w ould take an 
overdraft, if  needed, reluctantly” . They w ere thus following Bhide’s (1994, p. 156) 
recom m endation that “entrepreneurs should favour ventures that aren’t capital 
intensive and have the profit margins to  sustain rapid grow th with internally 
generated funds” .
Tw o o f  the high perform ers thought that it was currently m ore im portant to  
control costs than to  generate revenue through extra sales \c f  Table 6.3], Case C  
had a target profit margin which they w anted to  improve, because “th a t’s w here 
the m ost effect on our profitability can be made” [c f  Churchill and Lewis (1983)]; 
and Case K  thought that controlling costs came first in this business, because they 
w ere “a well-established com pany now, there’s a selection o f  contractors w ho use 
us on a daily basis” and, in any case “the sales are the sales” . Case L thought that 
“you should always be controlling costs” so increasing revenue was currently m ore
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FIRM’S PREFERENCE FOR COST CONTROL 
VERSUS INCREASED SALES
Table 6.3
Prefers to 
Control Costs
Prefers to 
Increase Sales
No
Preference
High Performers
CASE c S
CASE K Y
CASEL
Medium Performers
CASE B
CASE G
CASE H
CASE I
CASE J
CASEN
Low Performers
CASE A ✓
CASED
CASE E
CASEF s
CASEM
CASE 0
CASEP
CASE Q
Note: S  - yes 
*  - no
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im portant [cf. P orter (1985)].
Financially, these business had started with often little m ore than the weekly 
enterprise allowance: “I started with nothing” (Case C). H ow ever, w ith grow th 
and experience, further investm ent had been achieved. Case C  said that it had 
“com e through overdraft and profits” ; and Case L that “there has been little 
change: I w ould rather keep money in the company than take it out, and m oney is 
always there to  be invested for the future” . Case K  had started with tw o business 
loans from  the local enterprise trust, now  paid back, they made regular use o f  a 
£75,000 overdraft facility, and had taken out a m ortgage on their new premises.
On a daily basis, all o f  the high perform ers looked very closely at cash flow: it 
was, to  Case K , “the m ost im portant thing at the  m om ent” ; and Case L used “a 
H O B S 1 machine to  look at cash flow; it’s essential that it’s done daily” . Tw o o f  
these firms, however, looked at sales and profit margins on a regular basis: Case C, 
because “you don’t look at the cash flow and know  accurately w hat your accounts 
are; you w ork  out the profit and loss from the cash flow; it breaks things dow n into 
m anageable bite-sized pieces” ; and Case K , w ho w ould analyse “margin and sales 
per product group; the product mix is im portant in term s o f  the well-being o f  the 
com pany” . Com pare this with Thurston’s (1983, p.180) statem ent that “no 
capable m anager should find surprising news in the monthly financial report [and] 
the m anager for each area o f  responsibility should have daily and w eekly running 
figures on how  that responsibility is perform ing against plan” . See also Bhide 
(1994, p. 157), who claims that “the astute entrepreneur ... understands that 
returns from additional analysis diminish rapidly and avoids using spreadsheet
1 ‘Home and Office Banking Service’. This is a small desk-top terminal, introduced by the Bank 
of Scotland, which enables users to gain on-line access to their business accounts.
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softw are to  chum  out detailed but not particularly insightful analyses o f  a project’s 
break-even point, capital requirements, payback period, or N PV ” .
The high perform ers w ere likely to  be able to  produce their ow n accounts 
w ithout any outside help: “it’s all done by the time I go to the bank” (Case C); “the 
tw o o f  us do the budget, and the accountant does w hat w e tell him” (Case K ); and 
“I know  w hat I need; the bank m anager doesn’t care because w e’re  solvent” {Case
L). Local governm ent and enterprise agencies w ere generally thought to  have been 
helpful, though non-participatory and not often likely to  influence heavily 
decisions: “I ’ve had training grants and the enterprise allowance, and they’ve been 
helpful” (Case C); Case K  had received “grants for property” ; and Case L  had “a 
little grant at the beginning, and an 80 per cent grant for com puter training; the 
grant influenced me in doing  that” .
The high perform ers had few, if  any, problem s with funding, all having managed 
to  reinvest profits since start-up, and aiming to continue in this way. They were 
good at controlling costs and careful to  keep a close eye on cash flow  and resulting 
profit and loss accounts [cf. W elsh and W hite (1981)]. These firms w ere also 
willing to  take on debt, if  necessary, and had dem onstrated the bank’s confidence 
in them  by making use o f  loans and overdrafts. Although enterprise agencies and 
local governm ent bodies had been useful sources o f  additional funding, their help in 
budgeting w as not required by the high perform ers, nor was it offered, in any case.
M edium Perform ers
M ost o f  the medium perform ers thought that grow th could be financed, to  some 
extent at least, through reinvested profits, and some were looking for additional 
investment. Case H  hoped to finance grow th “through equity and new  business” ;
282
Case I  w as evaluating the possibility o f  a m erger with som eone w ho “w ould bring 
an existing business plus money into our business” ; and Case N  thought grow th 
had “got to  be done on the basis o f  profits reinvested, unless I can get a low  cost 
business loan from  the Enterprise Trust; but I prefer to  be debt free” .
Two thirds o f  the medium perform ers w ere hoping to  increase sales, rather than 
trying to  control costs [cf. Table 6.3], although many realised, as in Case B, that 
“the tw o go hand in hand” , so they “always do control costs” ; Case G  said that 
“they are both  im portant, but w e’ve taken on another, loss-making, company, so 
we need to  m ake it a profit-m aking concern” ; Case H, that “controlling costs is 
vital, and w e’re constantly doing that” , but he w anted to  increase sales “because 
w e’re expanding the business” ; and Case J  though that “only by increasing your 
sales can you invest m ore in the business and make it grow ” . Case / ,  on the other 
hand, pointed out that “if  you control costs within estimates, then profitability 
looks after itself; it allows expansion, m ore people, higher profits, and so on” [cf. 
Porter (1985)].
M ost o f  the medium perform ers had been able to  put m ore money into their 
business since start-up, be it either further debt or equity, and several had 
reinvested profits: “everything w e’ve done is from the initial investment, which 
came from ourselves” {Case B)\ “profits have gone back in and w e’ve used bank 
overdrafts” {Case G ); “equity investm ent is the main thing; once we are m ore 
established w e may take on debt funding” {Case H ); “there was the money I put in, 
plus bank loan and business overdraft; the loan was a regional m ortgage on our 
house” {Case J); and “w e started with our own money, and I put m ore and m ore 
into it; I cashed in all my pensions and investments, and have taken out a m ortgage 
on my hom e for £30,000” {Case N).
283
N early all o f  the medium perform ers would look at cash flow on a daily basis, 
and Case N, for example, found bank statem ents useful for telling “how  m uch you 
have in the bank, and how  much business you’re doing on a regular basis” . O thers 
w ould also look regularly at detailed financial reports, such as Case B, w ho use 
“full m anagem ent accounts, tu rnover and out-goings” ; Case G  used “m anagem ent 
reports based on the profit and loss account” ; Case H  thought “the profit and loss 
account is the  m ost im portant thing, and is looked at monthly” ; and Case I  w ould 
“look at all the financial data and do a detailed cost analysis on each product” .
The medium perform ers w ould quite often seek help in preparing budgets: “we 
ask our accountants if  w e’re not aware o f  something, and use them  as 
consultants” , said Case B, w ho had also received “first class help and advice” from 
various Enterprise Trusts; Case G  said that “accountants are involved in planning” ; 
Case H, that “w ith a m ajor business plan, w e get our accountants [auditors] to 
w ork on it” , and “equity investors have a seat on the Board and will take an active 
role” ; Case J  thought that “accountants are very helpful for preparing budgets” ; 
and Case N  said “the bank m anager is im portant and has been very helpful” . In 
addition, Case H  had “a fully-qualified CA in-house as our financial controller” ; 
and Case I  had “an in-house accountant who prepares m ost o f this” .
There w as a mixed reaction am ongst medium perform ers as to  the assistance 
offered by local governm ent o r enterprise agencies to  small firms. Case B  said “we 
w ould not be w here we are today w ithout them ” ; Case H  had received a “small 
innovation grant, related to  capital spending and the money and jobs you create” ; 
and Case N  had received a “grant for the initial purchase o f  these premises, and for 
attendance at shows” . On the other hand, Case G  thought that such organisations 
“have been no help at all, and have given nothing, in term s o f  m oney or support” ;
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and Case / ,  that local governm ent had “not been a great help at all [although] the 
local Scottish Enterprise office has been invaluable, and kept us abreast o f  new 
developm ents” \cf. Fass and Scothom e (1990)].
M edium  perform ers w ere reinvesting profits and seeking additional input from 
elsewhere, in both debt and equity form. Although they realised the im portant o f  
cutting costs, they w ere currently m ore focused on increasing turnover and 
generating extra sales revenue. Careful m onitoring o f  cash flow  w as im portant, 
and some used full managem ent accounts on a regular basis. These firms often 
used external sources o f  advice on budgeting, appealing to accountants, auditors, 
bank m anagers and enterprise agencies for assistance, although the latter w ere 
thought by some to  have been o f  no help at all.
Low Perform ers
The low perform ers experienced some difficulties in finding the m oney to  fund 
grow th; som e hoped to  get bank loans, and others hoped to  m ake profits that 
could be reinvested. Case A w as funding grow th “through our ow n savings, o ff 
our own back, which is very, very difficult” ; Case D  would do it “hopefully 
internally, through profits” ; Case E, through “increased sales [because] I have the 
stock there” ; Case M , through “reinvested profits, nothing else” ; Case O w ould 
“hope to  get an advance on royalties” ; Case P  would use “reinvested profits or 
D irectors’ loans; w e put it in and then take it out when the business can afford it” ; 
and Case O  said “w e need finance, but the banks don’t want to help” [c f  W oods et 
a l (1995)].
Five o f  the low perform ers w ere trying to  increase sales rather than control costs 
[cf. Table 6.3], although m ost agreed that both were im portant. Case A said
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“controlling costs is how  w e survive in this game, and we control our costs 
extremely well. So extra revenue is m ore im portant at the m om ent” ; Case D  w as 
“looking forw ard to  breaking the £100,000 turnover m ark” ; Case E  thought that 
“controlling costs is difficult to  do” ; Case F  had “go t the stock there” for sale; and 
Case M  said “both are im portant” . O f those who thought cost control w as m ost 
im portant, Case O  said “if  I ’m not making much money, I keep my salary dow n to 
a basic minimum” ; Case P  thought that “controlling costs is the m ost im portant 
thing with any  small company; if  you ’re not making a profit you ’re not able to 
expand” ; and Case 0  said that “you’ve only go t a budget to  w ork  on, and you ’ve 
go t to  w atch you don ’t go over it” .
The low perform ers had generally experienced funding shortages during the 
period since start-up, although a few  had made some small profits. Case A said 
they w ere “spending m ore than w e’re earning, and equity has gone up and dow n”; 
Case D  had used “overdraft facilities plus reinvested profits” ; Case E  had “put my 
own money into the business” ; Case F  had “started w ith my own money and 
there’s been no change” ; Case P  had used “our own money, reinvested profits and 
D irectors’ loans” ; and Case O  had used “our own money for one year; w e w ere 
under-funded” . Only Case M  had received much financial support, w ith loans at 
preferential interest rates from Shell, the Coal B oard and the Enterprise Trust.
This group o f  firms typically had a short-term  view o f  the finances they would 
need, looking mainly at cash flow, or back on historical accounts for the m onth 
ended, but rarely forecasting ahead: “w e see how  w e did last year at the same time, 
and try  and see patterns when people aren’t spending as much; it’s only kept in our 
heads, but we look at the bank account” (Case A); “I w ork a ll the time from cash 
flow, and it’s updated every m onth w ithout fail” (Case D); “Cash flow is the m ost
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important; if  you don’t have the cash, you can’t buy it” (Case E ); “w e tend to  look 
at cash flow  mainly; money in and money out” (Case F); Case M  looked at “my 
sales for the m onth, and make a graph to  chart it; I see w hat’s going in and out and 
make an educated guess” ; Case P  would “w atch the cash flow” ; and Case 0  w ould 
“get our accounts done and sit down and com pare them  with the year before, and 
keep an eye on cash flow on a weekly basis” .
Given that few  o f  the low  perform ers perform ed any kind o f  forecasting, advice 
on this w as unlikely to  be sought from any o f  the usual sources for help on 
w orking w ithin set budgets. Instead, accountants w ere used m ore often to help 
with tax com putations and w age bill calculations: “they would give advice if  we 
asked for it” {Case A); “the biggest role is played by my accountant, who tells me 
how  much tax  I owe, and how  to change or improve the situation” (Case D )\ “the 
accountant does the wages, and checks the VAT to  see I ’ve done it right” (Case 
£ ) ; “accountants should play a bigger part, I think, though I don’t think it would 
influence the budget too  much” (Case F); “the accountant is involved; he looks at 
our figures” (Case M); “I have a friend in insurance who helps a bit” (Case O); and 
“the accountant does the VAT and the yearly accounts” (Case 0 ) .
These firms had usually received some small assistance from enterprise agencies, 
often in term s o f  the Enterprise Allowance or a start-up grant. H ow ever, since this 
initial help, they had received little else: “w e started with nothing” (Case A); Case 
D  had “not recently” had any grants; Case E  said that “the Enterprise Allowance 
w as slightly helpful” ; Case F  that “it helped”, and that “w e tried for new 
assistance, but because we w ere vague about employing people, we go t no 
money” ; Case O  had “once approached them [i.e. the Enterprise Trust] for help 
with advertising, and they said that they had no money left for that” ; Case P  had
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m anaged to  obtain “grants for equipment” ; and Case Q  a ‘H eadstart Capital L oan’ 
to  spend on a com puter. It w as again Case M  that had experienced m ost help from  
the Enterprise Trusts, w ith “one grant for people, and one for the business plan” .
It was not uncom m on for the low perform ers to  have experienced difficulties in 
funding their firm ’s operations, w ith some having had to  use their home, o r some 
other asset, as security on a loan, and others putting in their ow n money, raised, 
for example, through personal loans o r by cashing in insurance policies. They 
generally seem ed aw are that it was im portant to  control costs, but w ere m ore 
anxious, at this point, to  increase their sales. Low  perform ers did not tend to 
forecast budgets, but w orked instead from daily o r monthly cash flow  reports. 
They used accountants, m ore than anything else, for help with tax calculations and 
w age bills. They had often m anaged to  get the weekly Enterprise Allowance, but 
had received little else in term s o f  money o r support from these organisations.
Conclusions
The high perform ance group o f  firms w ere the m ost likely to  think that grow th 
could be financed through the profits they expected to make, but w ould also be 
willing to  consider both debt and equity investment, if  required. They w ere well 
aw are that cost control w as vital if they w ere to  maintain a com petitive edge, and 
they seemed to  m anage this effectively. The high perform ers had started with a 
relatively small equity base, and some had the Enterprise Allowance, but profits 
had been reinvested, overdraft facilities used, and some substantial subsidies or 
preferential loans received from  enterprise-assisting bodies. They w ere all au fa i t  
w ith the w orkings o f  financial and managem ent accounts, using both  cash flow  and 
profit and loss accounts on a regular basis, and preparing forecast budgets [c f
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W elsh and W hite (1981)]. They tended to  prepare their own budgets, and w ere 
no t likely to  appeal for help on this to  either an accountant, bank m anager or 
business advisor.
The medium perform ers were fairly stable, financially, hoping for profits to 
reinvest. They appeared slightly m ore likely than the high perform ers to  w ant to  
bring in m ore equity investm ent from outside. They w ere also m ore likely to  w ant 
to  increase sales than to  reduce costs, although again they realised the im portance 
o f  cost control, and w ere often taking steps to  improve this. Som e o f  the medium 
perform ers had been in a position to  reinvest profits since start-up, and others had, 
quite frequently, taken out loans. Some had added m ore o f  their ow n savings, o r 
had even used their own hom e as collateral for a bank loan. A lthough some used 
profit and loss accounts to m onitor their firm ’s perform ance, they w ere m ore likely 
ju st to  use cash flow  on a regular basis. They generally sought advice on preparing 
budgets, m ore so than the high perform ers, and thought that enterprise agencies 
had been either very helpful, or o f  no use w hatsoever, depending on their personal 
experience o f  the Enterprise T rust concerned.
The group m ost likely to  experience financial difficulties was, perhaps not 
surprisingly, the low  perform ers. M any had access only to their ow n personal 
funds, as the banks refused to lend them  any money. M ost o f  this group w ere 
trying to  increase their sales and, although they realised cost-cutting w ould help, 
the found it difficult to  do. These firms w ere the least likely to  use profit and loss 
accounts in the running o f  their business, using only cash flow to m onitor their 
progress, and rarely, if  ever, projecting budgets. A ccountants w ere brought in to  
help with operational procedures such as wage bill and VAT calculations, but not, 
as with the medium perform ers, to help forecast or budget ahead for a period.
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They had generally found the Enterprise Trusts to  be unhelpful, and w ere the m ost 
likely firms to  complain about the lack o f  funding or support they received; 
although they also appeared to  be the least likely to  actually seek this support they 
claimed to  warrant.
Supporting Evidence
Supporting evidence on the financial organisation am ongst small firms is to  be 
found in the  adm inistered questionnaire. W hen asked to  choose betw een tw o 
m ethods o f  increasing the w orking capital in the business, 50 per cent o f  high 
perform ers w ould rather restructure their debtors’ or creditors’ payback term s than 
inject m ore capital, com pared to  40 per cent o f  medium and 32 per cent o f  low 
perform ers. This supports the case study evidence that higher perform ers are m ore 
likely than low er perform ers to be able to  support grow th through internal funding, 
rather than through further investment.
M ethods o f  restructuring trading accounts included factoring and invoice 
discounting, which w ere m ost likely to  be considered by high perform ers (40 per 
cent), com pared to  only 5 per cent o f  medium and 4 per cent o f  low  perform ers; 
possibly because o f  a lack o f  awareness o f  the existence o f  such possibilities 
am ongst small firms in general, but possibly also because o f  the high charges levied 
by these factoring organisations [cf. H arris (1993); Hawkins (1993)].
All o f  the  high perform ers (100 per cent) specifically m entioned that they might 
seek an extension o f  trade credit, again supporting case study evidence [cf. Case 
K \, com pared to  63 per cent o f  medium and 46 per cent o f  low  perform ers. The 
low perform ers w ere m ost likely to try  and ‘chase u p ’ their debtors m ore quickly 
(35 per cent), com pared to around one quarter each o f  medium and high
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perform ers, possibly because creditors were least likely to  offer low perform ers any 
extension o f  credit, or leeway in payment terms.
The high perform ers w ere the m ost likely to  have received bank finance (60 per 
cent) \cf. Reid (1996b)], followed by medium (49 per cent) and low  (47 per cent) 
perform ers, but least likely (10 per cent) to have had a loan from friend or family, 
com pared to  16 and 15 per cent o f  medium and low  firms, respectively. N o m ore 
than 10 per cent o f  firms overall had friend or family holding an equity share in the 
business, whilst over 90 per cent o f  all firms had invested their own m oney at some 
point.
In term s o f  grants, which included subsidies, preferential loans, and the 
Enterprise Allowance, the high perform ers w ere the least likely to  have received 
any (60 per cent), com pared to  the medium (73 per cent) and low (74 per cent) 
perform ers. This perhaps reflects the fact that high perform ers are those w ho are 
m ore likely to  have an idea that will succeed in the first place, are therefore m ore 
likely to  a ttract bank support or equity funding, and are less likely to  require the 
kind o f  support offered by an Enterprise T rust to  small firms with little nous or 
business acumen. This conclusion is borne out by the second year evidence on 
funding, which shows that 14 per cent o f  high perform ers had m anaged to  a ttract 
business angel or venture capital investment, com pared to  a negligible num ber o f  
medium or low  perform ers (less than tw o per cent in total) [cf. Bhide (1994)].
In a similar way to  the analysis o f  several variables in Chapter 5, a count, or 
indexation, variable, Funding, w as generated to  m easure the number o f  sources o f  
funding open to  the firm. This variable was the sum o f  responses to  6 possible
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sources o f  funding2, w here ‘1’ represented use o f  that source, and ‘0 ’ no appeal to  
the source. The maximum possible value for funding was, therefore, ‘6 ’, and the 
minimum, a possible ‘zero ’, though m ore feasibly, ‘1’; few firms can exists with no 
financial injection at all. The proposition to  be examined is as follows:
P 6: those firms w ith greater access to sources o f  funding will perform  
better than those who have few er sources on which to  draw.
Figure 6.1 shows the boxplots resulting from an analysis o f  Funding  by
perform ance group. From  first glance, it is obvious that each group is very similar,
w ith half o f  all firms having access to  betw een tw o and three sources o f  funding,
with a mean value o f  2 for the low and medium perform ers, and 3 for the high
perform ers. Som e low  and medium perform ers have access to  4 different sources,
whilst there are firms in each group that have used only 1 source to  fund their
business, m ost likely, their own cash injections. The cross-tabulated results give
some further detail. A high proportion o f  the low (46% ) and m edium (59% )
perform ers had used 2 sources o f  funding, com pared to  40 per cent o f  high
perform ers; and 37.4 per cent o f  the low perform ers, com pared to  30.6 per cent o f
the medium and half o f  the high perform ers, had used 3 sources. Very few had
access to  any m ore funding, and indeed the high perform ers had used no m ore than
3 sources in total.
On average, therefore, the high perform ers have access to  slightly m ore sources 
o f  funding than the low er perform ers. How ever, the Pearson and Likelihood Ratio 
tests, and the test for linear association, produce statistics that do not fall in the 
critical region, so the results are inconclusive, and w e cannot accept Proposition 6.
2 Personal financial injection, loan from family or friend, family or friend taking ‘share’ in the 
business, bank loan, venture capital equity stake, ‘business angel’ equity stake.
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BOXPLOTS AND CROSS-TABLUTATION OF 
NUM BER OF SOURCES OF FUNDING TO WHICH FIRM HAS ACCESS
BY PERFORMANCE GROUP
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Interpreting this result, w e see that g reater access to  different sources o f  funding 
does not necessarily lead to  higher perform ance. Indeed, it is shown, that the 
higher perform ers can often use few er sources o f  finance than the low er- 
perform ing groups. O f course, in an analysis o f  this kind, one w ould ideally be 
interested in the extent o f  funding provided from each source, bu t these data are 
not currently available in a suitable form  for the firms in question. Further w ork  
could investigate in greater detail the am ount o f  funding provided from each 
category, giving a m ore accurate prediction o f  perform ance than does the current 
model.
The evidence on willingness to  dilute equity is relatively inconclusive. Forty per 
cent o f  high perform ers w ould consider sacrificing a proportion o f  their stake in 
the business, or their equity holding, in order to prom ote grow th. Slightly m ore o f  
the medium and low  perform ers (49 per cent each) would do similarly. This figure 
is probably higher because the latter w ere m ore likely to  be in need o f  extra 
funding than the high perform ers.3 The percentage o f  equity that each group 
w anted to  retain w as betw een 49 and 53 per cent, on average, with m ost 
nom inating a desire to  retain a controlling share. Com pare this with S torey’s 
(1994, p.146) finding that “in all the studies o f  fast-grow th businesses, those which 
indicated tha t either they had shared, o r w ere willing to share, equity w ere m ore 
likely to  g row  or have grow n than the businesses which indicated a reluctance to 
share equity [and] it is clearly the case that grow th can be constrained by an 
unwillingness to  share equity” .
3 However, compare this with the evidence that 14 per cent of high performers had gained 
business angel or venture capital investment since year one, whereas the medium and low 
performers had little success in this area. This supports the findings of Reid, Terry and Smith 
(1997), that acknowledge the efficient ‘screening out’ of low potential firms by venture capital 
investors.
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L et us now  develop and examine a further proposition, in an attem pt to  find 
support for the findings o f  Storey and others. It reads as follows:
P 7: the  greater the  dilution o f  equity that the ow ner-m anager is willing 
to  accept, the better will be performance.
The variable Stakhold  m easures the minimum percentage o f  equity that the ow ner- 
m anager w ould wish to  retain, having first adm itted a willingness to  at least 
consider equity dilution. This initial screening question meant that, in year one, 
there w ere only 73 responses to  Stakhold, and in year tw o, 53 responses. It is 
clear, therefore, that over 50 per cent o f  respondents in each year w ere unwilling 
to  given up any share at all o f  their holding in the business.
For those w ho w ould  sell o ff  a share in the business, in return for equity 
investment, the results o f  Stakhold  by perform ance group are shown, for each o f  
years one and tw o, in Figure 6.2. Considering, first o f  all, the year one data o f  
Figure 6.2a, the first point to note is that m ost firms wish to  retain at least a 
controlling share o f  the business (i.e. >50% ). For all groups, the median value is 
ju st over 50 per cent. The spread o f  results is similar for low  and medium 
perform ers, and both  have outliers or extrem e values ranging from zero to  around 
90 per cent. Fifty per cent o f  high perform ers fall in the range from 50 per cent to  
about 80 per cent, w ith the w hisker o f  the boxplot extending dow n to  ju st under 40 
per cent.
A part from  the fact that the high perform ers’ responses are dispersed over a 
smaller range, in total, there seems to  be little clear pattern emerging betw een 
perform ance groups. The M antel-Haenszel test statistic for the cross-tabulation o f
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Stakhold  by perform ance is insignificant4, and supports the assum ption o f  no linear 
association. By contrast, the Pearson test is significant at the 5 per cent level, and 
the Likelihood R atio test is significant at the 10 per cent level. This suggests that, 
for the year one data, there is at least some (although not linear) association 
betw een the level o f  equity dilution an owner-m anager w ould accept, and the 
subsequent perform ance o f  the firm. H ow ever, w hat this relationship might be is 
not quite clear.
F or the year tw o data, presented in Figure 6.2b, the first point o f  note is that now  
only the low  perform ers show outliers, and there are no extrem e values. The 
spread o f  results for Stakhold  has narrow ed, as the firms becom e m ore focused on 
their goals. It is interesting to  note also that part o f  the boxes o f  bo th  the medium 
and high perform ers now  fall below the 51 per cent level representing retained 
control. This might suggest that w e can support the theory that higher perform ers 
are m ore willing to  give up a share o f  their equity holding. H ow ever, the median 
values for all perform ance groups are still over 50 per cent, and the median value 
for high perform ers has even risen, to around 60 per cent. In o ther w ords, as the 
value o f  the firm has increased, the high perform ers have becom e even less willing 
to give up a share in the business.
For the year tw o data, the M antel-Haenszel test shows no linear association 
betw een Stakhold  and perform ance.5 Additionally, the Pearson and Likelihood 
Ratio test results fail to fall into the critical region, suggesting that there no longer 
exists any association w hatsoever. Taking the results from both  years together,
4 Chi-square test statistics for year 1 Stakhold by performance are: Mantel Haenszel test for linear 
association (0.77298); Pearson (0.0028); and Likelihood Ratio (0.07671).
5 Chi-square test statistics for year 2 Stakhold by performance are: Mantel-Haenszel test for 
linear association (0.95489); Pearson (0.83635); and Likelihood Ratio (0.83635).
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there is very little, if  any, evidence to  suggest an association betw een the ow ner- 
m anager’s willingness to  dilute equity, and firm performance. The data do not 
support such an association, and w e must therefore reject the assum ption o f  
P roposition  7.6
O f those firms that w ould accept smaller profits for a while, if  this w ould help to 
expand the business (for example, by investing in further assets or human capital), 
all o f  the high perform ers (100 per cent) w ere in favour o f  such a move, com pared 
to  92 per cent o f  medium and 87 per cent o f  low perform ers. Again, on a sliding 
scale from  high to  low  perform ers, the m ore successful firms w ere willing to  take 
less out o f  the  business, o r to  put m ore into it, than the less successful firms, who 
w ere m ore likely to  w ant profits, and to  w ant them soon.
(iii) Procedures
The final section under ‘Strategy Im plem entation’ looks at the procedures adopted 
by the firm: in how  much detail does it have to  clarify procedures, so that 
everybody know s w hat to  do? \cf. Johnson and Scholes (1984, C hapter 11)]. It 
therefore looks at how  new plans are com m unicated and implemented, in term s of, 
for example, policy leaflets or procedural manuals. Then it looks at the ow ner- 
m anager’s changing role within the firm, and the impact grow th has had upon their 
job  description.
6 Compare this with Reid, Terry & Smith (1997) who investigate risk management in the venture 
capital industry. They show that mere willingness by the entrepreneur to share the equity of his 
business, in return for a share of the downside risk associated with running the business, does not 
necessarily suggest a good project. Venture capitalists only invest in a very small percentage of 
those firms who are willing to dilute equity, having first screened out very effectively those they 
believe will not succeed.
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High Perform ers
N ew  plans w ere typically comm unicated through conversations, internally, or using 
mail-shots o r suppliers’ literature if  the information was going to  o r cam e from  the 
external environment. Case C  would have “conversations and regular meetings 
w ith key people” , and employees, although sub-contracted, w ere “firmly w ithin the 
business and involved in the decision-m aking process” ; Case K  said that, 
“internally, w e sit dow n and talk, and externally, w e use mail shots, for example, if 
w e had a new  product” ; and Case L  said “it’s either comm unicated verbally, or 
through literature passed on by copying the information from suppliers” .
Em ployees w ere m otivated to  adhere to  the procedures laid out by various 
m ethods, usually financial, and including those discussed earlier \c f  C hapter 5: 
‘policies’]. Case C  said that his employees found it was “a financial m otivation for 
them  to be sub-contracted” ; and Case K, that “if  it’s m ore profitable then they get 
m ore m oney” . Case K  also thought that getting people to  follow  procedures 
adopted as being ‘best p ractice’ was not a problem, because “not many people like 
to  think they’re not doing a good job” .
The ow ner-m anagers o f  the high perform ing firms were still involved to  some 
extent in the day-to-day running o f  the firms, often w orking longer hour than ever: 
“I w ork  harder and am still very much involved in the day-to-day running; I would 
plan to  do m ore managerial things in February and M arch, w hen w e’re not so 
busy” {Case Q ;  “w e still do telephone enquiries, but I don’t get involved as much 
in the day-to-day running; w e set the deals up” {Case K ); and “it hasn’t changed; 
it’s exactly the same thing, just m ore o f  it; I ’m w orking a bit harder now ” {Case 
L).
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A m ongst high perform ers, new plans and procedures w ere com m unicated 
primarily verbally, w ith regular meetings and conversations. Em ployees were 
m otivated to  assist in making these procedures successful by financial incentives, 
through being sub-contracted or involved in decision-making. The directors o f  
these firms w ere regularly in touch with their subordinates, and som e said their 
roles had not changed, except to  becom e busier; although tw o tried to  m ake m ore 
tim e for management, strategic planning or ‘doing deals’.
M edium Perform ers
Tw o o f  the medium perform ers, the smaller firms, com m unicated procedures 
verbally: “it’s informal, as it arises” (Case J)\ and by “conversation, over tea” 
(Case N). H ow ever, the remaining four all had very detailed and formal m ethods 
for com m unicating procedures: “we will have a new plan, and always have a 
strategy meeting with the staff involved who will implement it; part o f  our success 
is that we com m unicate well, about the smallest thing, on a daily basis” (Case B ); 
“procedures are w ritten down; each member o f  staff has his ow n copy in a folder 
with their name on it” (Case  G); “every process is docum ented on the com puter 
and can be looked up at any tim e” (Case H); and “we have a procedure system, 
which w e’ve pu t together ourselves over the last five years” . Com pare A nsoff 
(1965, p. 119) who believes that, instead o f  having to  make new decisions every 
time a problem  occurs, “a better, and m ore economical procedure is to  prescribe, 
in advance, the response to  be made whenever a specified contingency occurs. 
This is done through a w ritten statem ent o f  the appropriate policy and o f  
accompanying procedures for its implementation. Since the m anagem ent decision 
is thus made in advance o f  the event, a rule for behaviour can be im posed on lower
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levels o f  supervision. Thus econom ies o f  management are realized, and 
consistency o f  action is assured” .
These firms confirmed their ambition o f  making sure that everyone knew  w hat 
w as going on, by having available procedures that w ere well docum ented and 
available to  all staff. It was thought that such clarity o f  direction w ould assist in 
the  implem entation o f  procedures: “w e m ake sure that everyone is happy and 
knows their role beforehand” (Case B); Case G  would let tem porary secretaries 
see a copy o f  their procedure manual because “it’s how they know  w hat to  do; I 
couldn’t always tell them ” ; Case H  offered no motivation to  employees to comply 
with procedures, because “th a t’s their jo b ” ; and Case I  had a contract team  for 
each project, w ho w ould “meet to discuss the programme, production and cash 
flow” .
All except one o f  the medium perform ers had moved away from  the daily 
running o f  the business; Case N, who still carried out “ sales and production and 
everything else” . Case B  found that “from  the second you start increasing staff, 
som eone has to  be the boss” , and so was now  playing “a managerial role” ; Case G  
was moving “further and further away from  the ‘hands-on’” side o f  the business, 
and w anted to  w ork  purely in sales, spending “all my time in front o f  custom ers 
[because] I love their money” ; Case H  said “my main role now  is strategic planning 
and generating new business” ; Case / , that “I now  spend a lot o f  tim e trying to 
generate new business” ; and Case J  w as “trying to  step back from  the front o f  
shop and becom e m ore business-like” .
M ost o f  the medium perform ers continued their tendency for formality, with 
w ritten manuals preferred over verbal communication. They used these w ritten 
docum ents to help employees becom e aw are o f  the roles they had to  perform , and
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hoped that clear com m unication w ould encourage their m otivation and 
cooperation. Nearly all o f  these owner-m anagers found that their roles had 
changed quite substantially since start-up. N ow , they had distanced them selves 
from the day-to-day running o f  the  organisation to  concentrate on strategic 
planning and managerial tasks.
Low Perform ers
The low perform ers tended to favour verbal com munication over w ritten manuals, 
when it cam e to  procedures, thus conforming with M intzberg’s (1979, p .308) 
‘simple structu re’ firms, for w hom  “informal communication is convenient and 
effective” . F o r example, “I say, ‘w hat do you think?’” (Case A); “W e ju st sit and 
talk about it, and try and see if  it w orks” (Case E); “it’s m ore verbal than anything 
else, and w e do have problem s now  and again, with com m unications” (Case F); 
“we tell them  som ething new” (Case M); and communications w ere “typically 
through conversation” (Case 0 ) .
Others, though, did have a slightly m ore formal procedure, usually when H ealth 
and Safety regulations w ere a concern: “I have an orientation pack for staff 
[which] sets ou t our philosophy in dealing with children, risk assessm ent for each 
activity, and tim etables” (Case D); “w e have a safety manual which has all the 
procedures in it; it’s for their own safety” (Case M); “I ’m always getting on to  the 
for Health and Safety” (Case P); and “we had a Health and Safety inspector in, 
who suggested things w e had to  do” (Case 0 ) .
The implem entation o f  procedures was helped slightly by communications, but 
was not generally a m ajor issue: “seasonal staff are handed a booklet when they 
arrive” (Case D )\ “I try and keep them  in touch with things” (Case F); “the author
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w rites out everything and sends a big book  o f  references” (Case O); “they know  
how  I operate and I don’t expect them  to  do anything to put them selves in 
jeopardy” (Case  P ); and “w e have a partnership agreem ent” (Case O). Procedural 
changes am ongst the low  perform ers, then, typically came about as the  need arose, 
and w ere com m unicated through conversation or by the ow ner-m anager showing 
staff w hat to  do.
The low  perform ers had not experienced a great change in their position since 
start-up, although some w ere beginning to  move away from the daily tasks: it 
hasn’t changed; I ’m involved on every level” (Case A); “I ’ve delegated a lot o f  the 
physical w ork  and am doing m ore adm inistration and m arketing” (Case D )\ “I ’m 
still involved in the  day-to-day running” (Case E ); “it hasn’t changed very much” 
(Case F)\ “w e are busier now, w e do a lot m ore admin, and are m anagers” (Case
M); “I don’t think it has changed” (Case O); “I am doing m ore on administration, 
sales and custom er relationships” (Case P); and Case Q  said that the partners’ 
roles “haven’t changed; one does the trophy engraving, and one does the glass and 
book w ork  and m ost o f  the sales” . C om pare M intzberg (1979, p.312), who states 
that “the ch ief executive can get so enm eshed in operating problem s that he loses 
sight o f  strategic considerations” .
The low perform ers w ere m ost likely to have w ritten procedures only when 
required by H ealth and Safety regulations. Except for this, procedures w ere 
com m unicated verbally, and employees w ere either shown how  to  do things, or 
expected to  know  how  it was done in the first place. These ow ner-m anagers 
typically found them selves still very much involved on a day-to-day basis, perhaps 
now  w orking a little harder than previously, but generally carrying out the same 
tasks. O f those who h ad  experienced a change in role, this was often tow ards a
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desk-based position, concentrating on m anagement and administration, and 
occasionally spending m ore tim e on sales.
Conclusions
The high perform ers w ere not tied dow n to strictly enforced procedures, bu t w ould 
use verbal com m unication on a daily basis to  let everyone know  w hat w as 
happening. They w ould use w ritten docum entation whenever the situation 
w arranted it, bu t did not feel obliged to  produce, for example, a set o f  com pany 
‘rules and regulations’ to clarify their m ethods o f  working. It was not considered 
too difficult to  gain the participation o f  employees in following com pany policy, 
probably because it w as not too  rigid, but also because o f  financial m otivators [cf. 
Johnson & Scholes (1984, C hapter 11)]. The ow ner-m anagers o f  the high- 
perform ing firms still played a high-profile role, being visible daily and still dealing 
with ‘hands-on’ w ork; although they had stepped back, to  some extent, from  this 
position, to concentrate m ore on management, ‘doing deals’ and making new 
contacts.
By contrast, the medium perform ers tended tow ards a m ore formal and 
structured m ethod o f  communication, often having procedure manuals o r policy 
docum ents, w hether in hard copy form, or available on a com puter for ready 
access, thus following recom m endations o f  the likes o f  B aker et a l (1993, p.88) to 
“distribute condensed plan docum entation to  all departm ents for use by all 
em ployees” . They were very precise, almost clinically so, in making sure that 
everyone knew  in detail exactly w hat their job  was to  be, spending time in meetings 
going over plans for, perhaps, a new project. The ow ner-m angers o f  the medium 
perform ing firms had distanced themselves further than the high perform ers from
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the day-to-day business, in order to  spend time mainly on marketing, but also on 
strategic planning.
The low  perform ers rem ained relatively informal in their com m unication o f  
procedures. H ow ever, it is to  be noted that these firms were the only ones to  
m ention specifically H ealth and Safety regulations and the im pact these had on 
their businesses. Perhaps their informal structure laid them  open to  m ore criticism 
than, for example, the medium perform ing firms, who had m ore formalised 
procedures that w ere well-docum ented and available for consultation at any time. 
Or, perhaps because this group o f  firms were so unlikely to have any structured 
procedures, a visit by a H ealth and Safety officer, who may have suggested 
alternative and safer m ethods o f  working, was a m ajor event and one they deemed 
w orthy o f  a mention. This group o f  owner-m anagers was the least likely o f  all the 
perform ance groups to  have experienced any change in their roles, probably 
because typically they had not yet grow n to  the stage w here delegation o f  
responsibility becom es an issue. Instead, they found themselves often working 
harder at the same tasks, perhaps spending a little m ore time on administration.
6.3 Evaluation and Controls
The final section o f  the sem i-structured questionnaire is related to  ‘Evaluation and 
C ontrols’: w hat are those few  key things that will determine w hether the firm 
makes it, and how  can it keep track o f  them? H ow  im portant is it for managem ent 
to  “gain know ledge o f  w hat they realistically can achieve, individually and as a 
team ?” [Thurston (1983, p. 180)]. It examines m easures o f perform ance and the 
m ethods used to  describe the success or failure o f  new strategies, for example, 
com paring actual with planned performance. It discusses changes in policies based
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on the evaluation o f  perform ance, or feedback from custom ers. And it finishes by 
asking w hat it is that gives the firm its edge over rivals; w hat are the  unique skills 
o r attributes it has that sets it out above its com petitors?
High Perform ers
Tw o o f  the  high perform ers m easured the success or failure o f  new  strategies 
partly in term s o f  the financial benefits they conferred. Case C  w ould ask, “does it 
fulfil the financial targets and budgets w e’ve set, and do people enjoy w orking 
here?” ; and Case K  w ould rate a strategy as being successful “if  w e m ade plenty o f  
money; it totally depends on the profitability o f  the company” . Case L said that “I 
haven’t done anything new ” ; so evaluation o f  a new  strategy was irrelevant.
The tw o firms who had used new strategies or implemented new courses o f  
action also had m ethods for evaluating perform ance. Case C  used perform ance 
appraisals o f  his staff, but found that tim e constraints prevented him from doing as 
much o f  this as he w ould have like to  do: “if  I have time on my hands I start doing 
things like that” . On the other hand, he com pared financial perform ance in one 
period w ith that o f  another period: “I plo t graphs o f  grow th, for example, this year 
versus last year” . Case K  would analyse “the mix for everything, volum e and 
sales”, and set a m arketing budget every month. In addition, they w ould “do a 
client analysis, which gives us the sales figure per client for 12 product groups, and 
tells us w hat w e’re doing right and w rong” ; and “product analysis using stock 
reports and gross margin on a monthly and yearly basis” ; Case L, w ho had w orked 
in the trade for 20 years, said that “I used to set targets years ago, and I think I 
should  set them  now ” .
306
All o f  the high perform ers said that they had changed policies at som e point, 
based on their appraisal o f  perform ance [cf. Table 6.4]. Case C  had “w anted to  
expand last year, but things didn’t  go as well as planned” . In this case, he had 
“stood back from  the situation” to  give him self time to  think and re-form ulate 
plans. Case K  had needed to  pay o ff staff: “our company has evolved rather than 
been pre-planned; it’s grow n up and is continually changing; and skills are being 
developed” . Case L thought that it w as now “easier to  know  w here I think we 
should be going” , and had com e to realise that “it’s financially beneficial to  go 
dow n the main contract line, w ith m ajor contractors, [because] I have a far bigger 
input on a smaller project” .
W hen asked w hat it w as that gave their firms the edge over their rivals, the high 
perform ers w ere agreed that the quality and service they offered w ere superior. 
Case C  said “w e are friendly, offer one-to-one contact, are flexible and 
professional, and w e care” ; Case K  said “we will go that w ee bit further for them, 
w e help them  w ith their cash flow, and w e get a plan started for them  if they have 
difficulty paying; it’s a very personalised business” ; Case L said that “price isn’t as 
necessary as the quality and service” that his business offered.
O f those high perform ers who w ould evaluate new strategies, the key criterion 
for success w as profitability. These firms w ould set budgets or targets, and 
com pare actual perform ance against them, in order to  m easure perform ance [cf. 
Johnson & Scholes (1984, C hapter 8)]. They had learnt from failure, and changed 
plans as required, proving that adaptability and flexibility w ere im portant to  their 
success. All o f  the high perform ers thought that high quality and the provision o f  a 
service that w ent above and beyond that o f  their rivals w ere m ajor factors
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INDICATION OF CHANGE OF POLICIES
Table 6.4
P o l ic ie s
C h a n g e d ?
N a tu r e  o f  P r o b le m
High Performers
C A SEC S w anted to  expand; didn’t  w ork; stood 
back to  think and re-form ulate ideas
CASE K S paid o ff staff to  low er overheads; 
com pany has evolved as it has grow n 
up; continually changing; skills 
developing
C A SE L financially beneficial to  use m ajor 
contractors as clients
Medium Performers
CASE B x
CASE G s opened office in London; trouble with 
local authorities; had to  close dow n
CASE H X
CASE I S changed contract m anagement, to  ‘go 
fo r bust’
CASE J S product lines have not w orked; they 
w ere dropped
C A SEN S stopped advertising in magazines; it was 
not effective
Low Performers
CASE A S small scale changes
C A SED S financial constraints; staffing problem s
C A SEE S changed supplier to one who was 
cheaper
C A SEM S tried to  diversify with a new  business, 
but this one suffered so it w as stopped
CASE 0 S little reaction to  a new product range
C A SEP V changed little things
CASE Q changed product lines
Note: S  - yes 
* - no
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contributing to  the admirable perform ance o f  their companies.
M edium  Perform ers
M edium  perform ers m easured the success o f  new  strategies mainly in term s o f  an 
increase in turnover or profits, and by the reaction o f  custom ers. Case B  said “it’s 
very mercenary; if  turnover, and therefore profit, increases; projected targets are 
set monthly” ; Case G  w ould ask “does it make any money; cost against return?” ; 
Case H  said “if  it was purely a business strategy, how successful has that part o f  
the business been, com pared w ith the plans we had for it; if it’s a process, has it 
been a hindrance, or can w e see any benefits; is it helping the product, at the end o f  
the day?” ; Case I  said that “the profit and loss account is a m easure o f  our 
success”, and they used “cost control for each project”, but w ould also consider 
the “clients’ reaction and the am ount o f  repeat business” the strategy generated; 
Case J  said that “m ore money coming in as a result, and reactions from  the public” 
w ere a gauge o f  success; and Case N  said “it becom es self-evident”, for example 
“if  an advert brings in new  accounts, o r I see a great uptake in production” .
These firms very often set targets, either for their products, or for employees. 
Case B  did “annual salary reviews and a personal evaluation o f  each person’s 
perform ance”, adding that “team  spirit makes success” ; Case G  set targets and said 
you should “not pretend to  you rse lf’, and “if  it doesn’t work, then I ’ll close it 
dow n” ; Case H  “set targets for employees [and had] annual goals and six-month 
appraisals” ; Case I  said “every job has an estim ated figure; w e set up targets and 
com pare with actual” ; Case J  said “each ball-gown has a card, and I enter onto it 
when it goes out; if  it doesn’t go out, it’s a failure” ; and Case jV had “target levels
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as far as ou tput is concerned” , and kept “a note o f  numbers o f  actual versus budget 
sales” .
M ost o f  the  medium perform ers had changed policies at some point [cf. Table
6.4], because o f  perform ance. Case G  had “opened an office in London to  trade 
with schools” , but had to  close it down because o f  difficulties with the local 
authorities; Case I  had “changed the contract m anagement o f  operations” because 
they “w anted to  go for bust” ; Case J  said “some lines have not w orked, and I have 
dropped them  because they have been unsuccessful” ; and Case N  had stopped 
advertising in magazines because it had not been effective.
The medium perform ers thought that their staff and the unique selling points, or 
USP, o f  their products gave them  and edge over their rivals. Case B  said “it’s all 
down to staff, and w e have the m ost brilliant team ” ; Case G  said it w as “me, and 
the team ” who made the business w hat it was; Case H  said “w e have a better 
gam e” that w as produced “within the budget set at the start” ; Case I  said that the 
“quality and service w e produce with the CAD facility [is] the best asset in term s 
o f  sales now ” ; Case J  said it was “the quality o f  the stock, the friendliness o f  the 
staff, the layout o f  the shop and the way it’s organised” ; Case N  said it was the fact 
that he sold a “modern, up-to-the-m inute product; [and] good quality at a good 
price” .
M edium  perform ers w ere m ost likely to m easure success in term s o f  the 
profitability o f  a new strategy, but w ould also pay attention to  the reaction o f  
custom ers and the effect it had on their organisation or production. This group o f  
firms commonly set perform ance targets, and would evaluate actual perform ance 
against these goals, both in term s o f  em ployees’ productivity and product sales. 
They had often changed policies because o f  poor outcom es, but seemed to  think
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that it w as be tte r to  do that than to  persevere with an idea that might not w ork. 
Finally, they believed that the team  o f  staff they w orked with, and the quality o f  
their product or service, combined to make them  better than their rivals.
Low Perform ers
Low  perform ers often m easured the success o f  a new idea by the reaction it 
received from  custom er, or by the fact that they w ere selling m ore than previously. 
Case A said success w ould be “reaching the black in the bank account and starting 
to  build a financial cushion, [having] m ore personnel, nicer premises and a better 
w age” ; Case D  m easured success by “revenue, and feedback” ; Case E  said “if  it 
sells, it’s a success, if  it doesn’t, it’s a failure” ; Case F  said success meant “we 
managed to  increase our custom er base” ; Case M , that it w as based on 
“profitability and the response w e get from the clients” ; Case O , that “I can get 
w ork out o f  it, for example, through referrals” ; Case P, “if  we get repeat business, 
som eone likes the idea, and it makes money” ; and Case 0 ,  if  “custom er feedback is 
favourable” .
The low  perform ers w ere unlikely to  set formal targets o r to  m onitor 
perform ance regularly; when targets were set, it was often with a vague goal o f  
increasing, o r im proving upon, the previous year’s turnover. Case A said “it’s all 
held in my mind, we feel the pressure and dig our heels in” ; Case D  said “the full 
and part-tim ers have appraisals, but not the seasonal staff” , and he w ould 
“com pare actual perform ance with targets and budgets” ; Case E  had a “target sales 
level over the year; above it equals success, below it equals failure” ; Case F  set “a 
financial target m ore than anything else” , and would “not even look back on a 
certain project; as far as w e’re concerned, the jo b ’s done”; Case M  knew “for
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every individual job  if  it’s reached target” ; Case 0  said “if  it’s busy, it’s busy, if  it’s 
quiet, it’s quiet, and there’s not a lot you can do about it” ; Case P  w ould “try to  
get m ore w ork  done than the year before” ; and Case Q  would “try to  increase over 
the previous year” .
W here changes had been m ade by low perform ers, they w ere m ore often o f  a 
m inor nature [cf. Table 6.4], and commonly due to  the w ithdraw al o f  an 
unsuccessful product range o r for financial reasons. Case A had m ade changes, 
“but only on a very small scale” ; Case D, because o f  “financial constraints or 
staffing” problems; Case E  had changed to  a different supplier for his goods, and 
thought that “although they are cheap, they are o f  good quality” ; Case F  was 
“learning through experience that some things ju st aren’t w orth doing” ; Case M  
had “tried to  diversify [with a] new, but related company” , but their present 
com pany had suffered; Case O  had received “not a lot o f  reaction” on a new 
product range; Case P  had changed “little things” ; and Case 0  said that “product 
lines change, but there has been no change in the jo b ” .
Low  perform ers thought that their quality, versatility and the people in their 
business gave them  an edge over rivals. Case A said “it must be the quality, and a 
good price for that quality, because people keep coming back; and personality is 
im portant to o ” ; Case D  thought his com parative strengths came from  his “quality, 
flexibility, adaptability and diversity” ; Case E , from the “personal service” and a 
greater selection o f  stock” ; Case F, “the experience to  do all types o f  installation 
w ork” ; Case M , “our personal service” ; Case O, that he was “trying to  tackle 
things that they w on’t do o r can’t do” ; Case P , “m yself and my know -how ” ; and 
Case 0 ,  that “w e’ve go t m ore experience that them  [i.e. rivals]” .
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Low  perform ers m easured success or failure by the reactions o f  custom ers, or an 
increase in sales. They usually set a  target o f  improving on previous perform ance, 
but w ere not often likely to  carry out formal appraisals or analysis based on actual 
results. The low  perform ers had made few changes, usually only small, and often 
to  do with a product that did not sell, or because o f  financial constraints. They 
often thought tha t the very w ide and diverse range o f  products o r services they 
offered gave them  an advantage over their rivals, as did their personal service and 
custom er contact.
Conclusions
High perform ers had the m ost clearly defined measure o f  success o r failure; it 
w ould depend entirely upon the profitability generated by a new strategy, meaning 
not only an increase in turnover, but also in profits, relative to  turnover. 
A ccording to  Shuman and Seeger (1986, p. 13), “by providing a feedback 
mechanism m anagem ent allows for the continuous reappraisal o f  the com pany’s 
strategy and the learning and im provem ent that results from experience in using the 
process” . M edium  perform ers, too, m easured success in financial term s, but also 
by the reaction o f  clients. And low  perform ers were the m ost likely to  gauge 
success mainly by the custom er feedback generated by a new strategy, or by the 
fact that a new product w ould sell.
O f the high perform ers who had m ethods o f  evaluating strategies, these w ere 
fairly clear, and involved m easuring actual against budgeted o r forecast 
perform ance, and detailed analysis o f  sales. M edium perform ers frequently set 
targets for em ployees and sales, and m onitored them  regularly. B oth o f  the higher 
perform ing groups, therefore, adhered to Baker et aV s (1993, p.88)
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recom m endation that managem ent should “at least quarterly, check em ployees’ 
and organizational units’ perform ance against the plan” . Low  perform ers w ere the 
least likely to  set targets or budgets in a formal sense. Instead, they usually w anted 
ju st to  keep improving, and selling m ore than previously.
The high perform ers adm itted to  having changed policies based on perform ance, 
seeing this not as a w eakness, but as a sign o f  their adaptability. F our o f  the six 
medium perform ers had changed things, either policies or product lines, because o f  
their evaluation o f  perform ance, although tw o had not yet seen any need for 
change. L ow  perform ers had rarely changed any policies, with the main changes 
coming from  new  or discontinued product lines, or because o f  financial difficulties.
H igh perform ers thought their quality and service gave them an edge over rivals, 
w ith personal contact being important. The medium perform ers thought success 
came from  their staff, and unique attributes o f  their product o r the fact that they 
offered a better or slightly different good. And low  perform ers thought that their 
willingness to  offer a w ide selection o f  products or to  take on any job they were 
offered earned them  m ore business than their rivals, and hence gave them an edge 
over com petitors.
High and medium perform ers, therefore, from the evidence discussed above, 
appeared to  think that the evaluation and control o f  perform ance w as m ore 
im portant than did low  perform ers. They were m ore likely, too, to  have 
procedures for evaluating perform ance, whereas low perform ers would, m ore 
frequently, know  if  som ething had been a success or a failure because o f  custom er 
feedback and reactions, o r because a new product had sold. H igh perform ers w ere 
m ost likely to  believe that, if  a procedure or policy was not w orking, then they 
should change it. M oving dow n the perform ance levels, through medium to low, it
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becom es apparent that the low er the perform ance, the less likely are the firms to 
w ant to  change anything, or to  believe that something is amiss w ith their 
organisation. Reid and Smith (1996) provide evidence to suggest that, in the early 
stages o f  a firm ’s life-cycle, the self-assessment o f  the attributes o f  the firm, by the 
inexperienced small business owner-m anager, can often be badly-judged. The 
evidence discussed above w ould appear to  support this view.
In term s o f  the unique skills or attributes that gave firms the edge over their 
rivals, high perform ers seemed to think that personal contact and the quality o f  
their product w as im portant. M edium  perform ers appeared to play upon the fact 
that their service w as slightly different to  that o f  competitors. L ow  perform ers, 
however, w ere m ore likely to stress that they w ould do anything, and offered a 
greater range o f  goods and services than did their rivals, in the belief that this gave 
them an advantage over rivals. This belief may be ill-founded [cf. Reid and Smith 
(1996)]; the broad range on offer did not appear to confer any specific benefits, 
given that these firms w ere classified as low  perform ers. Perhaps these firms could 
gain from  following the lead o f  the high or medium perform ers, in targeting a 
specific niche m arket [cf. Porter (1980, 1985], rather than trying to  be everything 
to  everyone, as seemed to  be their current ambition.
6.4 S u m m ary
C hapter 6 has dealt w ith the final tw o sections o f  the sem i-structured 
questionnaire, viz. ‘strategy im plem entation’, and ‘evaluation and controls’. 
Again, the observed tendencies, suggested by examination o f the qualitative data, 
w ere supported w ith statistical evidence from the administered questionnaire. Tw o
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propositions w ere developed and investigated using the m ethods established in 
C hapter 5, o f  boxplots, cross-tabulations and chi-square statistics.
In term s o f  program m es followed to  help the firm achieve its goals, both the high 
and medium perform ers w ere investing in new staff or premises [c f  Shuman and 
Seeger (1986)] and going after bigger jobs, whereas low perform ers did not have 
the money fo r reinvestm ent, and w ere trying to  improve sales by increasing 
custom er awareness. Firms from all perform ance groups realised the im portance 
o f  custom er feedback and used it to  help maintain and im prove quality [c f  
Thurston (1983)].
On balance, the high and medium perform ers had experienced som e problem s in 
implementing new  strategies, often involving staff attitudes [c f  Johnson & Scholes
(1984)], re-training and organisation. Problem s am ongst low  perform ers, 
however, w ere m ore likely to  be organisational, and related to a lack o f  finance or 
space, and failure o f  new product lines. Constraints on g row th  for the high 
perform ers w ere self-imposed (if at all) because o f  uncertainty about the industry in 
general, but w ere not due to a lack o f  finance [c f  Bull (1993)]. M edium  
perform ers show ed a slight reluctance to  pursue immediate fast grow th, but w ere 
also constrained in part by a lack o f  finance, staff or time. Low  perform ers, on the 
other hand, found financial constraints to  be a major barrier to grow th.
In term s o f  budgets for grow th, high perform ers w ere to  finance expansion 
primarily through reinvested profits [c f  Bhide (1994)]. M edium perform ers, too, 
hoped to be able to  do similarly, but would also consider equity investment. L ow  
perform ers w ere unlikely to  generate much profit for reinvestm ent, had difficulty in 
getting access to  bank funds [c f  W oods et a l (1995)], and w ere often reliant upon 
their own personal funds. High perform ers emphasised the im portance o f  cost
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control [c f  P o rter (1985)], as did medium perform ers, although the la tter w ere 
m ore likely to  w ant to  increase sales. Low  perform ers w ere split on this, but said 
that it w as difficult to  do anything about cutting costs.
High perform ers used m anagem ent accounting systems and kept a regular eye on 
cash flow, dealing w ith this in-house [cf. Thurston (1983)]. M edium  perform ers 
also kept profit & loss accounts, but w ere m ore likely to  concentrate on cash flow 
[cf. W elsh and W hite (1981)], and to  seek outside advice on preparing budgets. 
They w ere m ost likely to seek advice on organisational features such as the 
calculation o f  w age bills and taxation, rather than for strategic planning.
Proposition 6 investigated the assum ption that access to  m ore sources o f  funding 
will be reflected in better perform ance. It is shown that, although the high 
perform ers have, on balance, access to  slightly m ore sources than medium or low  
perform ers, this difference is not a significant factor in predicting perform ance. A 
further proposition is developed to  examine the assum ption that the willingness to  
accept g reater equity dilution will lead to  enhanced perform ance [cf. S torey 
(1994)]. Again, this assum ption is not confirmed; the evidence on willingness to 
dilute equity shows a non-linear association with perform ance in year one, and no 
association w hatsoever in year two.
Procedures am ongst high perform ers often involved meetings w ith staff and their 
involvement in decision-making, but were not generally laid dow n in leaflets or 
manuals. M edium  perform ers w ere more likely to have formally docum ented 
procedures [cf. A nsoff (1965); Johnson & Scholes (1984)]. L ow  perform ers 
discussed new  procedures as they arose, usually through an informal conversation. 
M otivation for the employees o f  high perform ers to  adhere to  procedures was 
usually financial. For medium perform ers, it often involved making sure that
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everyone w as clear about their role, and that lines o f  communication w ere kept 
open. Low  perform ers w ould communicate new  procedures verbally [c f  
M intzberg (1979)], and kept employees aw are o f  new ideas, in an effort to  
encourage their participation.
The high-perform ing ow ner-m angers still made sure they w ere involved in the 
daily running o f  the business, and often w ere spending more time than before on 
additional tasks such as m anagem ent or planning. The medium perform ers were 
m ore likely to  have distanced themselves from the day-to-day w ork, concentrating 
on strategic planning o r sales. L ow  perform ers found that their roles had changed 
very little since start-up, although there w as m ore administration to  do.
U nder evaluation and controls, high perform ers measured success or failure o f  a 
new strategy in purely financial terms, by w hether o r not it reached the target set. 
M edium  perform ers, too, used financial indicators, but also judged success by the 
reaction o f  custom ers. L ow  perform ers concentrated on custom er reaction, and 
w hether a new strategy helped to  increase sales, in a vague sort o f  way.
High perform ers w ould som etim es set targets, both for the business and for staff, 
and w ould carry out perform ance evaluations on each [c f  Johnson & Scholes 
(1984)]. M edium  perform ers regularly set targets and com pared actual 
perform ance against these targets [c f  B aker et a l (1993)]. Low  perform ers, 
however, set rather intangible targets, if  at all, such as grow th, or im proving on 
turnover. They w ere unlikely to  carry out any formal analysis o f  perform ance in 
the same way as the medium or high performers.
Nearly all firms had changed tack at some point because o f  the failure o f  an idea 
or policy. For high and medium perform ers, these often involved strategic change, 
w hereas for low perform ers, they w ere m ore likely to  be small scale o r operational
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changes, probably because these firms w ere least likely to try new  strategies in the 
first place.
Finally, high perform ers thought their quality and personal service differentiated 
them  from  their rivals. M edium  perform ers thought similarly that their staff and 
the better quality o f  products gave them an edge over rivals. Low  perform ers w ere 
agreed that their quality and personnel distinguished them from rivals, and also 
m entioned their versatility and adaptability as being good selling points. A lthough 
they appeared to  think that their strengths were as good as, o r better than, 
com petitors, this w as not reflected in perform ance.
Overall, a picture is emerging o f  distinct differences betw een the low, medium 
and high perform ers, in term s o f  the strategies adopted. High perform ers seem to 
be aw are o f  formal m ethods o f  strategic planning, but do not allow them selves to  
get so snowed under that they neglect the actual running o f  the business \cf. 
M intzberg & Quinn (1991); Bhide (1994)]. M edium perform ers try  very hard to 
follow the tex tbook form s o f  strategy, having often very detailed and formal 
processes, and trying to  follow form s o f  hierarchy, delegation and managem ent 
suggested in the literature as ‘best p ractice’. Low  performers, on the o ther hand, 
have little, if  any, idea o f  strategic planning, being concerned often with only 
operational problems, and thinking no m ore than a month or tw o ahead. Chapter 7 
will now  draw  together the conclusions from the full study, to  try  and establish 
characteristics o f  each perform ance group, in terms o f  their strategic planning and 
processes.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 In tro d u c tio n
A  key aim o f  this w ork  has been to  advance the literature on small business 
strategy through, first o f  all, an appraisal o f  the existing w ork  in the area o f  
strategic managem ent, as it relates to  both the large and small firm. It then 
introduced a new  instrum ent designed to  gather quantitative evidence on 150 
young small firms in Scotland. Additional qualitative evidence w as gathered using 
a specially designed sem i-structured questionnaire to  investigate in-depth the 
strategies pursued by small firms.
The investigation o f  the extant literature was split into tw o parts. First, there 
w as a discussion o f  the earlier works, which w ere concerned primarily w ith 
corporate strategy. A distinction appeared betw een those who advocate formal 
strategic planning [cf. A nsoff (1965); P orter (1980, 1985)], com pared to  those 
who believe that intuition and anticipation play a m ore im portant role [c f  
M intzberg (1979); Steiner (1979)].
The second part o f  this review  examined the emerging literature on strategy, as it 
relates specifically to  the small firm. It looked first at the processes o f  decision­
making within small businesses, and the role o f  the ow ner-m anager’s goals and 
objectives in m aking these decisions [c f  B am berger (1983); M iller and Toulouse
(1986)]. N ext, the role o f  forward planning was investigated for the case o f  the 
small firm. The literature was found to  be divided on the issue as to  w hether small
320
firms should (and indeed are able to), or should not, plan ahead [c f  W elsh and 
W hite (1981); Thurston (1983)].
The question o f  sources o f  funding for small firms has received probably the 
m ost attention in recent years [c f  Welsh and W hite (1981); Bull (1983); Jarvis et 
a l (1996); Reid (1996a,b)]. This is one o f  the m ost im portant issues facing a small 
business, so a considerable am ount o f  time and effort has been devoted to  
investigating liquidity constraints, and m ethods o f  overcom ing them. Again, views 
differ as to  w hat constitutes best practice, be it, for example, factoring the firm ’s 
debts [c f  H arris (1993)], taking on further investm ent [c f  Bull (1993)], diluting 
the ow ner-m anager’s equity holding [c f  S torey (1994)], or varying the num ber o f  
part-tim e em ployees [c f  Reid (1996a)].
The review  o f  the literature continued by looking at the possibilities offered by 
new technologies [c f  P o rter and M illar (1991)]. It is thought by som e [c f  C ooper 
et a l (1991)] that technology can help firms to differentiate their products in ways 
that w ere not possible previously. H ow ever, others suggest that, rather than 
innovating themselves, many small firms are free-riding on the technologies o f  
larger com petitors or parent com panies [c f  Variyam and Kraybill (1993); Reid, 
Siler & Smith (1996)].
The final consideration o f  the small firm literature examined systems o f  quality 
control and the analysis o f  strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. It 
introduced recent techniques in m anagement accounting, such as total quality 
m anagem ent systems, which suggest that procedures for maintaining quality be 
implemented [c f  Hankes (1993 a)]. The literature implies that a know ledge o f  the 
firm’s strengths and weaknesses will assist the ow ner-m anager in positioning the
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business so as to  gain the best possible competitive advantage \cf. M adu and Kuei 
(1993)].
Som e recent w orks on small business developm ent have em phasised the stages 
through which a new and growing firm m ust pass, from start-up, through survival 
and grow th, to  expansion and, eventually, m aturity \cf. Churchill and Lewis 
(1983); M ount et a l  (1993)]. How ever, these w orks have developed from  an 
analysis o f  the existing literature, and are w ithout specific empirical foundation. 
Perhaps the inability o f  w riters to  agree upon the strategy processes followed by 
new small firms, especially micro firms, has arisen because o f  a lack o f  hard facts 
and evidence. W hat is required is a cohesive program m e for investigating w hat 
actually happens in the new small firm. Theory may be useful in developing 
hypotheses about the pattern o f  behaviour in the new small firm, but w ithout 
grounding this theory in empirics, it may be difficult to draw  any concrete 
conclusions or to  prescribe new policies.
This study has developed a m ethodology for gathering fieldwork data, based on 
techniques employed in earlier studies [cf. Reid (1993)]. A  new  administered 
questionnaire w as designed specifically to  address the questions and conflicts 
which are raised in both  the earlier and m ore recent literature. Face-to-face 
interviews w ere held with the ow ner-m anagers o f  150 small firms throughout 
Scotland, for each o f  tw o years, to  generate a unique source o f  data on the 
experience o f  new enterprises in Scotland in the early 1990s. A  new  database was 
designed to  store and process the information thus gathered, w hich provided an 
original body o f  evidence on which to  base results.
In addition to  the adm inistered questionnaire, a new sem i-structured interview 
schedule w as designed to  question owner-m anagers on their strategies, while
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giving them  the opportunity  to  talk about w hat they actually do in some detail. A  
novel tw ist w as to  introduce answers previously given in the  administered 
questionnaire, in order to  probe the respondent further on his earlier responses and 
changes since these had been given. These sem i-structured interviews enabled the 
developm ent o f  17 case studies \cf. Appendix IV], which examine in detail the 
strategies followed by new  small firms.
Having established these tw o unique bodies o f  evidence, an original m ethod was 
developed o f  ranking the firms by perform ance. Instead o f  adopting com m on 
techniques o f  a one-variable m easurem ent such as, for example, turnover, profits 
o r asset value, this m ethod used three indicators o f  perform ance. The units o f  
m easurem ent w ere grow th (defined as the percentage change in employment), 
return on investm ent (in term s o f  net profit divided by ow ner-m anager’s initial cash 
injection), and productivity (being sales per head). C luster analysis was used to  
divide the 150 firms into three groups o f  low, medium and high perform ers, w hose 
strategies could then be observed by reference to  both the quantitative and 
qualitative evidence.
The substantial analysis o f  the evidence is contained in Chapters 5 and 6. These 
examine in great detail the strategies followed by firms in each perform ance group. 
They m ake appeal primarily to the case study evidence, but support the observed 
tendencies with statistical analysis, using quantitative data on the full sample o f  150 
firms. Seven propositions are developed and investigated, w ith the help o f  
boxplots and cross-tabulations, to  com pare perform ance with specific actions. 
Chi-square tests o f  association are used either to  accept or reject the assum ptions 
behind the propositions, which add further support to  the findings.
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The rem ainder o f  this chapter will proceed, first, by encapsulating the earlier 
analysis o f  this w ork  in sharp characterisations o f  each perform ance group. This 
will present the m ost im portant points noted from the investigation. Key 
characteristics will be summarised in three separate tables for each perform ance 
group, in turn. There will then be presented a set o f  prescriptions, based on 
evidence o f  the best courses o f  action to  take for high perform ance, follow ed by 
suggestions as to  w hat can be done by support agencies to  assist small firms.
7.2  H ig h  P erfo rm ers
I f  w e refer to  the dendrogram  o f  Figure 4.3 [cf. C hapter 4, p.168], w e observe that 
the first m ajor split o f  firms is betw een high perform ers and the rest. W hat, 
therefore, distinguishes these exceptionally well-perform ing businesses, in term s o f  
their strategies? L et us summarise the evidence on the characteristics o f  high 
perform ers.
Environm ental Scanning
The high perform ers know  the industry well, keep to  a local or (at m ost) Scottish 
m arket to  retain firm control, and price at a level that means they are com petitive 
with rivals. They aim to provide a high quality product or service, and rely on 
good relationships with suppliers to ensure, in turn, a good relationship with their 
custom ers. M ost started the business in order to  exploit a new m arket opportunity 
or to  get rich. They also display a high need for achievement and a wish to  be their 
own boss. These findings suggest that the owner-m anagers chose to  go into 
business on their own, rather than being forced into it through, for example, 
unemployment.
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These firms appear to  have the m ost realistic appraisal o f  their ow n strengths and 
w eaknesses, the form er relating to  the quality o f  staff, and the latter to  problem s o f  
organisation and lack o f  suitably skilled staff. They use m arketing to  advertise 
their strengths, and have actively w orked to  rem edy their w eaknesses, investing in 
new  skills, resources and systems. They are also aw are that their product quality 
and staff com petencies offer them  opportunities. They take advantage o f  such 
opportunities, for example, encouraging skilled staff to innovate and develop their 
unique skills or com petencies [c f  Kay (1993)]. High perform ers are astu te enough 
to  realise that the largest threats com e from the competition, so they focus their 
business to  operate in a specific niche [c f  Porter (1980, 1985)], trying to  beat 
rivals on price, quality o r b o th .1
The emerging assum ption that high perform ers know m ost about the 
environm ent in w hich they operate is supported by the qualitative evidence. The 
majority actively gather inform ation on their rivals, on average every 10 weeks. 
This covers rivals’ m arketing, products, financial performance, m arket share and 
personnel, and is gathered primarily through newspapers, trade journals and ‘the 
grapevine’. H ow ever, they often also use electronic databases, governm ent 
publications and library sources. It is shown [c f  Chapter 5: Environm ental 
Scanning] that greater gathering o f  trade intelligence on rivals is in some m easure 
related to  better perform ance.
1 See also Reid’s (1993, Chapter 7) discussion a la Porter on competitive and defensive strategies 
for small firms in fragmented markets.
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Strategy Formulation
O f those high perform ers who have a business plan, it has usually been developed 
through their ow n initiative and is used in the running o f  the business to keep the 
firm on track. Only one third have used external sources o f  advice to  help develop 
the plan, usually appealing to  family o r friends for their thoughts o r ideas. They 
show a good  ability to  develop their own ideas, and have a useful netw ork o f  
people ready and able to  discuss suggestions. These firms set strategic objectives 
o f  long-term  profit and a high rate o f  return, both for personal financial stability, 
and to  generate employment [cf. Storey (1994)]. They also have the longest 
planning horizons o f  any perform ance group working, on average, to  a tw o-year 
plan.
High perform ers have a clear idea o f  w hat they w ant to achieve, and the means 
by which they wish to  do it. They do not typically generate a so-called ‘m enu’ o f  
strategic options, as they tend to  be already firmly focused. Any new  ideas depend 
primarily on the prevailing m arket conditions. These firms often consider the 
experience o f  o ther firms w hen making their own strategic decisions. They also 
seek outside advice on new investment, for which a high proportion are willing to  
pay. Advice on personnel and m arketing is also sought by high perform ers. These 
three considerations (viz. new investment, personnel, marketing) are all relevant to  
a growing firm that may require skills not already in place in the business. The 
willingness by high perform ers to  seek advice on strategic m atters, when needed, 
and, often, to  pay for it, reflects their awareness o f  the im portance o f  having 
accurate and professional advice and judgem ents, where necessary.
Am ongst the high perform ers, the owner-m anagers are still very much involved 
in making decisions, with m ost being made by one person only. In addition, the
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m ajority o f  operational decisions are made by one person, reflecting the high 
perform ers’ attitude o f  ju s t getting on with the daily work, w ithout becom ing 
embroiled in too  much formal discussion. These businesses try  to  retain long­
standing custom ers, and also to  attract new custom ers, by advertising, maintaining 
a high m arket presence and through differentiation o f  their p roduct or service.
The high perform ers believe, on balance, that information technology is very 
im portant to  their business for the advantages it gives over com petitors, but this 
belief is shown not to  be a good indicator o f  perform ance. Instead, the actual use 
o f  IT  is m easured and judged  to  be o f  high statistical im portance. The high 
perform ers m ake m ost use o f  IT, in particular being the only group to  extend IT 
usage to  a com bination o f  radio communications, satellite links, telephone 
conferencing and microfiche. They use it for netw orking and tracking com petitors, 
as well as for producing accounts. This supports the findings o f  others \cf. Porter 
and M illar (1991)] that the seeking o f  know ledge confers com petitive advantage, 
and that IT  can assist in this process.
H igh perform ers address any problems in quality through additional training. 
They try  to ensure quality by regular m onitoring and inspection, and through spot- 
checks. Some have implemented their own quality procedures or recognised 
systems such as IS 09000 . They give custom ers guarantees or prom ises to  replace 
faulty goods, and try to  ensure their satisfaction by guiding them to a suitable 
product for their purpose, while also relying on their reputable track record to 
clinch the sale.
S taff o f  the high perform ing firms are often thought to  be self-motivated. 
H ow ever, these firms also offer employees additional motivation. First, they are 
encouraged in their w ork, and invited to  participate in decision-making, developing
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a good w orking relationship with the owner-m anager. B ut m ost im portant, these 
business ow ners recognise that money is a highly effective m otivator, so employees 
are offered incentives in term s o f  commission and bonuses.
Strategy Im plem entation
The high perform ers both  recognise that, to  implement new strategies, they m ust 
invest in s taff and premises, and seek larger contracts and new business, and have 
been successful in doing so. They use custom er feedback to  im prove quality. 
W here problem s have been encountered in new strategies, they have often 
struggled through to  make them  w ork, using advertising and cutting prices if 
necessary. They like to be sure that a new  strategy has a high probability o f  
success before com m itting themselves to  it, making sure that the required staff and 
resources are in place beforehand. H ow ever, once com mitted to  a new  plan, it is 
im portant to  them  to  put it into action very quickly, and to  follow it through 
whole-heartedly. M ajor constraints on grow th lie with the current m arket 
situation, o r a lack o f  consum er spending, rather than a lack o f  funding.
These firms expect grow th to  be financed from reinvested profits. They are very 
careful to  control costs in order to  try  and achieve improved margins and 
profitability. Financial inputs since start-up have come mainly from reinvested 
profits or loans from  the banks and Enterprise Trusts. High perform ers are the 
m ost likely group to  consider change, in term s o f  restructuring their finances, for 
example, by factors or invoice discounting. They generally deal with all budgeting 
and financial m anagem ent in-house, enabling them to know, at a glance, w hat their 
cash flow is like.
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Verbal com m unication o f  procedures is prevalent am ong high perform ers, who 
have regular meetings with key people in the business. The involvement o f  the 
staff in this w ay is thought to  be enough to  encourage them to  participate in the 
firm’s procedures. The productivity bonuses to  be achieved by adhering to  
procedures also means that they earn m ore money if  the firm is profitable. The 
ow ner-m anagers are still heavily involved in the daily running o f  the  business, 
showing a high com m itm ent that is appreciated by staff
Evaluation an d  Controls
High perform ers set targets and evaluate new strategies on their financial success, 
or failure. They often use quite sophisticated m ethods to  do this, having graphs to 
com pare periods, m easuring both  volume and sales mix and variance, carrying out 
staff appraisals and perform ing client analyses. In addition, they use stock reports 
and both m onthly and annual managem ent and financial accounts.
These firms change policies based on perform ance w hen it becom es evident that 
the strategy is not a viable proposition at that time. On such occasions they take 
time to  reflect on w hat has gone wrong, and place a great emphasis on learning 
from experience. They accept on-going change and developm ent as a fact o f  life, 
and recognise the need to  develop skills. Their personal service and quality is 
thought to  be the m ost im portant factor in attracting and keeping custom ers, rather 
than the price they offer.
7.3  M e d iu m  P erfo rm ers
The next split o f  firms, again by reference to  Figure 4.3, is between medium and 
low perform ers. The medium perform ers account for one third o f  firms in the
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sample. Let us now  examine these businesses by summarising the evidence 
available.
Environm ental Scanning
M edium  perform ers have often seen a gap in the m arket (for which areas differ, 
depending on the firm), or have acquired previous experience in the  industry 
w orking for som eone else, before deciding to  start their own business. Their prime 
reasons for start-up w ere to  satisfy a need for achievement o r to  avoid 
unemployment. The m ajority gather trade intelligence on rivals, w ith newspapers, 
trade associations and trade journals being im portant sources o f  such information. 
H ow ever, this is done to  a lesser extent than is evident am ongst the high 
perform ers. Quality is generally high, and prices are based on a need to  cover 
costs, but are also, to som e extent, based on rivals’ actions.
These firms are generally happy with suppliers, and with custom ers. They are 
sure o f  their strengths, which lie in their quality and specialist know ledge, and 
weaknesses, which com e dow n to a lack o f  funds, poor m anagem ent and bad 
planning. They know  opportunities lie with their staff, who are developed through 
training, and their ability to  provide custom ised products. Threats are not always 
acknow ledged; rivals are often ignored, and governm ent legislation, by-law s and 
H ealth & Safety legislation are thought to  be am ongst the major threats.
Strategy Formulation
M edium  perform ers typically have formal, w ritten business plans, which analyse 
m arkets, s taff levels, and required premises, and also contain financial forecasts. 
Seventy-five per cent seek outside help in preparing their plans. These firms aim to
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provide a quality product at a profit, but also seek a high ra te  o f  return and 
increase in their custom er base. They form ulate goals o f  grow th to  enable them  to 
step back from  the day-to-day running, but also think that it is im portant to  do the 
best they can and achieve the goals they have set.
These firms generate strategic options, using outside advice to  help in their 
evaluation, and com puters to  generate return on investment calculations to  assess 
their viability. D ecisions are based on m arket information, the ow ner-m anager’s 
specialist know ledge and his or her perception o f  consum ers’ spending power. 
Strategic decisions take into account the experience o f  other firms for ju st over 
half o f  medium perform ers. Just under half say strategic decisions are made by 
only one person. I f  medium perform ers seek outside advice, it is usually on 
investment o r m arketing, followed by personnel matters. They often hold regular 
Board, m anagem ent and staff meetings to make decisions. These firms show  a 
strong tendency for regular and detailed discussion o f  any plans before decisions 
are made. They rely on their quality and PR  to  keep the custom ers they have, and 
on w ord o f  m outh o r referrals to get new custom ers.
Inform ation technology is thought to  be m oderately to  very im portant am ongst 
these firms, because o f  its speed, accuracy and labour-saving possibilities. They 
use mainly PCs, faxes and mobile phones, and are the highest users, on average, o f  
electronic mail. IT is used for netw orking and keeping accounts. A lthough these 
firms think IT is im portant to  their firm, its actual use was less than for the high 
performers.
M edium  perform ers maintain an awareness o f  the m arket to  ensure quality is 
kept up to standard. They also have regular monitoring, checking and quality 
assurance systems. These ow ner-m anagers try to  assure custom ers o f  quality by
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their honesty, and som e give guarantees. They try  to  ensure em ployee m otivation 
first, by getting them  involved in decision-making, and making them  feel they have 
a share in the vision o f  the business; and second, often by offering financial 
m otivators such as non-contributory pension schemes, com pany cars and profit- 
related bonuses.
Strategy Implementation
M edium  perform ers have made investments to  help them  achieve grow th, taking 
on new  contracts and additional staff, and improving their fixed assets. They all 
receive feedback, m ost o f  it asked for. The majority are willing to  make changes 
based on this feedback, and they also use it for m otivation o f  employees. A  
substantial proportion have experienced problems, because o f  factors associated 
with tim e constraints, inappropriate organisation and a lack o f  suitable staff. N ew  
strategies tend to  be dictated by m arket conditions, but if  a new  idea is decided 
upon, it is generally thought im portant to  implement it quickly. Constraints on 
grow th lie w ith s taff shortfalls, slumps in trade and lack o f  finance.
M edium  perform ers reinvest profits and also, in some cases, have managed to  
attract additional investm ent in both debt and equity form since start-up. M ost are 
focused on increasing sales rather than cutting costs, although they recognise the 
latter is im portant. They often seek outside advice when form ulating budgets, 
from accountants, Enterprise Trusts, and bank managers. These firms typically 
prepare full m anagem ent accounts, generating managem ent reports and cost 
analyses, while looking at cash flow on a daily basis.
M edium  perform ers use formal communications, often having their own w ritten 
procedure manuals. Strategy meetings are held, and staff are given their own
332
copies o f  procedure manuals to  try and encourage their participation in w orking 
tow ards the firm ’s goals. The ow ner-m anagers o f  these small firms have typically 
m oved aw ay from the day-to-day running o f  the business to  concentrate their 
efforts on managem ent, sales, generating new business and strategic planning.
Evaluation and Controls
To medium perform ers, the success o f  a new strategy is measured by custom er 
reaction, and by its effect on turnover and profits. They set targets for both 
products and employees, carrying out detailed evaluations o f  estim ated figures 
com pared w ith actual perform ance. They change policies following failure o f  
systems, o r o f  new  product lines. Their staff and product quality are thought to  be 
their strongest points when trying to attract new business.
7.4  L o w  P erfo rm ers
A lthough this final group o f  firms contains the low est perform ers in the sample, it 
is im portant because it accounts for almost tw o-thirds o f  the businesses in the 
study. W hy are the majority o f  firms perform ing at a level which is m uch low er 
than the rest? Let us now  examine their strategies in the search for enlightenment.
Environmental Scanning
The ow ner-m angers o f  low  perform ing firms w ere often pushed into self- 
em ploym ent through redundancy or unemployment. M any express a need for 
achievem ent o r to  be their own boss, and some started the firm to profit form a 
hobby. V ery few, however, expect to  get rich from  running their own business. It
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is apparent tha t lifestyle goals are therefore very im portant to  the ow ner-m anagers 
o f  these small firms.
Quality is ideally good o r high, but can be variable. Price is derived from  unit 
cost plus a m ark-up percentage, and is not often based on w hat com petitors are 
charging. These ow ner-m anagers w ork primarily in a local o r regional m arket 
because they know  it best and it is convenient to  do so. Often, the m arket niche is 
not specifically targeted, so it is defined by the area from which the custom ers ju st 
so happen to  come. This group o f  firms are the low est gatherers o f  trade 
intelligence on rivals, learning less than the higher perform ers about rivals’ 
finances, m arket share, m arketing and personnel m atters o f  com petitors. Low  
perform ers are generally happy with their suppliers, although unable to  bargain any 
m ore effectively than rivals over price. They typically say that the custom er 
relationship is also good, and depend upon w ord o f  m outh and referrals for a  large 
part o f  their business.
These firms are able to  identify their strengths as being the quality o f  their 
product and staff, and the personal service they offer. O pportunities are thought to  
lie in their quality, adaptability and flexibility. They are hard-pushed to admit to  
any faults in them selves or their operations, seeing w eaknesses instead as being a 
lack o f  finance, suitable premises, machinery and staff, or the small share they have 
o f  the m arket. Threats are perceived to  lie with rivals’ m arket share and 
governm ent legislation. The low  perform ers show  a strong tendency to  over­
estim ate strengths and opportunities, and to  under-estim ate w eaknesses and 
threats, as reflected by their poor perform ance.
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Strategy Formulation
These firms usually have a business plan o f  some sort but, by the tim e o f  their 
interview, only a small proportion o f  these are formal and w ritten, or current. 
They look up to  14 months ahead when planning. Personal issues are an im portant 
issue to  the ow ner-m anagers o f  these firms, who often w ant simply to  earn a living 
for them selves and their family. Their main aim is survival, and m ost hope to  grow  
the business on. This is m easured by their having m ore work, a higher tu rnover 
and greater profit. Their goals are mainly personal, and for family security, and 
only a tiny proportion hope for a high rate o f  return. These ow ner-m anagers are 
therefore m otivated not by the thought o f  a large future income, but rather by the 
need to  provide for their family. They rely on custom er loyalty and good  relations 
with them  to  keep w ork  coming in. They often fear confrontation and so do not 
actively seek to  take custom ers from rivals.
M ost low  perform ers say they do com e up with various strategic alternatives, 
which they decided betw een over casual conversations. In reality, these may not 
be viable strategic options, but simply ideas that sound good at the time, as it 
seems that low  perform ers have many m ore ideas than are implemented. A  new 
plan is put into action if  it looks like it might make money and the business can 
afford to  fund it.
These firms are m ost likely to  use outside help or advice for planning, for 
example, from  their local Enterprise Trust. Strategic decisions are mostly 
negotiated. They are also m ost likely to  seek advice on m arketing, but not as 
willing to  pay for such advice. Although, therefore, they see a need for 
professional advice, their unwillingness to pay for it shows a lack o f  com m itm ent 
to  getting things right.
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Low  perform ers appear to  think that information technology is m oderately 
im portant to  their firm, but their actual implementation o f  IT is low er than both the 
high and medium perform ers. They use mainly telephones, faxes and PCs. They 
are the m ost likely o f  all perform ance groups to  use the PC for their business plan, 
probably because that is how  the Enterprise T rust shows them to  do it. And they 
are the least likely to  use IT  for networking, preferring to  w ork  in the dark as 
regards their environm ent and competition.
These firms are the least likely to  have formal quality systems, relying instead on 
their ow n judgem ents as to  w hat is right, with occasional spot-checks. They tend 
only to give a guarantee if  it is requested, and prefer to  use verbal reassurance. 
Any em ployees are m otivated through encouragem ent, and the easy-going 
atm osphere in which they w ork. They are not heavily involved in decision-making, 
although they may be consulted for an opinion.
Strategy Implementation
Few  o f  the low  perform ers have anything to  reinvest in their business, although one 
or tw o are trying to  increase staff and improve their equipment. They hope that 
grow th will occur through new  contracts and new product lines, and try  to  increase 
custom er aw areness through m arketing and cold-calling. Positive feedback is used 
as an advertising tool, and negative to  try and improve the product o r service. 
M ost o f  these firms experience problems, usually associated with a lack o f  money, 
time and staff.
A lack o f  funds is seen to  be the major constraint on grow th. These ow ner- 
m anagers w ould like to  get bank loans, or to make enough profits to  reinvest, but 
are usually supporting the business from their own personal sources. The majority
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w ant to  increase sales rather than cut costs, because they find it very difficult to 
achieve the latter. They use cash flow  to assess their financial situation, and look 
back on perform ance about one month. They are unlikely to  perform  forecasts or 
budgets, and find accountants o f  m ost help when preparing w ages and tax 
calculations.
Com m unication am ongst the low  perform ers tends to  be verbal, except on 
m atters o f  H ealth & Safety, w here leaflets or pamphlets are provided to  show 
advised procedures. Change occurs as and when needed, and em ployees are told 
or show n w hat to  do. These ow ner-m anagers have experienced very little change 
in their ow n role. They are now  busier, doing m ore administration and marketing, 
and have, in some cases, taken on a m ore managerial role.
Evaluation an d  Controls
Low  perform ers m easure the success or failure o f  a new idea by the custom ers’ 
reaction, or an increase in sales. There are no formal targets set, except to 
improve, in general, and perform ance is not typically m onitored. Changes are 
minor, if  they occur at all, and tend to  relate to  new  product lines, or to  arise from 
financial considerations. The ow ner-m anagers o f  these firms believe their quality, 
versatility and staff to  be o f  m ost im portance in gaining custom  over rivals.
7.5  P rescrib ed  S trateg ies  fo r  G ro w th  an d  Success
The preceding sections have draw n together the findings on each perform ance 
group. From  the analysis throughout this study, eleven key factors emerge, and 
these are summarised for high, medium and low perform ers in Tables 7.1, 7.2 and
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Table 7.1
S T R A T E G IC  C H A R A C T E R IS T IC S  O F
H IG H  P E R F O R M E R S
Factor Characteristic Details
1. Awareness very good knowledge of industry;
aware of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities & 
threats
willing to pay for advice 
gather trade intelligence
2. Objectives clearly defined niche invasion
cost & differentiation focus
strategic objectives
long term profit and high rate of return 
beat rivals on quality and price
3. Targets quantifiable long time horizon 
financial targets
comparison of forecast with actual 
variance analysis
4. Decision- 
Making
efficient owner-manager heavily involved in strategic and
operational decisions
account taken of employees suggestions
5. Policies adaptable learn from experience 
willing to change
6. Commitment high believe it important to follow ideas through 
reinvestment of all profits 
still involved daily
7. Motivation high financial bonuses and commission most important
non-pecuniaiy benefits
staff involved in decision-making
made to feel part of a team
8. Quality high maintained through regular monitoring and training 
own or approved systems 
rely on personal service
9. Communications quick & concise verbal
meetings as required with key personnel
10. Information- 
Technology
exploited heavily used 
well implemented
11. Finance healthy reinvestment of profits in staff, premises and assets 
cost control a priority 
accounts dealt with in-house
3 3 8
Table 7.2
S T R A T E G IC  C H A R A C T E R IS T IC S  O F
M E D IU M  P E R F O R M E R S
Factor Characteristic Details
1. Awareness moderate to 
good
previous experience in industry
know strengths, weaknesses and opportunities
not very aware of threats
gather trade intelligence
analyse markets
seek advice on investment and marketing
2. Objectives fairly clear avoid unemployment and need achievement 
high rate of return and increase in customer base 
want to achieve goals set 
strategic options
3. Targets quantifiable measured by customer reaction, turnover and profits 
targets set for products and employees 
detailed evaluations 
estimates versus actual
4. Decision- 
Making
formal & 
laborious
outside advice, personal computers and market
information used
project return on investment
more than 50% of strategic decisions negotiated
Board, management & staff meetings
formal discussions
5. Policies adaptable willing to change 
market conditions dictate
6. Commitment moderate to 
high
important to achieve goals set
reinvested profits
move away from daily work
7. Motivation high involved in decision-making 
share future vision of the business 
financial motivators include pension schemes, 
company car, profit related bonuses
8. Quality high keep aware of market
regular monitoring, checking, quality systems 
assure customers through honesty and guarantee
9. Communications formal & 
structured
formal, written procedures 
manuals, regular meetings 
strategy meetings
10. Information- 
Technology
well used moderate to very important
use PCs, mobiles phones, fax and email frequently
for networking and accounts
11. Finance adequate reinvested
additional debt and equity 
full management accounts 
prepare budgets with outside help 
look at cash flow daily
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Table 7.3
S T R A T E G IC  C H A R A C T E R IS T IC S  O F
L O W  P E R F O R M E R S
Factor Characteristic Details
1. Awareness poor gather the least trade intelligence of all firms 
can identify strengths and opportunities 
reluctant to admit weaknesses 
tendency to both over- and under-estimate strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities & threats, in general 
least likely group to network
2. Objectives personal avoiding redundancy and unemployment 
want to achieve, be own boss, profit from hobby 
lifestyle goals 
main aim is survival
3. Targets vague shortest time horizon
vague target of overall improvement
evaluated on customer reaction
4. Decision- 
Making
informal casual conversations
depend on financial situation at the time
discuss long-term decisions with others
5. Policies not defined little available to reinvest for growth 
rely on marketing and cold-calling 
no formal quality system 
take things as they come
6. Commitment moderate owner-manager busier
more administration and some delegation
finance through own resources
often unwilling to pay for professional advice
7. Motivation moderate owner-manager’s need to provide for self and family 
staff given encouragement 
easy-going atmosphere 
few (if any) financial rewards
8. Quality variable ranges from low to high
least likely to have formal quality systems
rely on own judgements
some spot checks
verbal reassurance rather than guarantee
9. Communications informal verbal except for Health & Safety 
staff told or shown what to do
10. Information- 
Technology
not used 
extensively
believe IT is important, but not shown in actual use 
lowest users of IT of all performance groups 
phone, fax, PCs
11. Finance insufficient funding shortages are major constraint on growth 
want bank loans, but difficult to get 
personal investment
want to increase sales rather than cut costs 
look mostly at cash flow 
no projections or budgets
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7.3, respectively. These tables aim to  provide a summary account o f  the larger 
body o f  evidence in this thesis. They enable a clear set o f  prescriptions to  be 
enunciated, which may be useful not only to practitioners, but also to  academic 
analysts o f  small business strategy. This section now  proceeds by taking each 
factor in turn  from  the tables, prescribing strategies and suggesting patterns o f  
behaviour w hich should, when implemented, help the ow ner-m anager o f  a  new  
small firm to  achieve grow th and profitability.
7 .5 .1  A w areness
° develop an awareness, not only o f  the industry in which you operate, but also o f  
com petitors
o appreciate that com petitors are am ongst your biggest threats
° keep a close eye on the activities o f  rivals, and seek inform ation o f  them  and 
their operations on a regular basis
o netw ork as often as possible, building up contacts in the industry
o be willing to  pay for specialist advice if  it means the difference betw een success 
and failure
° be aw are o f  your strengths and opportunities, and be ready to  exploit them
o know  your w eaknesses and threats, and w ork hard to  improve upon them
o be self-critical and carry out a regular appraisal o f  your strengths, w eaknesses, 
opportunities and threats
7 .5 .2  O b jec tives
o set clear long-term  objectives
° set business, rather than personal, goals
o aim for long-term  profit and a high rate o f  return
° target a  specific niche and concentrate on developing your business within it
° cut costs w here possible and/or try  to  develop a product that is differentiated 
from those o f  rivals
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7.5.3 Targets
© set long-term  targets and w ork  tow ards them 
© have quantifiable financial goals
© com pare forecast figures w ith actual, and w ork  to  im prove on any shortfall 
© analyse perform ance to  discover w here problems arise 
© set targets for em ployees and evaluate their perform ance
7 .5 .4  D e c is io n -M a k in g
© the ow ner-m anager should have autonom y in strategic decision-m aking 
© take into account em ployees’ suggestions
© do no t spend too  much tim e discussing possible actions to  the detrim ent o f  
running the firm
7 .5 .5  Policies
© learn from  experience
© be willing to change if  som ething is not w orking 
© be adaptable, and listen to  the dictates o f  the m arket-place
7 .5 .6  C o m m itm e n t
© com m it to  a plan o f  action and follow it through 
© reinvest all profits 
© maintain a daily involvement 
© strive to  achieve the goals you have set
© pay for help and advice if  it will help the business in the long run
7 .5 .7  M o t iv a t io n
© offer em ployees financial bonuses
© involve staff in decision-m aking, taking into account their ideas to  let them  feel 
they have a say in their own future
© develop a team  spirit
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7.5.8 Quality
o provide a high quality product or service to  develop a long-term  and loyal 
custom er base
° m onitor quality on a regular basis, either through your ow n system  o f  one 
externally approved
® maintain a personal service
° be aw are o f  new  products and keep up-to-date  w ith changes in the m arket 
o assure custom ers w ith guarantees, w here relevant
7 .5 .9  C o m m u n ica tio n s
o keep com m unications efficient, speedy and verbal
® have regular meetings with key personnel to  raise any problems
o develop w ritten procedure manuals for s taff consultation, but do not becom e 
too  bogged dow n w ith formalising processes and procedures
7 .5 .1 0  In fo rm a tio n -T e c h n o lo g y
o implement and update technology, and learn how  to  use it correctly
o install PCs, mobile phones, faxes and electronic mail to im prove information 
gathering, storage and retrieval, and to enhance communications
o use IT for netw orking, developing your awareness and building contacts
o learn how  to deal with your own accounts, for example, using accounting 
softw are packages, in order to have up-to-date  financial inform ation at your 
fingertips
7 .5 .11  F in an ce
o reinvest any profits to  finance extra staff, and improve assets 
o control costs w herever possible, and always seek the best deals 
o deal w ith your own accounts [see above] 
o prepare budgets and try to  stick to  them  
® m onitor cash flow  on a daily basis
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7.6  T h e o ry  B u ild in g  an d  F u tu re  R esearch
W hat the prescriptive analysis developed above suggests is the possibility o f  
building an overarching theory that provides a parsim onious and intuitively 
satisfying w ay o f  viewing diverse patterns o f  small firm behaviour. A  core 
principle adopted in areas like Social Psychology, Sociology and M anagem ent and, 
in some measure, em braced by Industrial Organisation, is that conduct determines 
perform ance. This core principle can be used for theory building in the area o f  
small business strategy.
The discussion that follows makes reference to  Table 7.4, which presents a new 
theory for explaining firm perform ance by strategic behaviour. The basic equation, 
Perform ance = F(Conduct) (1)
provides a general point o f  departure. Perform ance is itself a qualitative attribute 
that experts can often evaluate with unerring accuracy and consistency w ithout 
being entirely aw are o f  the basis for so-doing. Here it is suggested that the 
principle features o f  perform ance are threefold: grow th, productivity and 
profitability. This has the advantage o f  reducing a qualitative judgem ent to 
quantitative m easures, but the disadvantage remains that it is multidimensional. 
Therefore a satisfactory way o f  aggregating these several m easures into a one­
dimensional index needs to  be found and implemented. F or example, in this w ork, 
cluster analysis w as used to  allocate firms to  one o f  three perform ance ranks, using 
a combination o f  three perform ance m easures, ad thus providing an index against 
which conduct might be com pared. Thus by a process o f  assigning proxies for
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THEORETICAL MODEL OF SMALL FIRM PERFORMANCE 
EXPLAINED BY STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
Table 7.4
Perform ance = F(Conduct) (1)
W here perform ance is proxied by a set o f  Perform ance M easures e.g. profitability
Index o f  Performance = } (Performance M easures) (2)
Substituting (2) in (1) w e get
Index o f  Performance = j(C onduct) (3)
Turning to  RHS o f  (1):
Conduct = F(Goals, Techniques, Cognition) (4)
So:
Index o f  Performance = F(Goals, Techniques, Cognition) (5)
Proxies for m easuring Goals, Techniques and Cognition are:
Goals: targets, objectives, policies
Techniques: decision-making, quality, communication, IT, finance
Cognition: awareness, commitment, m otivation
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perform ance and aggregation (e.g. using cluster analysis) one gets:
Index o f  Perform ance = f(Perform ance M easures) (2)
and substituting (2) in (1) w e get:
Index o f  Perform ance  = f(C onduct) (3)
Finally, conduct itse lf has an even higher dimensionality than perform ance. To 
use a m etaphor, there may be a myriad o f  ways o f  creating a cake {conduct), but 
rather a few  num ber o f  ways o f  evaluating it {performance) e.g. does it taste  good, 
look good, smell good? The implementation o f  the theoretical fram ew ork above, 
for prescriptive purposes, suggested eleven m easures o f  conduct (viz. ‘strategic 
characteristics’ in Section 7.5). F or the purposes o f  parsim ony in theory 
form ulation, these eleven m easures can be grouped under ju s t th ree headings: 
Goals, Techniques and Cognition. Thus:
Conduct = F(Goals, Techniques, Cognition) (4)
U nder the  heading o f  ‘G oals’ lie targets, objectives and policies. U nder the 
heading o f  ‘Techniques’ lie decision-making, quality, com m unication, IT and 
finance. Finally, under the heading o f  ‘C ognition’ lie awareness, com m itm ent and 
m otivation. Expressed briefly, the theory built on, or grounded in, evidence to  be 
presented here is that:
Index o f  Perform ance = F(Goals, Techniques, Cognition) (5)
The im plem entation above o f  the prescriptive evidence shows that this theory 
provides a plausible separation o f  new business starts into groups o f  high, medium 
and low  perform ance. The task  remains o f  applying this theory o f  the connection 
betw een Goals, Techniques, Cognition and Perform ance to  contexts hitherto 
unseen by the current investigator e.g. new, small firms in another country.
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W hat this m odel allows is the quantifiable m easurem ent o f  tw o often intangible
factors, perform ance and conduct. The thesis has suggested a convenient new  way 
o f  m easuring firm perform ance, using 3 readily observed m easures, which can be 
easily transferred and applied to  other datasets. Conduct too  can be proxied by 3 
main factors, which can be further broken dow n into a total o f  11 key measurable 
strategic characteristics. Defined as such, the model is readily transferable for 
application elsewhere, and therefore provides a useful m ethod for analysing 
strategic behaviour and perform ance in the new  small firm.
The evidence presented throughout this thesis flies in the face o f  w riters who 
disagree tha t small firms can and do utilise strategic planning in the  organisation o f  
their businesses [cf. S torey (1994)]. This is not to say that some businesses are not 
run on a ‘w ing and a prayer’. Indeed, som e firms appear to  prefer the  latter course 
o f  action. H ow ever, w hat this w ork has shown is that those small firms w ho use 
strategic planning in an effective m anner will perform  better, som etim es very much 
better, than those small firms who leave things to  chance and deal w ith problems as 
they occur, on a reactive, rather than a proactive, basis.
The long-held belief of, for example, M intzberg (1979) that the type o f  intuitive, 
visionary o r reactive approach to running the firm, as expounded in his own 
writing, is the  only and best way to  go, is therefore repudiated. Instead, this w ork 
supports the theories o f  P orter (1980, 1985) that, to  achieve and sustain 
com petitive advantage, the firm should follow a number o f  formal m easures which 
can be incorporated into its strategic planning processes. For example, it should 
take note o f  the Five Forces o f  Competition, and strive to  beat these by means o f  
cost-cutting, differentiation, or a com bination o f  the two. I f  it can achieve this, 
then perform ance, as defined earlier in this w ork, should necessarily be enhanced.
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Thus it has been shown that strategic planning, as defined in the literature and 
related primarily to  large organisations, can be applied equally to  the new  micro 
firm. There is strong evidence to  show  that young firms plan ahead, on occasion 
up to  10 years; often longer than they have been in business themselves. It is those 
firms with longer planning horizons w hose perform ance is shown to be superior 
[cf. Reid and Smith (1996)].
In addition, this w ork  has addressed points where o ther literature has fallen 
short, as discussed in C hapter 2. The firms in this study have been very clearly 
grouped into m easures o f  high, m edium  and low  perform ance, using a combination 
o f  three very im portant factors, rather than ju st using vague m easures [c f  Steene 
(1991); Variyam  and Kraybill (1993)] or simple one-variable indicators such as 
profitability [cf. B aker et a l  (1993)]. Instead o f  looking at small firms by reference 
to  their stage o r phase o f  developm ent [cf. Churchill and Lewis (1983); Peiser and 
W ooten (1983); M ount et a l  (1993)], which enables one merely to  analyse firms by 
their organisational form, w e are able to  relate perform ance to  strategies 
characteristic o f  varying levels o f  success.
Planning is clearly defined as being part o f  a strategic process [cf. David (1989)] 
and is related to  empirical evidence [c f  C ooper (1993)], which facilitates 
com parisons betw een different levels o f  perform ance [c f  Aram and Cow en 
(1990)]. The fact that this study has evidence from m ore than one period, and 
therefore has som e longitudinal aspect to it, allows the investigator to observe the 
effects o f  earlier strategic decisions [c f  Shuman and Seeger (1986)]. And finally, 
respondents’ beliefs in the im portance o f  various factors o f  their business are 
observed, related to perform ance, and observed again in the light o f  experience, to
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test for self-awareness, adaptability and the capacity to learn from m istakes [cf. 
B am berger (1989)].
A lthough the discussion o f  results has provided an extensive analysis o f  small 
firm strategies as they exist in the early years following business inception, there 
remain som e questions still to  be addressed by future research. In summary, these 
can be broken dow n under the following headings: investigation using additional 
available data; suggestions for further data gathering; and m ore sophisticated 
model building using available data. Each shall now  be discussed in turn.
7.6 .1  In v e s tig a tio n  using a d d itio n a l a v a ila b le  d a ta
The scope o f  this thesis has covered the business strategy section o f  the 
adm inistered questionnaire. H ow ever, the nature o f  the w ork  means that 
additional data from  R eid’s Leverhulm e Trust funded project are available for each 
o f  the firms under examination; on their m arkets, finance, costs, hum an capital, 
organisation and technical change. Further w ork  can therefore m ake appeal to  this 
additional body o f  evidence, linking strategies used within the firm to various other 
factors.
F or example, Proposition 6 investigates the assum ption that access to  greater 
sources o f  funding will lead to  enhanced perform ance. However, these results are 
relatively inconclusive. One reason for this is that the m easure used for funding 
sources sums the results for several binary variables; either the firm does, o r it does 
not, use a specific source. Instead, it is suggested that the level o f  funding 
attracted  from  each source may have m ore significance is predicting perform ance. 
The additional data available from the ‘Finance’ section o f  the administered 
questionnaire include evidence on, specifically, the level o f  grant support, bank
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loans and outside equity which, with some manipulation, w ould enable the 
developm ent o f  a better m easure o f  outside funding and further testing o f  the 
model to  be undertaken.
The larger study will eventually provide four years w orth o f  data for all o f  the 
firms, rather than ju s t the  first tw o years used in this study. Thus the investigator 
will be able to  com pare the respondents’ willingness to dilute equity in, for 
example, year one, with w hat actually happens over years one to  four. This will 
facilitate a m ore in-depth examination o f  S torey’s (1994) suggestion that a 
reluctance to  share equity will restrict grow th and high perform ance. By direct 
investigation o f  the gearing trajectories over time, it will be possible to  com pare 
respondents’ willingness to  dilute their equity holding with w hat actually happens, 
and to  relate this to  the firm s’ subsequent perform ance.
In C hapter 5 the suggestion is raised that the level o f  education o f  owner- 
managers might have a direct impact on their firm’s perform ance. F or example, if  
long-term  strategic planning is thought to  be im portant in enhancing perform ance 
(and it is shown in this w ork  that it is), then it might be reasonably argued that 
those ow ner-m anagers w ith a higher level o f  education will also be those who are 
better able to  devise strategic plans and forecasts. They might also therefore be 
those who are m ore capable o f  perform ing the types o f  variance analyses that this 
w ork  suggests are useful. The larger study provides detailed know ledge o f  
respondents’ education and previous business experience, which should enable the 
testing o f  such a theory.
Finally, under this heading, in Chapter 6 it is suggested that the broad range o f  
products offered by low  perform ers in the belief that they are serving the custom er 
through their adaptability, may not in fact be assisting their perform ance. Instead,
350
as suggested throughout this w ork, they may do better to  follow P o rte r’s (1980, 
1985) suggestions and focus on a specific niche, narrow ing their product range or 
numbers. Specific evidence is available on both the num ber o f  products and ranges 
offered by each firm, and it can be used to  test the theory that firms w ith fewer, 
differentiated products, will perform  better than those providing many varied 
goods or services.2
7 .6 .2  Suggestions fo r  fu tu re  d a ta  g a th e rin g
Chapter 6 investigates budgeting within small firms, and the role o f  financial 
reports in decision-m aking. The findings suggest that, in general, high perform ers 
often have in-house accountants to  perform  forecasts and budgets, medium 
perform ers seek outside advice and concentrate on cash flow, but low  perform ers 
prepare very few, or no, financial forecasts, only seeing an accountant for auditing, 
tax or w age bill purposes.
Thanks to  the support o f  the Chartered Institute o f  M anagem ent Accountants 
(CIMA), P rofessor Gavin Reid (CRIEFF, University o f  St Andrew s) and Professor 
Falconer M itchell (University o f  Edinburgh) will be able to  investigate the 
accounting inform ation systems (AIS) within small firms. The grant aw arded by 
CIMA will enable further investigation o f  these small firms to  be carried out, 
enhancing the data available, and allowing further evidence to be incorporated and 
interpreted along with the existing information. It will allow  the team  o f  
researchers to  examine the developm ent, formality and structure o f  the AISs in 
young m icro firms, and will enable this investigator in particular to  test the theory
2 An alternative hypothesis that might be explored is that there is an optimum product range; 
above, or below it, performance deteriorates.
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that higher perform ers have m ore sophisticated systems than both low  and medium 
perform ers.
Given the im portance played by respondents’ belief in their firm s’ perform ance as 
com pared to  its actual perform ance, it might also be both useful and interesting to 
examine and com pare the perceptions o f  a selection o f  the firm s’ custom ers. For 
example, if  an ow ner-m anager believed his firm were better than its rivals on 
custom er service and product quality, is the perception o f  the custom er similar, or 
does it differ? Such investigation w ould help to  ascertain how accurate the ow ner- 
m anager is in evaluating his ow n strengths and weaknesses.
7.6.3 Sophisticated model building
Clearly, this w ork  has throw n up som e useful findings and hypotheses about the 
strategies deployed by new  small firms. For example, the use o f  information 
technology is highly statistically significant, and there is evidence to  suggest that a 
higher aw areness and gathering o f  inform ation on rivals can also lead to  enhanced 
perform ance. Long-term  planning, too , is shown to im prove the firm ’s chances o f  
grow th and success, broadly defined.
H ow ever, w hat is also clear is that good perform ance does not depend on any 
one single factor, but on a combination o f  inputs, both tangible and intangible, 
which together provide the firm with a com petitive advantage over rivals. Future 
w ork could attem pt to  explain perform ance by a combination o f  several criteria, 
using a m ultivariate model. One m ethod o f  doing so, for example, might be factor 
analysis, which enables the user to  identify relationships betw een sets o f  observed 
variables. A nother possibility would be to  use multiple linear regression analysis, 
which can also be used to  study relations among variables. W hichever m ethod is
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used, the extent o f  such an undertaking is outw ith the scope o f  this thesis, but the 
idea is there to  be investigated at a later stage.
7.7 Conclusions
D eveloped from  findings throughout this work, the suggestions o f  Section 7.5 are 
prescriptive, and based on inductive evidence. H ow ever, they should, if  
implemented, help the small business ow ner-m anager to  focus his business tow ards 
achieving the goal o f  high perform ance. O f course, it does not account for those 
who have no particular desire for large expansion, but should assist them, 
nevertheless, in avoiding business failure. The prescribed strategies should be 
followed in conjunction with an adaptable and open-m inded business policy. The 
ow ner-m anager m ust always be ready and willing to  change as the m arket dictates, 
and should maintain an aw areness o f  trends and patterns in the industry. An ability 
to  anticipate change should prove invaluable in achieving com petitive advantage.
To some extent, success or failure depends upon the personality o f  the ow ner- 
m anager concerned. N atural entrepreneurs will always find a way to  succeed. 
H ow ever, for those who are less than ‘naturals’, bodies form ed to  assist small 
business developm ent com e into their own. Organisations such as the cham bers o f  
com m erce or Enterprise Trusts should help small firms to develop the skills 
required to  run and manage their business. To some extent, they do this already 
[cf. Reid & Jacobsen (1988, Chapter 5)], but evidence suggests that they could be 
m ore effective. Through training, they should impress upon prospective ow ner- 
m anagers the need for critical self-analysis and realistic appraisals o f  the strengths, 
w eaknesses, opportunities and threats affecting their business. They need to  stress 
also that com petition is fierce and should not be ignored.
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It w ould probably help those firms with cash flow difficulties to  be offered free 
and readily available professional advice, for example, on m arketing, and for it to  
be made know n that this advice was available [cf. Curran and D ow ning (1993)]. 
Small firms might prove willing to  forgo the Enterprise Allowance in favour o f  
such initiatives. N ew  ow ner-m anagers should be encouraged to  netw ork, and 
regular meetings at Enterprise Trust premises could provide a forum  for such 
activities. This should be on-going, rather than only during the first year or tw o 
following inception. Simply getting together to  discuss problem s and make 
contacts can be a useful process for the small business owner-m anager. It might 
also be w orth  considering providing small firms w ith open access to  com puter 
netw orking facilities and internet pages, perhaps charging a small fee for such a 
service.
The fledgling entrepreneur w ould probably benefit from being shown some case 
studies o f  firms that have failed due to their ignorance o f  competition. An injection 
o f  stark reality at the form ation o f  their new business might encourage them  to be 
always alert, although advisors should be careful not to kill o ff any early 
enthusiasm, so com plem entary case studies on successful small firms should also 
be included in training courses.
The ow ner-m anager m ust decide why he is running the business. I f  it is purely 
for personal goals, o r ju s t to make a living, then he will probably be naturally m ore 
cautious, and less willing to  take risks. H ow ever, if  he decides that he w ants 
success, he m ust com m it him self totally to  long-term  strategic objectives. H e 
should be encouraged to  target a specific niche m arket, and to  control costs as 
much as possible. Advisors should also encourage ow ner-m anagers to  try and
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bargain w ith suppliers on costs, and might provide courses to  train the am ateur 
businessm an in assertiveness and bargaining techniques.
Business advisors ought to  be skilled in m ethods o f  setting financial and personal 
targets, and should help and encourage small firms to do the same. Specific goals 
should be set, and perform ance com pared with forecasts. Again, advisors should 
help entrepreneurs learn to  analyse their perform ance and uncover problems. N ot 
hitting targets need not necessarily be an indicator o f  failure, but the ow ner- 
m anager should be encouraged to seek out the reasons for falling short o f  the 
targets set.
The acquisition and implementation o f  information technology is found to  be an 
extremely im portant factor in new, small firm success. Perhaps some owner- 
managers are frightened to  use new technology because o f  a relative ignorance o f  
w hat is available, and o f  the advantages it offers. Business advisors can help by 
placing a heavy emphasis on IT training. N ew  ow ner-m anagers should be shown 
the possibilities on offer, and made aw are o f  the benefits that may be conferred by 
effective use o f  IT. In particular, they should be taught the value o f  networking, 
which will heighten their awareness o f  the business environment. And they should 
learn how  to  deal with their own financial accounts, which will provide immediate 
and accurate information, enabling speedy decisions to  be made.
The m ajor strategic problem s am ongst small firms concern their lack o f  self- 
awareness, a naivete about the strength o f  competition, and a failure to  implement 
information technology in an effective manner. Enterprise agencies can help in all 
regards, by forcing ow ner-m anagers to  carry out a critical analysis o f  strengths, 
w eaknesses, opportunities and threats, by specifically stating that com petition will
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be a m ajor threat, and by allowing access to  training courses and practice in the use 
o f  inform ation technology.
This thesis w as developed to  address several objectives, each o f  w hich has now  
been covered in some detail. It began with a critical analysis o f  the relevant 
literature, which raised a num ber o f  issues w orth pursuing further. It discussed the 
developm ent o f  tw o new  instrum ents for use in fieldwork data-gathering. In-depth 
analysis o f  the data thus collected showed that small firms are able to , and do, 
make strategic decisions, and that those who do this m ost effectively will benefit 
from enhanced perform ance. Finally, the thesis prescribes m ethods o f  strategic 
behaviour which should assist the small business ow ner-m anger in the running o f  
his firm.
F or new  entrepreneurs seeking high perform ance, it is hoped that this w ork  has 
provided some fresh ideas. By presenting recent evidence on the actual strategies 
followed by small firms, and by breaking these into groups o f  high, medium and 
low  perform ers, it has been possible to  prescribe actions to  follow o r adopt, while 
flagging those to  be avoided. Those small business ow ner-m anagers who seek 
merely to  earn a living w ould also do well to  follow the suggestions o f  section 7.5, 
if  they are to  defend them selves against com petitors, and thus avoid business 
failure. H ow ever, for those with greater ambition, the prescriptions outlined 
above, together w ith an open-mind, a flexible attitude and a willingness to  w ork 
hard, should aid them  in their search for high perform ance and long-term  success.
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